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Without guanxi, or personal connections life is difficult, this research has 
taught me. And I do not just mean the kind of instrumental favor seeking 
guanxi practices, corruption in China is so often associated with. No I mean 
that without the knowledge, support, company, humor, criticism, warmth, 
and cooperation of others the present work would not have been possible. 
Guanxi are reciprocal, and it is in recognition of this fact that I now realize 
the tremendous debt I have built up over the years of doing this research.  
 The warm welcome I have received in the three villages, here called 
Jiacun, Licun and Baocun, and the factories at Lake Dianchi has impressed 
me. I know how difficult it is to accept a stranger in a community, especially 
when this stranger sets out to learn about local problems. People at Lake 
Dianchi have warmly welcomed me to their homes, their offices, factories 
and rice paddies. While always remaining on guard when sensitive issues 
were involved, Dianchi’s villagers and factory managers have given me the 
time and opportunity to talk with them and learn from their experiences. My 
warmest thanks goes out to the people living and working around Lake 
Dianchi, although I cannot name them in person.  
 Another debt of gratitude I owe to the many Chinese civil servants, 
both local as well as national, who helped make this research possible. Since 
the start of this research, I received great help from civil servants at SEPA in 
Beijing. Especially Bie Tao, with whom I cooperated in a training program 
for Chinese environmental law enforcement officials, has over the years been 
of great help. It is through his advice that I started to look at law 
enforcement campaigns. In addition, he helped me several times to get in 
contact with the right local officials. First in Chengdu and later in Kunming, 
local law enforcement agents in the EPB, and later SLB and DMB, have 
been as cooperative as possible, and sometimes even beyond that. I want to 
thank these local enforcement officials especially. I know how difficult their 
work is, especially with the low status and bad reputation their work has. I 
have been impressed by the willingness they had to meet me and to invest a 
significant amount of time answering my sometimes, sensitive questions.  
 This research could also not have been possible without the help of 
people working at academic institutions. For my work in Chengdu in 2001 
and 2002, Sichuan University, its the Faculty of Law and the College of 
Environmental Science and Engineering in particular, have been important. I 
would like to thank especially Lu Hongyan who made a tremendous effort to 
help me meet the right agents and inform me of local enforcement problems. 
I would also like to thank Helen Reynolds, who helped me to make my first 
contacts after just arriving in 2001. In addition, I would like to thank all the 





 For my work in Kunming, especially Yunnan University, its Faculty 
of Law and its Research Institute for Minorities and Folk Law are important. 
I can honestly say that without the support of Professor Zhang Xiaohui and 
his research team of legal anthropologists the research at Lake Dianchi 
would not have been possible. Zhang Xiaohui’s personal commitment 
helped to get me formal approval for this research project. He also helped 
me to make contact with the various local governments, through his many 
former students working in local procurates, courts, governments and 
people’s congresses. During my year in Kunming I grew very fond of 
professor Zhang and his wife. The second person I owe a tremendous 
amount of gratitude to in Yunnan University is Liu Xiaomin, who 
collaborated with me during the fieldwork in the villages and factories at 
Lake Dianchi. I clearly recall all the mornings that Xiaomin picked me up in 
his car and we drove to one of the villages for a long day of interviews and 
banquets. He helped me despite the fact that he was also heavily engaged as 
a lawyer, a lecturer and a deputy head of a department at Yunnan University. 
Xiaomin’s strong character and his lack of fear of asking sensitive questions 
made him essential to the success of this project. The third person from 
Yunnan University, I should thank is Wang Qiliang, whose friendship has 
enabled me to learn so much in such an enjoyable manner, especially about 
how to do fieldwork in Yunnan. Apart from these three, I would like to 
thank all the other staff and students at Yunnan University who have helped 
to make this research possible.  
 Except for the universities in Chengdu and Kunming, I owe a debt 
of gratitude to several schools in China. From Wuhan University I would like 
to thank Cai Shouqiu, Wang Xi, Li Guangbing, and Hu Bin. I look back with 
great warmth and happiness at the time spent in Wuhan and later in Fuzhou 
during the conference Wuhan organized there. At Beijing University I would 
like to thank Wang Jin, Zhu Xiaoyang, Wang Xixin and Chen Duanhong. 
Also I would like to thank Ye Jianping, Zhu Jingwen and Zhu Xiao of 
Renmin University. From Qinghua University I would like to thank Wang 
Mingyuan, Wang Chenguang, and Xu Zhangrun. From the University of 
Politics and Law I would like to thank Cai Dingjian, Ma Huaide, Wang Canfa, 
Xu Kezhu and all the others at the Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution 
Victims (CLAPV), who are doing outstanding work in this field. I would like 
to express my warm thanks to Zhao Xudong, from the China Agricultural 
University, whose many debates with me while he was in Leiden have been a 
real inspiration. Thanks also to staff members at the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences, including Liu Renwen, Hu Yunteng and especially Jiang 
Hong for her efforts in helping me get started. 
 Except for the Chinese institutions mentioned above, I have 
received important support from staff members working at various foreign 
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1. Legal Change at Lake Dianchi  
Legislative and Enforcement Efforts to protect 
Natural Resources in Kunming  
 
 
Attempts to Strengthen the Legal Protection of China’s Natural 
Resources 
Long before development opportunities arrived, Lake Dianchi, located right 
below Kunming city1 in the South West of China, had been rich in natural 
resources. “The lake’s water was pure and clean. We would swim there and 
even wash our clothes,” an old woman in Jiacun2  village, bordering the 
eastern side of the lake explains.3 In addition to clean water, local farmers, 
though not rich, used to have plenty of fertile land.  
 Since the last two decades, development brought change, for better 
and for worse. The inhabitants of this peri-urban region—like many 
Chinese—have been able to share in the prosperity rapid industrialization 
and rural urbanization brought. Farmers switched to off-farm jobs in the 
new industries. On the more developed eastern side of the lake, farmers even 
turned to real estate development, building second houses while leasing their 
old ones to newly arrived migrants. In addition, villages have earned income 
by renting out farmland for enterprise construction. Lake Dianchi thus 
witnessed its inhabitants transform from relative rural poverty to an initial 
stage of peri-urban riches.  
Economic development had its price; it was disastrous for the lake 
catchment’s natural resources. A combination of industrial pollution, 
municipal waste discharge, soil erosion and various kinds of non-point 
pollution from chemical fertilizer, solid waste and pesticides used in 
horticulture severely eutrophied the lake’s water. 4 In addition, the numerous 
new paper and chemical fertilizer factories polluted the lake catchment’s 
rivers and the region’s air. Finally, arable land, once an abundant resource, 
also suffered from development. Kunming’s unstoppable expansion ate-up 
whole villages, while in those villages left intact, the farmers’ own housing 
craze combined with the construction of village enterprises and new 
                                                     
1 Kunming is the provincial capital of Yunnan Province, located in the southwest of China. 
Kunming now has approximately 4 million inhabitants, 2 million of which live around the lake 
area. Yunnan province has about 44 million inhabitants. Kunming city covers both an urban 
area, the city proper, as well as a peri-urban area, which includes the whole of Lake Dianchi. 
2 All local placenames, personal names and company names have been replaced with fictuous 
names whenever the identity of informants was at stake and when possible.  
3 Based on an interview in Jiacun Village, Kunming, Summer 2004 
4 Y. Liu et al., "Policy and Research Efforts for Agricultural Non-point Source Pollution in 
Yunnan Dianchi Watershed," Enrich Conference, Qinghua University 26-27 September  (2002). 
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highways caused the amount of arable land to decrease even further, to the 
extent that some villages lost most of their land.  
 Lake Dianchi is but one of the many localities in China where 
development has adversely affected natural resources. 5  Throughout the 
country, economic development in combination with urbanization and 
industrialization has led to natural resource degradation. Most of China’s 
larger cities suffer from serious air quality problems. The country’s major 
lakes and rivers have been severely polluted and accidents involving highly 
toxic spills such as those at the Tuojiang River in 2004 and the Songhua 
River in 2005 keep on recurring. A World Bank study on air pollution found 
in 2005 that 16 of the world’s most polluted cities were in China. 6 
Furthermore, the country’s arable land continues to decline, in part because 
of urban and rural construction, but also because of land transformation to 
stop further soil erosion.7 Such erosion led to serious desertification causing 
severe water shortages throughout Northern China and sand storms reaching 
all the way to South-Korea.  
 China’s main approach to stop resource loss has been through using 
the legal system. Initial legislation made in the 1980s was vague and weak, 
and therefore unable to protect natural resources. China’s legal 
reconstruction and the country’s special circumstances were an important 
reason for why China’s original natural resource protection laws had been 
vague and weak. Lacking legal experience and faced with an enormous and 
rapidly changing society, during the early days of reform (in the 1980s and 
early 1990s), Deng Xiaoping’s credo “mo shitou guo he” (crossing the river by 
                                                     
5 T. Cannon, ed., China's Economic Growth, The Impact on Regions, Migration and the Environment 
(London: Macmillan Press LTD, 2000), E. Economy, Environmental Scarcities, State Capacity, 
Civil Violence, The Case of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press? 1997), R.L. 
Edmonds, Patterns of china's Lost Harmony (London: Routledge, 1994), R.L. Edmonds, "Studies 
on China's Environment," in Managing the Chinese Environment, ed. R L Edmonds (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998 (reprinted in 2000)), R.L. Edmonds, "China's Land Resources, 
Environment and Agricultural Production," China Quarterly 156, no. December (1998), A.R. 
Jahiel, "The Contradictory Impact of Reform on Environmental Protection in China," China 
Quarterly 149 (1997), T.M. Johnson, Clear Water, Blue Skies: China's Environment in the New 
Century (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1997), M.B. McElroy, C.P. Nielsen, and P. Lydon, 
eds., Energizing China, Reconciling Environmental Protection and Economic Growth (Cambridge 
(Massachusetts): Harvard University Press, 1998), V. Smil, China's Environmental Crisis: an 
inquiry into the limits of national development (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), V. Smil, "China's 
Agricultural Land," China Quarterly 158, no. June (1999), V. Smil, China's Past, China's Future, 
Energy, Food, Environment (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004), E.B. Vermeer, "Industrial 
Pollution in China and Remedial Policies," in Managing the Chinese Environment, ed. R L 
Edmonds (London: Routledge, 1998 (reprinted in 2000)). 
6 J. Watts, "Satellite data revels Beijing as air pollution capital of world," The Guardian, October 
31 2005. 
7 Z. Feng et al., "Grain-for-green policy and its impacts on grain supply in West China," Land 
Use Policy 22 (2005). 
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feeling the stones) had been central for China’s legal development. Following 
a “piece meal approach”, the country at first used an incremental method of 
lawmaking.8 This meant that the country first established abstract general 
laws, which could later be specified in easily changeable administrative 
regulations. As legislation was the result of extensive bargaining between 
various stakeholders, for natural resource protection this meant watered-
down legislation, sacrificing environmental for economic and social concerns. 
After 1995, national leadership started to believe that by 
strengthening anti-pollution and land legislation, mainly made in the 1980s, it 
would better be able to control resource loss. 9  Their belief was based on 
reports by scholars and policymakers blaming the ongoing deterioration of 
natural resources on the existing legislation. 10  Thus, for natural resource 
protection law, the piecemeal approach and the bargaining practices were 
partly abandoned in the mid-1990s. In 1998, the amended Land Management 
Act established a strict arable land protection system limiting the conversion 
of arable land into non-arable use. In similar fashion, pollution laws were 
amended and new laws introduced. While the amended 1995 Air Pollution 
Prevention and Control Law failed to realize most of the ambitious 
legislative proposals of environmentalists, the amended 1996 Water Pollution 
Prevention and Control Law and 2000 Air Pollution Prevention and Control 
Law and the 2002 Environmental Impact Assessment Law did introduce 
stricter and more specific norms to protect the nation from pollution.  
Around the same time, apart from blaming legislation, scholarship 
and policymakers also attributed ongoing resource loss in places such as 
                                                     
8 J. Chen, Chinese Law, Towards an Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and Development (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999). 
9 See for example: NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office, ed., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudi Guanlifa 
Shiyi (Commentary on the PRC Land Management Act) (Beijing: Falü Chubanshe, 1998). NPC 
Legal Committee, "Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Daqi Wuran Fangzhi Fa Xiuding 
Caoan Xiugai Qingkuang de Huibao (Report on the Changes to the Draft Amendment to the 
PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law)," in Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Da Qi Wuran 
Fangzhi Fa Shiyi (Commentary to the PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law), ed. NPC-SC 
Legal Affairs Office (Beijing: Falü Chubanshe, 2001). NPC Legal Committee, "Guanyu 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Daqi Wuran Fangzhi Fa Xiuding Caoan Shenyi Jieguo de 
Baogao (Report on the Results of Review of the the Draft Amendment to the PRC Air 
Pollution Prevention and Control Law)," in Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Da Qi Wuran Fangzhi 
Fa Shiyi (Commentary to the PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law), ed. NPC-SC Legal 
Affairs Office (Beijing: Falü Chubanshe, 2001). 
10 M. Li, "China's Compliance with WTO Requirements Will Improve the Efficiency and 
Effective Implementation of Environmental Laws in China," Temple International and 
Comparative Law Journal 18 (2004). 165, W.P. Alford and Y. Shen, "Limits of the Law in 
Addressing China's Environmental Dilemma," in Energizing China, Reconciling Environmental 
Protection and Economic Growth, ed. M B McElroy, C P Nielsen, and P Lydon (Cambridge 
(Massachusetts): Harvard University Press, 1998). 134, E.W. Orts, "Environmental Law With 
Chinese Characteristics," William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal 11 (2003). 561  
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Lake Dianchi to weak enforcement. 11  Weak enforcement—whether of 
natural resource protection law, or any other locally unfavorable national 
legislation—was caused by “difang baohu zhuyi” (local protectionism), scholars 
and policy-makers held. Local protectionism meant that local governments 
let their own local interests prevail over national concerns. Local 
governments were able to exercise such protectionism through their control 
over the budgets and personnel management of their local bureaucracies—
including courts, procurates, police and administrative departments such as 
land bureaus, industrial bureaus and environmental protection bureaus.12  
After 1995, in order to overcome the local protectionist influence on 
law enforcement, China’s leadership decided to strengthen central control 
over local inspections and sanctions for violations. Accordingly, in a 
seemingly Maoist fashion, China organized national political campaigns 
aimed to enhance the enforcement of natural resource protection law. Since 
1996, there have been continuous rounds of campaigns for arable land 
protection law enforcement and for pollution law enforcement. 13  These 
efforts were similar to political legal campaigns Beijing has organized against 
other illegal practices caused by weak enforcement such as drug trafficking, 
corruption, pirated goods and illegal internet cafes.14.  
Since the second half of the 1990s, China’s central level leadership 
has thus changed the existing legislation and organized law enforcement 
campaigns to control or at least slow down the ongoing deterioration of 
natural resources at places such as Lake Dianchi. The question is what these 
changes have accomplished at the local level. Can these changes prevent a 
future with shortages of water to drink, air to breathe and arable land for 
food to eat? To what extent have stricter norms been better able to prevent 
the local conversion of arable land or control local air and water pollution? 
Have legal enforcement campaigns been able to overcome local 
protectionism and served as a sufficient deterrent to end ongoing local 
violations and prevent violations occurring in the future? In order to find an 
answer to these questions, this research seeks to know what influence 
China’s post-1995 legislative changes and law enforcement campaigns have 
had on compliance with natural resource protection law at Lake Dianchi. 
                                                     
11 For an overview of this literature, see Chapter 13. 
12 Ibid.  
13 See Chapter 14. 
14  For an overview see B. Van Rooij, "China's War on Graft: Politico-Legal Campaigns 
Against Corruption in China and Their Similarities to the Legal Reactions to Crisis in the 
U.S.," Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 14, no. 2 (2005). See also Chapter 14. 
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Western and non-Western Regulatory Law 
China’s legal attempt to stop natural resource degradation at places such as 
Lake Dianchi is an example—drawn from a non-Western, transitional, 
developing legal system—of the functioning of command and control 
regulation. Command and control regulation (from now on “regulatory 
law15“) is (mostly administrative) law that the state uses to change economic 
behavior (mostly of businesses or corporations, and mostly behavior deemed 
harmful to citizens), first by setting norms for desired behavior—
lawmaking—and second by detecting violations and issuing sanctions against 
those who break such norms in order to stop occurring violations and 
prevent violation in the future—law enforcement 16 . If regulatory law is 
successful such lawmaking and law enforcement lead to behavioral changes 
because the targeted actors will abide by the norms—compliance. 17  
Regulatory Law in Western Countries 
Regulatory law has gained importance during the past century. In the West, it 
has been an essential element of the welfare state18 for shielding its citizens 
from the dangers of the “risk society”.19 It has become the Western state’s 
choice instrument to protect citizens from harm, whether it is from 
environmental degradation, occupational health hazards, unfair competition, 
securities fraud, fire or unsafe housing construction, to name but a few 
examples.20 Not surprisingly in the West, there have been many studies on 
the formation and functioning of regulatory legal regimes. There is now a 
significant and detailed body of literature on the main processes of regulatory 
law21—lawmaking22, enforcement23 and compliance24—as well as on how 
                                                     
15  We use this term following Gray and Scholtz. See W. Gray and J.T. Scholz, "Does 
Regulatory Enforcement Work? A Panel Analysis of OSHA Enforcement," Law & Society 
Review 27, no. 1 (1993). 
16 Here we follow socio-legal and law and economics authors See Ibid, N. Gunningham, P. 
Grabosky, and D. Sinclair, Smart Regulation, Designing Environmental Policy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998). J. Black, "Critical Reflections on Regulation," LSE, CARR Discussion 
Paper Series  (2002).  
17 While, of course, the law is more than an instrument aiming to attain certain goals or even 
to attain compliance, this book primarily uses an instrumental approach to law.  
18 G. Teubner, "The Transformation of Law in the Welfare State," in Dilemmas of Law in the 
Welfare State, ed. G Teubner (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1985). 
19 U. Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage Publications, 1992). 
20 For an overview of the rise of protective regulation in the US. See E. Bardach and R.A. 
Kagan, Going by the Book, The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1982). Chapter 2 
21  The dissemination, the invocation, the application and the adjudication are important 
aspects of regulatory law. Due to limitations the present research does not discuss these 
aspects in detail, nor their theoretical backgrounds. 
22 For an overview of the literature see Chapter 2.  
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such processes have influenced one another, for example looking at the 
impact of enforcement on compliance25, or, to a lesser extent the relation 
between norm formulation and enforcement, and norm formation and 
compliance. 26   In the West, studies on the interrelationships between all 
three main regulatory processes—the content of the legislation/the process 
of lawmaking, the process of enforcement and compliance with such 
legislation—have been limited. Notable exceptions include Bardach and 
Kagan’s study of regulatory unreasonableness27, Hutter’s study of compliance 
with Britain’s environmental and occupational health regulations 28 , and 
Gunningham et al. studies of chemical and agricultural industries29.  
Studies on regulatory law in the West have changed in focus and 
content over the years. Studies on US regulation are illustrative. In the 
earliest studies from the 1950s until the 1970s the fear of “capture” was 
dominant. Bernstein’s study on independent commissions—the main 
agencies implementing regulatory law in the US at the time—found that in 
many instances regulators became captured by the industry they regulated.30 
Following increased attention for this phenomenon, especially when interest 
groups called for strong action against such capture after large catastrophes 
attributed to weak regulation, the US initiated reforms towards stronger 
regulatory legislation and institutions, limiting discretionary powers, 
increasing the legislation’s level of demand and enhancing enforcement 
powers. Thus, “the regulatory state” gained strength in America. By the early 
1980s when the economy declined somewhat, the debate changed; now fear 
of over-regulation became dominant. Bardach and Kagan’s work on 
regulatory unreasonableness is illustrative, demonstrating how the regulatory 
state had at times gone too far and become unreasonable and therefore less 
effective.31 This led to regulatory reform and attempts at deregulation. Soon 
                                                                                                                        
23 For an overview of the literature see Chapter 12.  
24 For an overview of the literature see Chapter 6.  
25 For an overview of the literature see Chapter 12.  
26 Bardach and Kagan, Going by the Book, The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness. B.M. Hutter, 
"Regulation: Standard Setting and Enforcement," Law & Society Review 27, no. 1 (1993). N. 
Shover, D.A. Clelland, and J. Lynxwiler, Enforcement or Negotiation: Constructing a Regulatory 
Bureaucracy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986). 
27 Bardach and Kagan, Going by the Book, The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness. 
28 B.M. Hutter, The Reasonable Arm of the Law? The Law Enforcement Procedures of Environmental 
Health Officers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). B.M. Hutter, Compliance: Regulation and 
Environment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). 
29 Gunningham, Grabosky, and Sinclair, Smart Regulation, Designing Environmental Policy. 
30  M.H. Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission (Westport (Connecticut): 
Greenwood Press, 1955 (reprinted in 1977)). 
31 Bardach and Kagan, Going by the Book, The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness. 
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US scholars debated the effects of regulatory reform.32 In addition, many of 
the assumptions about the effects of regulatory law and its optimal 
functioning—that had been fueling the ongoing debates—became objects of 
empirical studies. Such American empirical research looked at what style and 
what type of command and control regulation could have the most effect on 
compliance behavior. 33  Finally, since the 1990s, the experiences with 
unreasonable regulation and deregulation led to a questioning of command 
and control type regulation. This led to debates about alternatives to 
command and control regulation, including self-regulation, or incentive 
based or private regulation alternatives.34 In such debates, some proponents 
argued that command and control regulation is not obsolete and has under 
certain circumstances been successful.35 In addition scholars have argued that 
alternatives depend on command an control regulation and cannot be 
successful without a functioning system of inspections and enforcement.36 
Gunningham’s work argues for the right mix of command and control and 
alternative instruments.37 
                                                     
32  B.D. Wood, "Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcement," 
American Political Science Review 82, no. 1 (1988). B.D. Wood and R.W. Waterman, "The 
Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy," American Political Science Review 85, no. 3 
(1991). B.D. Wood and R.W. Waterman, Bureaucratic Dynamics, The Role of The Bureaucracy in a 
Democracy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994). 
33 J.T. Scholz, "Cooperation, Deterrence and the ecology of regulatory enforcement," Law & 
Society Review 18 (1984). R.A. Kagan, N. Gunningham, and D. Thornton, "Explaining 
Corporate Environmental Performance: How does regulation matter?" Law & Society Review 
37, no. 1 (2003), J.T. Scholz, "Cooperative regulatory enforcement and the politics of 
administrative effectiveness," American Political Science Review 85 (1991), D. Thornton, N. 
Gunningham, and R.A. Kagan, "General Deterrence and Corporate Environmental 
Behavior," Law & Policy 27, no. 2 (2005). 
34 For an overview of such decentered approaches see Gunningham, Grabosky, and Sinclair, 
Smart Regulation, Designing Environmental Policy., Black, "Critical Reflections on Regulation." See 
also D. Sinclair, "Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control? Beyond False Dichotomies," 
Law & Policy 19, no. 4 (1997). M. Aalders, "Self-Regulation and Compliance with 
Environmental Law from a Global Perspective," in Towards Integrated Environmental Law in 
Indonesia, ed. N Niessen and A Bedner (Leiden: CNWS, 2003). See also Gunningham, 
Grabosky, and Sinclair, Smart Regulation, Designing Environmental Policy. T. Tietenberg, 
"Disclosure Strategies for Pollution Control," Environmental and resource Economics 11, no. 3-4 
(1998). 
35 Gunningham, Grabosky, and Sinclair, Smart Regulation, Designing Environmental Policy.42-45 
36 A. Blackman, "Informal Sector Pollution Control: What Policy Options Do We Have?" 
World Development 28, no. 12 (2000), Gunningham, Grabosky, and Sinclair, Smart Regulation, 
Designing Environmental Policy.54, 58-9, 72 
37 Gunningham, Grabosky, and Sinclair, Smart Regulation, Designing Environmental Policy.91 
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Regulatory Law in Non-Western Countries 
In non-Western countries 38 , over the last decades, following ambitious 
nation-building efforts 39  and development policies aiming at large scale 
social-economic issues such as corruption, environmental degradation, 
unsafe working conditions, low tax collection, regulatory law has become 
more important. In these countries, it has played an important role to change 
behavior for attaining the goals of development, including security, 
prosperity, social justice, sustainability and health.40 There is now also a large 
body of literature on regulatory law in non-Western countries. Examples are 
studies about environmental regulation, corruption control regulation, tax 
regulation and occupational health and child labor regulation. 41 
Unfortunately, there has not yet been an overview of these studies, 
comparable to the overview articles published in the West.42 Consequently, 
the large body of literature on regulatory law in non-Western countries 
remains largely case-based and not very helpful when searching for 
generalities.  
Within the studies accessed for this research,43 some generalities can 
be discerned nevertheless. Non-Western studies about compliance and law 
enforcement have looked at how to enhance enforcement in a context of 
weak institutions and corruption. In most of the literature, existing state 
                                                     
38  For the sake of clarity non-Western countries here include what have been called 
developing, transitional, Southern, or non-Western countries, but also countries with 
developing legal or participatory systems From now on this book will use the term non-
Western to summarize these different types of countries. With this, we literally mean countries 
that are different from the economically developed, countries in Northern-America, Western-
Europe, Australia and New-Zealand, with a tradition of democratic participation, rule of law 
and market based economies. Non-Western countries mean developing and transitional 
countries that score low on one or more of the social, economic and governance indicators: 
including per capita gdp, gini index, life expectancy, child mortality, literacy, corruption 
perception, to name some. There is no clear demarcation between non-Western and Western, 
however the distinction is made because most existing theoretical studies of regulatory law are 
about countries that make part of clearly Western countries, while the present study here is 
clearly one done in a clearly non-Western context, in terms of economic development, 
democracy and rule of law tradition. 
39 A. Allott, The Limits of Law (London: Butterworths, 1980). 
40 J.M. Otto, "Real Legal Certainty in Developing Countries: a Missing Link between Law, 
Social Reality and Development" (paper presented at the Conference on Implementation of 
Law in China, Copenhagen, 24-5 May 2004). J.M. Otto, Some Introductory Remarks on Law, 
Governance and Development (Leiden: Van Vollenhoven Institute, 2005). 
41 Examples are mentioned in more detail in Chapter 2, 6, 12 and 16. 
42 For example Bardach and Kagan, Going by the Book, The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness. 
Gunningham, Grabosky, and Sinclair, Smart Regulation, Designing Environmental Policy. R.A. 
Kagan, "Regulatory Enforcement," in Handbook of Regulation and Administrative Law, ed. D H 
Rosenbloom and R D Schwartz (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1994). K. Hawkins and J.M. 
Thomas, eds., Enforcing Regulation (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing, 1984). 
43 See examples named above and the studies quoted in Chapter 2, 6 and 12. 
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enforcement mechanisms are deemed to be weak due to lack in financial, 
technical and human resources and political support. In addition, the 
problem of corruption is in most studies named as a dominant obstacle 
towards successful enforcement.44  
An important theme in the literature has been to understand why 
regulated actors have complied with the law even when state enforcement 
was weak. Here especially the studies on pollution regulation in Colombia, 
Bangladesh, the Philippines, India, China, Mexico and Brazil are important.45 
These studies have emphasized the importance of alternative regulatory 
instruments such as financial instruments46, public disclosure mechanisms47, 
and informal community based enforcement mechanisms48 play when formal 
enforcement is weak.49  
The World Bank has proposed that there is a new model for 
regulation in developing countries, which strongly emphasizes the use of 
flexible and informal (non-state) control mechanisms that work better in a 
context of weak state institutions. As such, similar to Western regulation, 
non-Western regulation witnesses a trend towards alternatives to Command 
and Control regulation. 50  However, also similar to Western scholarship 
emphasizing alternatives, the World Bank’s new model has been questioned 
by those emphasizing that alternatives only work under certain conditions 
and that they often require the traditional command and control structure of 
inspections and enforcement.51  
                                                     
44 For literature on these points see Chapter 12. 
45 For an overview see World Bank, Greening Industry, New Roles for Communities, Markets and 
Governments (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
46 For an analysis finding that financial instruments work see Ibid. Chapter 2, for a critical 
analysis of the success of charges in Colombia and China seeA. Blackman, "Colombia's 
Discharge Fee Program: Incentives for Pollutors or Regulators?" Resources for the Future 
Discussion Paper 05-31 (2005), A. Blackman, "Economic Incentives to Control Water Pollution 
in Developing Countries, How Well Has Colombia's Wastewater Discharge Fee Program 
Worked and Why?" Resources, no. Spring (2006), A. Blackman and W. Harrington, "The Use of 
Economic Incentives in Developing Countries: Lessons from International Experience with 
Industrial Air Pollution," Journal of Environment and Development 9, no. 1 (2000). 
47 For an overview see World Bank, Greening Industry, New Roles for Communities, Markets and 
Governments.Chapter 3, Public Disclosure is based on the work of Tietenberg, see Tietenberg, 
"Disclosure Strategies for Pollution Control." 
48 World Bank, Greening Industry, New Roles for Communities, Markets and Governments.59-60, R. 
Cribb, "The Politics of Pollution Control in Indonesia," Asian Survey 30, no. 12 (1990). 
49 World Bank, Greening Industry, New Roles for Communities, Markets and Governments.  
50 Ibid. 
51  Here the work of Blackman is especially important. See Blackman, "Informal Sector 
Pollution Control: What Policy Options Do We Have?", Blackman, "Colombia's Discharge 
Fee Program: Incentives for Pollutors or Regulators?", Blackman, "Economic Incentives to 
Control Water Pollution in Developing Countries, How Well Has Colombia's Wastewater 
Discharge Fee Program Worked and Why?", A. Blackman and W. Harrington, "Using 
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Where in the West the quest for alternatives to command and 
control regulation was partly caused by concern about unreasonableness, in 
studies on non-Western regulation such concern is not explicitly mentioned. 
There are some exceptions. Fjeldstad and Semboja’s study about tax 
collection in Tanzania has for example shown that unreasonably strict tax 
enforcement does not lead to more tax collection law compliance.52 Another 
exception is Abuodha and Bowles’s study on Kenyan overregulation and 
deregulation efforts.53 
The present study of natural resource protection regulation in China 
is made with explicit reference to the large body of literature about regulatory 
law in Western and non-Western countries. First, the existing literature has 
served to analyze and structure the data collected. Second, the existing 
literature is used as a comparative body of knowledge that helps to deepen 
the understanding of how regulatory change has affected compliance at Lake 
Dianchi. Third, a comparison between the existing Western and non-
Western literature and Lake Dianchi hopes to demonstrate some of the 
commonalities and differences between regulatory law in different contexts 
that help further the theoretical understanding thereof.  
Main Research Questions 
This book analyzes how changes in natural protection legislation and 
enforcement procedures have affected compliance with such laws at Lake 
Dianchi. Its objective is thus to make a case study of how regulatory law 
functions and changes in a locality in China.  
The exact object of study is limited based on several choices. First, 
the book studies the formation and functioning of two sets of regulations: 
arable land protection law and pollution prevention and control law 
(focusing on air and water pollution). Second, it studies how changes in the 
content of legislation and the processes of lawmaking and law enforcement 
                                                                                                                        
Alternative Regulatory Instruments to Control Fixed Point Air Pollution in Developing 
Countries: Lessons from International Experience," Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 98-
21 (1998)., Blackman and Harrington, "The Use of Economic Incentives in Developing 
Countries: Lessons from International Experience with Industrial Air Pollution." See also for 
example Aalders, Marius. "Self-Regulation and Compliance with Environmental Law from a 
Global Perspective." In Towards Integrated Environmental Law in Indonesia, edited by N. Niessen 
and A. Bedner, 21-37. Leiden: CNWS, 2003. A. Lucas and A. Djati, The Dog is Dead so Throw it 
in the River, Environmental Politics and Water Pollution in Indonesia (Clayton: Monash Asia Insitute, 
2000). 
52 O.-H. Fjeldstad and J. Semboja, "Why People Pay Taxes: The Case of the Development 
Levy in Tanzania," World Development 29, no. 12 (2001). 
53 C. Abuodha and R. Bowles, "Enterprise Compliance with Local Authority Regulation in 
Kenya: a comparison of institutional and efficiency analysis perspectives," Africa Insight 31, no. 
1 (2001). 
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have affected compliance behavior and have attributed to the goals of these 
laws. Third, it studies such compliance behavior and law enforcement at 
Lake Dianchi in Yunnan province—here defined as the lake’s catchment 
area.54  
Thus, the main and first research question is: To what extent, how, and 
why have post-1995 changes in the norms in the law and the processes of lawmaking and  
the processes of law enforcement influenced compliance with arable land protection and 
water and air pollution prevention and control legislation at Lake Dianchi, and attributed 
to the realization of the goals of said laws? 
 In order to understand the extent to which the content of legislation, 
the process of lawmaking and the process of law enforcement, and not other 
factors, have influenced compliance and attributed to the realization of the 
goals of the laws, a separate, broader analysis of compliance behavior will be 
made. Such an analysis is to look broadly at why regulated actors have 
complied with natural resource protection laws or why such actors have 
violated them.  For this, the second empirical question is central. What other 
factors influence compliance with and violation of said laws at Lake Dianchi? 
 The purpose of this research goes beyond Lake Dianchi. The 
present study hopes to contribute to existing knowledge and insights about 
the formation and functioning of regulatory law in China as well as in 
comparison with other developing non-Western and developed Western 
contexts. This book first aims to contribute to the body of knowledge about 
lawmaking, compliance and enforcement of natural resource protection law 
and generally of regulatory law in China. Second, it aims to contribute to 
existing studies of regulatory lawmaking, compliance and enforcement from 
other, Western and non-Western contexts. For these purposes, the third 
question is added: What new insights (for China and theory) do the answers to the 
questions posed above provide about lawmaking, compliance and enforcement (both as 
separate and as interrelated processes)? 
Three Perspectives of Analysis and Methodologies 
This book analyses three legal processes: lawmaking, compliance and 
enforcement. Studying these processes in an integrated manner presents 
significant challenges, especially in a context such as the Chinese. Given the 
wide approach this research has, focusing not on one but on three legal 
processes, limitation is necessary. In addition, local research on how law 
functions in China is sensitive and further limits the amount of data that can 
be obtained.  In response to such broad focus and the given limitations, this 
study has made choices about what data to gather for each of the three legal 
processes. These choices have led to three perspectives of analysis, each with 
                                                     
54 Which includes its main tributaries such as the Tanglang river. 
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its own choice on what data is to be used to study one of the three legal 
processes and what frameworks are used to structure and analyze the data 
gathered.   
First Perspective: The Implementability of Legislation and its relation to the Process of 
Lawmaking 
The first perspective, developed in Part I of the book, studies how changes 
in existing legislation have taken place and how in theory these changes 
affect compliance, enforcement and help contribute to achieving the law’s 
formal goals. It focuses on the content and lawmaking process of four recent 
Chinese natural resource protection laws: the 1996 Water Pollution 
Prevention and Control Law, the 1998 Land Management Act, the 2000 Air 
Pollution and Control Law and the 2002 Environmental Impact Assessment 
Law.  
 First, it analyses how such changes have come about by looking at 
the processes of lawmaking. It uses data from legislative histories of the 
relevant national natural resource protection laws, edited by the National 
People’s Congress Standing Committee Legal Affairs Committee and 
published by the Falü Chubanshe (Law Publishing House).55 Based on such 
legislative histories, it analyses the debates between the various stakeholders 
involved in the drafting process, focusing on the level of participation and 
rationality in this process.  
 Second, it analyses to what extent changes made in these laws can be 
expected to affect compliance behavior and enforcement processes. For this 
analysis, the study uses an analytical framework based on existing theories 
about the quality of legislation. Here a set of characteristics for 
“implementable” legislation in terms of compliance and enforcement is used, 
including the law’s adequacy, certainty, feasibility and adaptability. In 
addition, the first perspective analyses the implementability of local laws and 
regulations. The analysis of such local legislation concerns the role local level 
legislation and rules, provincial as well as village level, play in making national 
legislation more implementable at the local level in Peri-Urban Kunming. 
                                                     
55 See for example NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office, ed., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudi Guanlifa 
Shiyi (Commentary on the PRC Land Management Act). NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office, "Gesheng, 
Zizhiqu, Zhixiashi he Zhongyang Youguan Bumen Dui Huanjing Yingxiang Pingjia Fa Caoan 
Shenyi de Yijiang (Provincial, Autonomous Regions and Provioncial Level Cities and Central 
Level Ministries Opinions on the Draft PRC EIA Law)," in Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Huanjing Yingxiang Pingjia Fa Shiyi, ed. N S L A Committee (Beijing: Falü Chubanshe, 2003). 
NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office, "Ge Difang He Zhongyang Youguan Bumen Dui Daqi Wuran 
Fangzhi Fa (Xiuding Caoan) de Yijian (Opinions by Local and Central Relevant Departments  
on the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law Draft Amendment)," in Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Da Qi Wuran Fangzhi Fa Shiyi (Commentary to the PRC Air Pollution Prevention and 
Control Law), ed. NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office (Beijing: Falü Chubanshe, 2001). 
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The first part of the analytical framework for the first perspective 
consists of ideas about how the process of lawmaking affects the content of 
the legislation, based on public administration theories on policymaking and 
insights from case studies of the lawmaking process. It recognizes  three 
types of lawmaking processes in terms of the level of participation, ranging 
from full pluralistic, to limited corporatist, to exclusive elitist models. 56 
Second it characterizes different types of rationalities in the lawmaking 
process, ranging from full rationality, to bounded rationality, to coincidental 
rationality to symbolic rationality.57 The second part of the first perspective’s 
analytical framework uses a set of criteria of implementable legislation in 
order to evaluate changes made in the law. The framework consists of four 
characteristics of implementable legislation: adequacy, legal certainty, 
adaptability and feasibility.58  
Second Perspective: Compliance in Relation to Legislation, Enforcement and the Wider 
Social, Economic, Political and Cultural Contexts 
The second perspective, described in Part II of the book, studies compliance 
and violation at Lake Dianchi. It is based on data gathered during a year of 
fieldwork when eighteen cases of compliant and deviant behavior were 
studied. The eighteen cases include studies about rural construction—such as 
housing, industries but also schools and temples, and studies of polluting 
enterprises—paper industry, chemical fertilizer industry, steel industry, 
restaurants and chemical plants. The fieldwork data were gathered through 
interviews with the norm addressees as well as informants living in their 
vicinity or working at relevant enforcement institutions, carried out in three 
villages and at several enterprises and enforcement bureaus. The data thus 
obtained were used, in some cases combined with other published sources, 
to relate how and why compliance or violation took place.    
 Part II of the book contains a collection of stories detailing the 
reception of Beijing’s norms at Lake Dianchi, decribing how and why 
compliance or violation occurred. Findings in each case study are first 
structured and analyzed for each case individually, based on an analytical 
framework. Subsequently, conclusions to the case study chapters (7-10) and 
the conclusion of Part II (Chapter 11) will structure and analyze the 
combined findings of these cases.  
The analytical framework, detailed in Chapter 6, used to structure 
and analyze these cases is based both on existing studies on compliance and 
violation from organizational criminology, economics, and sociology of 
                                                     
56 For an overview of this literature, see Chapter 2. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
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law. 59  As an introduction to this framework, first, a distinction is made 
between rational choice, moral and competence reasons for norm 
conformity.60 The analytical framework itself distinguishes factors related to 
the regulated actor itself (internal variables) as well as factors related to the 
actor’s wider context (external variables). The internal variables include the 
regulated actor’s manner of cost benefit measurement, ethical norms, social 
responsiveness, resources and organizational size. External variables include 
the influences from the regulatory, the economic, the social, and the political 
contexts.61  
Third Perspective: Understanding Enforcement’s Effects on Compliance 
The third perspective, as detailed in Part III, studies how the state has 
reacted against violations of law. It studies how state law enforcement has 
been organized for said laws in Peri-Urban Kunming. Based on findings in 
Part II it addresses the question why enforcement has had the influence on 
compliance behavior it had. The third perspective uses data based on 
interviews with enforcement officials in three related enforcement structures 
(Environmental Protection Bureaus, Land Bureaus and the Dianchi 
Management Bureau) combined with interviews in villages and with 
companies. In addition, the study uses nationwide comparative data about 
environmental enforcement and EPB structures to place Lake Dianchi’s 
enforcement within a more comparative analysis. Finally, the study uses 
reports on enforcement campaigns, both from policy makers as well as 
newspapers. 
 The third perspective differentiates between regular enforcement 
and campaign enforcement. First in Chapter 13 it analyzes regular 
enforcement. Structuring the data gathered based on the analytical 
framework described below, it looks at how the existing patterns of 
inspections and sanctions can be explained in the absence of campaigns. It 
analyzes the internal bureau structures, the way in which the bureau can 
control its agents, the bureau and its agents’ relations with the violator, and 
the type of violation, and the legal, political, social and economic contexts in 
which enforcement bureaus operate. A separate chapter in Part III is 
dedicated to campaign-type enforcement (Chapter 14). This chapter analyzes 
                                                     
59 For an overview of this literature, see Chapter 6. 
60  R.A. Kagan and J.T. Scholz, "The "Criminology of the Corporation" and Regulatory 
Enforcement Strategies," in Regulatory Enforcement, ed. K Hawkins and J M Thomas (Boston: 
Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing, 1984). 
61  N. Gunningham, R.A. Kagan, and D. Thornton, Shades of Green, Business Regulation and 
Environment (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). W. Huisman, Tussen Winst en Moraal, 
Achtergronden van Regelnaleving en Regelovertreding door Ondernemingen (Between Profit and Morality, The 
Backgrounds to Enterprise Compliance and Violation) (Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2001). 
World Bank, Greening Industry, New Roles for Communities, Markets and Governments. 
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the influence political campaigns to enhance arable land and pollution 
enforcement have had on enforcement work and compliance in China and 
Kunming in particular. 
The analytical framework used here is based on studies about 
administrative behavior from the field of public administration and socio-
legal, political science and economic studies about enforcement work in 
particular. 62  First, the framework distinguishes styles of enforcement, 
distinguishing deterrence and cooperative styles.63  Second, the framework 
uses a set of factors to study how enforcement work takes place in practices 
looking at the organizational structure of the enforcement bureau, how 
agents have used the discretion the bureau allows them, the relationship 
between agent/agency and regulated actor, the type of violation, and the 
influence from the political and social contexts.64  
Choice of Fieldwork Locations 
Local fieldwork is a central source of data for this research. Ideally the choice 
of research locations should be representative of the field that is studied, in 
this case Lake Dianchi. Due to limitations in access, the choice in locations 
could not always be controlled.  
 The first choice concerned the three villages around Lake Dianchi. 
Based on extensive preparation through multiple trips to possible research 
locations in the vicinity of Lake Dianchi a choice was made for villages 
located in three townships. At the time, I was looking for a village with a 
significant amount of polluting industry, because in such a village both 
problems of land loss and pollution should exist. Second, I was looking at 
villages at different sides of the lake, ideally one on the richer flat eastern 
shore, and one in the mountainous more remote and poorer western shore 
of lake Dianchi. In this manner, I selected Baocun village in Kouxiang 
Township, Pucun Village in Maxiang Township, both in Dianxi district on 
the western side of the lake, and Jiacun village and Fucun village in Jiacun 
Township, in Diandong district on the eastern side of the lake. Through my 
contacts with Yunnan University, the district governments superior to these 
townships were contacted and they were able to arrange meetings with 
leaders of two of the three townships. In Kouxiang township  local leaders, 
after several copious meals and long drinking sessions, enthusiastically agreed 
to introduce me to  Baocun village, which I had selected for its large 
chemical fertilizer industry and its remote and rural character. Without asking, 
they also introduced me to Licun village, a Hui minority Muslim community, 
                                                     
62 For a complete overview of the literature see Chapter 12. 
63 A.J. Reiss, "Selecting Strategies of Social Control over Organizational Life," in Enforcing 
Regulation, ed. K Hawkins and J M Thomas (Boston: Kluwer Nijhoff Publishing, 1984). 
64 For an overview of the literature and this framework, see Chapter 12.  
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located close to Kouxiang Town itself. In Jiacun Township things were a 
little bit more difficult. At first, the Jiacun government arranged for a 
meeting with the leadership of Fucun village. Quite unexpectedly, this 
former model village, with a significant amount of rural enterprises, refused 
to let me do research there, even though I had all the approvals from the 
provincial and also the Township governments, for which I had had to wait 
three months. Fortunately, Jiacun village was a little easier and after a long 
session and I was finally able to convince them of my honest intentions was 
allowed to start fieldwork there. Although the choice of villages was limited, 
the chosen villages, because of their different economic and geographical 
setting do offer a relatively representative picture of villages around Lake 
Dianchi.  
 The second choice concerned which enterprises to interview. This 
choice, perhaps more than any, was not a real choice but one of pursuing all 
available options. Lake Dianchi’s enterprises were generally not excited about 
speaking with a foreign researcher about their compliance and violation 
behavior. Even when neutral approaches not involving any question about 
the law or about possible problems were used, many companies proved to be 
extremely hesitant, or they refused to talk with me at all. In the end, the 
enterprises that have ended up in this book were either small scale 
enterprises that I was able to approach through village contacts, or they were 
larger enterprises where I was lucky enough to have been able to make 
contact through the network of colleague researchers from Yunnan 
University. Because of the differences in size, ownership, location and 
product, the enterprises finally contacted ended up representing the most 
important enterprises at the lake.  
 The third choice involved the regulatory officials I approached. 
Three regulatory agencies at the municipal level in Kunming form the core 
institutions for arable land protection and pollution prevention and control 
regulation: the environmental protection bureau (EPB), the state land 
resources bureau and the Dianchi Management Bureau. The choice to 
interview these three bureaus was an easy one, as these were the main 
enforcement agencies for the topic studied. Within these three bureaus I 
focused on agents working in the enforcement departments, and second on 
staff working in the personnel and law departments. Getting access to the 
local district land bureaus and EPBs proved to be more difficult and in the 
end I was only able to interview two township level land offices (one in 
Kouxiang and one in Jiacun Township) and one district environmental 
protection bureau in Ningshi. Access to the Diandong and Dianxi district 
EPBs was impossible because of the national media attention for Dianxi 
EPBs failure to curb the pollution at the Tanglang River (see Chapter 10). 




Doing fieldwork in the field of law in China is not easy. In the course of this 
study, gaining access was a battle, every interview conducted a victory, and 
every piece of data obtained a treasure. Due to the country’s strict protection 
of governmental information, its relative inexperience with foreign 
researchers and the dominance of an idealized version of reality, getting to 
speak with the right people and getting trustworthy answers instead of what 
informants believe they should tell you, has been difficult. With all the 
sensitivity surrounding the legal system, and especially land and pollution 
regulation, the difficulties have only been worse.  
In sum, access was difficult and had a significant influence on the 
research methods and research outcomes. It should be stated, however, that 
in order to do the kind of research this project aimed to do, a certain degree 
of such influence should be expected and accepted. It is impossible to carry 
out sensitive social scientific research in China without sacrificing in terms of 
validity and representativeness. This makes that this study is explorative in 
nature. It has tried to bring together as much local data about the working of 
the law and the attempts at legal change as possible. It has structured these 
data using analytical frameworks, however due to the exploratory nature of 
the research a true testing of existing theories in a local setting, as some other 
studies have done, has not been possible. 
Instead, it has attempted to generalize the case findings for 
answering the main questions about the effects of lawmaking and 
enforcement on compliance at Lake Dianchi. The generalizations thus made, 
it should be noted though, are based on a limited number of cases, some of 
which may not be fully representative of the Lake Dianchi area, even though 
such representativeness was strived for when selecting field sights. When 
collecting data in the field, and also when analyzing the data and using the 
data for this book, I have tried as much as possible to verify whether 
generalizations made, based on these data, hold true for Lake Dianchi. For 
this, triangulation has been important, especially through discussing my 
findings with other Kunmingnese researchers and local citizens whose 
knowledge was much broader of course than mine.   
Research Experiences: Getting the Data 
The long road to data collection started several years before I went to do 
fieldwork in Kunming in 2004. It all began in 2000, when I met with State 
Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) officials in Beijing to prepare a 
Dutch sponsored workshop on environmental law enforcement. Through 
these initial contacts, I was able to make my first interviews about 
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environmental law enforcement.65 At the time, I hoped that such national 
level contacts might help me secure local access to EPBs. Hope became 
disappointment when my contacts in Beijing informed me that although they 
were willing to help me with introductions to Sichuan EPBs, they believed 
such introductions would not make me a welcome guest. On the contrary, 
they believed, that the local staff members would only talk with me out of 
duty, but all the time fearing I had only come to check upon them for SEPA. 
Therefore, I initially decided to go to Sichuan without any form of formal 
access. In 2001, I spent six weeks creating a local network around the 
provincial level EPB, partly helped through Sichuan University contacts. 
Through this network, I gradually learned whom I should approach within 
the provincial EPB and what sensitivities I should avoid at first. After I had 
successfully made my first contact in November 2001, I was able to 
interview staff of all provincial EPB sub-departments relevant for my 
research. However, when I returned in 2002 to carry out interviews at lower 
levels I soon ran into trouble because the provincial level contacts proved to 
be powerless in introducing me to these lower level EPBs. In the end, the 
Chengdu (Sichuan’s capital) municipal EPB even asked me for a formal letter 
from SEPA in Beijing forcing them to cooperate with my research. After I 
had obtained such letter, their cooperation was highly formal and no more 
than the minimum required of them.  
Because of this, I had to move my research to another city. In the 
meantime, I had been approached by a delegation from Yunnan province. 
This delegation consisted of local lawmakers visiting the Netherlands on a 
mission about environmental regulation. I had been unable to meet them 
while in the Netherlands, but in 2003 I decided to visit them in Kunming. I 
was welcomed by the mission head, the vice chair of the Yunnan Provincial 
People’s Congress and an influential local leader. With his support I met 
several other lawmakers and went on a short research mission to Qujing city, 
Yunnan’s second city. Mr. Wu also arranged that I did a lecture at Yunnan 
University. Here I met with the vice-dean and CCP party secretary of the 
faculty of law. Because of the high level support I had received and also 
because we shared an interests in socio-legal research the vice-dean decided 
to support my research in exchange for a guest lecture series on 
anthropology of law.  
In 2004, I thus returned to Kunming to start a twelve-month period 
of fieldwork in Kunming and teach a eighteen week course on legal 
anthropology. Before I arrived, Yunnan University had arranged a significant 
                                                     
65  Resulting in B. Van Rooij, "Implementing Chinese Environmental Law through 
Enforcement, the Shiwu Xiao  and Shuangge Dabiao Campaigns," in The Implementation of Law in 
the People's Republic of China, ed. J Chen, Y Li, and J M Otto (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2002a). 
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amount of paperwork, including a document, which stated that I was a State 
Council approved foreign expert. I assumed that these papers would be 
sufficient to start my research upon arrival. Unfortunately, this proved to be 
wrong. Two weeks after arriving in Kunming,  I was told that one document 
was missing, a so-called fieldwork permit, which is a local requirement 
Yunnan Province has for foreign researchers. In the end, this permit took 
another three months, during which I was not allowed to do any interviews 
neither in villages nor with governments or enterprises. The only thing I 
could do was to wait patiently and work hard to prepare my research by 
evaluating suitable fieldwork villages and by focusing on my teaching burden.  
In the meantime, I was introduced to Liu Xiaomin, a local lawyer 
and law lecturer at Yunnan University, who was to become my fieldwork 
collaborator. Using my research questions and experience from Beijing and 
Sichuan, and his local contacts, knowledge, experience and car, we soon set 
off to inspect possible research sites. After my research permit was finally 
granted after three months, in April 2004, we still had to wait to establish 
initial contacts through which we would be able to reach our target 
institutions and informants. With all Chinese holidays and with the local rural 
elections ongoing, this proved to take another six weeks. By the end of May 
2004, by using Liu Xiaomin’s and some other Yunnan University lecturer’s 
contacts I was slowly able to reach the chosen informants. In this period, I 
decided to start the research at the grass-roots level in the three villages, and 
to leave the research with the regulatory agencies and the enterprises for a 
later time.  
In June 2004, we could finally go to our three fieldwork villages. 
Having a fieldwork permit did not solve all my problems, however. All three 
villages and the township level governments that had granted us access to 
the villages, had refused me to live in the villages. They did so through a 
formalistic interpretation of China’s hotel regulations, which require 
foreigners to stay in especially approved hotels only, which of course do not 
exist in these villages. This meant that the only way to get to my research 
sites was in Liu Xiaomin’s car. Every time we went we either had to fight our 
way through an hour of arduous traffic on the east side of the lake, or worse 
through two hours of dangerous mountain roads when going to the two 
villages located on the western side. Distance thus kept access difficult.  
From the start, I learned to accept these limitations and tried to use 
my available time in the three villages as best as possible. The limitations did 
have consequences: without living in the villages, I was not able to gain the 
in-depth trust of the villagers at large. What I did gain was the trust of the 
village leadership, with whom I had numerous meetings from June until 
December. During these meetings, I gradually learned how to discern fact 
from fiction, truth from outright lies. I did so by talking with as many 
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different Village Committee members as possible, and by talking the most 
with those who seemed more cooperative and less afraid to touch upon what 
actually was going on. At the same time, I tried to check their stories with 
villagers outside of these local elites, and later with local enterprises and 
regulatory agencies. I got the information from the villagers during the many 
informal conversations I had in the village, when I met people during lunch 
or just drinking tea with them and on several occasions had long 
conversations just by going to farmers when sitting in front of their homes. 
My usual approach started with general and non-sensitive questions in order 
to gain trust but also to understand the general context of each village. In 
this manner, I learned about village economy, its history, its population and 
its current politics. Then I moved to questions related to conflict resolution, 
mediation, land use practices, housing and infrastructure. Finally, after 
having gained sufficient trust I started long interviews with village cadre and 
villagers on issues relating to construction on arable land and the pollution of 
local enterprises.  
By the end of summer, I was able to have basic information about 
local land and pollution practices in all three villages. At this time, I used my 
Yunnan University network again to get access to the three regulatory 
agencies mentioned above. As I had done extensive work on EPBs in prior 
research in Sichuan and Beijing, my understanding of the EPB enforcement 
work was much more advanced than that of the State Land Resource Bureau 
or the Dianchi Management Bureau. Although I was able to do several long 
interviews with relevant staff members in the latter two agencies, my most 
in-depth understanding of regulatory enforcement remained related to the 
EPB. My experience in interviewing enforcement officials has taught me a 
number of lessons. First, time is much more limited than during grassroots 
interviews. In general, I cannot take more than one hour of each official 
interviewed. During this one hour, I must try to gain trust but also try to get 
new data, which means significant probing. The second lesson is to mind the 
sensitivities of informants. Over the years I have learned slowly what kind of 
questions are too sensitive to be answered. I first learned this when 
informants did not answer or through their answer seemed to indicate not to 
understand the question. Prior, lacking sufficient experience, I would press 
again for an answer, only to receive a similar response again. Especially for 
regulatory agents sensitivities are crucial and if pressed to talk about them 
too soon or too often the interview relationship can come at peril. A new 
lesson I learned in this respect was that being too good at talking about 
sensitive subjects can also backfire. This happened with one informant with 
whom I had gained so much trust that he spoke freely about a number of 
ongoing cases. When I spoke with him again during a consecutive interview, 
he suddenly stopped, looked at me in a completely different manner and told 
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me that he could not tell me anything further and I should contact a 
different department. Later I understood that at the time he must have 
realized how much he had unknowingly told me and had been shocked to 
the point of refusing any further cooperation. A third lesson has been to 
show my informants what I know already. This proved to be especially 
helpful as I could use both my three prior years of EPB interview experience 
as well as my fieldwork knowledge about what was going on in the villages. 
Whereas normally informants mainly speak about their work in abstract 
terms, not wanting to give examples or cases, my informed probing led them 
to comment on what I told them helping me build the cases further. 
By August 2004, I had originally planned to start interviews with 
enterprises about their pollution compliance behavior. In order to gain 
access I had informed all my contacts, both in the villages, as well as in 
Yunnan University and the various agencies I had talked with. Getting the 
access proved to be the most cumbersome experience I had had until then. 
In the end, I had to tone down my expectations and be happy to be able to 
interview the modest amount I was finally able to. I was able to interview the 
Ningshi enterprises (see Chapter 8 and 10) through contacts in the Ningshi 
Procurate. The enterprises in Baocun village and Jiacun village I was able to 
interview through contacts with village leadership. The remaining enterprises, 
I was able to get information about indirectly either through Liu Xiaomin or 
former employees, or through the regulatory agencies I worked with. In 
terms of the validity and representativeness of the data the lack of enterprise 
interviews is a problem that I am the first to admit. Still, it is a problem that 
cannot be solved and because of the wide spread of people interviewed for 
this study I still believe that it presents sufficient data to discuss the pollution 
problems around Lake Dianchi. 
 During the final months of my stay in Yunnan, I used my last 
interviews to check facts and recheck some of the statements made during 
earlier interviews. At this time, the structure of this book became clear and I 
was able to bring the final structure with me during these last rounds of talks. 
In this manner, I tried to get all the data still missing to complete the work.  
 Given the obstacles to doing empirical research on the local 
functioning of the Chinese legal system, it is no surprise that there has been 
little empirical work in this area.  By partly overcoming these obstacles, the 
present work offers new explorative data that expands and deepens the 
understanding of the development of the world’s largest legal system. The 
data as structured, analyzed and presented in this book are hoped to further 
the development of a rule of law, and a functioning system of natural 
resource protection regulation in particular, which benefits China as a whole 
as well as local people in places such as Lake Dianchi.  











    2. Law in the Books  
Process of Lawmaking and Implementability of 
Legislation, Theory and China  
Introduction 
China has tried to curb arable land loss and pollution at places like Lake 
Dianchi by creating a framework of natural resource protection legislation to 
protect arable land, water and air. This framework was first established 
during the 1980s and has been revised in the second half of the 1990s. The 
original legislation was not stringent, rather vague and lacked detail. 
Consequently, the earlier legislation had little impact and economic growth 
continued to adversely pressure natural resources.1 Proponents of stronger 
natural resource protection hoped that by amending legislation and 
introducing stricter and more specific norms,  natural resource deterioration 
could be decreased. 2  Thus, in the second half of the 1990s these 
environmental stakeholders attempted to amend the existing laws and 
introduce new pieces of legislation. At first, their attempts to introduce 
stricter norms for the 1995 Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law largely 
failed at the bargaining table. However, since 1996, environmental 
stakeholders became more successful and were able to introduce stricter and 
more specific norms in the 1996 Water Pollution Prevention and Control 
Law 1998 Land Management Act, the 2000 Air Pollution and Prevention 
Control and the 2002 Environmental Impact Assessment Law. 
 The present study analyzes the effect such legislative changes have 
had on compliance behavior. This part of the book (Part I) first analyses how 
such changes have come about and how they have affected the quality of the 
legislation. For this analysis, the study uses an analytical framework about the 
process of lawmaking, focusing on the level of participation and the types of 
rationality and their effects on the content of the legislation made. Second, it 
analyses to what extent changes made in these laws—in combination with 
existing local norms—can in theory be expected to affect compliance 
behavior and enforcement processes and final goal attainment (in other 
                                                     
1  Li, "China's Compliance with WTO Requirements Will Improve the Efficiency and 
Effective Implementation of Environmental Laws in China." Alford and Shen, "Limits of the 
Law in Addressing China's Environmental Dilemma.", Orts, "Environmental Law With 
Chinese Characteristics."  
2 See for instance NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office, ed., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudi Guanlifa 
Shiyi (Commentary on the PRC Land Management Act). NPC Legal Committee, "Guanyu 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Daqi Wuran Fangzhi Fa Xiuding Caoan Shenyi Jieguo de 
Baogao (Report on the Results of Review of the the Draft Amendment to the PRC Air 
Pollution Prevention and Control Law)." 
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words how does it affect the law’s “implementability”3). For this analysis, the 
study uses an analytical framework, which comprises of a set of 
characteristics of “implementable” legislation including the law’s adequacy, 
legal certainty, feasibility and adaptability.  
The present chapter introduces these frameworks and provides a 
short overview of how laws are made in China and how this has affected 
their quality.  
The Process of Lawmaking: Participation and Rationality 
How the law is made influences what is in the law, and thus affects the 
quality of legislation and its implementability.4  In the legal and even the 
socio-legal literature, the study of the process of lawmaking has received little 
more attention than in the “how a bill becomes a law” kind of introductions 
detailing how on paper the lawmaking process should work. Although there 
are case studies about how the lawmaking processes of certain laws took 
place such as Berman’s famous study of the US lawmaking process of civil 
rights legislation, 5  theorizing analyses of how the process of lawmaking 
actually works are quite rare.6 Seidman et al.’s socio-legal observations on 
different drafting processes are an important example.7 Another example is 
Otto et al.’s work on lawmaking in a context of development, theorizing 
about the process of lawmaking by comparing lawmaking with policymaking, 
about which process there exists a blossoming field of study. 8  Here we 
further expand on their work and we introduce theories about the process of 
lawmaking by combining socio-legal insights with insights from public 
administration and political science about policymaking. 9  
                                                     
3 As state application of law, even though it is an important part of implementation and also 
affects compliance, has not been part of this study it will not be further discussed in this 
chapter.  
4  C.J.M. Schuyt, Tussen Macht en Moraal, Over de Plaats Van het Recht in Verzorgingsstaat en 
Democratie (Between Power and Morality, on the Place of Law in the Welfare State and Democracy) 
(Alphen a/d Rijn: Samson, 1983). 174 
5  D. Berman, M., A Bill Becomes a Law, Congress Enacts Civil Rights Legislation (New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1966 (Second Edition)). 
6 B.Z. Tamanaha, "A Pragmatic Approach to Legislative Theory for Developing Countries," 
in Making Development Work, Legislative Reform for Institutional Transformation and Good Governance, 
ed. A Seidman, R B Seidman, and T W Wälde (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999). 
7 A. Seidman, R.B. Seidman, and N. Abeyesekere, Legislative Drafting for Democratic Social Change, 
a manual for drafters (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001). 
8 J.M. Otto, S. Stoter, and J. Arnscheidt, "Using Legislative Theory to Improve Law and 
Development Projects," Regelmaat 2004, no. 4 (2004). 
9  Although there have been some studies on lawmaking, for most information we must 
borrow from public administration. This field has made an in-depth analysis of how 
governments make policy that is to a large extent applicable to law making. From here 
onwards we will use policy-making theory to describe lawmaking without referring to policy 
every time.  
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The Lawmaking Process 
The lawmaking process involves several stages and different actors. Most 
lawmaking processes start with the identification of a legislative need, often 
in the form of the identification of a social problem that is to be addressed in 
legislation. Such identification may come in the form of a policy decision, 
made by bureaucrats or politicians, however it may also come from interest 
groups who then try to involve politicians or bureaucrats. Once the 
legislative need has been identified, its proponents will try to get drafters 
involved.  
 In general, there are two types of drafters, specialists working as 
bureaucrats in the bureaucracy most closely related to the policy area 
involved, or general legal specialists working in a general legal department 
such as the Ministry of Justice or a parliamentary committee.10 Once a draft 
has been made, it will be submitted to the formal legislative procedure and 
will be decided upon by the relevant politicians and other stakeholders 
involved, depending on the political system. Thus, the lawmaking process 
involves a whole range of different “legislators”: drafters, politicians, 
bureaucrats, and stakeholders. Second, the lawmaking process consists of 
communications between such legislators in which complex social issues are 
translated into policy and then into legislative norms.  
 Lawmaking is a political process, of which the present study focuses 
in particular on its participation and rationality. Understanding the process of 
lawmaking involves understanding the manner in which the various actors 
involved are included or excluded in the process and second how the 
complexity of the social problem and their communication about regulating 
such problem influences the final legal text.  
Participation 
The type of participation defines power relations in lawmaking and has a 
large impact on the lawmaking process and the resulting type of legislation.11 
In the participation approaches to lawmaking there are two main ideas. 
Following Dahl, the first is the ideal-typical situation of pluralistic 
participation, meaning that the lawmaking process is the result of a fully 
open participation in which all stakeholders are heard whether powerful or 
not.12 In the ideal-typical full participation setting, participation is reflected in 
                                                     
10 For this difference in drafters and differences between the French and the British system 
see Seidman, Seidman, and Abeyesekere, Legislative Drafting for Democratic Social Change, a manual 
for drafters. 
11 For this paragraph and the next we have been influenced by Otto, Stoter, and Arnscheidt, 
"Using Legislative Theory to Improve Law and Development Projects." 
12 This idea is best represented in R.A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American 
City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961 (reissued in 1963))., quoted through W. Parsons, 
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the final legislation and leads to a representation of a variety of interests. 
Participation can take place at the various stages of the lawmaking process: 
during the policy formulation, during the drafting itself or during the formal 
deliberation on the draft. Under this ideal type of public decision-making, 
lawmaking is bottom-up.  
 Baldwin has noted that the problem with truly pluralistic legislation 
is that the larger the legal system and the scope of application of the law in 
question, the more stakeholders will participate and in general,13 the more 
watered down and less stringent and more abstract the law will become if it 
is to fully represent all interests.14 Such legislative process will therefore be 
well equipped to reflect as many different interests as possible in the law. 
However, participation leads to a negotiated law, which is watered down and 
may have weak and vague norms that are less well equipped to attain the 
goals that the law was originally intended for.  
 In non-Western contexts, where democracy and participation have 
been limited, the pluralist approach to lawmaking has remained more of an 
ideal than in most Western countries. However, there also participation can 
lead to watered down legislation. Brazil’s law no. 9605, the Crimes Against 
the Environment Act, is an illustration. As Benjamin writes, “the draft lost 
several of its original provisions thanks to pressures from an extremely 
powerful lobby that rallied together industrialists, mining concerns, timber 
companies and ranchers.”15 
On the other end of the spectrum is the elite model under which the 
legislation is the result of decision making by a single individual or a small 
group of powerful persons.16 Elite lawmaking mostly influences the policy 
formulation and the draft deliberation phases of the lawmaking process and 
will have less impact on the drafting itself, which requires legal experts. Low 
participation and a top-down approach characterize elite law making. 
Because such lawmaking does not have to consider a large amount of 
interests, it can directly reflect the goals the elite wishes to achieve. Similar to 
the elitist model is the corporatist model, under which a select group of 
powerful stakeholders negotiate over the draft legislation until an agreement 
                                                                                                                        
Public Policy, An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis (Cheltenham, UK  Lyme, 
US: Edward Elgar, 1995 (reprinted in 1997)). 134 
13 Pluralistic lawmaking does not necessarily lead to more abstract legislation. The exception is 
the specific compromise between different interest groups. For example about fines for 
pollution, after extensive bargaining the height of the fines may change but this does not 
affect the level of abstraction. 
14 R. Baldwin, Rules and Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 167 
15 A.H.V. Benjamin, Criminal Law and the Protection of the Environment in Brazil (INECE, 1998 
[cited); available from http://www.inece.org/5thvol1/5thTOC.htm. 229 
16 Parsons, Public Policy, An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis. 248-9 Allott, 
The Limits of Law. 
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is struck.17 Just as elite lawmaking, corporate lawmaking is top-down, as a 
small group of actors makes rules for society. Especially in non-Western 
contexts, with the prevalent influence of strong family ties and traditional 
forms of authorities, elites or corporatist groups may dominate lawmaking 
institutions, even when they such institutions formally adhere to pluralist 
principles.18 While elitist—and to a lesser extent corporatist—laws may be 
highly goal oriented, drafted as closely to the goals the legislators want 
attained, and thus may seem to be effective on paper, the lack of 
participation may mean that the law may lack support from relevant interests 
groups and second that there is a lower chance that it fits actual 
circumstances on the ground. This may mean that there will be less 
compliance and that enforcement becomes more difficult. 
Rationality 
The process of lawmaking is also defined by the level of rationality of the 
legislative decision making process.19 Rationality approaches differ in terms 
of how well planned and rational legislation can be made. In the ideal-typical 
situation, as found in Weber’s work, legislation is the product of a well-
prepared rational process that incorporates all relevant information and 
makes legislation based on such information. 20  The more information is 
processed in the policy formulation and preparation of lawmaking, the better 
the balance between the goals of the law and the various interests in society.  
An example of how such rational lawmaking should work ideally is 
Seidman et al.’s work on legislative drafting, made especially for drafters 
from developing countries. This work proposes that the drafters who are to 
translate a policy decision into legislation should study both legislative 
techniques as well as social science research methods.21 Second, Seidman and 
Seidman propose that within the preparation of legislation, research about 
compliance behavior of the regulated actor (or “role occupant” as they call it) 
                                                     
17 Otto, Stoter, and Arnscheidt, "Using Legislative Theory to Improve Law and Development 
Projects.", P.C. Schmitter, "Still the century of corporatism?" Review of Politics 36 (1974). 93-4 
18 Riggs has described how this happens, when there are overlapping traditional and modern 
structures causing a normative heterogeneity in institutions, causing formalism, a gap between 
the formal processes and the actual workings of the institution. See F.W. Riggs, Administration 
in Developing Countries, The Theory of the Prismatic Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1964). 
19 Here we have also been influenced by Public Administration. See Parsons, Public Policy, An 
Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis. For an overview of the literature on policy 
making models related to rationality.  
20 M. Rheinstein, Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1954). xlii-iii 
21  A. Seidman and R.B. Seidman, State and Law in the Development Process (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1994). 14-5 
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is essential and should form the basis for the policy analysis, the draft made 
and the final norms legislated.22 
In reality, lawmaking is never able to attain the ideal of full 
rationality. With his “bounded rationality” Simon demonstrated that human 
rationality is limited and human beings are not able to fully rationally process 
the complexity of contemporary society in a single rational decision making 
process.23 In response to Simon’s bounded rationality, Lindblom has shown 
that administrative decision-making, and thus legislative decision-making, is 
incremental.24 Incremental decisions are made based on negotiation and trial 
and error. When applied to lawmaking, this means that legislation cannot 
arise out of a coherent rationally well thought out plan. The first problem is 
that many of the social issues legislation tries to address are so complex that 
the causal relation between problem and cause, and especially cause and cure 
cannot be easily ascertained.25 Second, the translation of policy into legal 
draft is not purely a technical translation, but will affect the social impact of 
the law, in ways unknown to the drafter. 26  Most drafters lack sufficient 
knowledge about the underlying policies and the effects they may have on 
society. Seidman and Seidman believe they can solve this problem by training 
drafters in social science methodology. The feasibility of this in practice is 
questionable, however. Tamanaha has argued that drafters lack time and 
capacity to be trained in such techniques and even if they are will not be able 
to use them directly in their work.27 This is especially an acute problem in 
non-Western countries where there is a lack of institutional capacity, a lack 
of well trained lawyers and social scientists, and a wide gap between the two, 
where society itself is highly complex and heterogeneous, and where the 
                                                     
22 Seidman, Seidman, and Abeyesekere, Legislative Drafting for Democratic Social Change, a manual 
for drafters. 
23 H. Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1957). 79 Quoted through Parsons, 
Public Policy, An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis. 273-281 
24 C. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through," Public Administration Review 19 (1959). 
Quoted through Parsons, Public Policy, An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis. 
284-287 
25 Tamanaha, "A Pragmatic Approach to Legislative Theory for Developing Countries." M. 
Edelman, "The Construction and Uses of Social Problems," University of Miami Law Review 42, 
no. September (1987). Bardach and Kagan, Going by the Book, The Problem of Regulatory 
Unreasonableness. 58-9, Schuyt, Tussen Macht en Moraal, Over de Plaats Van het Recht in 
Verzorgingsstaat en Democratie (Between Power and Morality, On the Place of Law in the Welfare State and 
Democracy). 
26 Seidman, Seidman, and Abeyesekere, Legislative Drafting for Democratic Social Change, a manual 
for drafters. 
27 Tamanaha, "A Pragmatic Approach to Legislative Theory for Developing Countries." 
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alternative of importing laws through legal transplantation28 is tempting and 
often done.  
Coincidence is dominant in another line of thought about the 
rationality of public decision-making coincidence. Proponents of this idea, 
the so-called “Garbage Can” model, have largely given up on rational 
decision making in policy and lawmaking. They do not believe that 
policymaking and lawmaking occur in chronological cycles involving the 
identification of problems, causes and solutions. 29   They believe that 
lawmaking is highly coincidental and that streams of problems find streams 
of solutions by accident. 30  Berman’s analysis of the US Civil Rights Act 
lawmaking processes in 1960 and 1964 shows for example how coincidences 
involving large race riots, the murder of Kennedy and Johnson’s own 
background in relation to race relations influenced Congress to enact a 
strong new Civil Rights Act in 1964, not yet possible in 1960.31  
Finally, in the symbolic decision making perspective, policy makers, 
and thus also lawmakers, care about a different rationality than the rationality 
aimed at achieving an effective implementation. Scholars including Aubert, 
Edelman, Stone and Snelle, have argued that a political rationality may 
inform public decision-making and that such a rationality is based on the 
direct interests of the politicians involved rather than the effective solution 
to a certain policy problem for which the policy or in our case the legislation 
is made.32 In the same manner, Veerman has detailed how legislation, rather 
than a mere instrumental function of solving a certain social issue33, can have 
                                                     
28  Y. Dezelay and B. Garth, "The Import and Export of Law and Legal Institutions: 
International Strategies in National Palace Wars," in Adapting Legal Cultures, ed. D Nelken and 
J Feest (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001), Seidman and Seidman, State and Law in the Development 
Process, A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (Athens & London: 
University of Georgia Press, 1993). 
29 This point is most clearly made by Edelman. See Edelman, "The Construction and Uses of 
Social Problems." M. Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1988). 
30 J. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984). 119, 151, 
174 M. Cohen, J. March, and J. Olsen, "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice," 
Administrative Science Quarterly 17 (1972). quoted through Parsons, Public Policy, An Introduction to 
the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis. 192-194 
31 Berman, A Bill Becomes a Law, Congress Enacts Civil Rights Legislation. 
32  M. Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964). 
Edelman, "The Construction and Uses of Social Problems." Edelman, Constructing the Political 
Spectacle. D. Stone, Policy Paradox, The Art of Political Decision Making (New York: Norton & 
Company, 1997). I. Snellen, Boeiend geboeid (Captivated Captured) (Inaugural Lecture University of 
Tilburg) (Tilburg: University of Tilburg, 1987). V. Aubert, "Social Functions of Legislation," 
Acta Sociologica 10 (1967). 
33 G.J. Veerman, De Wet als Zinsbegoochelingstoestel, Over Kwaliteit van Wetgeving (The Law as Spell-
Machine for the Senses, On the Quality of Legislation) (Inaugural Lecture) (Maastricht: University of 
Maastricht, 2004). 
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political goals such signaling a Minister’s decisiveness, or serving to get a 
social issue off the agenda, or to let certain important constituents express 
their values in law. 34  The common denominator of these symbolic 
approaches to lawmaking is that they do not care about the implementation 
of law, or even on purpose do not wish that the law is implemented.35 The 
symbolic perspective does not aim at implementation, and in its rationality, 
attaining a high level of compliance and enforcement is not important. 
In conclusion, the lawmaking process has a profound effect on the 
quality of legislation, whether because of its manner of participation or its 
type of rationality. The next section will look at such quality in detail and 
provide an analytical framework for assessing legislation’s level of positive 
influence on compliance and enforcement. 
Quality of Legislation: Implementability 
What kind of legislation is better able to achieve its official goals and what 
kind of legal norms lead to more compliance and more effective 
enforcement? In other words, what constitutes “implementable”36 legislation? 
So far, there has been little scholarly work looking specifically at the 
implementability of legislation37 but rather at the quality of the law in the 
books in general.38 As Rubin wrote in 1989, when discussing the rise of what 
he calls the “administrative state” in the U.S. where regulatory law and its 
statutes became increasingly dominant:  
 
                                                     
34  This has often been called the symbolic perspective. Compare with Aubert, "Social 
Functions of Legislation." 
35 For this see Cohn who uses the term “pastiche lawmaking” to describe rules that have been 
made not to be implemented. M. Cohn, "Fuzzy Legality in Regulation: The Legislative 
Mandate Revisited," Law & Policy 23, no. 4 (2001). 
36 Our concept of implementable is limited. We merely look at whether the norms in the 
could possibly lead to compliance, enforcement and goal attainment. In this research we do 
not look at the role of application of law by state institutions such as permit granters or EIA 
evaluators. Such application institutions do however affect the implementability of legislation, 
its compliance and its enforcement. Due to limitations, application will not be discussed here 
though.  
37 Few studies have linked the quality of legislation to its implementability. Here we make an 
attempt, mainly based on studies of the enforceability of law derived from a framework made 
by Jong. See P. Jong, Handhaafbaar milieurecht (Enforceable Environmental Law) (Deventer: W.E.J. 
Tjeenk Willink, 1997). For an overview of his framework and its relation to the quality of 
legislation in terms of enforceability see B. Van Rooij, "The Enforceability of Chinese Water 
Pollution Regulations, What Room for Improvement?" China Perspectives, no. 43 (2002b). 
38 Schuyt confirms this in 1983. See Schuyt, Tussen Macht en Moraal, Over de Plaats Van het Recht 
in Verzorgingsstaat en Democratie (Between Power and Morality, on the Place of Law in the Welfare State 
and Democracy). 
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“We have no adequate theory, no general account of how such 
statutes should be designed and what makes them effective or 
ineffective, desirable or undesirable.”39  
 
The existing theories about the quality of legislation and 
implementable legislation, while retaining some overlap, can roughly be 
divided as follows: First there are the legal theorists writing about the quality 
of legislation from a rule of law or general jurisprudence point of view 
including Fuller40  and Hart41 . Second are the socio-legal scholars writing 
about the quality of legislation in terms of its ability to achieve social change, 
including Seidman and Seidman 42 , Bardach and Kagan 43 , Jong 44  and 
Griffiths45. Third are practitioners, often civil servants working in legislative 
or enforcement departments of state institutions who have made policy 
documents about the quality of legislation and the enforceability of 
legislation, including policy makers from the Dutch Ministry of Justice46, the 
US EPA47 and the European Union48. Fourth is research by legal scholars 
about these governmental standards for legislative quality, including for 
example from the Netherlands, research by Klosse et al.49, Voermans et al.50, 
                                                     
39 E.L. Rubin, "Law and Legislation in the Administrative State," Columbia Law Review 89, no. 3 
(1989). 369 
40 L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976). 
41 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961). 
42  Seidman and Seidman, State and Law in the Development Process. Seidman, Seidman, and 
Abeyesekere, Legislative Drafting for Democratic Social Change, a manual for drafters. R. Seidman and 
A. Seidman, "Using Reason and Experience to Draft Country-Specific Laws," in Making 
Development Work: Legislative Reform for Institutional Transformation and Good Governance, ed. A 
Seidman, R B Seidman, and T Walde (London: Kluwer Law International, 1999). R.B. 
Seidman, "Justifying Legislation: A Pragmatic, Institutionalist Approach to the Memorandum 
of Law, Legislative Theory and Practical Reason," Harvard Journal on Legislation 29, no. 1 (1992). 
43 Bardach and Kagan, Going by the Book, The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness. 
44 Jong, Handhaafbaar milieurecht (Enforceable Environmental Law). 
45 J. Griffiths, "The Social Working of Legal Rules," Journal of Legal Pluralism, no. 48 (2003). 
46 Netherlands Ministry of Justice, Legislation in Perspective, A policy plan for the further development 
and implementation of the general legislative policy, aimed at improving the constitutional and administrative 
quality of government policy. (The Hague: Netherlands Ministry of Justice, 1991).  
47  C.E. Wasserman, "Principles of Environmental Enforcement" (paper presented at the 
International Conference on Environmental Enforcement, Budapest, Hungary, September 22-
55, 1992 1992). 
48 For an overview of European policy on legislative quality see N.E. Bracke, Voorwaarden voor 
Goede EG-Wetgeving, Een Onderzoek naar de kwaliteit van Europese wetgeving (Requirements for Good 
European Community Legislation, Research about the Quality of European Legislation) (Den Haag: SDU 
Uitgevers, 1996). 
49 S. Klosse et al., Op Zoek Naar Kwaliteit, Een onderzoek naar de  toepassing en operationalisering van 
wetgevingskwaliteitseisen (Searching for Quality, Research on the application and operationalization of 
requirements for legislative quality) (Den Haag: SDU Uitgevers, 2003). 
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Veerman51 and Bracke.52 Apart from these studies focusing directly on the 
quality of legislation, there is much to learn about the expected effects of 
legislation on compliance and enforcement from socio-legal and economic 
studies of these two phenomena.53  
This section will present a framework for analyzing whether 
legislation has a positive effect on compliance and enforcement and will help 
the law to attain its goals (in other words whether it is implementable) based 
on the existing studies mentioned above. Drawing from such studies, this 
analytical framework comprises of four characteristics of implementable 
legislation: adequacy, feasibility, legal certainty and adaptability. The more 
these four characteristics are present in legislation, the higher the chances are 
that it is implementable.54  
Adequacy 
Regulatory law is about changing existing behavior. It does so by introducing 
norms and sanctions to punish those who break the law. Such norms and 
sanctions should be adequate that when fully complied with or when fully 
enforced the desired social change is as much achieved as possible. Adequacy 
is thus a first characteristic of implementable legislation.  
A first aspect of adequacy is the adequate translation of the law’s 
formal goals 55  into its substantive legal norms. 56  Evaluating the level of 
adequacy of substantive norms involves a thought experiment: if the law is 
                                                                                                                        
50 W. Voermans et al., Quality, Implementation and Enforcement, A Study into the Quality of EC rules 
and the impact on the implementation and enforcement wihtin the Netherlands (Leiden University, 2000 
[cited 25 July 2006]); available from 
 http://www.law.leidenuniv.nl/general/img/qualityreport_tcm11-5332.pdf. 
51  Veerman, De Wet als Zinsbegoochelingstoestel, Over Kwaliteit van Wetgeving (The Law as Spell-
Machine for the Senses, On the Quality of Legislation) (Inaugural Lecture). 
52  Bracke, Voorwaarden voor Goede EG-Wetgeving, Een Onderzoek naar de kwaliteit van Europese 
wetgeving (Requirements for Good European Community Legislation, Research about the Quality of 
European Legislation). 
53 These studies will be  discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, for compliance and Chapter 12 
for enforcement. However we have used them as much as possible here as well.  
54 This is not to say that legislation that does not meet these criteria is not implementable. 
First of all the level of repression and harsh enforcement may make that some laws, even 
though they are unacceptable and thus unfeasible and non-adaptable and not even certain, 
may still be enforced so strictly that they attain compliance. An example is China’s one child 
policy, which was not certain, as there was no official legislation for it until 2002, and the 
norms were not acceptable for many rural Chinese. Still due to harsh local level enforcement 
the law has created some of the desired social change.  
55 An important aspect here is whether the law’s goals are clear and unambiguous, which may 
often not be the case. Fir this point see Klosse et al., Op Zoek Naar Kwaliteit, Een onderzoek naar 
de  toepassing en operationalisering van wetgevingskwaliteitseisen (Searching for Quality, Research on the 
application and operationalization of requirements for legislative quality). 9-11 
56 Ibid. 8-9 
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fully complied with, to what extent does it contribute to the behavioral 
change desired? Legislation can better achieve its goals if the substantive 
norms in the law are sufficiently stringent57 and the scope of application wide 
enough. 58   
An example of a law that is insufficiently stringent would be a 
discharge pollution fee system where the level of the fee is set at a lower level 
than the costs of abatement. Compliance with such law will not lead to the 
desired behavioral outcome, less pollution, as most regulated factories will 
pay a fee instead cleaning up. An example where the scope of application of 
the law’s norms is too limited making the law inadequate is the Indian Child 
Labour Act’s failure to regulate family-run businesses or businesses 
supported by government training programs. As this act fails to address child 
labor in the most important sector in which it takes place—the informal 
sector—compliance with the act, if it would ever be attained, would not 
significantly help to decrease the amount of child labor.59  
Adequacy, secondly, means that the law’s sanctions should be 
sufficiently compelling to induce compliance in case there are violations. In 
what has been termed “deterrence” literature60, scholarship has argued that 
the law can only change behavior if the combination of the penalty for 
violation of law, combined with the detection probability is high enough, in 
the sense that it is higher than the benefits of violation of law, the regulated 
actor will comply with the law. 61  Following this perspective, adequate 
legislation has strict sanctions 62  depending on the level of detection 
probability and the possible benefits of violating the law. 
Brazil’s 1940 Criminal Code environmental provisions are an 
example of inadequate sanctions. These provisions treat actions harming 
                                                     
57 Stringency, or strictness, here means the extent to which the desired behavior as proscribed 
in the law is different from existing behavior. The more different, the  stricter a norm is. 
58 Jong, Handhaafbaar milieurecht (Enforceable Environmental Law). 76-9 and Netherlands Ministry 
of Justice, Legislation in Perspective, A policy plan for the further development and implementation of the 
general legislative policy, aimed at improving the constitutional and administrative quality of government policy. 
21 Veerman, De Wet als Zinsbegoochelingstoestel, Over Kwaliteit van Wetgeving (The Law as Spell-
Machine for the Senses, On the Quality of Legislation) (Inaugural Lecture). 
59 R.K. Agarwal, "The Barefoot Lawyers: Prosecuting Child Labour in the Supreme Court of 
India," Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 21, no. 2 (2004). 683 
60 For more about this school of thought see Chapter 12. 
61 The original proposition for this thought was introduced by Bentham, in the 20th century 
this line of research was restarted by Becker. See J. Bentham, "An Introduction to the 
Principles and Morals of Legislation," in The Ultilitarians (Rept. Garden City: Anchor Books, 
1789 (Reprinted in 1973)). G.S. Becker, "Crime and Punishment, An Economic Approach," 
Journal of Political Economy 76 (1968). 
62 Even though deterrence theory has been debated by those calling for a more adaptable 
form of law enforcement, most authors agree that even a adaptable enforcement style requires 
the possibility of using strict sanctions. For more see below under adaptability and Chapter 12.  
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flora as misdemeanors with only minor sanctions, “whether the offender has 
cleared one or 100,000 hectares of native forest.” 63  With the enormous 
profits that can be made from logging or the development of cash crops on 
cleared tropical forestland, minor sanctions are unlikely to serve as a 
deterrent.  
Feasibility 
The second aspect of good legislation, feasibility, is in many ways opposite to 
adequacy as it focuses not on the aspirations of the legislator but on the 
norm addressees’ and enforcement agents’ possibilities and willingness to 
comply with the law or enforce it.  
 Feasibility first means that legislation should demand behavioral 
changes that the norm addressee is able carry out, both financially, physically 
and technically. 64  Laws that demand a behavioral change that is too 
expensive or complex will have a lower chance of being complied with.  
 One example of an unfeasible norm for the regulated actor is the 
Tanzanian Wildlife Act from 1974. This act aimed to protect wildlife in game 
reserves, but while doing so greatly inhibited the people living in such 
reserves, to such an extent that violations were widespread. Masilingi wrote: 
“Hunting permitted under the law does not recognize traditional weapons 
such as spears, arrows and bows, yet local people cannot afford to acquire 
guns. Furthermore, walking in National Parks is not allowed, only motor 
vehicles are permitted. But many local people cannot afford to buy cars to 
visit national parks. Therefore compliance with the law becomes very 
difficult because local people are mainly hunters who use dogs and 
traditional weapons for hunting which is prohibited under the law.”65  
A second aspect of feasibility, as used here, is that the norms in the 
law should be as acceptable and reasonable to the regulated actor as 
possible.66 Unreasonable or unacceptable norms may lead to resistance and 
                                                     
63 Benjamin, Criminal Law and the Protection of the Environment in Brazil ([cited). 228 
64 Here we have been influenced by Coleman’s analysis of norm deviation which argues that 
violation requires both opportunity and motivation. Here in reverse we argue the same applies 
to compliance. For more on this point see Chapter 6. See J.W. Coleman, "Toward an 
Integrated Theory of White-Collar Crime," American Journal of Sociology 93, no. 2 (1987). See 
also Huisman, Tussen Winst en Moraal, Achtergronden van Regelnaleving en Regelovertreding door 
Ondernemingen (Between Profit and Morality, The Backgrounds to Enterprise Compliance and Violation). 
Kagan and Scholz, "The "Criminology of the Corporation" and Regulatory Enforcement 
Strategies." 
65  W.M.K. Masilingi, Social-Economic Problems Experienced in Compliance and Enforcement in 
Tanzania (1996 [cited 13 September 2006]); 
 available from http://www.inece.org/3rdvol2/masiligi.pdf. 68 
66 In this sense, the concept of feasibility is closely related to the Dutch and European quality 
standards of subsidiarity and proportionality. See Klosse et al., Op Zoek Naar Kwaliteit, Een 
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less voluntary compliance.67 Legal norms that demand behavior that is too 
different from the existing practices and are contrary to existing cultural and 
moral values are bound to be unfeasible and thus not implementable.68 An 
example is how the 1974 Tanzanian Wildlife Act demands that local people 
in the game reserves must first ask written permission from the reserve 
director when seeking herbs. The important cultural notion of secrecy that is 
part of the traditional healers’ value system makes such a request not 
acceptable. 69  Similarly, the Act’s legal prohibition of visits to ancestral 
graveyards within the reserve territory is not easily accepted, to say the 
least. 70  The complexity of value systems, especially in multi-ethnic, poly-
normativist,71 non-Western countries, challenges lawmakers when trying to 
draft acceptable and thus feasible norms.  
Feasible legislation further means that law enforcement is possible72. 
Norms that demand too much from the existing enforcement machinery will 
have a smaller chance of being applied and enforced. There are restrictions 
to what an enforcement bureau can do, due to limited information, capacity, 
and authority.73 The workload of enforcement agencies and the difficulty of 
doing such work are to some extent defined by the norms they have to 
enforce. First, laws whose norms place too great a demand on the regulated 
actor will lead to a high amount of violations, increasing the agency’s 
workload. In addition, norms with a greater scope of application also 
increase enforcement tasks.  
A second, more practical aspect of legislation that is feasible for 
enforcement concerns the verifiability (and provability) of the behavior 
regulated.74 Compliance of some norms is easier verifiable than of others, 
depending on the detectability of the regulated behavior. 75  Air pollution 
                                                                                                                        
onderzoek naar de  toepassing en operationalisering van wetgevingskwaliteitseisen (Searching for Quality, 
Research on the application and operationalization of requirements for legislative quality). 11-13 
67 K. Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement, Regulation and the Social Definition of Pollution (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1984). 32, Wasserman, "Principles of Environmental Enforcement". 32 
Schuyt, Tussen Macht en Moraal, Over de Plaats Van het Recht in Verzorgingsstaat en Democratie 
(Between Power and Morality, on the Place of Law in the Welfare State and Democracy). 181, Kagan and 
Scholz, "The "Criminology of the Corporation" and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies." For 
more on this see Chapter 6. 
68 Schuyt, Tussen Macht en Moraal, Over de Plaats Van het Recht in Verzorgingsstaat en Democratie 
(Between Power and Morality, on the Place of Law in the Welfare State and Democracy). 182-3 
69 Masilingi, Social-Economic Problems Experienced in Compliance and Enforcement in Tanzania  68 
70 Ibid. 69 
71 Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries, The Theory of the Prismatic Society. 
72 What is written here about enforcement institutions also applies to institutions that apply 
the law, such as permit agencies or EIA bureaus. Because application of law is outside of the 
scope of this study it is not further addressed here. 
73 For more see Chapter 12 
74 For this see Jong, Handhaafbaar milieurecht (Enforceable Environmental Law).  
75 Kagan, "Regulatory Enforcement." 396-7 
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violations can for example be detected visually from a rather long distance, 
whereas water pollution, especially non-point source violations are difficult 
to trace back to the polluting source if there are multiple possible violators in 
the vicinity. For developing countries, whose enforcement agencies often 
lack resources to carry out sufficient inspections, and where infrastructure is 
often lacking, making some regulated actors difficult to visit, concerns about 
the enforcement feasibility of legislation are especially important.  
In sum, the first two characteristics of good legislation in terms of 
compliance and enforcement stand largely opposed. Adequate legislation 
requires strict rules with a large scope of application, while feasible legislation 
has rules that are less stringent and with a limited scope of application as 
they should be possible, acceptable and practical.76 Implementable legislation 
balances both characteristics and makes balanced norms in terms of the right 
level of strictness, scope of application and practicality for enforcement.  
Certainty 
The third aspect of good legislation in terms of compliance and enforcement 
is the law’s certainty. Certainty, meaning that there is as little 
misunderstanding about what rules mean, is a standard part of most studies 
of legislative quality. Legal rules should be as certain as possible and 
vagueness and ambiguity in legal drafts should be avoided. 77 The importance 
of certainty is no surprise as legal certainty and its related predictability are 
essential in the influential rule of law doctrine. 78 Furthermore, certainty is 
also closely related to legality, also an important legal doctrine 79 , as 
                                                     
76 In the Dutch quality requirements for legislation, the term efficiency has been used to weigh 
the costs and benefits of legislation. Furthermore the requirement of subsidiarity and 
proportionality are used to seek a balance between the goals of the law and its wider effects 
on society, here covered in adequacy and feasibility. See Klosse et al., Op Zoek Naar Kwaliteit, 
Een onderzoek naar de  toepassing en operationalisering van wetgevingskwaliteitseisen (Searching for Quality, 
Research on the application and operationalization of requirements for legislative quality). 9, 11-13  
77 G.C. Thornton, Legislative Drafting (London: Butterworths, 1987). 56 Seidman, Seidman, and 
Abeyesekere, Legislative Drafting for Democratic Social Change, a manual for drafters. 255 Fuller, The 
Morality of Law. 38-9, 63, 65, 79 F.A. Hayek, The Political Idea of the Rule of Law (Cairo: National 
Bank of Egypt, 1955). 34 quoted though B.Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law History, Politics, 
Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 66, for studies specifically about 
environmental legislation see: Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement, Regulation and the Social 
Definition of Pollution. 32 Wasserman, "Principles of Environmental Enforcement". 52  Baldwin, 
Rules and Government. 177 analyzing I. Ehrlich and R. Posner, "An Economic Analysis of Legal 
Rulemaking," Journal of Legal Studies 3 (1974).  
78 Fuller, The Morality of Law. 38-9, 63, 65, 79 Seidman, Seidman, and Abeyesekere, Legislative 
Drafting for Democratic Social Change, a manual for drafters. 255 Hayek, The Political Idea of the Rule of 
Law. 34 quoted though Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law History, Politics, Theory. 66,  
79  Fuller, The Morality of Law. Veerman, De Wet als Zinsbegoochelingstoestel, Over Kwaliteit van 
Wetgeving (The Law as Spell-Machine for the Senses, On the Quality of Legislation) (Inaugural Lecture). 
Voermans et al., Quality, Implementation and Enforcement, A Study into the Quality of EC rules and the 
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contradictory rules, or rules that are not in accordance with higher-level rules 
do not have a clear status and therefore offer less certainty. But what does 
certainty mean for compliance and enforcement?  
For compliance, certain law is beneficial as it is more predictable and 
allows people to know what is expected of them in advance.80 Knowing and 
understanding a rule is a first requirement for complying with a rule.81 Rules 
that are too complex for the regulated actor to understand will lead to less 
compliance. Similarly, vague rules which offer no guidance as to what the 
norm addressee is to do, will also have a lower chance of achieving 
compliance. Contradictory rules are the most extreme example as they do 
propose contradictory models of conduct.82 Another aspect of certainty for 
compliance is that clearer and more specific rules serve better to limit the 
desired behavioral change within the goals of the law. Whereas there can be 
no debate about what compliance with a specific norm will accomplish, it is 
uncertain what compliance with a vague norm will achieve. Legal certainty is 
thus important for guaranteeing that legislation achieves what it set out to 
do.83  
Certainty is also important for law enforcement. First, because, 
clearer rules, both substantive norms, as well as norms on enforcement 
procedures, help to limit agent discretion. As Seidman et al. write: “When the 
laws speak vaguely or ambiguously, even honest officials fall back on 
                                                                                                                        
impact on the implementation and enforcement wihtin the Netherlands ([cited). Klosse et al., Op Zoek 
Naar Kwaliteit, Een onderzoek naar de  toepassing en operationalisering van wetgevingskwaliteitseisen 
(Searching for Quality, Research on the application and operationalization of requirements for legislative 
quality). Bracke, Voorwaarden voor Goede EG-Wetgeving, Een Onderzoek naar de kwaliteit van Europese 
wetgeving (Requirements for Good European Community Legislation, Research about the Quality of 
European Legislation). 
80 Seidman, Seidman, and Abeyesekere, Legislative Drafting for Democratic Social Change, a manual 
for drafters. 255 
81 Huisman, Tussen Winst en Moraal, Achtergronden van Regelnaleving en Regelovertreding door 
Ondernemingen (Between Profit and Morality, The Backgrounds to Enterprise Compliance and Violation), 
W. Voermans, "Weten van Wetgeving (Knowing the Law)," Regelmaat 2004, no. 5 (2004). 156, 
Kagan and Scholz, "The "Criminology of the Corporation" and Regulatory Enforcement 
Strategies." . Dutch Ministry of Justice Law Enforcement Expertise Centre. The Table of Eleven, 
A Versatile Tool (2004 [cited 31 July 2005]); available from 
http://www.sam.gov.lv/images/modules/items/PDF/item_618_NL_The_table_of_Eleven.
pdf.  
82  In developing countries knowledge and understanding of the law is extra challenging. 
Literacy rates are generally lower, as is the level of education. The difference between the 
written elite’s national language and the local vernaculars only exacerbates the problem. With 
a weak state and a weak infrastructure dissemination of rules to the regulated actor poses a 
significant effort, which cannot be taken for granted as it would be in smaller developed 
countries such as the Netherlands.  
83 Seidman, Seidman, and Abeyesekere, Legislative Drafting for Democratic Social Change, a manual 
for drafters. 255 
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personal values and attitudes, and dishonest ones, their material interests: 
development and good governance cannot survive in this environment; 
kleptocracy takes over.”84 Less discretion can help prevent capture-like85 or 
corruptive practices, 86  which may especially problematic in non-Western 
contexts and should be a major concern for lawmakers there. Second, 
certainty also helps law enforcement because it makes it easier to ascertain 
and prove whether behavior is in compliance or violation of the law.87  
Legal certainty demands rules that are as specific as possible. 
Seidman et. al. have made a comprehensive study of how to make such 
precise legal rules. Their “manual for drafters” provides legislators with a list 
of do-s and don’t-s for more precise legislation that includes avoiding vague 
and ambiguous words and modifiers. 88  However, there are limitations to 
attaining such certainty. Legal philosopher Hart has taught that vagueness, 
even if we wanted to, can never be avoided completely because of language’s 
limited ability to offer precision.89 But even if one could make a language that 
attained full certainty, absolute legal certainty would not be a wise option, 
because of the uncertainty and unpredictability inherent to social reality.  
Adaptability 
Implementation of law involves interpreting the law to a specific situation, in 
this research either by the regulated actor, or by the enforcement agent. Such 
interpretation requires norms to be adaptable to different circumstances. 
Adaptability is thus the fourth characteristic of implementable legislation. 
 There are several reasons why adaptability is likely to increase 
compliance. First, norms that are not adaptable to actual and future 
circumstances may lead to situations where they are difficult to comply with 
or unreasonable. The more complex the situation that is regulated and the 
more limited the resources for preparation a lawmaker has, and the less 
participation there is in the lawmaking process, the higher the chances are 
that the laws made without sufficient room for interpretation do not take 
such circumstances into account. Adaptable rules are especially important in 
non-Western countries90, which may on the one hand be characterized by 
                                                     
84 Ibid. 257 
85 Berman, A Bill Becomes a Law, Congress Enacts Civil Rights Legislation. 
86 Klitgaard makes this point linking corruption with discretion. See R. Klitgaard, Controlling 
Corruption (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). 
87 Bardach and Kagan, Going by the Book, The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness. 35, Jong, 
Handhaafbaar milieurecht (Enforceable Environmental Law). 
88 Seidman, Seidman, and Abeyesekere, Legislative Drafting for Democratic Social Change, a manual 
for drafters. 262-3, 266-7, 277 
89 Hart, The Concept of Law. 124-5 
90 But not exclusively. Witteveen has argued that in the Netherlands the use of open worded 
norms has become more important given the increased complexity of society and the 
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weak legislative institutions and limited participation and on the other by 
complex social circumstances involving multi-ethnicity, overlapping 
normative systems and rapid changes due to the development process.  
Adaptability is also likely good for compliance because adaptable, 
more openly worded norms allow the regulated actor, to find the most cost-
efficient way of complying with the law. Bardach and Kagan’s discussion of 
air pollution regulation for copper smelters in the US is illustrative. They 
argue for more adaptable regulation when stating that even for the 16 major 
copper smelters in operation in 1982, “a single government prescribed 
control technology, such as acid plants or sulfur dioxide liquefiers—
machinery that can cost millions of dollars—has worked well in some plants 
but has proved useless in others.” 91  Following the same argumentation 
scholarship has argued for goal-oriented pollution control instruments 
instead of detailed regulation that proscribes certain abatement methods.92 
The World Bank, for instance, strongly favors the use of pollution charges, 
which it argues have been successfully used in Colombia and the 
Philippines.93 
Furthermore, even if a lawmaker would know about all complexities 
of a social phenomenon, understanding its causes and cures, regulating such 
phenomenon in all complexity while maintaining clear and specific rules 
would be unworkable. Bardach and Kagan make this point clearly when 
discussing occupational health regulation in the US, quoting an inspector: 
“We regulate worker safety and health in almost five million workplaces. 
They are extremely varied. If we had rules that were exactly suited to each 
hazard and each situation in every one of those workplaces, the inspector’s 
manual would have to be transported in a truck.”94 One can imagine what 
                                                                                                                        
impossibility of legislators to fully oversee such complex processes. Dutch legislators have 
resorted to what he calls communicative legislation, which although highly aspirational, allows 
for considerable interpretation and thus debate about the law’s norms. W. Witteveen, 
"Turning to Communication to Study Legislation," in Social and Symbolic Effects of Legislation 
Under the Rule of Law, ed. N Zeegers, W Witteveen, and B v Klink (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen 
Press, 2005). 
91 Bardach and Kagan, Going by the Book, The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness. 35 
92  Gunningham, Grabosky, and Sinclair, Smart Regulation, Designing Environmental Policy. 
Blackman, "Informal Sector Pollution Control: What Policy Options Do We Have?" 
93 World Bank, Greening Industry, New Roles for Communities, Markets and Governments.37-44 For 
some doubt about this success see Blackman, "Colombia's Discharge Fee Program: Incentives 
for Pollutors or Regulators?", Blackman, "Economic Incentives to Control Water Pollution in 
Developing Countries, How Well Has Colombia's Wastewater Discharge Fee Program 
Worked and Why?" 
94 Bardach and Kagan, Going by the Book, The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness. 5 
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such an enormous amount of rules would mean for compliance. One way95 
to solve this problem is by making more abstract, open, adaptable rules that 
leave room for interpretation both to the norm addressee as well as to the 
law enforcer, without having to make a separate specific legal norm for each 
situation.  
 For enforcement, adaptable legislation offers enforcement agents 
the freedom of decision-making they need to engage in effective 
enforcement action. In the study of enforcement, rigid enforcement 
strategies have been increasingly questioned.96 Most scholars now agree that 
successful enforcement is about attempting to achieve compliance first 
through cooperation and non-repressive mechanisms, and only when those 
fail, to fall back on strict sanctions and deterrent methods. 97  Achieving 
cooperation means that enforcement agents need the freedom sometimes 
not to use sanctions for certain violations, or to use only minor sanctions. In 
addition, attaining compliance requires understanding the regulated actor and 
adapting the type of enforcement sanction to the regulated actors’ 
circumstances and behavior, which necessitates adaptable norms.98 Minimum 
sanction statutes, especially using minima that are relatively stringent, may 
obstruct such cooperative enforcement, and in fact may cause regulatory 
unreasonableness.  
 To achieve adaptable legislation, legal rules should be more abstract 
and open norms should be used99. Such open norms can better represent the 
complex interests of society, and furthermore they can be interpreted to fit 
different cases. Adaptable, abstract law is thus well geared to strike a balance 
between different interests, allowing such balance to be struck during the 
implementation process. However, the problem is that abstract legislation 
offers no control over the expected outcomes because it enables a high level 
of discretion to both the regulated actor and the enforcement agent. Thus we 
                                                     
95 Another way is simplifying the rules while maintaining certainty and have clear and specific 
rules that will be unreasonable and unfeasible for many other situations.  As Bardach and 
Kagan suggest has happened during the 1970s in the US. Ibid. 5  
96  M. Aalders, "Moving Beyond Command and Control: Reflexivity in the regulation of 
occupational safety and health and the environment," Law & Policy 19 (1997). K. Kuperan, 
"Blue Water Crime: Deterrence, Legitimacy, and Compliance in Fisheries," Law & Society 
Review 32, no. 2 (1998). 309, J. Braithwaite and T. Makkai, "Testing an Expected Utility Model 
of Corporate Deterrence," Law & Society Review 25, no. 1 (1991). Kagan and Scholz, "The 
"Criminology of the Corporation" and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies." 
97 See Chapter 12 
98 Kagan and Scholz, "The "Criminology of the Corporation" and Regulatory Enforcement 
Strategies." Huisman, Tussen Winst en Moraal, Achtergronden van Regelnaleving en Regelovertreding door 
Ondernemingen (Between Profit and Morality, The Backgrounds to Enterprise Compliance and Violation). 
99  Luhmann makes this point, see G. Teubner, "Substantive and Reflexive Elements in 
Modern Law," Law and Society Review 17, no. 2 (1983). 244 See also Hart, The Concept of 
Law.125-7 
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find that good legislation, in terms of its implementability, is characterized 
both by legal certainty and adaptability 100 : Legal certainty to control the 
outcomes of the implementation process and adaptability to apply the law to 
the complexities of social reality and to balance different interests in the law 
that are necessary to maintain the law’s feasibility and adequacy. Alternatively, 
following Hart we can say that certainty and adaptability are “the Scylla and 
Charybdis of juristic theory; they are great exaggerations…and the truth lies 
between them.”101  
 In sum, adequacy, feasibility, certainty and adaptability are 
characteristics of implementable legislation.102 As these four characteristics 
are partly contradictory legislation that scores high on all four accounts is 
difficult to make. In many cases, a balance between adequacy and feasibility 
and between certainty and adaptability must be sought.103 For adequacy and 
feasibility the balance is largely found on the continuum of the law’s level of 
behavioral change sought, or in other words its strictness, which includes its 
scope of application: the stricter or more demanding the more adequate but 
less feasible. For certainty and adaptability, the balance is largely found on 
the continuum of the level of abstraction of the rules: the more abstract the 
more adaptable and the less certain.  
Communicative Effects of Legislation 
So far, the analysis above has been based on an idea of direct instrumentality. 
It has looked at what direct effects the norms in the law are expected to have 
on compliance, enforcement and goal attainment. Another way to look at the 
quality of legislation is by looking at its indirect effects on society through its 
                                                     
100  Here we have been influenced by Jong’s concept of enforceability which also makes 
certainty and adaptability central. See Jong, Handhaafbaar milieurecht (Enforceable Environmental 
Law). For more about the concept of enforeability see Van Rooij, "The Enforceability of 
Chinese Water Pollution Regulations, What Room for Improvement?" 
101 Hart, The Concept of Law. 144 
102 Even unimplementable legislation can lead to compliance and effective enforcement. This 
is however due to other circumstances outside of the law. An example is a highly repressive 
state where unfeasible norms are strictly enforced, with disregard of local acceptance. China’s 
one child policy is a good example of such a situation where an uncertain, and unfeasible 
norm was according to some scholars strongly enforced and led to a behavioral change. Here 
the repressiveness of the enforcement was central. 
103 Klosse’s study on Dutch legislative quality requirements has paid attention to the tensions 
between these requirements. Similarly Bardach and Kagan have indicated tensions between 
the four requirements as described above. See Klosse et al., Op Zoek Naar Kwaliteit, Een 
onderzoek naar de  toepassing en operationalisering van wetgevingskwaliteitseisen (Searching for Quality, 
Research on the application and operationalization of requirements for legislative quality). 264-6, Bardach 
and Kagan, Going by the Book, The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness. 
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communicative workings.104  Dutch scholars have developed ideas of how 
law can influence society in indirect ways through what they call the 
“communicative” approach to law. The idea behind this is that legislation 
can “articulate community values in such a way as to prompt discussion, 
interpretation and lawmaking in the community itself.” 105  Under this 
approach, social behavior, including that of the regulated actor, may be 
influenced by the language, the thoughts and the symbolism of the law. This 
includes for example the law’s influence on society through its cognitive 
function, offering a “vocabulary for thinking and speaking which provides a 
specific access to reality.” 106  It also includes the law’s symbolic function 
where agreement on aspirational norms forms a symbol, which even though 
not enforceable, may influence citizen behavior. Similarly, the 
communicative approach to law argues that norm addressees have 
sometimes, even unconsciously, internalized the norms contained in the 
law. 107  All of this means that even when the direct instrumental 
characteristics for implementable legislation are not there and even when 
enforcement is lacking, a law, which has a significant amount of 
communicative and symbolic qualities may still achieve compliance.108   
Law Making in China: Top-Down, From Abstract and Weak to 
Specific and Strict  
How has China fared in terms of implementable legislation? A cursory glance 
at some of the literature tells us, not too well. China’s post-reform 
lawmaking has often been characterized as vague109 , contradictory110  and 
                                                     
104 B.v. Klink, "An effective-historical view on the symbolic working of law," in Social and 
Symbolic Effects of Legislation Under the Rule of Law, ed. N Zeegers, W Witteveen, and B v Klink 
(Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2005). Witteveen, "Turning to Communication to Study 
Legislation." J. Griffiths, "An introduction in eight propositions to the social working 
approach to legislation," in Social and Symbolic Effects of Legislation Under the Rule of Law, ed. N 
Zeegers, W Witteveen, and B v Klink (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2005), Griffiths, "The 
Social Working of Legal Rules." 
105 Witteveen, "Turning to Communication to Study Legislation." 
106 Ibid. 31 
107  M. Galanter, "The Perplexities of Legal Effectiveness," in Social and Symbolic Effects of 
Legislation under the Rule of Law, ed. N Zeegers, W Witteveen, and B v Klink (Lewiston: Edwin 
Mellen Press, 2005). xvii 
108 The present study does not specifically research the communicative effects of legislation, 
simply because understanding such subtle causalities is beyond the limited data that has been 
available for this work. This is not to say that communicative effects are not important. 
Whenever such effects are apparent, they will of course be mentioned.   
109  R. Peerenboom, China's Long March toward the Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002).251, P.H. Corne, Foreign Investment in China, The Administrative Legal 
System (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1997)., S.S. Cho, "Continuing Economic 
Reform in the People's Republic of China: Bankruptcy Legislation Leads the Way," Hastings 
International and Comparative Law Review 19 (1996).750, V.M.-Y. Hung, "China's WTO 
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weak.111 Legislation in China has been made in this manner partly due to a 
legislative strategy adopted to cope with the challenges China faced after 
1978 and partly  because of changes in China’s political system. Recently 
there have been trends that suggest change, however. The question is 
whether the changes lead to legislation that is more implementable. The 
cases of natural resource protection lawmaking discussed further on in Part I 
(see Chapter 3 and 4) are examples of these new trends and should be 
studied against the background of the recent history of lawmaking in China 
and its recent changes. 
 After Mao, China came to face the enormous legislative challenge of 
how to reestablish the world’s largest legal system. When Deng started 
reform in 1978, there was not much to start with. Decades of revolution and 
internal struggle had left China literally lawless.112 The country had internal 
CCP norms instead of legislation, policy instead of law.113 China was in a 
hurry and the first legislation was largely made in a top-down manner, 
through legal transplantation114 from abroad, or by translating policy into 
legislation.115 While China set to make new legislation, the country started to 
                                                                                                                        
Commitment on the Independent Judicial Review: Impact on Legal And Political Reform," 
American Journal of Comparative Law 52 (2004). 101-2, J.M. Otto and Y. Li, "An Overview of 
Law-Making in China," in Law-Making in the People's Republic of China, ed. J M Otto, et al. (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000).11, P. Keller, "The National People's Congress and 
the Making of National Law," in Lawmaking in the People's Republic of China, ed. J M Otto, et al. 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000). 
110 Chen, Chinese Law, Towards an Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and Development. 119. 
Peerenboom, China's Long March toward the Rule of Law.256-262 Here we will not discuss 
inconsitancy in detail because it falls outside of the scope of the present study.  
111 Corne, Foreign Investment in China, The Administrative Legal System. 
112 Chen, Chinese Law, Towards an Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and Development. 40 
113 H. Von Senger, "Ideology and Law-making," in Lawmaking in the People's Republic of China, 
ed. J M Otto, et al. (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000)., Chen, Chinese Law, Towards 
an Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and Development. 40 
114  L. Su, "Bianfa, Fazhi ji Bentu Ziyuan (Change of law, Rule of law and its Native 
Resources)," Zhongwai Faxue 5, no. 1 (1996)., A.H.Y. Chen, "Socialist Law, Civil Law, 
Common Law, and the Classification of Contemporary Chinese Law," in Lawmaking in the 
People's Republic of China, ed. J M Otto, et al. (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000)., 
Chen, Chinese Law, Towards an Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and Development. 49-55 For 
studies on the concept of legal transplants see R. Cotterrell, "Is there a logic of legal 
transplants?" in Adapting Legal Cultures, ed. D Nelken and J Feest (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2001), L.M. Friedman, "Some Comments on Cotterrell and Legal Transplants," in Adapting 
Legal Cultures, ed. D Nelken and J Feest (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001), D. Nelken, 
"Towards a Sociology of Legal Adaptation," in Adapting Legal Cultures, ed. D Nelken and J 
Feest (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001), Seidman and Seidman, State and Law in the Development 
Process, Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law. 
115 Peerenboom, China's Long March toward the Rule of Law.247 Chen, Chinese Law, Towards an 
Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and Development. 42 Our analysis in this paragraph is 
again focused on lawmaking in its relation to implementation and implementability. As such it 
is somewhat different from existing studies of Chinese lawmaking that have focused on the 
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transform fast under reform. China’s leadership was aware of the great 
challenge it faced when deciding to make new legislation for a large unitary 
country with great regional differences and that was rapidly changing. 
Furthermore, China lacked experience with law and lawmaking because of 
the preceding revolutionary period.116  
 To meet these challenges China adopted the so-called “piece meal” 
approach to legislation.117 The piece meal approach meant that first abstract 
general rules were made that could later be specified in lower level, mainly 
administrative legislation. It also meant that sometimes, legislation was first 
adopted on a trial basis and only later by the end of the 1980s and in the 
1990s was changed into regular legislation.118 Another aspect of the piece 
meal approach was that national legislation should not be too strict in order 
to enable local adaptation in local legislation.119 This was done, because in 
China’s unitary legal system, local law may only be as strict as or stricter than 
national law.120 Thus, the piece-meal approach meant that legislation was 
highly abstract and not too strict, making it adaptable and feasible, but also 
uncertain and inadequate.121 
 The corporatist and incrementalist process of lawmaking in post-
Mao China further enhanced the law’s vagueness and weakness. Whereas 
pre-reform CCP policy was largely an elitist affair122, under Deng politics 
became bargaining, between national power holders and provinces and 
between different national ministries.123 Because of the bargaining, national 
lawmaking also became corporatist and incremental.124 The various parties 
involved in the drafting process only enacted new legislation after a 
                                                                                                                        
role of the party on the lawmaking process Peerenboom, China's Long March toward the Rule of 
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Standford University Press, 1999). 147 
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123 S.L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1993). 
124 Tanner, The Politics of Lawmaking in China.22-8, 47 
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compromise on the main issues of contention was reached. The result was a 
compromise: more abstract or watered-down, weaker legislation.  
Lawmaking in China is largely a top-down process. Unlike the 
continental civil law countries in Europe, Chinese legislators have hardly 
made legislation by means of codification of existing norms. Instead, most 
new legislation has been based on foreign models125 or on policy made in to 
legislation. 126  Furthermore, China still lacks an institutionalized system 
through which societal norms can move bottom-up to become part of the 
national legal system. Adjudication does not have any legal effect outside of 
the case in question.127 This is in contrast with Western Europe’s continental 
legal systems where case law gradually has become an important source of 
law, indispensable for developing national doctrines of interpreting 
vagueness and ambiguity in national legislation.128 Because of the lack of case 
law, legislation needs more specific rules to attain certainty, because any 
room for interpretation leaves virtual full discretion to those applying the law, 
instead of the legal doctrines that have developed through case law in civil 
law systems of Western Europe. Lacking such a system of case law China’s 
legislator will have to make clearer, more specific legislation.129  However, in 
a country as large as China and lacking a pluralist political system top-down 
lawmaking that still reflects different interests and is feasible with local 
circumstances is extremely difficult. Lacking a bottom-up system, Chinese 
legislators have to anticipate what happens at the bottom level and in future 
circumstances. The obstructed vertical information flow that characterizes a 
non-pluralist political system makes this very difficult, while the rapid 
changes in China’s reform society add further complexity.  
While the piecemeal approach, bargaining and top-down process 
have been apt descriptions of lawmaking in reform China, recently there 
                                                     
125 Chen, "Socialist Law, Civil Law, Common Law, and the Classification of Contemporary 
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have been trends that seem to indicate changes.130 First, the necessity for the 
piece-meal approach has decreased over the last decade. Since China adopted 
the market economy in 1992, reform has matured and slowed to a more 
regular phase with less dramatic structural changes for society. Consequently, 
society and law could become more stable as they could now adapt to 
reform. 131  Furthermore, China has gained sufficient experience with 
lawmaking and establishing a legal system to make more stable less 
experimental legislation. Second, China has come under pressure to make 
more specific and stricter legislation in order to enhance legal certainty and 
the adequacy of some of its laws. Part of the pressure has come from within 
with leaders complaining about weak legislation or vague rules and Chinese 
scholars criticizing the piece meal approach132, and part from outside, for 
instance through China’s international obligations under the WTO133 or from 
international scholarship134.  
China’s adoption of the Yifa Zhiguo (Ruling the Country on the Basis 
of Law) principle  has been an important part of this development.135  This 
principle, which was laid down in the constitution in 1999, demands that 
legislation serves as a basis for government. Following this, China has now 
enacted the Law on Lawmaking to ameliorate its legislation. Furthermore, 
since the late 1990s legislation has become increasingly specific. Examples 
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are the 1996 and 1997 Criminal Procedure Law and Criminal Law 
amendments 136  and the 1999 Contract Law 137 . Former notoriously weak 
legislation has also become stricter. Environmental law provides ample 
examples with the 2000 Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law and the 
2002 Environmental Impact Assessment Law.  
 An important aspect of China’s legislative system is local legislation, 
which forms and important source of law. Local legislation could 
theoretically provide a specific, yet more legitimate alternative to the overly 
specific national legislation. Does China not have as many local regulations 
as it has different dialects?138 Indeed, lawmaking in China has a decentralized 
dimension. 139  Provinces have the authority to make local rules and 
regulations 140 , and at times, they have delegated this authority to the 
municipal and district level. Even township and villages have their own little 
laws, the cunguiminyue, or the village statutes; these are an old form of writing 
down local taboos and customs, which under communism have become a 
means of communicating party norms. Under Chinese law, local regulation 
may only exist if it is in accordance with higher legislation or if no higher 
legislation exists.141 Because localities are highly independent, there have been 
instances where local legislation is in blatant conflict with increasingly 
specific national law.142 In other cases, which will be discussed in more detail 
here for the Dianchi Lake area, local regulation is not much more than a 
copy of national legislation and therefore it hardly adopts national norms to 
local circumstances. 
 The following chapters will look in more detail at how the process 
of lawmaking in China has influenced its implementability and how changes 
in natural resource protection law have affected the law’s quality in terms of 
compliance and enforcement. First, Chapter 3 portrays the 1998 Land 
Management Act amendment and then Chapter 4 studies the lawmaking 
processes of the 1996 Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law, the 
2000 Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law and the 2002 Environmental 
Impact Assessment Law. Both chapters also analyze the implementability of 
relevant local legislation.  
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      3.  Bargaining on the Land Bill 
How Central Concerns for Food Security Lead 
to Stricter Legislation  
  
Introduction 
In 1994, Lester Brown predicted that China would soon face food 
shortages. 1  The country’s rapidly growing population got richer and 
urbanized and started to eat more food of a higher order in the food chain 
and thus more land was needed while actually the urbanization and 
industrialization had only cost land.2 Soon, Brown predicted, China would 
have to import amounts of food not available at the global food market.3 
Central in his analysis is the causal relationship between food security and 
arable land protection. In 1996, China’s prime minister, Li Peng was to join 
the international World Food Summit organized by the FAO in Rome. In 
preparation for the meeting and in response to mounting international 
pressure following Brown’s widely quoted publication, Li Peng asked his 
subordinates to prepare a detailed study on China’s land reserves. When such 
report was presented, it became apparent that China’s arable land reserves 
had indeed decreased at an alarming rate.4 During the FAO World Food 
Security Conference held in Rome, November 1996, Li Peng announced that 
China would solve food problems based on self-supporting policy and her 
own resources.5 This series of incidents marked a major change in China’s 
land legislation, leading to a new land law with strict and specific norms to 
prevent and stop further arable land loss.  
History has made Chinese leaders aware of the importance and 
challenges of food security and the protection of arable land. Famine has 
plagued China for centuries. Faced with one of the lowest amounts of per 
capita arable land and the largest absolute population in the world, the risk of 
food shortage has been real. In the last major famine during the Great Leap 
                                                     
1 L.R. Brown, "Who Will Feed China?" World Watch, no. September/October (1994). This 
paragraph is based on Brown’s book on  the topic, see L.R. Brown, Who Will Feed China? 
Wake-Up Call for a Small Planet (New York: W.W.Norton & Company, Inc., 1995). Smil made 
a similar but more nuanced warning, see Smil, China's Environmental Crisis: an inquiry into the 
limits of national development. 53-7, 140-9. For criticism on Brown’s use of Chinese data and his 
analysis in general see Smil, China's Past, China's Future, Energy, Food, Environment. 
2 Brown, "Who Will Feed China?" 
3 For criticism on Brown’s use of Chinese data and his analysis in general see Smil, China's Past, 
China's Future, Energy, Food, Environment.. 
4 Based on an interview with a Chinese land management expert closely involved with land 
related lawmaking. Aril 2005. 
5  SEPA, Progress Report of Trade Liberalization in the Agriculture Sector and the Environment with 
Specific Focus on the Rice Sector in China (UNEP, 2003 [cited July  25 2006]); available from 
http://www.unep.ch/etb/events/Events2003/pdf/FinalDraftofChinaStudy.pdf. 
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Forward (1957-1960), the largest in world history6, an estimated 30 million 
Chinese perished. Ever since, food security has been a priority of China’s 
leaders. After the great leap, China’s hunger for arable land incurred a 
destruction of nature, as forests on mountain slopes were cut to make rice 
paddies, and lakes were converted to arable land.7 Still arable land continued 
to decline, especially since Deng’s reform program started in 1978, 
industrialization and urbanization converted arable land to construction use. 
In an effort to control the loss of arable land, China adopted the Land 
Management Act in 1986. When even after that, arable lad loss continued in 
the early nineties, China’s central leadership, likely under the influence of 
Brown’s warning and Li Peng’s study, became convinced it had to strengthen 
its existing legal and institutional structures for the management of land 
resources. The amendments to the 1986 Land Law took place in 1998 and 
led to a stricter and more specific law, geared towards a better protection of 
China’s arable land. 8 
 The present research is about the impact of changes in China’s 
natural resource protection legislation, lawmaking and enforcement 
processes on compliance with such legislation. (See Chapter 1) Here a part of 
this question is addressed, by looking at the manner arable land protection 
legislation has been changed and how this change has possibly affected the 
law’s implementability (i.e. its chances for achieving compliance, effective 
enforcement and goal attainment). Based on the analytical frameworks on 
the process and quality of legislation introduced in Chapter 2, it will describe 
the debates about proposed amendments related to arable land protection 
and analyze what the effect has been of those debates on the quality of the 
legislation finally adopted. In addition, this chapter analyzes the 
implementability of Yunnan provincial, municipal and village legislation 
about arable land protection from Yunnan province.  
                                                     
6 Smil, China's Past, China's Future, Energy, Food, Environment. 
7 J. Shapiro, Mao's war against nature: politics and the environment in revolutionary China (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
8  Arable land protection was not the only issue regulated in the 1998 amendment. The 
lawmakers also took the opportunity to codify existing land ownership and land tenure policy 
into legislation. In the early phase of reform at the local level, there had been experiments 
with different types of land tenure for households in order to boost production. The 
Household Responsibility System unified such experiments under one policy, choosing some 
local practices over others and establishing a system of 15-year land use rights for households. 
Under influence of institutional economics, believing that land tenure security will lead to an 
increase in productivity and investment in land there was a need to expand the existing 
policies in the land legislation.  Y. Yang, Zhongguo Nongdiquan Jiben Wenti, Zhongguo Jiti nongdi 
quanli tixi de xingcheng yu tuozhan (Fundamental Problems of Rural Land Rights in China, The 
Formation and Development of Collective Rural Land Rights) (Bejing: Zhongguo Haiguan Chubanshe, 
2003). 
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The Chronology of the Lawmaking Procedure of the 1998 Land 
Management Act Amendment 
Faced with the fact that since the 1986 LMA had been adopted an average of 
10 million mu of arable land was still lost annually until 1995, 9  China’s 
highest leaders, the CCP Central Committee and the State Council, sought 
changes. They blamed ongoing arable land loss to local malpractices. Such 
malpractices had continued despite the fact that the national Land 
Management Law and legal institutions for implementation of the arable 
protection legislation had been in place for more than ten years.10 In 1997, in 
order to deal with this problem the CCP Central Committee and State 
Council issued a notice demanding the strengthening of macro level 
management of land resources.11 This notice initiate an amendment to the 
LMA.  
 On 11 April 1998, the National People’s Congress Environmental 
and Resource Protection (NPC-EP) Committee12 submitted a draft proposal 
for an amendment to the 1986 Land Management Law.13 Two weeks later, 
on 29 April, the NPC Standing Committee Legal Affairs Office (LAO) 
published a first draft of the amendment to the Land Management Act.14 
This publication quoted the State Council, emphasizing the importance of 
this amendment for “the basic position of agriculture, the interests of 
China’s 900 million farmers, and the children and grandchildren of the 
Chinese people.” 15  After this, in May and June 1998, the NPC Legal 
Committee, the NPC-EP Committee, the NPC Agriculture and Village 
Committee and LAO, jointly organized several work meetings and research 
sessions.16 During the work meetings relevant departments, political parties17 
                                                     
9 NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office, "Shiyi (Commentary)," in Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudi 
Guanlifa Shiyi (Commentary on the Prc Land Management Act), ed. NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office 
(Beijing: Falü Chubanshe, 1998). 33 
10 Ibid. 33-34 
11 Ibid. 34 
12 Asian Development Bank, Reform of Environmental and Land Legislation in the People's Republic of 
China (Manilla: ADB, 2000). 98  
13  State Council, "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudiguanlifa (Xiuding Caoan) ((Draft 
Amendment of the) PRC Land Management Act)," in Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudi Guanlifa 
Shiyi (Commentary on the Prc Land Management Act), ed. NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office (Beijing: 
Falü Chubanshe, 1998).  
14  NPC-SC Bureau, "Guanyu Gongbu Tudiguanlifa (Xiuding Caoan) Zhengqiu Yijian de 
Tongzhi (Notice on Seeking Suggestions on the Draft Amendment to the Published Land 
Management Act)," in Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudi Guanlifa Shiyi (Commentary on the Prc 
Land Management Act), ed. NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office (Beijing: Falü Chubanshe, 1998). 310 
15 Ibid. 310 
16 NPC Legal Committee, "Guanyu Zhonghuarenmingongheguotudiguanlifa (Xiuding Caoan) 
Chubu Shenyi Qingkuang de Huibao (Report on the First Review of the PRC Land 
Management Act Draft Amendment)," in Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudi Guanlifa Shiyi 
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and mass organizations were asked to comment on the draft law. Also in 
May and June 1998, 31 provinces, and 47 central departments provided their 
comments and suggestions. LAO further received 611 letters with 
suggestions of citizens on the published legal draft.  
 After receiving the initial input, the NPC Legal Committee 
organized three conferences, also in June, to discuss the various comments. 
Based on this it made first suggestions for changing the initial draft, 18 
summarized in its Report on the Initial Review of the Draft Amendment to 
the PRC Land Management Act of 6 June 1998.19 Two months later, on 17 
August, 1998, the NPC Legal Committee issued a report in which it 
summarized its findings based on a input from all provinces, 25 large cities, 
52 central departments, 173 letters from local work units, and another 502 
letters from citizens, of which one was signed by 836 people. Finally, on 28 
August 1998 the Legal Committee reported its suggestions for revising the 
initial draft to the NPC Standing Committee (NPC-SC)20, which adopted the 
law on 29 August 1998, with a total of 141 votes cast, 139 in favor, 2 
withheld, and none against.21 The law became effective for implementation 
as of 1 January 1999.22  
 The organization of the amendment procedure shows that although 
many were allowed to provide comments and input, only one organ, the 
NPC Legal Committee had the authority to channel these inputs into the 
final draft to be presented to the NPC-SC for final approval.  
                                                                                                                        
(Commentary on the Prc Land Management Act), ed. NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office (Beijing: Falü 
Chubanshe, 1998). 311 
17 China has a limited amount of political parties that are allowed to exist by the dominant 
CCP. These parties mainly have a consultative function for government policies.  
18 NPC Legal Committee, "Guanyu Zhonghuarenmingongheguotudiguanlifa (Xiuding Caoan) 
Chubu Shenyi Qingkuang de Huibao (Report on the First Review of the PRC Land 
Management Act Draft Amendment)." 311 
19 Ibid.  
20 W. Wang, "Guanyu Gaodeng Jiaoyufa (Caoan Xin Xiugai Gao he Tudiguanlifa (Xiuding 
Caoan Xiugai Gao) Xiugai Yijian de Baogao (Report on Suggested Changes to the New 
Changed Amednment to the Higher Education Law and the Changed Draft Amendment of 
the Land Management Act)," in Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudi Guanlifa Shiyi (Commentary on 
the Prc Land Management Act), ed. NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office (Beijing: Falü Chubanshe, 
1998). 
21 Y. Bian, "Tudi Guanli de Jiben Guifan (Basic Norms of Land Management)," in Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Tudi Guanlifa Shiyi (Commentary on the Prc Land Management Act), ed. NPC-SC 
Legal Affairs Office (Beijing: Falü Chubanshe, 1998). 1 
22 We do not have sources however of how the first draft was made and what ministries 
participated and negotiatied with the first drafters. As we will see later for the Air Pollution 
and Control Law, the initial bargaining stage is extremely important. See Tanner, The Politics of 
Lawmaking in China. 211-222 
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How Debates on the Land Management Act 1998 have affected 
its Implementability  
The opinions voiced during the various meetings and conferences, and the 
many letters about the draft amendment to the LMA, raised several points of 
concern about the intended changes. These concerns had different 
influences on the final LMA, as the NPC Legal Committee followed some 
suggestions while ignoring others. In the end this influenced the LMA’s 
implementability.  
Land Use Classification System 
The Land Use Classification System is one of the LMA’s systems to protect 
arable land. It defines different types of land use: agricultural use, 
construction use and not used.23 This classification forms the basis for the 
LMA’s other systems of arable land protection that limit conversion of 
arable to non-arable use. The idea is that land is assigned a classification of 
agricultural use, construction use or unused in the land use planning made at 
the district and township level, based on general planning at higher levels of 
administration. The original State Council draft contained no provisions as 
to how this classification was to be made.24 This evoked criticism from many 
of the actors asked to review the draft. Five central level departments, 
including the Forestry Department, the Public Railways Department, the 
Department of Transportation, the Ministry of Construction, and the State 
Council Office of Institutional Reform, asked for example: 
 
“But, what is “land used for agriculture”, “land used for 
construction”, and “unused land”? And how can land use change? 
The draft contains no specific regulation on this point. We suggest, 
therefore to make specific regulations on the land use management 
system.”25 
                                                     
23 Land Management Act 1998 § 4.2 
24  State Council, "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudiguanlifa (Xiuding Caoan) ((Draft 
Amendment of the) PRC Land Management Act)." 294 § 4, 3 
25 NPC Legal Committee Economic Law Section, "Zhongyang you Guan Bumen, Qunzhong 
Tuanti dui Tudiguanlifa (Xiudingcaoan) de Yijian (Relevant CEntral Level Ministries and Mass 
Organizations Opinions on the Draft Amendment to the Land Management Act)," in 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudi Guanlifa Shiyi (Commentary on the Prc Land Management Act), ed. 
NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office (Beijing: Falü Chubanshe, 1998). 335 For another example see 
NPC Legal Committee Economic Law Section, "Gesheng, Zizhiqu, Zhixiashi dui 
Tudiguanlifa Xiuding Caoan de Yijian (Provinces, Autonomous Regions and Provincial Level 
Cities Opinions on the Draft Amendment to the Land Management Act)," in Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Tudi Guanlifa Shiyi (Commentary on the Prc Land Management Act), ed. NPC-SC Legal 
Affairs Office (Beijing: Falü Chubanshe, 1998). 374, where the Jiangxi, Sichuan, Chongqing, 




In its first review report, the NPC Legal Committee recognized this 
problem noted in the various opinions on the draft law.26 The committee 
found that the existing legislation was not specific enough and that it needed 
to be specified further. The committee changed the draft and added several 
sentences on the strict prohibition of converting agricultural land into 
construction land and added definitions of agricultural, construction and 
unused land,27 which made it into the final law.28  
Thus, the law became more specific and certain. It seems the 
advocates of this particular change in the draft, which included central level 
ministries, and also the Legal Committee, believe that a more certain law will 
be more effective in protecting arable land. While as we saw in Chapter 2, 
certainty is certainly an important variable for achieving compliance and 
effective enforcement, certain regulation of complex practices, such as 
China’s land use systems, may well have the opposite effect as it lacks 
adaptability, which may influence its feasibility.  
Land Use Planning System 
The new law establishes a top-down structure of land use planning that 
protects agricultural land.29 This is done through provincial level general land 
use plans that guarantee the quantity of existing arable land.30 Lower level 
plans must be in accordance with higher-level plans; 31  this means that 
construction land use cannot exceed, and arable land is not allowed to be less, 
than that of higher level planning.32 These provisions were already part of the 
original draft amendment.33 In order to further specify the implementation of 
the land use classification system, based on input about the draft, the NPC 
Legal Committee changed section 22 of the draft on land planning and 
detailed that at the township level the land plan should include a 
                                                                                                                        
Xinjiang, Guangdong, Hainan, Hubei, Guangxi, Shanghai and Henan all ask for more detailed 
regulation. 
26 NPC Legal Committee, "Guanyu Zhonghuarenmingongheguotudiguanlifa (Xiuding Caoan) 
Chubu Shenyi Qingkuang de Huibao (Report on the First Review of the PRC Land 
Management Act Draft Amendment)." 312- 313 
27 Ibid. 313 
28 Land Management Act 1998 § 4.2-3 
29 Land Management Act 1998 § 19.1 
30 Land Management Act 1998 § 18.3 
31 Land Management Act 1998 § 18.2 
32 Land Management Act 1998 § 18.2 
33  State Council, "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudiguanlifa (Xiuding Caoan) ((Draft 
Amendment of the) PRC Land Management Act)." § 20 and 21 
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classification of agriculture, construction or unused of all plots of township 
land.34  
During the drafting progress there was concern that some provinces 
and large cities, undergoing rapid development and urban construction, 
would not be able to guarantee the total amount of farmland present.35 It 
was proposed that provinces having difficulty to meet this target in their own 
territory could develop arable land elsewhere as compensation.36 The NPC 
Legal Committee rejected this idea. It stated that a preliminary research had 
shown that the target was realistic and furthermore that it is difficult to 
inspect cross-territory arable land compensation.37  
The NPC Legal Committee exercised its considerable power, 
probably backed by the CCP central leadership, in order to safeguard what 
they believed to be the law’s effectiveness in protecting macro level interests 
of arable land protection over local interests such as urban development. 
Although local governments were able to voice their opinion, they were not 
able to influence the final draft. As local concerns were thus not taken into 
account, adequacy and legal certainty were deemed more important than 
adaptability and feasibility. 
Arable Land Conversion Balancing System 
The new amended Land Management Act introduces a balancing system to 
safeguard arable land quantity. Under the principle of balancing the amount 
of arable land converted into construction land with the development of new 
agricultural land out of unused land the total amount of agricultural land is 
protected. 38  This system means that when arable land is converted into 
construction land, the company responsible for the conversion must develop 
a plot of unused land and develop it into arable land. 39  Provincial level 
                                                     
34 Land Management Act 1998 § 22, 2 
35 NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office, "Shiyi (Commentary)." 88, NPC Legal Committee Economic 
Law Section, "Gesheng, Zizhiqu, Zhixiashi dui Tudiguanlifa Xiuding Caoan de Yijian 
(Provinces, Autonomous Regions and Provincial Level Cities Opinions on the Draft 
Amendment to the Land Management Act)." 374-5 
36  NPC Legal Committee Economic Law Section, "Gesheng, Zizhiqu, Zhixiashi dui 
Tudiguanlifa Xiuding Caoan de Yijian (Provinces, Autonomous Regions and Provincial Level 
Cities Opinions on the Draft Amendment to the Land Management Act)." 375 
37 NPC Legal Committee, "Guanyu Zhonghuarenmingongheguotudiguanlifa (Xiuding Caoan) 
Chubu Shenyi Qingkuang de Huibao (Report on the First Review of the PRC Land 
Management Act Draft Amendment)." 317 
38 Land Management Act 1998 § 31  
39  Land Management Act 1998 § 31 The basic norm addressee for the conversion 
compensation system is the land developer. Those who wish to use arable land for non-arable 
use, are the ones who must get approval and make land reclamation compensation. In the 
legislative commentary on the LMA this is further explained . See NPC-SC Legal Affairs 
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governments perform a central role in this arable land balancing system, as 
they must safeguard this balance at the provincial level.40 Largely the land 
balancing system was part of the State Council draft. 41  The draft article 
evoked the same criticism as the provision on the provincial guarantee on 
arable land quantity.42 The NPC Legal Committee stated: 
 
“Some localities, experts and masses think that land resources 
reserves are limited and that these provisions are difficult to carry 
out, and that more arable land is converted for construction than 
unused land developed for agriculture. Nevertheless, there are also 
localities and masses that hold that if we do our best, these 
provisions can be realized.  There are some localities who think with 
regard the “Compensating the Same Amount as Was Converted” 
that if a province has difficulty developing new arable land because 
of its own particular circumstances the State Council should allow it 
to develop land elsewhere.” 
 
The NPC Legal Committee weighed the opinions on 
implementability and local exceptions, but found that land calculations had 
shown that the law is executable and there is sufficient unused land to be 
developed, and decided against changes in the law.43 Again, local concerns 
were pushed aside at the center and a strict norm protecting macro level 
interests, with no exceptions, became national law. Here again certainty and 
adequacy were preferred over feasibility and adaptability. 
Basic Arable Land Protection System 
The basic arable land protection system establishes strict approval 
procedures for the conversion of basic farmland into construction land. 
Since 1988, China has experimented setting up a system of basic farmland 
                                                                                                                        
Office, "Shiyi (Commentary)." 109-114 Only in case the developer himself cannot compensate 
with land he will pay a fee to the local government who will in turn do it for him. 
40 Land Management Act 1998 § 33  
41  State Council, "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudiguanlifa (Xiuding Caoan) ((Draft 
Amendment of the) PRC Land Management Act)." 299-300 
42 NPC Legal Committee, "Guanyu Zhonghuarenmingongheguotudiguanlifa (Xiuding Caoan) 
Chubu Shenyi Qingkuang de Huibao (Report on the First Review of the PRC Land 
Management Act Draft Amendment)." 317 NPC Legal Committee Economic Law Section, 
"Gesheng, Zizhiqu, Zhixiashi dui Tudiguanlifa Xiuding Caoan de Yijian (Provinces, 
Autonomous Regions and Provincial Level Cities Opinions on the Draft Amendment to the 
Land Management Act)." 375 
43 NPC Legal Committee, "Guanyu Zhonghuarenmingongheguotudiguanlifa (Xiuding Caoan) 
Chubu Shenyi Qingkuang de Huibao (Report on the First Review of the PRC Land 
Management Act Draft Amendment)." 317 
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protection44. This system was made into law in 1992 and 1993, 45 and is 
incorporated into the 1998 LMA, which regulates that in order to convert 
basic farmland into construction land State Council approval is necessary.46  
 The law provides that certain kinds of land are basic farmland: 
approved land producing cash crops such as wheat, cotton or (vegetable) oil, 
favorable land such as paddies, land producing staple crops and vegetables, 
experimental land used for scientific purposes, or other approved land. In 
each province, basic farmland must make up 80% of all arable land.47  
 The original draft did not provide detail as to how Basic Farmland 
was designated. During the deliberations on the draft amendment, some 
commentators felt that this should be clarified to enhance the law’s 
effectiveness in protecting arable land. The NPC Legal Committee 
supported this thesis and added further detail on this point to the draft, 
which made it into the final law.48  
 Another point of debate in the drafting process was the percentage 
of Basic Arable Land that each province must have. Hunan and Hainan for 
example felt that the percentage should be higher, while Guangdong, 
Yunnan and Henan argued for lowering the amount to 70%. 49  Qinghai, 
Shanxi and Shaanxi argued for differentiation according to local 
circumstances, and Guangxi wanted a stricter mandatory norm and proposed 
to take out the words “in general”50, which were still present in the draft text 
that read that provinces must in general have 80% basic farmland”.51 Of 
these proposals, only the Guangxi idea of a stricter mandatory norm made 
into the final law. 52  
Just as with the prior debates, here again, China’s legislator chose a 
specific and also a strict rule to protect arable land over ideas for norms that 
could be adapted to different local circumstances. While parties were allowed 
                                                     
44 NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office, "Shiyi (Commentary)." 115 
45 The system was regulated in the 1993 Agriculture Law and the 1994 State Council Basic 
Farmlan Protection Regulations. See Ibid. 115 
46 Land Management Act § 45 
47 Land Management Act § 34 
48 Land Management Act § 32.2 which states that the District level land authorities together 
with the Agricultural Office carry out this task for Township level land. 
49  NPC Legal Committee Economic Law Section, "Gesheng, Zizhiqu, Zhixiashi dui 
Tudiguanlifa Xiuding Caoan de Yijian (Provinces, Autonomous Regions and Provincial Level 
Cities Opinions on the Draft Amendment to the Land Management Act)." 375-6 
50 Ibid. 376 
51  State Council, "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudiguanlifa (Xiuding Caoan) ((Draft 
Amendment of the) PRC Land Management Act)." 300 
52 Wang, "Guanyu Gaodeng Jiaoyufa (Caoan Xin Xiugai Gao he Tudiguanlifa (Xiuding Caoan 
Xiugai Gao) Xiugai Yijian de Baogao (Report on Suggested Changes to the New Changed 
Amednment to the Higher Education Law and the Changed Draft Amendment of the Land 
Management Act)." 332 
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to raise their concern there was no real bargaining, as opinions that doubted 
the norm’s local feasibility were discarded. This further reaffirms that the 
LMA lawmaking can be characterized as top-down and corporatist, and 
based on an idea that more adequate and certain law is of better quality even 
though it loses adaptability and feasibility.  
Arable Land Conversion Approval System 
The new law provides for a procedure for using arable land for construction. 
This procedure consists of four steps: first the approval for conversion of 
land use (from arable to construction)53, second, in case collective land is 
used, the procedure for requisitioning collective land into state ownership54, 
as construction is in general only permitted on state land, third --linked to 
the requisitioning-- a system of compensation for the loss of the land use 
rights for requisitioned land, and fourth the payment for the use of state land.  
Since the LMA was amended, land use conversion approval works 
as follows. In case the land to be used to build upon is originally farmland, 
whether it is building on state owned land or collectively owned, first a 
procedure of approval for converting the land use must be completed.55 
Larger conversions must be approved by the provincial level authorities or 
even the State Council, based on current land use plans.56 Batches of projects 
are decided at the level at which the land planning relevant for such projects 
was made, at least if such projects fall within the scope of such planning.57 
Authorities at city and district level decide on specific projects, which fall 
within the scope of relevant land use plans.58 Projects that fall outside of the 
land planning are to be approved by the provincial authorities.59  
The amendment has recentralized some of the decision-making on 
land use conversion to the provincial and even the national level. 60  The 
original draft amendment was even more centralized as it prescribed that all 
land use conversion must be approved by the provincial government or 
higher.61 Some commentators, including NPC Legal Committee members, 
central level ministries and local governments, felt that this article in the draft 
was unrealistic and could not be implemented in practice. This time the 
                                                     
53 Land Management Act § 44 
54 Land Management Act § 43 
55 Land Management Act § 44 and NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office, "Shiyi (Commentary)." 133-
5 
56 Land Management Act § 44.2 
57 Land Management Act § 44.2 
58 Land Management Act § 44.2 
59 Land Management Act § 44.3 
60 NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office, "Shiyi (Commentary)." 135 
61  State Council, "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudiguanlifa (Xiuding Caoan) ((Draft 
Amendment of the) PRC Land Management Act)." 302 § 39 
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Legal Committee listened to their concerns and made a somehow watered-
down version, which allows for approvals by lower level government in case 
the projects fall within the scope of relevant land use plans.62 Here, for the 
first time, we see that comments on the draft, in favor of local concerns are 
accepted and become part of the act. In contrast with the amendments 
detailed above, in this instance the Legal Committee did pay attention to the 
law’s feasibility.  
Collective Land Requisitioning Procedure 
The 1998 LMA dictates that construction on collectively owned arable land 
is not allowed, except for rural housing, TVE premises and village public 
works such as schools.63  After the land use conversion has been approved, 
before such land can be used for construction, it must first be requisitioned 
by the state and become state owned land.64 The idea behind the ban on 
using collective land for construction projects is to enhance the control on 
arable land use, and to ensure that rural collective land is mostly used for 
collective and not for non-collective commercial usage.65  The conversion 
procedure means that approval for basic farmland requisitioning and for 
large land requisitioning should be given by the State Council. Other 
requisitions must be approved by the provincial level government.66  
 The requisitioning approval procedural is very centralized as it is the 
provincial level government or the State Council that must approve of all 
requisitioning requests. Since the amendment, lower level governments no 
longer have the right to approve of land requisitioning.67 Furthermore, now 
all basic farmland requisitioning needs national level approval instead of 
provincial level approval for up to 500 Mu of basic farmland in the old law.68  
 Commentators on the draft, including local governments from 
Hunan, Liaoning, Beijing, Jilin, Guangxi, Shanghai and Henan, felt that the 
land requisitioning approval procedure in the draft amendment was too 
centralized and would take away local powers  of city level and district level 
governments and would be detrimental to the implementation of local land 
                                                     
62 NPC Legal Committee, "Guanyu Zhonghuarenmingongheguotudiguanlifa (Xiuding Caoan) 
Chubu Shenyi Qingkuang de Huibao (Report on the First Review of the PRC Land 
Management Act Draft Amendment)." 313-4 
63 Land Management Act § 43.1 
64 Land Management Act § 43.2 and 45-46 
65 NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office, "Shiyi (Commentary)." 132 
66 Land Management Act § 45 
67 NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office, "Shiyi (Commentary)." 140 
68 Ibid. 140 
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use planning.69 They felt that the top-down system of land use planning was 
sufficient to control land protection and a centralized approval procedure 
was unnecessary.70  
While some provincial level governments offered compromise 
solutions to limit the approval by the State Council only to larger projects, 
the NPC Legal Committee did not take any of the concerns or suggestions 
into consideration and maintained the original draft that centralizes 
requisitioning approval to the provincial and national levels.71 This means 
that if only one Mu of basic collective owned farmland, which is to make up 
80% of all farmland, is to be built upon State Council approval is needed. 
Here the final law, while adopting an adequate and certain norm, failed to 
find a balance allowing for sufficient feasibility and adaptability.  
Compensation for Requisitioning Collective Land Procedure 
The LMA regulates a system under which collectives and farmers whose land 
and land use rights have been expropriated for construction use must get 
compensation.72 The LMA provides for a standard of compensation 6-10 
times the annual average output value of the three preceding years and a 
resettlement fee of 4-6 times average annual output.73  The specific standards 
are determined at the provincial level. 74  Both Village Committees and 
farmers are to be consulted in the requisition compensation.75 Compensation 
payment shall be made public, and the new act explicitly states that it is 
forbidden to embezzle or divert compensation funds. 76  During the law 
making process commentators, including local governments complained that 
the proposed compensation was too low, that the procedure lacked 
transparency, that a hearing for farmers should be instituted, and that 
payment of compensation should be done in public, finally some thought 
that monetary compensation is not sufficient and farmers should be helped 
in finding new employment.77  
                                                     
69  NPC Legal Committee Economic Law Section, "Gesheng, Zizhiqu, Zhixiashi dui 
Tudiguanlifa Xiuding Caoan de Yijian (Provinces, Autonomous Regions and Provincial Level 
Cities Opinions on the Draft Amendment to the Land Management Act)." 377 
70 Ibid. 377 
71 NPC Legal Committee, "Guanyu Zhonghuarenmingongheguotudiguanlifa (Xiuding Caoan) 
Chubu Shenyi Qingkuang de Huibao (Report on the First Review of the PRC Land 
Management Act Draft Amendment)." 314 
72 Land Management Act § 46-49 
73 Land Management Act § 47.1 
74 Land Management Act § 47.2 
75 Land Management Act § 48 
76 Land Management Act § 49 
77 NPC Legal Committee, "Guanyu Zhonghuarenmingongheguotudiguanlifa (Xiuding Caoan) 
Chubu Shenyi Qingkuang de Huibao (Report on the First Review of the PRC Land 
Management Act Draft Amendment)." 316 
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The NPC Legal Committee reacted, stating that the height of the 
compensation fee is a difficult issue and that circumstances vary from place 
to place. Therefore, the committee held, it is impossible to enhance the draft 
to cover all points raised with this regard. 78  The Committee did make 
suggestions for changing the draft to allow for more transparency by 
instituting a hearing, making payment of fees public, and a rule that local 
governments should do their best to help farmers who have lost their land to 
start enterprises. These suggestions made it into the final law.79 Here we see 
again that China’s national legislator realizes the challenge of regional 
differences and refrains from making legislation that is more specific on the 
actual amount of compensation. However, as we saw, where arable land 
protection was at stake such consideration was not influential. 
Approval and Payment for Using State Owned and for Construction 
The last step in the construction approval procedure is the approval and 
payment for using State owned land for construction. The unit carrying out 
the construction project must ask approval at the county level or higher land 
department,80 and once approval for use has been granted and construction 
starts a land use fee is to be paid to the state.81 The LMA regulates that 30% 
of this fee goes to the central level government, to be used for protecting 
arable land, and 70% remains with the local government, also to be used for 
land cultivation.82 The original draft amendment had a different quota: 40% 
to the center and 60% to the local government.83 This evoked criticism from 
local governments, who felt they should get more. Some governments, 
including Shaanxi, Xinjiang, Shanghai and Henan, proposed a 20-80 ratio. 
Xinjiang further proposed to make exceptions for minorities in border 
regions and other poor areas where the money should completely remain 
with the local government, while others argued for a adaptable rule to be set 
at the provincial level.  
None of these suggestions made it into law, they did however 
influence the NPC Legal Committee to change the ratio from 40-60 to 30-70. 
Here the Legal Committee made a concession to local interests, however 
seen from the goal orientation of the law it was not over a major issue 
involving arable land protection. 
                                                     
78 Ibid. 316 
79 Land Management Act § 48, 49, 50 
80 Land Management Act § 53 
81 Land Management Act § 55 and relevant State Council Regulations. 
82 Land Management Act § 55 
83  State Council, "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudiguanlifa (Xiuding Caoan) ((Draft 
Amendment of the) PRC Land Management Act)." § 50.2 
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Construction on Collectively Owned Arable Land by the Collective 
The LMA has special rules on farmers, TVEs and Village Collectives 
building housing, factory premises and public interest buildings, such as 
schools, on collectively owned land. For this kind of construction land 
requisition is not required84 and only a land use conversion approval from 
the district level land authorities is necessary. 85  There are two important 
specific norms for construction on collectively owned land. The first 
stipulates that rural households can only use one plot of land to build a 
house that must conform provincial level standards. 86  Furthermore, 
households will not be allowed to build a second house after selling or 
renting their original house.87 The LMA thus provides a highly specific norm 
on rural housing regardless of local circumstances.  
 This stipulation evoked some comments during the drafting process. 
Four provinces, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Xinjiang and Henan, asked for a clearer 
definition of “household”.88 Henan province called for decentralization of 
rule making on rural housing.89 Hunan province called for decentralizing the 
approval procedure for rural housing from the district to the township 
level.90 Heilongjiang province stated that in their barren climate houses were 
a bit larger and often surpassed standard size, an exception should be made.91  
 The second norm on construction on collectively owned land is that 
such land may not be leased or rented out for (non-agricultural) construction 
purposes.92 Local governments voiced concern about this rule because prior 
                                                     
84 Land Management Act § 43.1 
85 Land Management Act § 44, 59, 60, 62 
86 Land Management Act § 62.1 
87 Land Management Act § 62.3 
88  NPC Legal Committee Economic Law Section, "Gesheng, Zizhiqu, Zhixiashi dui 
Tudiguanlifa Xiuding Caoan de Yijian (Provinces, Autonomous Regions and Provincial Level 
Cities Opinions on the Draft Amendment to the Land Management Act)." 379 NPC Legal 
Committee Economic Law Section, "Zhejiang Sheng Youguan Danwei he Renyuan dui 
Tudihuanlifa Xiuding Caoan de Yi Jian (Zhejiang Province Opinions of Relevant Work Units 
and Personnel on the Draft Amendment of the Land Management Act)," in Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Tudi Guanlifa Shiyi (Commentary on the Prc Land Management Act), ed. NPC-SC Legal 
Affairs Office (Beijing: Falü Chubanshe, 1998). 368 
89  NPC Legal Committee Economic Law Section, "Gesheng, Zizhiqu, Zhixiashi dui 
Tudiguanlifa Xiuding Caoan de Yijian (Provinces, Autonomous Regions and Provincial Level 
Cities Opinions on the Draft Amendment to the Land Management Act)." 379 
90 Ibid. 379 
91 NPC Legal Committee Economic Law Section, "Heilongjiang Sheng Youguan Bumen he 
yixie Zhuanjia, Jiceng Danwei Dui Tudi Guanlifa (Xiudingcaoan) de Yijian (Heilongjiang 
Provincial Departments, Experts and Grass Roots Work Units Opinions on the Draft 
Amendment of the Land Management Act)," in Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudi Guanlifa Shiyi 
(Commentary on the Prc Land Management Act), ed. NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office (Beijing: Falü 
Chubanshe, 1998). 360 
92 Land Management Act § 63 
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to the amendment construction on collective land through lease or rent has 
been widespread and in accordance with the market economy.93  
The NPC Legal Committee was not impressed. It stated that the 
current draft norm on banning lease and renting out arable land for 
construction purposes was in line with the 1997 CCP policy on arable land 
protection and kept the draft norms unchanged in the law.94 Thus, once 
again norms were kept strict and specific in order to protect China’s arable 
land even though difficulties in local adaptation were apparent.  
Local Legislation at the Provincial and Village Level in Yunnan: 
Selective Copying 
For understanding the implementability of arable land protection law at Lake 
Dianchi, local legislation is also important. Here we will take a short look at 
two different types of local regulation relevant for the Dianchi lake area. The 
first is the Yunnan Provincial Regulations on Land Management. The second 
is village regulation from the three villages in which we conducted our 
fieldwork.  
 The Yunnan Land Management Regulations were adopted on 24 
September 1999. They replaced the Yunnan Land Management 
Implementation Measures of 1994 and incorporated the 1998 Land 
Management Act regulations. Part of the law consists of specification and 
clarification of LMA norms. The Regulations thus specify the criteria for 
land use conversion, land requisitioning and land compensation 
procedures.95 The Yunnan Regulations on these procedures are all in line 
with national legislation. On one point, the provincial Regulations help adapt 
national regulation to local circumstances. This is the rule that at the 
provincial level the total amount of arable land must stay unchanged. 
Yunnan has opted not to strictly copy this rule to lower levels. At prefectural 
and municipal levels below the provincial level the general rule is that local 
governments must ensure a balance of arable land, however, if they cannot 
develop enough new arable land to compensate land lost to construction, 
they are allowed to develop such land outside of their own jurisdiction. Here 
Yunnan does what local governments suggested for the national LMA, 
enhancing the adaptability of the arable land compensation system.96  
 Concerning other issues, however, Yunnan strictly adheres to the 
letter of the national law. Article 16 for example specifies that all subordinate 
                                                     
93 NPC Legal Committee, "Guanyu Zhonghuarenmingongheguotudiguanlifa (Xiuding Caoan) 
Chubu Shenyi Qingkuang de Huibao (Report on the First Review of the PRC Land 
Management Act Draft Amendment)." 318  
94 Ibid. 318 
95 Yunnan Land Management Regulations § 17-30 
96 Yunnan Land Management Regulations § 15 
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levels at the prefectural, municipal and district levels must ensure that 80% 
of all arable land is basic farmland. Here the provincial legislator has not 
made use of the possible leeway offered in national legislation, which only 
demands 80% at the provincial level but not down to the district levels. For 
large cities like Kunming, this rule is difficult to implement.97  
 In addition, Yunnan provincial regulations do little except clarify 
some points while mainly copying most rules from the LMA. Some examples: 
articles 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 16, 19, 20, 33, all more or less copied from the 
LMA. This is not surprising; the LMA while vague on some points (not 
related to arable land protection), is relatively specific on others, mainly those 
related to arable land protection. The law making process of the LMA has 
not been able to balance the interests into the law. Such a national law leaves 
local legislation little room except for clarification, and copying to make it at 
least look like a local law. So what is the role of such a provincial law? First, 
it does provide working procedures for the implementation, not yet 
regulated in the national law nor in the State Council Regulations. Secondly, 
and perhaps more important, such a law serves to bring the LMA to the local 
level. As the national law is copied in the provincial law, it reaches a local 
audience.98 
 This dissemination of national law to the local through local 
legislation works different at the grassroots level. Village legislation does not 
have a formal role in China’s legal system, but is influential because it is the 
law of the village; the only law most villagers own and the law they know 
best. All three villages where we have conducted fieldwork have issued their 
own village regulations (cunguiminyue) and village self-government statutes 
(Cunmin Zizhi Zhangcheng), made by village leadership and approved by 
superior governments. The two villages located in Kouxiang Township, 
Licun and Baocun, have regulations and statutes that are the same. This 
shows that in two completely different villages, one a Muslim, Hui minority 
agrarian village and the other a Han Chinese part industrial, part rural village, 
the township government has dictated the village rules. Therefore, there is 
little truly local about their regulations.  
 All three village regulations and statutes contain provisions on land. 
Article 22 of the Baocun statutes and in art 16 of the Licun statute stipulates 
that the village “will strictly enforce land law, and based on village and town 
construction planning, will strictly deal with disorderly land occupation and 
building and housing construction without following the proper 
                                                     
97 Based on interviews with Kunming Land Management Bureau December 2004 
98 In other parts of China, local land regulation has been reported to be in violation of 
national law as it is less strict in its provisions on arable land protection. See X.e.a. Chen, 
Nongcun Tudi Falüzhidu Yanjiu, Tianye Diaocha Jiedu (Research in the Village Land Legal System, an 
Analysis on the Basis of Fieldwork) (Beijing: Zhongguo Zhengfa Daxue Chubanshe, 2003).43 
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procedures.”99 Statutes provide detail about how such housing procedures 
work at the grassroots level, not specified in higher-level regulation. In Licun 
and Baocun, the statutes provide for an approval procedure for rural housing 
construction starting at the natural village (xiaozu),100 and in Jiacun, there is 
more detail of a three-tier approval procedure including the natural village, 
VC and township governments.101  
 However, the village regulation provides nothing on two of the most 
important rules on building on collective land, the ban on more than one 
house per household and the ban on leasing out arable land for construction 
purposes. In this manner, the village (and perhaps the township government 
who is clearly the author of some of this legislation) has on purpose not 
taken these rules into its regulations because as we will see later violation of 
both rules is common practice in all three villages.  
 The fieldwork demonstrated the influence of the village regulations 
and statutes. All households have a copy, which cannot be said for the 
national land management act or for the Yunnan Land Management 
Regulations. This is the law in the village, and if the VC breaks a rule in this 
little booklet, the next day villagers will come to complain. Thus, the VC 
(and perhaps the township) has been careful what to put in the booklet and 
what not. In Jiacun, there is some detail about rebuilding houses, which are 
not allowed to be bigger than the old one, and should not have balconies or 
illegally occupy land.102 Furthermore, Jiacun prescribes that housing in old 
housing districts should be built according to history and in new housing 
areas the village planning should be followed.103 While it has such detailed 
rules, it is silent about building two houses or about leasing land for non-
arable purposes. In Licun and Baocun, the statute stipulates in general terms 
at the end of the section on land that it villagers should economically use 
land according to the LMA and that the VC has the right to punish them 
according to law, without specifying what the exact national norms for such 
economical use are.  
 Such selective reference to higher-level legislation is in fact a method 
of adapting national law to the local level, without officially making illegal 
legislation. If villagers have local legislation to read, why would they look for 
higher-level rules, especially if the higher level rules prohibit them to build 
houses. Village level law therefore can be a tool to disseminate higher level 
                                                     
99 Licun Village Committee, Self Government Statute § 16, Baocun Village Committee, Self 
Government Statute § 22 
100 Licun Village Committee, Self Government Statute §17, Baocun Village Committee, Self 
Government Statute § 23 
101 Jiacun Village Committee,  Village Regulations § 38 
102 Jiacun Village Committee,  Village Regulations § 39 
103 Jiacun Village Committee,  Village Regulations § 40 
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norms to the grassroots level, but if villages make statutes that do not include 
major norms relevant for their populations their selection will have the 
adverse effect, namely that the norm did not arrive in the village. 
Conclusion 
The LMA is an example of how the concern for arable land scarcity, a 
national, macro level concern, influences law making to regulate national 
over local interests. While most local actors involved in the drafting process 
recognize the national problem of arable land protection they have in several 
instances voiced concern over how overly centralized and strict rules fit their 
actual local circumstances. In most cases the NPC Legal Committee that, as 
we have seen, plays an important role in this drafting process, has been able 
to ignore such local criticism and has made a law that is centralized, specific 
and strict in order to protect arable land. The Legal Committee only 
appeased local concerns where they did not concern arable land protection 
norms, but other issues such as compensation or land use fee distribution. 
The LMA is a law that was made through power from the center, a power 
made possible because of a fear of famine, a fear of loosing autonomy 
because of food imports, based on a belief in the causal relationship between 
food production and arable land loss. In addition, it was a law that is based 
on a belief that a more stricter and more specific law can also be more 
effective.  
 It is interesting to note how China’s lawmaker, especially the NPC 
Legal Committee has mostly focused on the law’s adequacy and its certainty, 
while neglecting clearly voiced concerns about feasibility and adaptability. It 
seems that the LMA lawmaking process is thus not based on an ideal 
rationality in which all such concerns are equally weighed, but instead is 
limited. A reason for this may be the sense of urgency China felt to show 
that it would deal with its arable land issue, as their promises at the 1996 
World Food Summit demonstrated. Showing such ambition works better 
through making adequate and certain law, as it is law that looks strong and 
good on paper.  
Based on what we have learned in theory (see Chapter 2) about the 
quality of legislation and reach its goals, we know that legislation that lacks 
feasibility and adaptability will have difficulty in creating compliance, 
enforcement and thus attaining its goals. We believe that China’s LMA has 
many such unfeasible and inadaptable norms, most notably the norms on 
basic arable land conversion and non-agricultural construction on collective 
land.  Local legislation has not been able to solve these problems as it has 
not really adapted the national level legislation to the local circumstances, 
largely because the national legislation did not leave any room for such 
adaptation.   
 
    4.  Cleaning Up Pollution Legislation 
From Bargaining to Stricter Norms  
 
Introduction 
In the late 1970s, China began to use law to combat pollution and protect its 
natural environment. Since then, it has established a system of environmental 
legislation and an institutional framework for implementation and 
enforcement. In 1979, the NPC promulgated the Environmental Protection 
Law (for trial use). Even though this law only had a temporary character, it 
would form the backbone of Chinese environmental law for the next ten 
years. During this period, the Chinese legislator enacted a first set of 
pollution related laws: the Marine Environmental Protection Law in 1982, 
the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law in 1984 and the Air 
Pollution Prevention and Control Law in 1987. At the same time, China 
established its first nature conservation: the Forest Law in 1984, the 
Grasslands Law in 1985, and the Fishery Law in 1986 and in 1988 the Law 
on Protecting Wild Animals1. The second period of Chinese environmental 
legislation started with the promulgation of the new Environmental 
Protection Law in 1989. The law no longer had a trial status, a sign that the 
Chinese legislator put more emphasis now on environmental protection type 
legislation. Soon after the 1989 EP Law a second active period of 
environmental drafting started. In 1995 the Law on the Solid Waste 
Pollution Prevention and Control and in 1996 the Law on Noise Pollution 
Prevention and Control were added to the sectoral pollution type laws. 
Nature conservation law was further developed with the 1994 State Council 
Regulations on Nature Conservation Areas and the 1996 State Council 
Regulations on the Protection of Wild Plants 
 By the second half of the 1990s, China had established a 
comprehensive system of pollution legislation. At this time, Chinese law used 
three main systems to prevent and control pollution,2 all of which are still 
operational today. The first system was the Pollution Excessive Discharge 
Fee (PEDF) system. Under this system, polluters must pay a fee for the 
                                                     
1 For a good study of this first period environmental law see  L. Ross, Environmental Policy in 
China (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1988), L. Ross and M.A. Silk, 
Environmental Law and Policy in the People's Republic of China (New York: Quorum, 1987). 
2 Other systems include: standards (quality and discharge), pollution registration and reporting, 
pollution accident reporting, abatement deadlines, and specific pollution norms. For an 
overview of these systems see: R. Jin, ed., Environmental Law (Huanjing Faxue) (Beijing: Beijing 
University Press, 1999). J. Wang, Principles of Chinese Environmental Law (Zhongguo Huanjingfa 
Yuanli) (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2000). 
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pollution they discharge excessive of the Discharge Standards.3 The second 
system was the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), under which all 
construction projects that have an adverse impact on the environment must 
carry out one of three types of environmental impact assessment4. The third 
system was the Three Synchronizations System, which also concerned with 
construction projects. Under this system, the EP installations for these 
projects must be designed, built and put into operation at the same time that 
the original installations were designed, built and put into operation5. The 
systems ere instituted in a command and control fashion, meaning that 
violation of any of the systems led administrative sanctions, and in very 
severe cases criminal punishment. 
 There was criticism of China’s pollution legislation in the mid-1990s 
though. Environmental law was too weak and vague, policymakers and 
scholars held, and thus called for strengthening the existing legislative 
system.6 Around this time, major efforts were undertaken to improve the 
legislation. At first, such efforts were largely unsuccessful, as in 1995 
ambitious proposed amendments to the Air Pollution Prevention and 
Control Law had not made into the final law. Since 1996, however, 
lawmakers started to create stricter and clearer legislation, amending the 
Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law in 1996, the Air Pollution 
                                                     
3 The system is regulated both in the integral Environmental Protection Law (art. 28), the 
sectoral Water Pollution and Prevention Law (art. 15) and in the special 1982 State Council 
Temporary Measures on the Levy of Pollution Discharge Fees. 
4 This system is regulated both in the Environmental Protection Law art 13, all sectoral 
pollution laws and special regulations on EP for construction projects. 
5 This system is regulated both in the Environmental Protection Law art 26, all sectoral 
pollution laws and special regulations on EP for construction projects. 
6 Alford and Shen, "Limits of the Law in Addressing China's Environmental Dilemma." 417, 
H. Sun, "Controlling the Environmental Consequences of Power Development in the PRC," 
Michigan Journal of International Law 17, no. 4 (1996). 127, Z. Xie, "Bawo Lishi Jiyu, Qianghua 
Zhifa Jiandu, Zhazha Shishi Zuohao Wuran Kongzhi Gongzuo (Grasp the Historical 
Opportunity, Strengthen the Supervision of Law Enforcement, and Thoroughly Carry out the 
Job of Controlling Pollution)," Environmental Work News Report, no. 1 (1997). 4.  Such critique 
has remained after 2000, see Z. Xie, "Shuli he Luoshi Kexue Fazhanguan Tuidong Huanbao 
Gongzuo Zai Xin Taijie (Establishing and Implementing a Scientific Development Doctrine 
to Promote Environmental Work onto a New Level)," Huanbao Gongzuo Ziliao Xuan (Selected 
Materials on Environmental Protection Work) 4, no. 4 (2004a). 13, Z. Xie, "Yi Ren Wei Ben 
Qiuzhen Wushi, Nuli Wancheng Zhongdian Liuyu "Shiwu" Shuiwuran Fangzhi Renwu (With 
People as the Basis Being Pragmatic Based on Truth, Work Hard to Finish Work on the 
"Fifteen" Water Prevention and Control Tasks in Key Catchment Areas," Huanbao Gongzuo 
Ziliao Xuan (Selected Materials on Environmental Protection Work) 7, no. 7 (2004b). 8, J. Wang, 
"Vice Minister Wang Jirong's Speech at the National Environmental Inspection Work 
Summit," Huanbao Gongzuo Ziliao Xuan (Selected Materials on Environmental Protection Work) 8, no. 
8 (2004). 5.  
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Prevention and Control Law in 2000 and making a new Environmental 
Impact Assessment Law in 2002.  
 This chapter is about the changes made in China’s pollution 
legislation since the mid-1990s. Following the first perspective on our main 
research question (see Chapter 1), it aims to understand how changes in the 
process of lawmaking and the content of the legislation of these pollution 
laws can in theory affect the laws’ impact on compliance, effective 
enforcement and goal attainment. Using the analytical frameworks on the 
processes of lawmaking and the quality of legislation (see Chapter 2), the 
next sections will look in detail at the lawmaking process of three pieces of 
pollution related legislation of the last decade: the 1996 Water Pollution Law, 
the 2000 Air Pollution Law amendments, and the 2002 EIA Law. Just as in 
Chapter 3, the analysis of China’s national lawmaking processes and its effect 
on the laws’ implementability is followed by an analysis the implementability 
of Yunnan’s local legislation, which forms an important element of China’s 
pollution regulation. 
The 1996 Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law: 
Bargaining a Disappointing but Stricter Law 
By 1993, it became apparent that the 1984 Water Pollution and Prevention 
Law 7  was no longer satisfactory. 8  The law was outdated; China had 
progressed into a market-economy and the rapid economic growth, 
industrialization and urbanization were no match for the weak controls 
offered in the existing water pollution legislation.9 In 1993, NEPA and the 
NPC-EP Committee carried out a joint investigation into the problems of 
implementing the 1984 law10 and in the same year, they started drafting an 
amendment.11 The committee explained, when finishing the draft in 1995, 
that the changes in the existing law were “100% necessary”.12 It referred to 
the fact that since 1984, China’s water environment had continued to 
                                                     
7 The 1984 law had been somewhat amended already in 1986. 
8 Z. Qin, "Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguop Shui Wuran Fangzhi Fa Xiuzheng An 
(Caoan) de Shuo Ming (Explanation on the PRC Proposed (Draft) Amendment to the Water 
Pollution Prevention and Control Law)," NPC-SC Gazette 1996 (1996). 355-356, Asian 
Development Bank, Reform of Environmental and Land Legislation in the People's Republic of China. 9 
9  Qin, "Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguop Shui Wuran Fangzhi Fa Xiuzheng An 
(Caoan) de Shuo Ming (Explanation on the PRC Proposed (Draft) Amendment to the Water 
Pollution Prevention and Control Law)." 355 
10 Asian Development Bank, Reform of Environmental and Land Legislation in the People's Republic of 
China. 12 
11  Qin, "Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguop Shui Wuran Fangzhi Fa Xiuzheng An 
(Caoan) de Shuo Ming (Explanation on the PRC Proposed (Draft) Amendment to the Water 
Pollution Prevention and Control Law)." 356 
12 Ibid. 356 
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deteriorate and many of China’s water catchments had become severely 
polluted. 13  The committee stated that especially three major pollution 
disasters in 1994, including a widely reported pollution scandal at the Huai 
river, involving severe pollution from small enterprises, had shown the need 
for change.14 The committee also referred to pollution problems related to 
TVEs, drinking water safety, and urban water treatment facilities. In addition, 
it found that the transformation of China’s economic governance and the 
development of a private sector further necessitated changes in the 1984 law. 
The NPC-EP committee also wanted to change the law in order to shift the 
strategy for pollution control away from end of pipe, point source, 
concentration based treatment approaches, to pollution prevention by 
decreasing pollution sources in the production process and total load based 
pollution control.15  
The NPC-EP Committee spent nearly two years drafting the 
proposed amendment. During the drafting process, opposed stakeholders 
had been able to exert a significant amount of influence. They had done so 
before the final bill reached the NPC-SC where it would be submitted again 
to various stakeholders for further review and commenting, after which the 
NPC-SC finally voted it into law on 15 June 1996. 
The first original draft proposals have never been published. Still 
there is information about their content through an Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) report about a technical legal assistance project to aid the NPC-
EP committee and NEPA in drafting this law.16 In this project, ADB experts 
helped the committee members to identify the major issues in the 1984 law 
that needed amendment, and trained them to enhance their drafting skills to 
make the necessary draft amendments.17  
The final draft that was to be presented for review to the NPC-SC in 
1995 was a compromise because the most ambitious proposals were dropped 
after opposed stakeholders had criticized preliminary drafts. For instance, the 
original proposed amendment contained a comprehensive national and local 
system of pollution information disclosure.18 Another proposal that did not 
make the final bill was the norm requiring EIA, not only for individual 
construction projects, but also for new development areas. 19  In addition, 
provisions strengthening enforcement sanctions and public participation, and 
initiating institutional reform towards more independent EPBs were all part 
                                                     
13 Ibid. 355 
14 Ibid. 356 
15 Ibid. 356 
16 Asian Development Bank, Reform of Environmental and Land Legislation in the People's Republic of 
China. 
17 Ibid. 5 
18 Ibid. 77 
19 Ibid. 77 
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of earlier proposals that were deleted or seriously watered-down in 
preliminary negotiations. 20  Not all draft proposals were lost in the 
preparation phase though. The final draft did introduce some important 
changes, most notably concerning the total load discharge permit system, 
rules phasing out old and small enterprises and strict specific discharge 
norms. After the draft was finalized it was presented to the NPC-SC, and the 
NPC Legal Committee initiated several rounds of review involving various 
central level ministries and provincial level governments and even 
enterprises.21  
The Total Load Discharge Permit System 
A first important change that made it into the final law was the total load 
discharge permit system. This system designates certain areas22 as total load 
areas. In these areas, total load plans are made in which the total goal amount 
of emission in this area and the way to realize this goal amount are regulated. 
Based on the plans emission quotas, are distributed to the polluting 
enterprises in the area. All enterprises in these areas must register for a 
permit. Only those that emit within the limit of the quota get a permit, 
others get a temporary permit23. 
 The total load discharge permit system was what was left of the 
originally proposed mandatory permit system in the first draft WPPCL 
amendment.24 The original drafters, guided by the ADB experts, held that 
the lack of such a system in the 1984 WPPCL was an important cause for 
implementation failure:25 
 
“The discussion in the project concluded that a system of discharge 
permits would significantly strengthen implementation and 
                                                     
20 Ibid. 77 
21 NPC Legal Committee, "Guanyu Zhonghua Renming Gongheguo Shui Wuran Fangzhi Fa 
Xiuzhengan Caoan Shenyi Jieguo de Baogao (Report on the Results of Review of the Draft 
Amendment of the PRC Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law)," NPC-SC Gazette 
1996 (1996). 358-361 
22 These are areas in which enterprises meet the concentration based effluent standards but in 
which the quality standard is not met. This means that the total amount of pollution is higher 
than the quality standard. This is because enterprises dilute their emissions and thus meet the 
concentration based effluent standard but still emit too much for the area to meet the quality 
standard. Art 6 of the State Council Implementing Regulation of the Water Pollution 
Prevention and Control Law, 2000. 
23 The permit system has been regulated in the  State Council Implementing Regulation of the 
Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law, 2000, art. 6-9 and in the 1988 NEPA 
Temporary Measures on the Management of the Water Pollution Discharge Permit. 
24 Asian Development Bank, Reform of Environmental and Land Legislation in the People's Republic of 
China. 77 
25 Ibid. 36-37 
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enforcement of water pollution regulation. Ideally, each point source 
discharge should have a permit establishing specified limitations on 
each of the pollutants of concern discharged by a source in more 
than trivial amounts…A permit…defines the source’s legal 
obligations in objective and unambiguous terms. Based on 
monitoring data, government authorities, and the public can readily 
determine whether the source is in compliance.”26 
 
 The final draft bill failed to introduce such a comprehensive permit 
system, because opposing stakeholders “of certain commercial and industrial 
sectors” successfully blocked the original proposal to be submitted in the 
final bill.27 As a substitute, the final draft introduced the total load discharge 
permit system, which would only apply to designated areas. During formal 
review of the final bill there was some debate about this system. 
 First, some proposed to centralize the system, which in the original 
draft was organized by the district government. Because of its importance, 
some NPC-SC members held that it should be regulated at a higher level: the 
provincial level government.28 This proposal was adopted in the final law.29 A 
second suggestion concerned the fairness of the total load discharge permit 
system. In the final draft the word “xuke”, meaning permit had been used to 
indicate that enterprises that failed to meet the total load standards would 
not be allowed to operate. Some NPC-SC members thought this was unfair 
and commented that “to allow enterprises to exist, means allowing them to 
pollute”.30 They stated that the proposed law already forced enterprises to 
pay for the discharged pollution. They proposed to change the system so 
that enterprises that fail to meet the total load amounts, would be forced to 
undergo “checks and verifications” (heding) to make sure they would meet the 
total load standards.31 As this proposal was adopted into the final law32, the 
last bits of the permit system were eradicated from the law.33  
                                                     
26 Ibid. 37 
27 Ibid. 59 
28 NPC Legal Committee, "Guanyu Zhonghua Renming Gongheguo Shui Wuran Fangzhi Fa 
Xiuzhengan Caoan Shenyi Jieguo de Baogao (Report on the Results of Review of the Draft 
Amendment of the PRC Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law)." 359 
29 Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law § 16 
30 NPC Legal Committee, "Guanyu Zhonghua Renming Gongheguo Shui Wuran Fangzhi Fa 
Xiuzhengan Caoan Shenyi Jieguo de Baogao (Report on the Results of Review of the Draft 
Amendment of the PRC Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law)." 359 
31 It was not until the 2000 State Council Regulations that the system was clarified. These 
regulations, when read jointly with old NEPA measures from 1988, further elaborated the 
total load discharge permit system. These lower level rules chose to use the word permit (xuke) 
again instead of heding, thus reintroducing a form of permit. See State Council WPPCL 
Implementing Regulations, 2000 § 10, for more detail see 1988 NEPA Temporary Measures 
on Water Discharge Permits § 16 
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 After all the bargaining, both during the drafting and during the 
review of the final bill, there was little left of the originally proposed 
mandatory permit system. Instead, China had now adopted a norm that was 
less comprehensive and that left much unclear.34 This had consequences for 
the law’s implementability. First of all, the system lacked certainty. Its 
regulations were vague as there were no clear rules about how the system 
exactly works in national legislation or even in State Council regulations. The 
most detailed rules were to be found in temporary NEPA measures from 
1988, but even these old rules lacked certainty.35 A second problem was that 
the system lacks adequacy. The system provided temporary permits to 
enterprises failing to meet the standards and thus lacked the power of a real 
permit system in which enterprises need a permit for operation and can only 
get one when they are in compliance.36 The third problem is that the total 
load discharge permits were managed by the provincial level, instead of the 
district level as was originally proposed. Total control permits were therefore 
less easily adaptable to circumstances at the local level.  
 It is a pity that a true mandatory permit system was not adopted. 
Such a permit system could have offered clarity to enterprises what is 
expected of them. It would be able to do so in an adaptable case-based way 
by making specific permits for specific enterprises, based on general norms. 
And thus it could offer a relatively feasible system for enterprises, as well as 
enforcement agents who work easier when there is a specific permit for an 
enterprise. The challenges of such a permit system would be to maintain 
adequacy through standard setting and to maintain feasibility in installing 
such a system which poses a considerable administrative burden to establish 
and manage.37  
 Nevertheless, even the total load discharge permit system brings 
some improvement. It enhances adequacy, as in total load areas, enterprises 
are now governed based on the total amount of pollutants they discharge, 
instead of the pollution concentration. This means that enterprises can no 
longer comply with the law, simply by diluting their discharge and thus 
discharging significant amounts without violation.38  
                                                                                                                        
32 Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law § 16 
33 NPC Legal Committee, "Guanyu Zhonghua Renming Gongheguo Shui Wuran Fangzhi Fa 
Xiuzhengan Caoan Shenyi Jieguo de Baogao (Report on the Results of Review of the Draft 
Amendment of the PRC Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law)." 360 
34 See State Council WPPCL Implementing Regulations, 2000 § 10, for more detail see 1988 
NEPA Temporary Measures on Water Discharge Permits § 16 
35 1988 NEPA Temporary Measures on Water Discharge Permits 
36 State Council WPPCL Implementing Regulations § 10 
37 For some of these points see Asian Development Bank, Reform of Environmental and Land 
Legislation in the People's Republic of China.  36-8, 59 
38 Ibid. 
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Ban of Obsolete Technologies 
The 1996 WPPCL further introduced a norm phasing out obsolete 
technology, aimed at tackling the severe pollution at TVEs and smaller 
factories.39 Such a norm was warranted because of the severe pollution small 
enterprises, such as paper factories, cement mills and tanneries had been 
causing and the increased attention this had gotten in the media. While the 
norm was needed to deal with some of China’s worst pollution, and was thus 
important for raising the law’s adequacy, its feasibility is questionable. One 
can wonder what the effects on local economies and communities is of a rule 
abolishing certain small family owned or village owned enterprises that had 
been the driving forces of local economic growth and important for local 
livelihoods.  
While the ban of obsolete technologies itself was never questioned 
during the review of the final bill, there was some debate on a related issue. 
This concerned the control of small polluting enterprises. In the final draft 
there had been a rule forcing small family owned enterprises to report their 
major pollutants and report about the measures they were taking to control 
such pollutants.40 This rule would broaden the existing reporting system to 
also include tiny family operated enterprises (geti gongshang).  
Some NPC-SC delegates found that such a rule would be difficult to 
implement. They stated: “China is a large country with many different 
circumstances. In some areas family enterprises just engage in food and 
beverage production, here they can easily be managed in the municipal 
sewage systems. In other areas, family businesses operate industrial 
enterprises such as tanneries or printing factories, with serious pollution for 
which there must be industrial waste water treatment installations.” It was 
proposed to change the rule and let provincial governments decide what 
reporting requirements would be most suitable for their local family 
enterprises.41 In the final law, the reporting rule for family enterprises was 
dropped and instead an extra provision on heavily polluting family factories 
allowing provincial level governments to set up special regulation was added 
to the law.42  
It is interesting to note that there was thus a debate on a pollution 
reporting system with only a limited impact on local enterprises, while the 
strict norm phasing out enterprises with an extensive expected impact on 
                                                     
39 Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law § 22, 23 
40 NPC Legal Committee, "Guanyu Zhonghua Renming Gongheguo Shui Wuran Fangzhi Fa 
Xiuzhengan Caoan Shenyi Jieguo de Baogao (Report on the Results of Review of the Draft 
Amendment of the PRC Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law)." 360 
41 Ibid. 360 
42 Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law § 14 and 60. 
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local livelihoods was never, at least according to the sources consulted here, 
questioned.  
Specific Discharge Prohibitions 
Finally, the 1995 draft law contained a number of strict specific norms 
banning the discharging, dumping, burying and storing of certain substances 
in such a way that they can harm surface or ground water.43 These norms are 
strict, specific and their scope of application is quite large. The norms 
prohibit any kind of discharge (etc.) of the substances mentioned in any 
body of water, no matter the concentration or total amount. Taken to the 
strict letter of such norm, there are bound to be many violations, as most 
human activities will violate such all-encompassing norms. As such these 
norms lack feasibility and adaptability, however well meant they were in 
terms of adequacy and certainty. According to the sources consulted here, 
the specific discharge norms were never criticized during the drafting and 
review process.  
Norms Left Unchanged 
Except for these changes,44 the final draft WPPCL brought little new as it 
copied rules on PEDF 45 , EIA, 46  and the Three Synchronizations 47  from 
existing legislation. Keeping the old provisions was not good for enhancing 
the law’s implementability. The PEDF system lacked adequacy, because the 
charges to be paid had sometimes been lower than the costs for abatement 
and because the charges were concentration based instead of the total 
amount. 48   The EIA system, at least until the 2002 EIA Law was 
promulgated, lacked certainty. The WPPCL and the relevant State Council 
regulations49 failed to provide clarity on its exact scope of application and 
procedures, allowing approval agents a wide discretion when evaluating EIA 
                                                     
43 Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law § 29-34 and 41-42 
44 In addition other changes less relevant to the research here were also made: the draft 
amendment strengthened cross-provincial water quality management, § 10.2 and made 
concentrated urban sewage treatment mandatory, § 19. The draft law also instituted the 
possibility for provincial level governments to designate drinking water protection areas with 
strict pollution prohibitions, § 20, 27. It also introduced a provision on non-point source 
pollution demanding that agricultural bureaus take measures to prevent and control 
agricultural pollution, § 39. 
45 Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law § 14 
46 Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law § 13 
47 Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law § 13 
48 For an elaborate account see Van Rooij, "The Enforceability of Chinese Water Pollution 
Regulations, What Room for Improvement?" 
49 1998 State Council Regulations on EP in Construction Projects 
Cleaning Up Pollution Legislation       77 
 
 
applications. 50  Similarly, until 2002, the WPPCL norms on Three 
Synchronizations, even when combined with the State Council Regulations, 
failed to provide clarity on major issues such as their scope of application. 
 As the WPPCL left these norms unchanged, it maintained 
implementability problems of the past. A reason that necessary changes were 
never proposed may have been that the NPC-EP committee had put all its 
money on the mandatory permit system, which if it had been successfully 
adopted would have solved some of the existing problems mentioned here. 
WPPCL Findings 
The history of the 1996 WPPCL amendment is complex. It shows first how 
important the bargaining during the drafting phase was. The WPPCL lost 
some of its most ambitious features at the drafting table. The NPC-EP 
Committee and NEPA drafters had sought extensive inputs from various 
opposed departments during the actual drafting process that forced the 
drafters to compromise51; consequently, the final proposal submitted to the 
NPC Legal Committee had already lost its teeth. Unlike the LMA, where the 
NPC Legal Committee was able to control the bargaining process in favor of 
macro-level interests, in this case, with insufficient support for the macro 
interests at stake, and perhaps also because stronger bargaining took place 
during the drafting phase, powerful ministries and provinces were able to 
prevent legislation they deemed too strict.52.  
 On the one hand, the lawmaking process of the WPPCL was in 
some aspects different from the LMA. To a certain extent, the WPPCL’s 
lawmaking process followed China’s piece-meal approach (see Chapter 2) 
much closer in the sense that the rules were made after extensive bargaining, 
in the end leading to quite vague weak rules that still needed further 
elaboration in implementing regulations. This is especially true for what 
happened with the original ideas for the permit system that never made the 
final draft and its substitute, the vague and limited  total load discharge 
                                                     
50 For an elaborate account see Van Rooij, "The Enforceability of Chinese Water Pollution 
Regulations, What Room for Improvement?" 
51 Unfortunately such inputs and comments were not published, or at least in a form available 
for this research. They could only be consulted through a summary made by the NPC Legal 
Committee. See NPC Legal Committee, "Guanyu Zhonghua Renming Gongheguo Shui 
Wuran Fangzhi Fa Xiuzhengan Caoan Shenyi Jieguo de Baogao (Report on the Results of 
Review of the Draft Amendment of the PRC Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law)." 
358-361 
52 For the permit system the ADB writes cryptically that “The resistance to a permit system 
on the part of certain industrial and commercial sectors, was, however recognized. In addition 
EPAs (EPBs) generally lack the administrative resources necessary for applying the permit 
requirements to all sources.” Asian Development Bank, Reform of Environmental and Land 
Legislation in the People's Republic of China. 59 
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permit system that were almost completely watered-down after the last 
formal deliberation.  
At the same time, the WPPCL amendment signifies a trend towards 
stricter norms and single-interests lawmaking, similar to the LMA. 
Proponents of the new law had tried their best to install more 
comprehensive, more specific and stricter legal systems to control water 
pollution. Although, as we saw their most ambitious proposals failed at the 
bargaining table, environmentalist stakeholders were still successful in some 
aspects. The WPPCL introduced strict specific norms banning the 
discharging, dumping, burying and storing of certain substances in such a 
way that they can harm surface or ground water.53 In addition, it introduced a 
total load system for heavily polluted areas in which enterprises were to meet 
certain discharge standards, based on the total amount of pollutants 
discharged instead of the easily cheatable concentration based standards of 
the past. 54  The WPPCL further prohibited the use of certain obsolete 
technologies and the establishment of new small heavily polluting 
enterprises,55 about which there was no bargaining at all.56  
 All of this has influenced the expected effect the WPPCL may have 
on compliance, enforcement and goal attainment. First, the WPCCL has 
several inadequate provisions, especially its norms on the total load discharge 
permit system and norms on PEDF57. Second, the law also contains many 
vague and thus uncertain norms, most notably norms on EIA, Three 
Synchronizations and the total load discharge permit system.58 Third, some 
of the laws’ new stricter norms pay no attention to China’s complex and 
different circumstances and may at times be unfeasible. This is especially true 
for the norms on small polluting enterprises and the strict prohibition on the 
discharge of certain substances.  
The 2000 Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law: the Right 
Opportunity for Stricter Legislation 
When the NPC-EP Committee and SEPA started another amendment in the 
late nineties, this time to the Air Pollution Control and Prevention Law 
(“APPCL”), they had learned from prior experiences.59 The WPPCL 1996 
                                                     
53 Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law § 29-34 and 41-42 
54 Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law § 16 
55 Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law § 22, 23 
56 At least in the documents available to us. 
57 For a more detailed analysis of PEDF see Van Rooij, "The Enforceability of Chinese Water 
Pollution Regulations, What Room for Improvement?" 
58 Ibid. 
59 Alford and Liebman argue that the 2000 Amendment was based on experience gained in 
the 1995 APPCL amendment. They do not discuss the impact of the WPPCL 1996 
amendment. W.P. Alford and B.L. Liebman, "Clean Air, Clean Processes? The Struggle over 
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amendment had taught them that without sufficient central level support, 
powerful opponents could bargain major features out of draft legislation, 
even when it was still at the drafting table. Only a year before that, in 1995, 
the NPC-EP committee had suffered a similar legislative defeat at the hands 
of opposed stakeholders. This happened when the committee had presented 
an ambitious draft amendment to the 1987 Air Pollution Prevention and 
Control Law to the NPC-SC for review, without prior consultation of 
relevant departments and provincial level governments opposed to stronger 
legislation. 60  The submitted draft included a mandatory emission permit 
system, a total load control system and restrictions on high-sulfur coal use.61 
The strategy of pushing a proposal for approval by the NPC-SC without 
prior deliberation with opposed stakeholders was unsuccessful as it backfired 
during the NPC-SC review and forced the NPC-EP committee to withdraw 
its most ambitious proposals in order to get enough backing to make the bill 
into law.62  
 In the late nineties, a window of opportunity arose to make stricter 
and more comprehensive pollution regulation. As Alford and Liebman write, 
“overall consciousness about environmental problems, within the 
government and among the general population, increased significantly 
between 1995 and 1999”. 63  Even some local governments, in particular 
Beijing, supported stronger air pollution measures.64 In 1996, there had been 
a clear change in central government pollution policy. In this year, the State 
Council had issued a notice that strengthened pollution related enforcement 
and set strict targets for the end of 2000.65 This notice signaled a change that 
made stricter legislation possible and that marked the beginning of pollution 
enforcement campaigns (see Chapter 16). Furthermore, by the late 1990s, 
China’s air pollution problem gained extra attention when the World 
Resources Institute published a report stating that nine of the world’s ten 
most polluted cities were in China66, a fact also reported in the Chinese 
press67.  At this time of change, and with the disappointing 1995 law68 and 
                                                                                                                        
Air Pollution Law in the People's Republic of China," Hastings Law Journal 52, no. March 
(2001). 745 
60 Ibid. 716-7 
61 Ibid. 718-23 
62 Ibid. 725 
63 Ibid. 219 
64 Ibid. 733-4 
65 State Council, "State Council Decision on Several Problems concerning Environmental 
Protection (Guowuyuan guanyu Huanjing Baohu ruogan  Wenti de Jueding)," Environmental 
Work News Report, no. 8 (1996). 10-3 
66 Editorial, China: 9 of the World's 10 Most Polluted Cities are in China (29 January 1999 [cited 29 
September 2006]); available from http://www.edie.net/news/news_story.asp?id=653. 
67 J. Bai, "Rang Women Changkuaide Huxi (Let us Breathe in Comfort)," Renmin Ribao, March 
18 1999. 
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the failure of the State Council to make implementing regulations that could 
have remedied some of the deficiencies in the law itself, the NPC-EP 
committee decided to try amending the APPCL once again.69 For the 2000 
APPCL amendment, the committee sought opposed opinions during the 
drafting process70; this was contrary to the 1995 amendment process, but like 
the strategy for the 1996 WPPCL amendment. Because this time, the NPC-
EP committee was able to muster central level support for its proposal71, it 
was able to be more successful during the preliminary negotiations. 
Consequently the committee was able to get many of the failed proposals for 
the 1995 APPCL amendment incorporated into the 2000 law, including: a 
pollution emission permit system, a ban on emissions excessive of the 
standards, an emission fee system, and stricter and mandatory minimum 
sanctions for violations.  
Total Load Emission Permits 
The 2000 amendment called for the establishment of pollution emission 
permits within certain designated “total load” areas, similar to the WPPCL.72 
In its explanation on the draft amendment the NPC-EP committee 
emphasized the importance of the total load permit system.73 Originally, in 
an earlier draft law, SEPA and the NPC-EP Committee had tried again, this 
                                                                                                                        
68 Alford and Shen, "Limits of the Law in Addressing China's Environmental Dilemma."134-5 
69 In his explanation to the draft amendment the chairman of the NPC-EP Committee Qu 
Geping emphasized the necessity of the amendment by referring to the fact that China 
occupied seven positions on the list of ten worst air polluted cities in the world. Qu Geping 
(Director of the NPC-EP Committee), "Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Daqi Wuran 
Fangzhi Fa Xiuding Caoan de Shuo Ming (Explanation to the Draft Amendment to the PRC 
Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law)," in Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Da Qi Wuran 
Fangzhi Fa Shiyi (Commentary to the PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law), ed. NPC-SC 
Legal Affairs Office (Beijing: Falü Chubanshe, 2001). 202-3 
70 Alford and Liebman, "Clean Air, Clean Processes? The Struggle over Air Pollution Law in 
the People's Republic of China." 745 
71 Ibid. 747-8 
72  Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law § 15.2 For an explanation of what these 
designated areas are we must look at the WPPCL implementing regulations: areas in which 
enterprises meet the concentration based effluent standards but in which the quality standard 
is not met. This means that the total amount of pollution is higher than the quality standard. 
This is because enterprises dillute their emissions and thus meet the concentration based 
effluent standard but still emit too much for the area to meet the quality standard. Art 6 of the 
State Council Implementing Regulation of the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law, 
2000. 
73 The committee quoted President Jiang Zemin: “History teaches that in order to safeguard 
environmental safety we must implement a control of the total amount of pollutants.” See Qu 
Geping (Director of the NPC-EP Committee), "Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Daqi 
Wuran Fangzhi Fa Xiuding Caoan de Shuo Ming (Explanation to the Draft Amendment to 
the PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law)." 206-7 
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time for air pollution, to introduce a mandatory permit system, with a general 
scope of application and with detailed procedural regulations.74 However, 
just as had happened with the WPPCL, they had had to withdraw this 
proposal while still at the drafting table 75 , after powerful stakeholders 
strongly opposed to it. 76  As a substitute the drafters introduced the total 
load emission permit system.  
 When this weakened permit system in the final draft came up for 
review, opponents voiced further concerns. Some argued for first testing the 
total load discharge permit system in certain major cities including Beijing 
and Shanghai before implementing it nationally.77 There was also concern 
that many of China’s enterprises still did not meet the Pollution Excessive 
Discharge Fee (“PEDF”) standards and would not be able to comply with 
the total load discharge permit system. In short, opponents believed that 
China was not ready.78 They argued for a decentralized system under which 
provinces in which all enterprises meet the discharge standards can institute 
a total load permit system. 79  Others demanded more research on the 
feasibility of the new system.80 Some NPC-SC delegates, proposed to insert 
the phrase “according to local circumstances” to the draft provisions,  to 
make the system more adaptable to various circumstances.81 Finally, there 
was also criticism of the fact that the draft amendment let local EPBs 
implement the total load permit system; because of the economic and 
                                                     
74  Ibid. 207, Alford and Liebman, "Clean Air, Clean Processes? The Struggle over Air 
Pollution Law in the People's Republic of China." 736 
75  Qu Geping (Director of the NPC-EP Committee), "Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Daqi Wuran Fangzhi Fa Xiuding Caoan de Shuo Ming (Explanation to the Draft 
Amendment to the PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law)." 207 
76  Ibid. 207, Alford and Liebman, "Clean Air, Clean Processes? The Struggle over Air 
Pollution Law in the People's Republic of China." 736 
77  NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office, "Ge Difang He Zhongyang Youguan Bumen Dui Daqi 
Wuran Fangzhi Fa (Xiuding Caoan) de Yijian (Opinions by Local and Central Relevant 
Departments  on the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law Draft Amendment)."  236 
78 Ibid. 236 
79 Ibid. 236 
80  NPC-SC, "Shenyi Daqi Wuran Fangzhi fa Xiuding Cao An Erci Shenyigao de Yijian 
(Opinions on the Second Review of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law Draft 
Amendment)," in Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Da Qi Wuran Fangzhi Fa Shiyi (Commentary to the 
PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law), ed. NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office (Beijing: Falü 
Chubanshe, 2001). 231, NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office, "Ge Difang He Zhongyang Youguan 
Bumen Dui Daqi Wuran Fangzhi Fa (Xiuding Caoan) de Yijian (Opinions by Local and 
Central Relevant Departments  on the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law Draft 
Amendment)." 236-7 
81  NPC-SC, "Shenyi Daqi Wuran Fangzhi fa Xiuding Cao An Erci Shenyigao de Yijian 
(Opinions on the Second Review of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law Draft 
Amendment)." 231 
82       Lawmaking and Legislation 
 
 
environmental interests involved, some felt that the local government would 
be better suited to implement this system.82 
As in the 1998 LMA amendment, the NPC Legal Committee 
occupied a dominant position in the drafting process of the APPCL 2000 
amendment. Based on the sources consulted, it seems that the Legal 
Committee had the power to decide whose suggestions to follow and whose 
to ignore. The committee stated that the system with its broad impact was 
very complex and economic and environmental concerns should be balanced 
in its implementation.83 For this, the Legal Committee added a provision that 
“the State Council will issue specific measures on the most important aspect 
of total load air pollution system”. 84  The committee also made local 
governments, instead of local EPBs, responsible for implementing the total 
load permit system.85 However, the Legal Committee was less convinced by 
other concerns such as the need for patience and more research and 
decentralization. Thus, except for relatively minor changes, the committee 
maintained the final bill’s total load permit provisions, which the NPC-SC 
voted into law.86  
The implementability of the APPCL total load permit system is in 
many ways similar to that of the WPPCL. Due to the extensive bargaining 
that took place during the drafting phase, which even the strong support for 
these norms during the formal deliberations could no longer alter, the 
APPCL permit system had already lost an important part of its adequacy. It 
no longer applied for all air polluting enterprises, but merely for certain 
designated areas. Although the text of the law was more ambitious and 
clearer that the final WPPCL version, using the clear word xuke (permit) 
instead of heding (checks and verifications), the related provisions on permits 
are nearly as vague as those in the 1996 WPPCL were. However, where the 
WPPCL soon got clarification in its State Council Implementing Regulations, 
the APPCL has had none. 87  Consequently, the 2000 APPCL contains a 
                                                     
82  NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office, "Ge Difang He Zhongyang Youguan Bumen Dui Daqi 
Wuran Fangzhi Fa (Xiuding Caoan) de Yijian (Opinions by Local and Central Relevant 
Departments  on the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law Draft Amendment)." 236, 
NPC-SC, "Shenyi Daqi Wuran Fangzhi fa Xiuding Cao An de Yijian (Opinions on the Review 
of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law Draft Amendment)," in Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Da Qi Wuran Fangzhi Fa Shiyi (Commentary to the PRC Air Pollution Prevention and 
Control Law), ed. NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office (Beijing: Falü Chubanshe, 2001). 222 
83 NPC Legal Committee, "Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Daqi Wuran Fangzhi Fa 
Xiuding Caoan Xiugai Qingkuang de Huibao (Report on the Changes to the Draft 
Amendment to the PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law)." 212 
84 APCCL § 15.1, Ibid. 212  
85 Ibid. 212 
86 Ibid. 212 
87 At least until 2004 at the time this research took place. 
Cleaning Up Pollution Legislation       83 
 
 
significant amount of uncertainty about the exact procedure for air pollution 
total load permits.  
In sum, the 2000 APPCL’s permit system brought some 
improvement in terms of adequacy, when compared to the 1995 APPCL, 
which lacked such a non-concentration based total load system. However, 
the adequacy was not improved as much as had been hoped for, while also 
leaving a significant amount of uncertainty. 
Ban on Emissions Excessive of the Standards 
One of the key features of the 2000 APPCL amendment is that emissions 
excessive of the standards have become illegal. 88  This new provision is 
significant, not only because it makes civil liability claims easier, but also 
because it makes excessive emissions, even though PEDF has been paid, 
punishable with a minimum punishment of 10.000 RMB and a maximum of 
up to 100.000 RMB.89  In its explanation to the proposed amendment, the 
NPC-EP committee argued that excessive emission is illegal in most 
developed legal systems worldwide and that the 1996 State Council notice on 
pollution problems forces the legislator to take stronger measures to make 
enterprises comply with the standards.90 The committee noted that when it 
gathered opinions of relevant departments during the drafting process, there 
was criticism of this proposal. 91  However, according to the NPC-EP 
committee, most agreed that it was necessary to create clarity about the legal 
status of excessive emissions and none held that they should be legal.92 The 
committee stated that its proposed amendment would “strengthen enterprise 
management and speed up enterprise compliance with the emissions 
standards.”93  This time the committee held its ground and presented an 
unchanged proposal for formal review to the NPC-SC. During the review 
process, surprisingly, the provision on the illegal status of excessive discharge 
never came up for debate and made the final law unchanged.94 Here the 
                                                     
88 APPCL § 13 
89 APPCL § 48 
90  Qu Geping (Director of the NPC-EP Committee), "Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Daqi Wuran Fangzhi Fa Xiuding Caoan de Shuo Ming (Explanation to the Draft 
Amendment to the PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law)." 206 
91 Ibid. 206 
92 Ibid. 206 
93 Ibid. 206 
94 NPC Legal Committee, "Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Daqi Wuran Fangzhi Fa 
Xiuding Caoan Shenyi Jieguo de Baogao (Report on the Results of Review of the the Draft 
Amendment to the PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law).", NPC Legal Committee, 
"Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Daqi Wuran Fangzhi Fa Xiuding Caoan Xiugai 
Qingkuang de Huibao (Report on the Changes to the Draft Amendment to the PRC Air 
Pollution Prevention and Control Law).", NPC-SC, "Shenyi Daqi Wuran Fangzhi fa Xiuding 
Cao An de Yijian (Opinions on the Review of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law 
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adaptability and feasibility was never questioned, even though in practice it 
seems that these rules will not always fit local circumstances, especially given 
the high minimum sanction requirements for minor violations.  
Pollution Emission Fees 
The amendment also regulated a new system of pollution emission fees. 
Whereas before, enterprises only paid fees for emissions excessive of the 
discharge standards, the 2000 amendment made fees for all emissions 
mandatory. 95  In its explanation to the draft amendment, the NPC-EP 
committee stated that with the illegal status of excessive emissions, the 
PEDF system had become redundant and a new fee system for all emissions 
had become necessary in order to stimulate emission reductions beyond the 
standard levels.96 The NPC-EP Committee also explained that while drafting, 
it had consulted with relevant stakeholders, who voiced concern on the extra 
burden the new fee system would place on enterprises.97 The committee 
convinced such stakeholders that the State Council would be able to 
incorporate their concerns, when setting the fee standards. 98  The draft 
amendment could therefore proceed, unchanged, for the final rounds of 
review. During this phase, opposed stakeholders once again voiced concerns 
about the new pollution emission discharge system. Some NPC-SC delegates 
said that they did not understand a system in which an enterprise must pay 
fees even though its emissions are within the standards: 99  “Controlling 
pollution and protecting the environment is good. However, China is a 
developing country with special circumstances. If we do not pay heed to 
such circumstances and place excessively high demands on enterprises that 
                                                                                                                        
Draft Amendment).", NPC-SC, "Shenyi Daqi Wuran Fangzhi fa Xiuding Cao An Erci 
Shenyigao de Yijian (Opinions on the Second Review of the Air Pollution Prevention and 
Control Law Draft Amendment).", NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office, "Ge Difang He Zhongyang 
Youguan Bumen Dui Daqi Wuran Fangzhi Fa (Xiuding Caoan) de Yijian (Opinions by Local 
and Central Relevant Departments  on the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law Draft 
Amendment).", NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office, " Zhongyang Youguan Bumen Dui Daqi 
Wuran Fangzhi Fa (Xiuding Caoan) de Yijian (Opinions by Relevant Central Departments  on 
the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law Draft Amendment)," in Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Da Qi Wuran Fangzhi Fa Shiyi (Commentary to the PRC Air Pollution Prevention and 
Control Law), ed. NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office (Beijing: Falü Chubanshe, 2001). 
95 APPCL § 14 
96  Qu Geping (Director of the NPC-EP Committee), "Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Daqi Wuran Fangzhi Fa Xiuding Caoan de Shuo Ming (Explanation to the Draft 
Amendment to the PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law)." 207 
97 Ibid. 208 
98 Ibid. 208 
99  NPC-SC, "Shenyi Daqi Wuran Fangzhi fa Xiuding Cao An Erci Shenyigao de Yijian 
(Opinions on the Second Review of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law Draft 
Amendment)." 229 
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will greatly burden them, we can endanger their development.” 100  These 
delegates called for more research into the matter. 101  Other stakeholders 
argued similarly that China’s enterprises would suffer too much from the 
extra burden of these new fees.102 They argued for maintaining the PEDF 
system, until enterprises were economically and technologically more 
developed. 103  Many stakeholders proposed that the State Council should 
provide further elaboration in special regulations, in order to keep the law 
itself abstract enough to be adaptable to different circumstances.104 Other 
stakeholders feared that EPBs would start collecting fees at random, just to 
increase their limited funds.105 Therefore they argued that the fees should 
only be used as funds for environmental protection enhancement at 
enterprises or that a tax system, collected by the financial department, should 
be instituted instead.106 Others just demanded State Council procedural rules 
on fee collection and use to prevent misappropriation. 107  Some even 
proposed to delete the new discharge fee provisions and only strictly punish 
excessive discharge.108 
In response to the criticism on the draft amendment provisions on 
pollution emissions fees, the NPC Legal Committee made minor changes to 
the final draft, while maintaining the fee system as a whole.109 The committee 
recognized the complexity of the new fee system and the necessity to take all, 
including environmental, technical, economic, and enterprise interests into 
                                                     
100 Ibid. 229 
101 Ibid. 229 
102 NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office, "Ge Difang He Zhongyang Youguan Bumen Dui Daqi 
Wuran Fangzhi Fa (Xiuding Caoan) de Yijian (Opinions by Local and Central Relevant 
Departments  on the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law Draft Amendment)." 235 
103 Ibid. 236 
104 NPC-SC, "Shenyi Daqi Wuran Fangzhi fa Xiuding Cao An de Yijian (Opinions on the 
Review of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law Draft Amendment)." 222 
105  NPC-SC, "Shenyi Daqi Wuran Fangzhi fa Xiuding Cao An Erci Shenyigao de Yijian 
(Opinions on the Second Review of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law Draft 
Amendment)." 229 
106 NPC-SC, "Shenyi Daqi Wuran Fangzhi fa Xiuding Cao An de Yijian (Opinions on the 
Review of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law Draft Amendment)." 222, NPC-SC, 
"Shenyi Daqi Wuran Fangzhi fa Xiuding Cao An Erci Shenyigao de Yijian (Opinions on the 
Second Review of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law Draft Amendment)." 229 
107 NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office, "Ge Difang He Zhongyang Youguan Bumen Dui Daqi 
Wuran Fangzhi Fa (Xiuding Caoan) de Yijian (Opinions by Local and Central Relevant 
Departments  on the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law Draft Amendment)." 236 
108  NPC-SC, "Shenyi Daqi Wuran Fangzhi fa Xiuding Cao An Erci Shenyigao de Yijian 
(Opinions on the Second Review of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law Draft 
Amendment)." 230 
109 NPC Legal Committee, "Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Daqi Wuran Fangzhi Fa 
Xiuding Caoan Xiugai Qingkuang de Huibao (Report on the Changes to the Draft 
Amendment to the PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law)." 212 
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consideration.110 Furthermore, it affirmed the importance of preventing fee 
collection abuse.111 To accommodate these issues, the committee installed 
two provisions. First, the provision that the State Council would make 
implementing regulations that help to adapt the system to China’s 
circumstances and provide detail on fee collection procedure to prevent 
misuse. Second, it installed the provision that fees collected were to be 
turned over to the financial department and can only be used (for 
environmental protection) under strict supervision of the relevant audit 
department.112 Again, the Legal Committee was selective; it accommodated 
some of the concerns, while ignoring those calling for delay, more research 
or outright annulment of the proposed fee system. Here again, adequacy and 
certainty were dominant, and adaptability and feasibility, equally important, 
were largely ignored. 
Stricter and Mandatory Minimum Sanctions 
The new APPCL incorporated a stronger, and to some extent mandatory, 
enforcement system that limited enforcement discretion. In its explanation 
to the draft amendment, the NPC-EP committee stated that the existing 
legislation was often regarded as a “weak law” lacking strong sanctions for 
violations.113 Thus, the amendment proposed stronger sanctions. The new 
law, for the first time, established mandatory minimum sanctions for certain 
violations, most notably those related to EIA114 and emissions excessive of 
standard levels.115 For both of these two types of violations, no matter what 
the circumstances were, a minimum sanction of 10.000 RMB should be 
issued.116  
 There was much debate about the new proposed sanctions. 
Although some stakeholders called for even stronger sanctions 117 , many 
opponents voiced concern about the excessive emphasis on punishment for 
violations. Opponents feared that the new strict sanction provisions would 
make enforcement too rigid and ill adaptable to special circumstances. As an 
                                                     
110 Ibid. 212 
111 Ibid. 212 
112 Ibid. 212 
113  Qu Geping (Director of the NPC-EP Committee), "Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Daqi Wuran Fangzhi Fa Xiuding Caoan de Shuo Ming (Explanation to the Draft 
Amendment to the PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law)." 208 
114 APPCL § 47 (The original draft already contained this provision) 
115 APPCL § 48 (The original draft already contained this provision) 
116 APPCL § 47, 48 (The original draft already contained these provisions) 
117 NPC-SC, "Shenyi Daqi Wuran Fangzhi fa Xiuding Cao An de Yijian (Opinions on the 
Review of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law Draft Amendment)." 224, NPC-SC, 
"Shenyi Daqi Wuran Fangzhi fa Xiuding Cao An Erci Shenyigao de Yijian (Opinions on the 
Second Review of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law Draft Amendment)." 232 
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example, they argued that struggling state-owned and collective enterprises 
would have to make significant investments to comply with the new law and 
such compliance would take a long time. Opponents felt that in the 
meantime it is unfair to punish them extra strongly for violations.118 Others 
feared that stronger sanctions would only be beneficial to EPBs but not for 
environmental protection and would lead to abuse of authority. 119 
Opponents held that there should be less emphasis on sanctions and more 
on propaganda and education.120 Moreover, they proposed that the specific 
sanction amounts should be deleted from the law and should be regulated 
later in State Council implementing regulations that are more flexible.121  
 The NPC Legal Committee never reacted to any of these concerns 
and just maintained the text as it was. Thus, the new APPCL is the first 
national environmental law in China that uses strict mandatory sanctions 
applicable to the most minor offences. The APPCL’s mandatory minimum 
sanctions increase the law’s adequacy and certainty, while decreasing its 
feasibility and adaptability. 
2000 APPCL Findings 
The main reason why the APPCL amendment in 2000 was more successful 
in installing stricter legal system geared to environmental protection than the 
1995 APPCL amendments was that it was supported by central level 
stakeholders. 122 This change became apparent with the 1996 State Council 
document on pollution, which paved the way for stricter enforcement, but 
also for stricter legislation, we know now.  
 In the lawmaking process, this new central level support was most 
clearly represented by the NPC Legal Committee, which exercised its 
considerable powers to ensure that the most important new proposals in the 
final bill made it into law.123 It could only do so by ignoring some of the 
concerns voiced by opposed stakeholders. Just as with the LMA, the 2000 
APPCL amendment did not consider the full complexity of the different 
                                                     
118 NPC-SC, "Shenyi Daqi Wuran Fangzhi fa Xiuding Cao An de Yijian (Opinions on the 
Review of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law Draft Amendment)." 224-5 
119 Ibid. 225 
120 Ibid. 225 
121 Ibid. 225, NPC-SC, "Shenyi Daqi Wuran Fangzhi fa Xiuding Cao An Erci Shenyigao de 
Yijian (Opinions on the Second Review of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law 
Draft Amendment)." 232 
122 Alford and Liebman, "Clean Air, Clean Processes? The Struggle over Air Pollution Law in 
the People's Republic of China." 745 
123 Except for the amendments, relevant to the present research, discussed above, the 2000 
APPCL amendment also brought stricter norms for energy use (§ 19), reducing high sulfur-
content coal use (§20-31), automobile pollution emissions (§ 32-35), and for controlling and 
preventing waste gas, small particulate and odorous pollutants emissions (§36-45).    
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practices and interests involved. Even though many stakeholders were heard, 
the committee chose several times to let environmental interests prevail. As a 
result, China’s APPCL took first steps to incorporate more specific and 
stricter rules. It must be noted though that the current APPCL still leaves 
much unclear. The best example is the total load permit system, for which in 
2005 the State Council still has not issued implementing regulations. Overall, 
the changes made in the APPCL are not necessarily better for compliance, 
law enforcement and goal attainment. Especially their lack in feasibility 
combined with limited adaptability and uncertainty of some of the norms 
may be troublesome in practice.  
The 2002 EIA Law: Little Bargaining leads to a more 
Comprehensive and somewhat Stricter Law 
In 2002, China finally made a national law to regulate its EIA system. Prior, 
the EIA system, which also includes the Three Synchronizations, was 
mentioned only vaguely in the Environmental Protection Law (both the 
1979 trial as well as the 1989 version) and the various sectoral pollution 
prevention and control laws. This legislation provided little detail and thus 
certainty. For this, Chinese environmental law depended on State Council 
Regulations issued in 1998,124 which still left much unclear.125 The window of 
opportunity for stricter environmental legislation that opened in 1996 with 
the State Council notice on pollution had opened wide enough in 2000 for 
the NPC-EP committee to try codifying the existing regulation into a true 
national law. By 2000, the drafters could count on the direct support of 
China’s central level leaders who had called for enacting a new EIA law. The 
immediate cause for enacting a new law was to broaden the scope of 
applicability of the original EIA system. While it originally covered individual 
construction projects, the new law was to make EIA mandatory for all 
governmental strategic and regional planning. In 1998, China’s president and 
CCP leader, Jiang Zemin, called for the establishment of such a “Planning 
EIA”.126 Then on April 2000 Li Peng, head of the NPC and an influential 
                                                     
124 1998 State Council Regulations on Environmental Protection Management at Construction 
Projects 
125 Van Rooij, "The Enforceability of Chinese Water Pollution Regulations, What Room for 
Improvement?" Later most was clarified in SEPA regulations. See SEPA 2001 Classified 
Directory for Environmental Protection Management of Construction Projects (Batch 1), 
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Environmental Protection Management of Construction Projects, SEPA 2002 No 14. 
126  Wang Tao (Vice Director of the NPC-EP Committee), "Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Huanjing Yingxiang Pingjia Fa (Caoan) de Shuoming," in Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Huanjing Yingxiang Pingjia Fa Shiyi, ed. N S L A Committee (Beijing: Falü Chubanshe, 
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leader in the CCP, called on the NPC-EP Committee to start drafting the 
new EIA law.127 The NPC-EP Committee was able to finish their draft by 
the end of 2000. Then the review procedure started which took until the end 
of 2002 before the NPC-SC voted the bill into law with 125 votes for and 
two abstaining votes.128 The law that was finally introduced was largely based 
on existing regulation 129  and thus partly suffered from the same lack of 
adequacy and certainty as before.130 However, it also brought new norms, 
which similar to amendments of the LMA and APPCL favored adequacy and 
certainty over feasibility and adaptability. 
Planning EIA 
The new law’s most innovative and contested feature was the establishment 
of a mandatory Planning EIA under which new regional 131   and special 
project planning132 must first be assessed for its impact on the environment 
before it is to be approved.133 The original NPC-EP committee draft EIA 
Law had a somewhat broader language for the Planning EIA: it also covered 
policy.134 Without an explanation, the legal committee decided to change the 
language, delete references to “policy”, and just keep EIA for planning 
only.135 Some NPC-SC delegates complained that the proposed law did not 
distinguish between EIA procedural requirements for different kinds of 
planning. 136  The NPC Legal Committee recognized their concern and 
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Projects 
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Regulations, What Room for Improvement?" 
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Law § 7.1. 
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134  Wang Tao (Vice Director of the NPC-EP Committee), "Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Huanjing Yingxiang Pingjia Fa (Caoan) de Shuoming." 168 
135 NPC Legal Committee, "Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Huanjing Yingxiang 
Pingjia Fa Caoan Shenyi Jieguo de Bao Gao (Report on the Results of Review of the Draft 
PRC EIA Law)," in Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Yingxiang Pingjia Fa Shiyi, ed. NPC-SC 
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Legal Affairs Office, "Gesheng, Zizhiqu, Zhixiashi he Zhongyang Youguan Bumen Dui 
Huanjing Yingxiang Pingjia Fa Caoan Shenyi de Yijiang (Provincial, Autonomous Regions and 
Provioncial Level Cities and Central Level Ministries Opinions on the Draft PRC EIA Law)." 
185 
136  NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office, "Gesheng, Zizhiqu, Zhixiashi he Zhongyang Youguan 
Bumen Dui Huanjing Yingxiang Pingjia Fa Caoan Shenyi de Yijiang (Provincial, Autonomous 
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changed the draft so that regional planning only needed to write an EIA as 
an integral part of the plan itself, while special planning, as defined in the law, 
required a full EIA that must also be approved. 137  Three central level 
departments, the Ministry of Construction, the Ministry of National Land 
Resources and the State Forestry Agency, argued that the new law should 
not be applicable to their particular planning, as had been proposed in the 
draft bill. 138  Their “turf” protecting rhetoric was ignored as the Legal 
Committee ignored their arguments and maintained the draft. 139  Further 
criticism came from some opponents who felt that it was too early to enact a 
Planning EIA and that China lacked sufficient experience with this system to 
make it into national law.140 In the light of this, they even questioned the 
necessity of the new law in general, arguing that strengthening the existing 
regulations and their enforcement should be sufficient.141 Finally, the NPC 
Legal Committee, in its usual dominant role was able to ignore such criticism 
and maintain most of the original draft.142  
Ordinary Construction Projects 
For ordinary construction projects, the 2002 EIA law incorporated the EIA 
regulations of the 1998 State Council Regulations for EP Management at 
Construction projects. In its explanation to the draft law, the NPC-EP 
Committee stated that the new law merely copied from the existing 
regulations on EIA at construction projects. Originally, the draft EIA law 
also contained rules on the Three Synchronizations system. 143  The 
committee had chosen to leave as much intact as possible in order to 
                                                                                                                        
Regions and Provioncial Level Cities and Central Level Ministries Opinions on the Draft PRC 
EIA Law)." 185 
137 NPC Legal Committee, "Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Huanjing Yingxiang 
Pingjia Fa Caoan Shenyi Jieguo de Bao Gao (Report on the Results of Review of the Draft 
PRC EIA Law)." 172-3 See also EIA Law § 7.2, 8.2, 10-12 
138 M.o.N.L.R. Ministry of Construction, State Forestry Agency, "Dui Huanjing Yingxiang 
Pingjia Fa Caoan Shenyi de Yijiang (Opinions on the Draft PRC EIA Law)," in Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Yingxiang Pingjia Fa Shiyi, ed. N S L A Committee (Beijing: Falü 
Chubanshe, 2003).  179, 182 
139 NPC Legal Committee, "Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Huanjing Yingxiang 
Pingjia Fa Caoan Shenyi Jieguo de Bao Gao (Report on the Results of Review of the Draft 
PRC EIA Law)." 173 
140  NPC-SC Legal Affairs Office, "Gesheng, Zizhiqu, Zhixiashi he Zhongyang Youguan 
Bumen Dui Huanjing Yingxiang Pingjia Fa Caoan Shenyi de Yijiang (Provincial, Autonomous 
Regions and Provioncial Level Cities and Central Level Ministries Opinions on the Draft PRC 
EIA Law)." 184 
141 Ibid. 184.  
142 NPC Legal Committee, "Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Huanjing Yingxiang 
Pingjia Fa Caoan Shenyi Jieguo de Bao Gao (Report on the Results of Review of the Draft 
PRC EIA Law)." 173 
143 See above 
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safeguard continuity of law and maintain existing compliance. 144  After 
stakeholders complained that the Three Synchronizations system was not 
part of an EIA, the Legal Committee deleted this section from the law.145 
Still other opponents argued against the new EIA law stating that the 
existing regulation was sufficient and still rather new; they advised against 
new legislation for the time being. 146 This last suggestion did not influence 
the NPC Legal Committee that, apart from deleting the section on the Three 
Synchronizations, kept the new EIA law intact maintaining its EIA 
provisions for ordinary construction projects.147 
Mandatory Minimum Sanctions 
The new law introduced mandatory minimum sanctions for violations of 
EIA for construction projects. 148  Before, the existing State Council 
Regulations only contained a maximum fine of 100.000 RMB.149 Now the 
law introduced fines with a maximum of 200.000 and a minimum of 50.000 
RMB.150 The original draft EIA law did not contain the mandatory minimum 
fines. The NPC Legal Committee decided to insert such minimum sanctions 
upon suggestions from central level stakeholders within the NPC-SC seeking 
to strengthen EIA enforcement.151 Amongst the various actors involved in 
the making of the new law there was no concern for the fact that EPB agents 
were now obliged to fine 50.000 RMB even for the smallest infractions of 
the law. For example if a farmer builds a new shed without filling out an EIA 
form, the EPB must issue a fine of 50.000 RMB, much more than many 
farmers earn a year. In this aspect the 2002 EIA law has clearly not paid 
attention to feasibility and adaptability. As argued in Chapter 2, minimum 
sanction requirements may seriously hamper enforcement work, making 
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147 NPC Legal Committee, "Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Huanjing Yingxiang 
Pingjia Fa Caoan Shenyi Jieguo de Bao Gao (Report on the Results of Review of the Draft 
PRC EIA Law)." 174 
148 EIA Law § 31.1 
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enforcement either unreasonable or forcing agents to circumvent such 
mandatory minimum sanctions.  
Findings EIA Law 
The lawmaking process of 2002 EIA law thus further demonstrates how 
central level concerns for environmental protection have recently come to 
dominate recent lawmaking processes. Although there was considerable 
opposition to the law itself and some of its most important new features, the 
NPC Legal Committee supported it and brought it to enactment. The 
debates on the law’s new features demonstrate that there was little true 
concern for the law’s feasibility and adaptability. While this may have some 
effect on government planning, the worst norms in terms of feasibility and 
adaptability are the sanction minima which truly seem to be unworkable for 
local enforcement agents, especially when faced with minor violations by 
poor regulated actors.   
Local Legislation: Yunnan EP Rules are Xeroxed, the Dianchi 
Protection Rules are rather Strict and Kunming makes its own 
restaurant rules 
Thus, some of the stricter and more specific norms in China’s post-1995 
national pollution legislation lacks in terms of adaptability and feasibility. 
This section will analyze the implementability of Yunnan’s local 
environmental legislation.  
Yunnan Environmental Protection Regulations  
Just as for arable land protection, Yunnan also has its own provincial 
regulations for environmental protection. The Yunnan Environmental 
Protection Regulations (YNEPR) were enacted on 25 November 1992, and 
amended on 2 December 1997. Also similar to land, the provincial 
regulations are largely no different from national level legislation existing 
around the time the law was adopted. The local regulations thus also 
function to disseminate national level legislation to the local level. The 
YNEPR provisions on PEDF152, EIA153, 3T154, limited time treatment155, 
accidents reporting156 and sanctions157 are not substantially different from 
national law.158 The provincial regulations do not provide detail on these 
                                                     
152 YNEPR § 40 
153 YNEPR § 36, 38, 39 
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pollution systems, nor do they adapt the national law to local circumstances. 
There is a difference with land legislation though. While national arable land 
protection legislation left little room for local legislation, national pollution 
law (especially around 1997) is not overly specific, thus local regulation could 
have adapted it easier to local circumstances. In Yunnan, however, there is 
little truly local about the 1997 provincial environmental protection 
regulations. 
 It should be stated however that the YNEPR has some provisions 
that are different from national law of around 1997. Some are stricter than 
national law. For instance, the 1997 provincial regulations introduced a 
mandatory permit system for all enterprises discharging pollutants.159 This 
system goes beyond national law that only mandated permits for water 
pollution in designated total load areas.160  
 Other Yunnan provisions are less strict than national legislation. The 
YNEPR provides regulation for small, highly polluting enterprises including 
paper and pulp factories that are only allowed to continue operation after 
approval by the district level EPB. 161  While this norm is not directly in 
violation of national law, the way it has been stated is certainly not what was 
meant in national policy and regulation that stipulates that heavily polluting 
enterprises of a certain size must be closed, no exceptions allowed.162 As the 
provision is currently worded, it opens up the way for allowing small 
polluting factories to continue operation, as long as they can meet the 
discharge standards. For a relatively poor province such as Yunnan, with 
extremely underdeveloped areas such as Nujiang and Jiaotong Prefectures, 
closing down small polluting business is not easy and this special rule 
enabling an exception is no surprise.  
Dianchi Protection Regulations 
Yunnan has made another important set of environmental protection 
regulations: the Dianchi Protection Regulations (DPR). These regulations 
were adopted originally in 1988 in recognition of the severe environmental 
degradation at Lake Dianchi. In 2001, the Kunming People’s Congress 
amended them and the new rules became operational in 2002.  
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 The amendment introduced a stronger institutional structure163 (see 
Chapter 13) with stronger norms to combat pollution164, lake conversion into 
land165, and soil erosion166. For a local law, the DPR is relatively strict. Where, 
for instance, national legislation fails to make water pollution discharges 
excessive of the standards illegal167, the DPR prohibits such discharge into 
Lake Dianchi168. Moreover, all enterprises in the area surrounding the lake 
must comply with standards and if they fail to do so within a limited period 
of time shall be ordered to halt production. 169  Here local legislation in 
Yunnan goes beyond national requirements. This is not surprising as Lake 
Dianchi is one of the spear points of national policy and there has been 
continued pressure from the centre170 as well as an expressed willingness by 
provincial and municipal policy makers to ameliorate the situation.171 The 
DPR 2002 also introduced strict rules prohibiting the establishment of highly 
polluting enterprises including paper factories, chemical factories, and 
chemical fertilizer factories.172 The DPR also clearly prohibits weihaizaotian 
practices of converting the lake into land173, as occurred on a large scale 
during the Cultural Revolution.174 Similar to the 2000 APPCL and the 2002 
EIA Law, the 2002 DPR introduces strict sanction provisions with 
mandatory minimum fines. 175  Although the DPR provides rather strict 
pollution and erosion control regulations, it should be noted that even this 
local law has directly copied many of its other norms from national law.176 
Similar to national legislation, there was also a legislative review 
procedure for the DPR. The debates about the DPR amendment 
demonstrate that there was little real bargaining between different interests 
                                                     
163 DPR § 8-10 
164 DPR § 17.2 , 19.2, 20, 21.2, 23, 20, 31, 33, 39, 40 
165 DPR § 15, 32 
166 DPR § 15, 24, 28, 29 
167 See WPPCL 
168 DPR 2002 § 17.2 . It is punishable with a maximum fine of 100.000 RMB. DPR § 47 
169 DPR 2002 § 21.2 
170 State Council, "State Council Decision on Several Problems concerning Environmental 
Protection (Guowuyuan guanyu Huanjing Baohu ruogan  Wenti de Jueding)."  
171  Kunming People's Congress Committee on Urban and Town Construction and 
Environmental Protection, Guanyu Dui Dianchi Baohu Tialoli Xiuding Caoan Shenyi de Yijian 
(Opininion on the Draft Amendment to the Dianchi Protection Regulations) (22 November 2001 [cited 
17 March 2004]); available from 
http:www.kmpg.gov.cn/renda/content.asp?ARTID=910&COLID=163.. 
172 DPR § 19.3 
173 DPR § 15 
174 Shapiro, Mao's war against nature: politics and the environment in revolutionary China. 
175 DPR § 44-46 
176 See for example DPR § 19.1-2 on 3T, § 21.1 on EIA 
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groups or stakeholders.177 On the contrary, all debate was geared towards 
enhancing an effective protection of Lake Dianchi, without apparent eye for 
economic concerns.178 This is probably related to the fact that there has been 
a strong national emphasis on cleaning up lake Dianchi179 and also that there 
has been local recognition of the need for protecting and restoring the lake. 
180 The DPR lawmaking process and its contents do not seem to reflect other 
interests though and there is little known as to whether the economic welfare 
of the region was taken into account when the rules where made.  
Kunming Municipal Management Rules on Environmental Pollution Prevention and 
Control for Restaurants and Food Business (KMREP) 
In 2003, the Kunming government promulgated local rules for pollution 
prevention and control at local restaurants.181 Kunming’s rapid urbanization 
and economic growth have led to a rapid development of restaurants in 
residential areas. With the increased prosperity, local residents have become 
more sensitive to disturbances from nearby eateries. In response to local 
complaints, Kunming has made local rules dealing especially with this 
problem. China’s national lawmaker also recognized this issue, which it 
regulated in the 2000 APPCL.182 The Kunming rules provide detail as they 
contain strict requirements for new restaurants that were no longer allowed 
to be built underneath residential buildings.183 Larger restaurants must carry 
out a full EIA, while smaller ones must carry out a less extensive form of 
EIA. 184  The rules also provide that existing restaurants must meet strict 
                                                     
177  Kunming People's Congress Law Committee, Guanyu Dui Dianchi Baohu Tialoli Xiuding 
Caoan Shenyi Jieguo de Baogao (Report on the Results of Review on the Draft Amendment to the Dianchi 
Protection Regulations) (22 November 2001 [cited 17 March 2004]); available from 
http:www.kmpg.gov.cn/renda/content.asp?ARTID=911&COLID=163. Kunming People's 
Congress Committee on Urban and Town Construction and Environmental Protection, 
Guanyu Dui Dianchi Baohu Tialoli Xiuding Caoan Shenyi de Yijian (Opininion on the Draft Amendment 
to the Dianchi Protection Regulations) ([cited). 
178  Kunming People's Congress Committee on Urban and Town Construction and 
Environmental Protection, Guanyu Dui Dianchi Baohu Tialoli Xiuding Caoan Shenyi de Yijian 
(Opininion on the Draft Amendment to the Dianchi Protection Regulations) ([cited). Kunming People's 
Congress Law Committee, Guanyu Dui Dianchi Baohu Tialoli Xiuding Caoan Shenyi Jieguo de Baogao 
(Report on the Results of Review on the Draft Amendment to the Dianchi Protection Regulations) ([cited). 
179 State Council, "State Council Decision on Several Problems concerning Environmental 
Protection (Guowuyuan guanyu Huanjing Baohu ruogan  Wenti de Jueding)."  
180  Kunming People's Congress Committee on Urban and Town Construction and 
Environmental Protection, Guanyu Dui Dianchi Baohu Tialoli Xiuding Caoan Shenyi de Yijian 
(Opininion on the Draft Amendment to the Dianchi Protection Regulations) ([cited).. 
181  Kunming Municipal Management Rules on Environmental Pollution Prevention and 
Control for Restaurants and Food Business (KMREP) 
182 APPCL § 52, 56 
183 KMREP § 6 
184 KMREP § 7 
96       Lawmaking and Legislation 
 
 
requirements in order to maintain operation, including specific water, air and 
noise pollution installations.185 Furthermore, Kunming restaurants must meet 
certain air, water and noise standards, dispose of its solid and liquid waste in 
a certain manner, pay emissions and discharge fees and refrain from using 
plastic boxes for takeaway, using highly polluting fuels and using phosphor 
containing cleaning products.186 The Kunming rules introduce sanctions with 
a maximum of 100.000 RMB in fines or closure of the establishment.187 
There are even some mandatory minimum sanctions, but only of 500 RMB 
at most.  
Although the Kunming local rules on restaurants may seem strict at 
first blush, comparing them to some of the national regulation shows that in 
fact they are not strict at all. As we saw, national law stipulates that 
enterprises that emit air pollutants above the standards must be fined a 
minimum of 10.000 RMB. This rule applies to restaurants.188 In Kunming, 
we find however that restaurants that fail to meet the air pollution standards 
can be fined for a maximum of 5000 RMB189, providing EPB agents with 
considerable discretion to adapt the law to local circumstances. An EPB 
agent explained to me that the local rules were partly meant to tackle 
Kunming’s pollution problem, but also to adapt the unreasonably harsh 
APPCL to Kunming’s local conditions. In sum, the KMREP is an example 
of how local rules adapt national legislation to local circumstances. They do 
so in an odd manner though, as by the letter of the law, the KMREP are in 
violation of the APPCL, which dictates a mandatory sanction minimum. The 
Kunming legislator has created what Cohn calls parallel arrangements that 
allow them to escape the stringency of the unfeasible national legislation.190  
Conclusion 
The lawmaking processes of the three national pollution laws described 
above demonstrates complex changes. For pollution law we see first of all a 
shift in emphasis. While at first with the 1995 APPCL the introduction of 
ambitious norms was stopped by opposed stakeholders, with the 1996 
WPPCL, 2000 APPCL and the 2002 EIA the laws’ legislators resisted some 
of such opposition, creating some stricter and more specific norms while 
leaving others unchanged, vague and weak. In these cases, such resistance 
was possible because by 1996 and especially by 2000 there was a strong 
support for environmental protection within the central level leadership, for 
                                                     
185 KMREP § 8, 11 
186 KMREP § 10 
187 KMREP § 11 
188 APPCL  § 48 
189 KMREP § 11.2 
190 Cohn, "Fuzzy Legality in Regulation: The Legislative Mandate Revisited." 479 
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the first time clearly visible in the 1996 State Council policy document on 
strengthening pollution control. This support had come after a series of 
pollution incidents had increased attention for pollution control and forced 
China’s leadership to show their willingness to address this problem in a 
strong manner.  
 The shift towards environmental protection was welcome and 
important. However, in some instances, generally it did not lead to better 
legislation. First, the new laws continued to contain a significant amount of 
weak and vague rules. In all three pollution laws studied in detail here, many 
of the older norms were largely maintained in the new legislation, which 
copied many norms from existing rules, inheriting their lack of certainty and 
adequacy.  In addition, both the WPCCL and the APPCL never realized 
some of the most ambitious legislative proposals, a comprehensive permit 
system in particular, which were watered down in the drafting phase. Second, 
although stricter and more specific norms enhanced the law’s adequacy and 
certainty, some of these new norms failed to acknowledge China’s 
complexity and therefore are deficient in terms of feasibility and adaptability. 
This is especially so for the WPPCL’s norms on small enterprises, the 
APPCL’s norms prohibiting excessive emissions, and the APPCL and the 
EIA’s high minimum penalty levels. Unfortunately, local regulation has not 
been able to remedy most of these problems, with the notable exception of  
Kunming’s semi-legal rules on restaurant pollution circumventing the 
unfeasible sanction minima of the APCCL. Instead, the local DPR, made 
under the pressure of national policies directed to stop pollution at Lake 
Dianchi, has only exacerbated the lack of feasibility when making all 
discharges surpassing the standards illegal and ordering companies that 
continue to do so to be shut down. As with national legislation, the 
lawmaking processes for this norm in the DPR, never considered whether it 
would be feasible in terms of compliance and enforcement. 
 
 
 5. China’s Legislative Challenges 
Lawmaking and its Effects on Compliance, 
Enforcement and Goal Attainment 
 
“We are men, not gods,” Hart has reminded us in relation to the challenges 
of lawmaking.1 Faced with the complexities of modern society, legislators 
should be humble in what they can hope to achieve. However, citizens place 
ever-greater demands on the state to protect their ever more differentiated 
interests and the state has turned to law as an instrument to protect different 
interests in society. Consequently, instead of humbleness we are now faced 
with great expectations of what law can do. This is not new. Roscoe Pound 
wrote in 1917 about the U.S.: “To-day we are almost willing to throw out 
our hard-worn justice according to law in order to bring speedy and vigorous 
application of new types of rules securing new interests.”2 Pound argued that 
people expect too much of law: “When men demand much of law, when 
they seek upon it to devolve the whole burden of social 
control…enforcement of law comes to involve many difficulties. Then few 
can comprehend the whole field of the law, nor can they do so at one 
glance.” Today, as Bardach and Kagan, in their overview about the growth 
of protective regulation in the US have shown, the pressure for more and 
stricter legislation, covering more fields, and protecting more interests is no 
less than in Pound’s time, it is far greater.3 Contemporary legislators are 
increasingly pressured not to listen to Hart’s and Pound’s warnings and to 
regulate more and stricter for increasingly complex situations. Since the 
second half of the 1990s, China is no different as it followed a path towards 
more specific and stricter legislation.  
This study has analyzed how China changed its natural resource 
protection legislation in the second half of the 1990s. It has looked at how 
such changes have come about and how they have affected the law’s quality 
in terms of implementability. In the lawmaking processes studied, a trend 
towards stricter and more specific legislation was apparent. The process of 
lawmaking changed; it became less characterized by China’s piece meal 
approach 4  of incrementalism and bargaining. With the 1998 LMA 
amendment, most local concerns about locally unfeasible draft stipulations 
were pushed aside to ensure a strong law to protect China’s arable land 
resources. The history of pollution regulation shows that at first in 1995 with 
the APPCL amendment the lawmaking process involved a great amount of 
bargaining and resulted in water downed rather abstract and weak legislation. 
                                                     
1 Hart, The Concept of Law. 124-5  
2 R. Pound, "The Limits of Effective Legal Action," International Journal of Ethics 27 (1917). 151  
3 Bardach and Kagan, Going by the Book, The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness. 
4 Chen, Chinese Law, Towards an Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and Development. 
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With the 1996 WPPCL, and especially with the 2000 APPCL and the 2002 
EIA Law this changed somewhat and environmentalist stakeholders were 
able to push through stricter and more specific legislation. Both changes 
came after a fundamental choice within China’s national leadership to 
protect natural resources. Underlying both changes was the idea that stricter 
and more specific legislation would be more effective to stop ongoing 
resource abuses.5  
So how have these changes affected the laws’ implementability? In 
our analysis of the expected effects the new norms have on compliance, 
enforcement and goal attainment, we found neutral, positive, and negative 
results. First, the changes in the laws had neutral results as for some norms 
little was changed. This was especially so for pollution legislation, the 1995 
APPCL and the 1996 WPPCL in particular. The extensive bargaining that 
still took place for these laws meant that ambitious legislative proposals such 
as a comprehensive permit system never made it into the final draft. In 
addition, all pollution laws, even the 2002 EIA law and the 2000 APPCL, 
retained some of the vague and weak legal systems, such as PEDF, and the 
3T/EIA system from the 1980s legislation. As a result, in these matters the 
legislative change did not solve existing problems of adequacy and certainty.  
On the positive side, the new natural resource protection legislation 
is more specific and provides legal certainty. Thus, it reduces discretion, 
which would seem to enhance its effect. Furthermore, the new legislation has 
also become stricter, making it better in terms of adequacy.  
On the negative side, although the norms have become more 
specific and certain, such enhanced certainty and adequacy have come at a 
cost. For some of the provisions in the new legislation one can wonder 
whether they are adaptable enough to local circumstances. Good examples 
are the specific norms on basic arable land protection in the LMA, the 
specific norms prohibiting certain kinds of water discharges in the WPPCL, 
and the minimum sanctions requirements in the DPR, APPCL and the EIA 
Law. Moreover, for some of the new stricter rules the local feasibility has 
come at stake, a point sometimes noticed by dissenting opinions during the 
legislative process. Here examples include the norms on basic arable land 
protection and collective construction in the LMA, the norms on small 
polluting enterprises in the WPPCL, the norm on closing enterprises with a 
discharge above the standards in the DPR, and the minimum sanction 
requirements in the APPCL and the EIA law. Chapter 2 argued that 
implementable law must strike a balance between certainty and adaptability, 
                                                     
5 Few scholars oppose to this idea and emphasizes adaptability and feasibility. See for example 
S.P.S. Ho and G.C.S. Lin, "Non-Agricultural Land Use in Post-Reform China," China Quarterly 
179, no. September (2004). 777  
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and between adequacy and feasibility. With the most specific and strictest 
new legal provisions, this balance seems to have been lost. 
 Making law that balances certainty and adaptability, and adequacy 
and feasibility is no easy feat, especially not in China. A first problem is 
knowing what is feasible and adequate in China. The country’s size, its 
complexity and its speed of change make determining the costs and benefits 
(both financial and social) of a certain policy decision or of a certain law 
extremely difficult. Through the amendments of the natural resource 
protection legislation, China’s legislator has attempted to include research on 
the effects of the law in the lawmaking processes.6 For the WPPCL for 
example, local research in Dalian city was carried out.7 One can wonder 
though what the experiences in a rather developed and rich city such as 
Dalian mean for other less developed parts of China. Seidman and Seidman 
propose that the process of lawmaking should include as much social 
scientific research as possible. 8  Ideally, such research should look at the 
expected effects of the law, especially on the regulated actors and its 
compliance behavior. Apart from the difficulty of doing such research and 
involving it in the lawmaking process9, the question remains what to do if 
such research provides a complex picture of compliance behavior that 
cannot be directly translated into specific norms. 
This raises the second problem of how to make good legislation in a 
context of complexity, even when such complexity can be understood. In 
other words, how can adequacy, feasibility, adaptability and certainty be 
balanced in a complex context? In China, this is closely related to the spatial 
dimension to law. In an ideal world, law would work like a map, as De Sousa 
Santos has taught us.10 The greater the scope of application the less detail law 
should provide, the more careful one should be with making strict rules. 
However, in a country as large as China this would mean that law would 
become so abstract and weak, as to be completely void of certainty and 
adequacy. Therefore, it is no surprise that large legal systems11 such as China, 
but also like European and U.S. federal law, have been relatively specific and 
strict. Here, the dilemma that large legal systems face reveals itself: making 
                                                     
6 For an overview of such research see Asian Development Bank, Reform of Environmental and 
Land Legislation in the People's Republic of China. 
7 Ibid. 83-88 
8 Seidman and Seidman, "Using Reason and Experience to Draft Country-Specific Laws." 
9 For this point see Tamanaha. Tamanaha, "A Pragmatic Approach to Legislative Theory for 
Developing Countries." 
10 B. De Sousa Santos, "Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of 
Law," Journal of Law and Society 14, no. 3 (1987). 
11 Obviously, the issue is the amount of complexity that a lawmaker is faced with, which is to 
a large extent related to the scope of application. Larger legal systems will have laws that have 
a larger scope of application. 
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legislation that fits local circumstances but that still is strong enough to have 
an impact. A country as large and complex as China, with a unitary legal 
system, that is largely top-down and lacks a system of case law, will face 
extreme difficulties making implementable law. There is a spatial logic to 
Chinese law making. The country’s size, combined with its unitary system of 
governance, and its gap between central and local interests and 
fragmentation of local/functional power holders (see Chapter 13) make the 
legal system a one-size-shoe that must fit a zoo of different feet. This makes 
it nearly impossible to make laws that score well in terms of a combination 
of legal certainty and adaptability, adequacy and feasibility. In practice, we 
have seen that depending on the importance that China’s national leadership 
accorded to environmental protection, China’s natural resource legislation 
has actually developed along the lines of a dilemma. At first, it was abstract 
and weak because of extensive bargaining, but without much effect because 
it lacked direct control. Recently it has become more specific and stricter, 
based on narrow central functional interests and it was hoped that this would 
enhance its effectiveness. The question remains though whether a definition 
of outcomes is sufficient to create legislation that is effective in 
implementation while it is not adaptable to, and possibly not feasible under 
local circumstances.  
A third problem is that lawmakers sometimes do not care for 
balancing adequacy, adaptability, feasibility and certainty. In several instances 
the NPC Legal Committee refused to pay heed to seemingly valid concerns 
about the local implementability of strict and specific norms because of their 
lack in feasibility and adaptability. Thus, although the committee could have 
known that proposed norms would be less implementable, in practice it still 
adopted them. An explanation 12  is that lawmakers preferred strict and 
specific norms to feasible and adaptable norms, no matter what their 
influence on actual implementability was, caring more instead about norms 
that looked and sounded effective. A series of incidents preceded the 
changes in lawmaking. For arable land, Brown’s alarming report, Li Peng’s 
preparation in participating in the FAO World Food Summit and the 
national investigation in land resources and Li Peng’s promises while at the 
World Food Summit (see Chapter 3), which were again reported in China, 
seem to have started a national sense of urgency to stop arable land 
reductions. For pollution, a series of pollution accidents in 1994, the media 
attention for severe pollution at the Huai-river in 1994, the overall increased 
reporting on pollution and the increased environmental awareness, the 
strengthening of the NPC-EP committee and the issuing of the 1996 State 
                                                     
12  Another explanation could be that lawmakers did not wish to have implementable 
legislation and made what Cohn calls “pastiche law”. Cohn, "Fuzzy Legality in Regulation: 
The Legislative Mandate Revisited." 
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Council document on pollution control13, likely led to a similar sense of 
urgency to tackle China’s worsening pollution. These events, especially 
because of their public character, likely made that China’s lawmakers had to 
demonstrate their willingness to tackle the problems of land loss and 
pollution. Demonstrating such willingness stands opposed to adopting 
balanced rules that on paper seem weak and vague. In this manner, these 
incidents and the sense of urgency they seem to have caused affected the 
lawmaking process’s rationality. The debates on the laws, especially with the 
1998 LMA and the 2000 APPCL and the 2002 EIA were less based on a 
neutral, social scientific, analysis of what is best for the country as a whole or 
even on what works best to attain the goal of protecting natural resources, 
and more on an idea, not supported by scientific knowledge, and opposed by 
local stakeholders and practitioners, but rather popular conventional wisdom 
that more specific and stringent legislation clearly aiming at natural resource 
protection should be instituted. The rationality behind more specific and 
stricter legislation was one of showing that the problem was addressed in a 
strong manner, not addressing the problem in a realistic way.  
Hence, a series of incidents, combined with a political commitment 
to show improvements, influenced how law is made in China, as it changed 
its nature from incremental bargaining to coincidental, garbage-can elitism. 
China’s legislative reactions to incidents are not unique and are quite similar 
to studies from other countries. Western literature has demonstrated that 
disasters, electoral shifts, cases of legal failure covered in the media, or 
scandals can all incur a change in the lawmaking process.14 Bardach and 
Kagan provide some very telling examples15 from the United States. One 
example is a state fire marshal stating that his agency “sometimes 
intentionally waited until after a particularly dramatic fire to petition the state 
legislature to enact new fire code requirements and grant the agency more 
funds and greater powers.”16 Another example is that after a tunnel exploded 
in California in 1971 killing 17 workers, a “highly publicized legislative 
investigation” resulted in new legislation introducing “automated 
enforcement actions.” 17  This type of lawmaking also occurred in non-
Western contexts. In India, following the Bhopal incident in 1984, a series 
“of environmental acts, regulations and protocols followed.” 18  In Juárez, 
                                                     
13 See State Council, "State Council Decision on Several Problems concerning Environmental 
Protection (Guowuyuan guanyu Huanjing Baohu ruogan  Wenti de Jueding)." 
14 Here we have been influenced by Kagan’s work on the political influences on enforcement. 
See for more in Chapter 12. Kagan, "Regulatory Enforcement." 
15 Another well documented example is Berman’s analysis of the 1960 and the 1964 making of 
the US Civil Rights act. See Berman, A Bill Becomes a Law, Congress Enacts Civil Rights Legislation. 
16 Bardach and Kagan, Going by the Book, The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness. 23 
17 Ibid. 
18 Stuligross, "The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation in India." 398 
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Mexico, the election of a new mayor, following community protest against 
local pollution, led to new strict local rules banning polluting brick making 
practices.19 The tendency to introduce new stricter norms after a disaster was 
also apparent in Indonesia, following a large explosion at the Indorayon pulp 
mill in North Sumatra in November 1993, BAPEDAL Minister Sarwono 
declared that all new Indonesian paper mills would have to use elementary 
chlorine-free pulping technology. 20  Lawmaking can thus react to public 
incidents, which forces lawmakers to simplify, instead of dealing with a 
problem in its full complexity. 
The analysis of the case of China made above, in Part I of this book, 
provides several insights about lawmaking in relation to compliance, 
enforcement and goal attainment. The first is that a framework on the quality 
of legislation is necessary to help analyze, prepare and thus make laws that 
have the expected effect once implemented. Although many studies exist on 
the quality of legislation, a framework of characteristics of implementable 
legislation does not exist and should be made and tested. The analysis of the 
existing literature has shown that such a framework should consist of at least 
four elements: adequacy, feasibility, certainty and adaptability. Second, the 
quality of lawmaking is closely related to the legislative process. The manner 
in which lawmaking is prepared, the rationality of such preparation, the 
drafting and the adoption debates and finally the manner in which 
stakeholders can participate all influence the final outcome and thus 
implementability of legislation. A third insight is that making laws that meet 
all four characteristics of implementability is difficult as they are partly 
opposed. Therefore, a balance should be sought. A fourth insight is that in a 
context of complexity finding such balance is not easy. We saw that 
complexity makes analyzing feasibility and adequacy extremely difficult. In 
addition, complexity poses an insurmountable contradiction between the 
four requirements. The more complex the more impossible it is to find a 
balance. Finally, when lawmaking is done as a reaction to a public incident, 
the sense of urgency such event creates precludes a full weighing of all 
complexity and all requirements. The fifth insight is closely related to this. In 
some cases, lawmakers do not care about social scientific observations about 
the implementability of legislation. Following incidents or shifts in power, 
lawmakers may care more for a political rationality showing their willingness 
to act rather than truly solving the problem at hand. The lesson this teaches 
is that lawmakers do not necessary apply whatever scholarship theoretically 
                                                     
19  World Bank, Greening Industry, New Roles for Communities, Markets and Governments. 83, 
Blackman and Bannister, "Pollution Control in the Informal Sector: the Ciudad Juarez 
Brickmakers' Project." 
20 D.A. Sonnenfeld, "Social Movements, environment, and technology in Indonesia's pulp and 
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discovers about the quality of legislation, as they may be more influenced by 
a political rationality than a social scientific or economic one.21 In sum, the 
challenge in lawmaking is how to create a political environment and a 
legislative framework that incorporates knowledge about legislative quality 
and that can work together with legislative experts to create laws that are able 
to have control over outcomes without sacrificing the law’s ability to adapt 
itself to the complex circumstances it may come to face. 
 
  
                                                     
21 Snellen, Boeiend geboeid (Captivated Captured) (Inaugural Lecture University of Tilburg). 
 
Part II 




     6. Why People Obey the Law 
Regulatory Compliance and Violation,  
China and Theory 
Introduction 
Mrs. Li is happy: “I get 2000 RMB; the village collective pays me every year. 
Now that my husband has passed away, I have sold our land. I can no longer 
work on it.” She is sitting in her earthen, traditional house where she still 
lives, unlike many of her co-villagers. The others have built new second 
houses and get extra income from renting the old one. Mrs. Li’s annual 
stipend comes from collective profits of leasing village land to privately 
owned enterprises. She smiles: “I depend on this money.” She does not 
know that her pension comes from illegal funds. Over the years, Jiacun 
village has developed its main resource, arable land. It has converted large 
parts into construction land. As a result, the village and most villagers reap 
the rewards. However, the 1998 Land Management law strictly forbids some 
of the land practices carried out in Jiacun, such as families building a second 
house, or leasing out village land for construction of privately owned 
factories.1 “Such laws are logical in Beijing, they want to protect national 
food security,” Mr. Zhang, one of the village leaders tells me, “but here we 
just want to develop, who are they to say we cannot.”2  
 A week later, on the other side of the lake, in Baocun village, Mr. 
Yang does not know what to do. “Look at my rice. You see, it is red.” He is 
standing in his rice paddy. Indeed about 60% of his rice kernels are not 
yellow, but red. A giant phosphor chemical fertilizer plant emits a white 
smoke and acidic smell, not 500 meters from where we stand. Mr. Yang 
shrugs and points at the factory. “I know it is their fault, but what can I do? 
We all depend on them, in many ways.” What Yang means is that all income 
in Baocun is directly (jobs in the factory) or indirectly (selling farm produce 
or renting houses to factory workers) related to the dirty giant in the middle 
of the village. The factory has paid for most infrastructure, has built a school 
and even pays compensation for pollution related damages, all be it much 
less than the actual losses. Furthermore, the factory forms an intricate part of 
the local phosphor economy that provides income for the whole county. It is 
no surprise that this factory and many others in the region have been able to 
violate pollution regulation through illegal discharges at night. “Sure, we 
know, why else would the factory employ more people in the evening than in 
the afternoon?” Mr. Yang says. Still he has never called the Environmental 
                                                     
1 LMA §62.1 and 62.3 
2 Based on fieldwork interviews with villagers and village leadership in Jiacun village, 2004.  
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Protection Bureau; he knows that strict enforcement may save his rice, but 
not his livelihood.3 
Mrs. Li and Mr. Yang’s cases illustrate that law in action at Lake 
Dianchi is different from the law in the books made in Beijing. China’s 
recent natural resource protection legislation was strengthened to 
accommodate increasing concerns for nationwide natural resource losses. 
The recently amended and enacted legislation focuses on national, long-term 
interests related to natural resource protection and little on short-term local 
interests related to local economic development. China’s legislators seem to 
believe that more certain and stricter legislation, even if it does not fit local 
circumstances would be more effective in achieving its goals of protecting 
resources.4 This belief is questionable though. A low level of feasibility and 
adaptability so it seems will lead to less voluntary compliance and will make 
implementation costly and enforcement necessary.  
Part II of this book continues the study of the influence changes in 
legislation and enforcement have had on compliance with land and pollution 
regulation at Lake Dianchi. It looks at why regulated actors have complied or 
violated the law and to what extent such compliance or violation was 
influenced by legislation and enforcement efforts. During a year of fieldwork 
around the lake, a rich collection of relevant data was gathered from which 
eighteen case studies of compliance and violation could be distilled. This part 
of the book first relates these case studies in as much detail as possible. The 
case studies have been further analyzed by structuring findings in each case, 
based on an analytical framework derived from studies of compliance 
behavior from elsewhere.  
This chapter will introduce the analytical frameworks that are used in 
these analyses, introducing both existing studies on compliance with land 
and pollution regulation in China, as well as theories and studies on 
regulatory compliance from elsewhere.  
Previous Studies: Compliance and Violation in China 
Although understanding norm conformity is essential for improving the 
effects of legislation and enforcement, so far there have been surprisingly 
few empirical studies of compliance and violation behavior related to natural 
resource protection legislation in China. Both for arable land protection law 
and pollution control law there have been studies about why so much arable 
land has been lost or why pollution continues, but few of these studies have 
linked their findings with the existing legal norms. Furthermore, actual case 
                                                     
3 Based on fieldwork in Baocun village, interviews with villagers, and village leaders 2004. 
4 Some scholars agree with them, see for example Ho and Lin who believe that the new LMA 
because of its strictness is better equipped to curb ongoing arable land loss. See Ho and Lin, 
"Non-Agricultural Land Use in Post-Reform China." 277 
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studies about the choices that the various regulate communities make about 
compliance and violation are rare.  
Arable Land Protection 
For arable land, scholars have tried to find out why so much arable land has 
been lost in China over the last years.5 Several scholars link arable land loss 
to general trends. For example, in their study of diminishing farmland in the 
1990s Han and He state that population growth and real estate development 
were the most important factors for arable land loss in urban areas. 6 Other 
scholars studying trends of arable land loss, including Guo, Zhang, Ho and 
Lin, argue that continuing arable land loss has been caused by economic 
development in general and its resulting urbanization and infrastructure 
development.7 In line with this are studies that argue that arable land loss is 
related to the market opportunities economic development has created. 8 
Thus, Li and Sun’s study employing Geographical Information System 
analysis blames industrialization for arable land loss.9 Zhang contends that 
                                                     
5 Most do so however, without directly linking this to the LMA. In one study a direct link is 
made between the LMA’s land conversion balancing system, LMA § 31, and the failure to 
protect arable land well. This study found that most arable land that is converted for non-
arable use is of high quality, but the new arable land that is developed to balance it is of low 
quality. See J. Tang, "Dangqian Gengdi Baohu Gongzuop de Duice yu Jianyi (Current Policy 
Measures and Recommendations for Arable Land Protection Work)," Zhongwai Fangdichan 
Daobao 2003, no. 7 (2003). 17  
6 S.S. Han and C.X. He, "Diminishing Farmland and urban development in China: 1993-
1996," GeoJournal 49, no. 3 (1999). 257 In Chinese studies the link between arable land loss 
and population is also emphasized, see W. Liu, "Xibu Dakaifa de Gengdi Baohu Zhengce 
(Arable Land Protection Policy in the Western Development Campaign)," Zhongguo Tudi Kexue 
15, no. 3 (2001). 10, X. Zhang, D. Xu, and Y. Wu, "Pinkun Xian Gengdi Baohu Silu Ji Duice 
(Ideas and Remedies about Protecting Arable Land in Poor Districts)," Guotu Jingji 2002, no. 9 
(2002). 41 See also Ho and Lin, "Non-Agricultural Land Use in Post-Reform China." 762, 
765- 
7 W. Guo, "Woguo Chengshihua Fazhan Zhong de Gengdi Baohu (Protecting Arable Land in 
Urbanzing China)," Chengxiang Jianshe 2003, no. 5 (2003). T. Zhang, "Land Market Forces and 
the Government's Role in Sprawl," Cities 17, no. 2 (2000). Ho and Lin, "Non-Agricultural 
Land Use in Post-Reform China." 758, 763-4, also looking at secondary urban settlements and 
arable land loss at page 768 See also He, Ma, and Fan, "Muqian Woguo Gengdi Baohu 
Mianlin de Zhuyao Wenti Yu Duice (The Most Important Problems China Currently Faces 
for Arable land Protection and Their Policy Solutions)." 13, Chen, Nongcun Tudi Falüzhidu 
Yanjiu, Tianye Diaocha Jiedu (Research in the Village Land Legal System, an Analysis on the Basis of 
Fieldwork).38 
8  S. Sargeson, "Subduing "The Rural House-building Craze": Attitudes Towards Housing 
Construction and Use Controls in Four Zhejiang Villages," China Quarterly 172, no. December 
(2002).929 She quotes the following sources that argue this: Y. Mao, "Nongcun Zhaijidi 
Guanli yu Gengdibaohu (The management of rural house sites and protection of farmland)," 
Zhejiang Sheng Tudi Xuehui Huikan 1998, no. 10 (1998). 
9 X. Li and L. Sun, "Driving Forces of Arable Land Conversion in China," IIASA Interim 
Report IR-97-076/Sept (1997). 2 
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village development depends on converting arable land for construction, and 
that this is an unstoppable process ongoing both in richer and poorer 
villages.10 Other scholars link economic growth and market opportunities to 
the decentralized institutional arrangements (see Chapter 13) under which 
local governments could benefit from violating the arable land legislation.11 
Cai for example finds that as village cadres have deciding power in many 
land conversion issues they have had the opportunity for “predatory 
behavior” to profit from construction because there is a high degree of local 
autonomy.12 Other examples are Skinner et alia’s and Zhang’s studies that 
hold that the de facto institutional devolution (See Chapter 13) gives local 
governments the opportunity to reinterpret national land protection 
legislation undermining its implementation and sustaining local economic 
growth while diminishing arable land.13 Ho and Lin argue that official land 
conversion procedure is not followed because of tax evasion and other 
benefits related to illegal land transfer.14 Their study further contends that 
illegal land loss has been caused by weak enforcement and short-term 
revenue attainment.15  Ho and Lin further link arable land loss with land 
tenure security, arguing that as long as there is no tenure security farmers will 
be less inclined to protect arable land. 16  Several scholars agree that the 
                                                     
10  W. Zhang, "Nongcun Jianshe Yongdi Shiyong Quan Zhidu de Faxue Fenxi (A Legal 
Analysis of Village Land Construction Rights)," in Nongcun Tudi Falüzhidu Yanjiu, Tianye 
Diaocha Jiedu (Research in the Village Land Legal System, an Analysis on the Basis of Fieldwork), ed. X 
e a Chen (Beijing: Zhongguo Zhengfa Daxue Chubanshe, 2003).236-8 
11  Sargeson, "Subduing "The Rural House-building Craze": Attitudes Towards Housing 
Construction and Use Controls in Four Zhejiang Villages."929, quoting J. Yan, "Nongmin 
Jianfang Yongdi Zhon de "Cunpi Xianxiang Toushi (The Phenomenon of 'village 
approval"for farmers'use of land for housing construction)," Cunzhen Jianshe 1999, no. 11 
(1999).41 See also Y. Wang, "Gengdi Baohu Yu Zhengfu Zhineng de Xiangguanxing Fenxi (A 
Relational Analysis of Arable Land Protection and Governmental Powers)," Nongye Jingji Wenti 
2004, no. 4 (2004). 57 
12  Y. Cai, "Collective Ownership or Cadres' Ownership? The Non-agricultural Use of 
Farmland in China," China Quarterly 175, no. September (2003).665 This view resonates with 
He et al., see He, Ma, and Fan, "Muqian Woguo Gengdi Baohu Mianlin de Zhuyao Wenti Yu 
Duice (The Most Important Problems China Currently Faces for Arable land Protection and 
Their Policy Solutions)." 13 
13 M.W. Skinner, R.G. Kuhn, and A.E. Joseph, "Agricultural Land Protection in China: A 
Case Study of Local Governance in Zhejiang Province," Land Use Policy 18 (2001).329 Zhang, 
"Land Market Forces and the Government's Role in Sprawl." 
14 S.P.S. Ho and G.C.S. Lin, "Emerging Land Markets in Rural and Urban China: Policies and 
Practices," China Quarterly 175, no. September (2003). 703-4 
15 Han and He, "Diminishing Farmland and urban development in China: 1993-1996." 257 
See also He, "Gengdi Baohu Ying Zuodao "Liu Ge Bixu" (The "Six Must Be Dones"of 
Arable Land Protection)."40 
16 Ho and Lin, "Emerging Land Markets in Rural and Urban China: Policies and Practices." 
703, see also Sargeson, "Subduing "The Rural House-building Craze": Attitudes Towards 
Housing Construction and Use Controls in Four Zhejiang Villages."quoting P. Ho, "Who 
 Why People Obey the Law       111 
 
 
existing institutional structure further weakened enforcement, which is an 
important factor for explaining continuing arable land losses. 17    Some 
scholars look at farmers’ perceptions when explaining ongoing land loss. 
Sargeson argues that arable land loss due to rural housing construction is the 
result of “families’ demographic and social aspirations”.18 Another finding in 
Sargeson’s study is that arable land loss continues because peasants perceive 
farming as unprofitable and secondly that farmers do not support the arable 
land conservation goals of the law.19 This resonates with Ceng’s study about 
the protection of arable land in Xinjiang Autonomous Region that 
emphasizes the lack of public awareness as a main cause for continuing land 
loss.20  
 In sum, these studies seek to explain arable land loss practice, 
offering both general factors related to trends external to the norm addressee, 
as well as specific factors closely related to the norm addressee. 
Unfortunately, few of them link their analyses with the existing legislative 
framework and with the regulated actors’ reaction to the legislation. 
Pollution Prevention and Control 
For pollution control legislation in China, studies about compliance and 
violation behavior are also rare.21 There are many studies about pollution 
behavior though. Most studies focus on the polluter’s external institutional 
environment. Of these studies, most scholars, including Bachner and 
Johnson link pollution with the legal system, arguing that it continues 
                                                                                                                        
Owns China's Land? Policies, Property Rights and Deliberate Institutional Ambiguity," China 
Quarterly 166, no. June (2001).  G. Feder et al., "The Determinants of farm investment and 
residual construction in post-reform China," Economic Development and Cultural Change 42, no. 1 
(1992). C. Shang, "Woguo Nongcun Tudi Zhidu Zhong Cunzai de Ruogan Wenti (Soem 
Problems occuring in China's rural land System)," Shantou Daxue Bao 1998, no. 4 (1998). L. 
Zhu and Z. Jiang, "From Brigade to village community: the land tenure system and rural 
development in China," Cambridge Journal of Economics 17, no. 4 (1993). 
17 Han and He, "Diminishing Farmland and urban development in China: 1993-1996." 257 
See also T. He, "Gengdi Baohu Ying Zuodao "Liu Ge Bixu" (The "Six Must Be Dones"of 
Arable Land Protection)," Zhongguo Tudi 2004, no. 9 (2004).40 He, Ma, and Fan, "Muqian 
Woguo Gengdi Baohu Mianlin de Zhuyao Wenti Yu Duice (The Most Important Problems 
China Currently Faces for Arable land Protection and Their Policy Solutions)."13 
18  Sargeson, "Subduing "The Rural House-building Craze": Attitudes Towards Housing 
Construction and Use Controls in Four Zhejiang Villages." 931 
19 Ibid. 954 
20 Q. Ceng, "Qianghua Gengdi Baohu Yishi, Cujin Gengdi Shuliang He Suliang de Tigao 
(Strengthening Arable Land Protection Awareness to Increase the Quantity and Quality of 
Arable Land)," Xinjiang Nongye Keji 1995, no. 4 (1995). 13 
21 Ma and Ortolano, form a notable exception, as they truly make a study of compliance and 
violation behavior. X. Ma and L. Ortolano, Environmental Regulation in China (Landham: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2000). 
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because of weak law enforcement.22 In addition, scholars, including Ma and 
Ortolano hold that pollution continues because of the law’s weak incentives 
for pollution abatement23, partly the result of vague legislation.24 Most of the 
studies looking at the external context find fault with the decentralized 
environmental governance structure that has enabled local governments to 
choose short-term economic concerns over pollution control.25 Zhang Lei’s 
                                                     
22 Johnson, Clear Water, Blue Skies: China's Environment in the New Century. 60-1 C. Yang, J. Head, 
and S. Liu, "China's Treatment of Crimes Against the Environment: using criminal sanctions 
to fight environmental degradation in the PRC," Journal of Chinese Law 8, no. 2 (1994).677, B. 
Bachner, "Regulating Pollution in the People's Republic of China: An Analysis of the 
Enforcement of  Environmental Law," Colorado Journal of International Law and Policy 7, no. 2 
(1996).407,  See also H. Sims, "One-fifth of the Sky: China's Environmental Stewardship," 
World Development 28, no. 7 (1999). 1235-6, L. Zhang, "Ecologizing Industrialization in Chinese 
Small Towns" (PhD Thesis defended at Wageningen University, 2002). 185, C.W.H. Lo, 
P.K.T. Yip, and K.C. Cheung, "The Regulatory Style of Environmental Governance in China: 
The Case of EIA in Shanghai," Public Administration and Development 20, no. December (2000). 
314 
23  Ma and Ortolano, Environmental Regulation in China. 91-2, 111-2, Sun, "Controlling the 
Environmental Consequences of Power Development in the PRC."1046-7, Alford and Shen, 
"Limits of the Law in Addressing China's Environmental Dilemma." 137, Railton, "The 
Rhetoric and Reality of Water Quality Protection in China." 873. The World Bank found that 
in places where there was an effective levy pollution levels did decrease. See Johnson, Clear 
Water, Blue Skies: China's Environment in the New Century. 60 But another World Bank study did 
not find a correlation between pollution levy and compliance, see S. Dasgupta et al., 
"Industrial Environmental Performance in China, The Impact of Inspections," World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 2000, no. 2285 (2000). 3 
24 See Li, "China's Compliance with WTO Requirements Will Improve the Efficiency and 
Effective Implementation of Environmental Laws in China." 165, Alford and Shen, "Limits 
of the Law in Addressing China's Environmental Dilemma." 134, P. Howlett, "Striking the 
Right Balance: The Contrasting Ways in Which the United States and China Implement 
National Projects Affecting the Environment," Missouri Environmental Law and Policy Review 12 
(2004).34, Orts, "Environmental Law With Chinese Characteristics." 561, Sims, "One-fifth of 
the Sky: China's Environmental Stewardship."1235, H. Wang and B. Liu, "Policymaking for 
Environmental Protection in China," in Energizing China, Reconciling Environmental Protection and 
Economic Growth, ed. M B McElroy, C P Nielsen, and P Lydon (Cambridge (Massachusetts): 
Harvard University Press, 1998). 400, T. Panayotou, "The Effectiveness and Efficiency of 
Environmental Policy in China," in Energizing China, Reconciling Environmental Protection and 
Economic Growth, ed. M B McElroy, C P Nielsen, and P Lydon (Cambridge (Massachusetts): 
Harvard University Press, 1998). 443-5, Jahiel, "The Contradictory Impact of Reform on 
Environmental Protection in China." 94. As we have seen in Section II, since 1996 there have 
been improvements in Chinese environmental law and the vagueness and weakness has 
decreased. In contrast with most studies, Ferris and Zhang have argued that low 
implementation is partly caused by the legislation’s “aspirational character” and its 
impracticality. See R.J. Ferris and H. Zhang, "Reaching out to the Rule of Law: China's 
Continuing Efforts to Develop an Effective Environmental Law Regime," William and Mary 
Bill of Rights Journal 11 (2003). 599. As we will show below we agree with this point for certain 
cases. 
25 See Railton, "The Rhetoric and Reality of Water Quality Protection in China." 872, Sun, 
"Controlling the Environmental Consequences of Power Development in the PRC.", Johnson, 
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study contends that the role of township governments is important, once 
township officials become more inclined to environmental protection, 
smaller enterprises will clean up. 26  Another finding about the external 
context of pollution control is that the lack of public participation and local 
community pressure has correlated with continued pollution.27  
There are also studies that focus on the polluter itself. Several 
authors, including Johnson and Fryxell and Lo state that the type of industry 
affects pollution behavior, finding that larger plants comply better, and 
furthermore that state-owned enterprises do better than private firms do.28 
In contrast, Ma and Ortolano also look at the influence of ownership on 
compliance. Their research shows that TVEs comply better with the PEDF 
system, while for other norms both State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and 
                                                                                                                        
Clear Water, Blue Skies: China's Environment in the New Century., Ma and Ortolano, Environmental 
Regulation in China., Howlett, "Striking the Right Balance: The Contrasting Ways in Which the 
United States and China Implement National Projects Affecting the Environment." 34, Ferris 
and Zhang, "Reaching out to the Rule of Law: China's Continuing Efforts to Develop an 
Effective Environmental Law Regime." 595,  Zhang, "Ecologizing Industrialization in 
Chinese Small Towns".183-5. Jahiel, "The Contradictory Impact of Reform on Environmental 
Protection in China.", A.R. Jahiel, "The Organization of Environmental Protection in China," 
in Managing the Chinese Environment, ed. R L Edmonds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 
(reprinted in 2000)).This is issue is often called local protectionism and will be further 
discussed in Chapter 14 and 15. See also Tang et al.’s study that tries to link perceived 
enforcement effectiveness with enforcement style. This study found that external influences 
had a negative impact on the perceived effectiveness. S.-Y. Tang, C.W.H. Lo, and G.E. Fryxell, 
"Enforcement Styles, organizational commitment, and enforcement effectiveness: an 
empirical study of local environmental protection officials in urban China," Environment and 
Planning 35 (2003).75 
26 Zhang, "Ecologizing Industrialization in Chinese Small Towns".181-3 
27  Johnson, Clear Water, Blue Skies: China's Environment in the New Century. 61 In contrast, 
another World Bank study has found that citizen complaints can only help to control the 
most visible and social welfare related violations. See S. Dasgupta and D. Wheeler, Citizen 
complaints as environmental indicators: evidence from China (Washington: The World Bank, 1997). 15, 
S.-Y. Tang et al., "Institutional Constraints on Environmental Management in Urban China: 
Environmental Impact Assessment in Guangzhou and Shanghai," China Quarterly, no. 152 
(1997), S.-Y. Tang, C.-p. Tang, and C.W.H. Lo, "Public Participation and Environmental 
Impact Assessment in Mainland China and Taiwan: Political Foundations of Environmental 
Management," The Journal of Development Studies 41, no. 1 (2005). Ferris and Zhang, "Reaching 
out to the Rule of Law: China's Continuing Efforts to Develop an Effective Environmental 
Law Regime."596-7 
28 Johnson, Clear Water, Blue Skies: China's Environment in the New Century. 62, Alford and Shen, 
"Limits of the Law in Addressing China's Environmental Dilemma." 137, G.E. Fryxell and 
C.W.H. Lo, "Organizational Membership and Environmental Ethics: A Comparison of 
Managers in State-owned Firms, Collectives Private Firms and Joint Ventures in China," World 
Development 29, no. 11 (2001).1941, 1953 Jahiel’s study agrees with this finding that pollution 
fee compliance was much lower with TVEs than with larger SOEs. Jahiel, "The Contradictory 
Impact of Reform on Environmental Protection in China."88. Xu has argued similarly. See H. 
Xu, "Environmental Policy and Rural Industrial Development in China," Human Ecology Review 
6, no. 2 (1999). 75  
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TVEs have violated the law but for different reasons, SOEs because of 
financial problems and TVEs for lack in environmental management 
capabilities. 29  In Fryxell and Lo’s study of firm attitudes towards 
environmental protection, a surprising high amount of firm management 
environmental commitment is found. Furthermore, this study shows that 
firms have not been able to translate this commitment into action because of 
obstacles including the high costs of abatement and “doubts about the 
economic benefits of environmental awareness.”30 Zhang’s study confirms 
their findings about financial concerns, as she argues that there is a 
correlation between better the firm’s financial capability and its 
environmental protection.31 Ma and Ortolano also look at what they call 
“informal rules that affect compliance” and find that Chinese cultural values 
of guanxi (interpersonal networks), mianzi (face) and the Confucian emphasis 
on status (zhengming) has influenced compliance and violation behavior.32  
For pollution compliance and behavior, these studies have indicated 
external and internal factors. However, few of the studies, with the exception 
of Ma and Ortolano and Sinkule and Ortolano33, have linked compliance and 
violation behavior to the content of the legislation and its relation to local 
interests and local attitudes about such legislation. This is a pity because 
understanding compliance is essential for making legislation that is more 
implementable and for enhancing enforcement.  
Kagan and Scholz’s Three Perspectives 
As an introduction to the main analytical framework used to structure and 
analyze the case studies in subsequent chapters, Kagan and Scholz’s general 
ideas on compliance and violation are important. Kagan and Scholz argue 
there are three general perspectives to study compliance and violation.34 The 
first perspective stresses that behavior can be explained through rational 
choice theory and that the motivation for compliance and violation can be 
analyzed through a cost benefit analysis. 35  Under this perspective, when 
legislation brings more costs than benefits for the regulated actor there will 
be more violation and less voluntary compliance. The central assumption in 
this perspective is that compliance and violation behavior is rational and that 
it is based on the regulated actor’s weighing of the perceived costs and 
                                                     
29 Ma and Ortolano, Environmental Regulation in China.144-9 
30 Fryxell and Lo, "Organizational Membership and Environmental Ethics: A Comparison of 
Managers in State-owned Firms, Collectives Private Firms and Joint Ventures in China." 1952 
31 Zhang, "Ecologizing Industrialization in Chinese Small Towns". 93, 110  
32 Ma and Ortolano, Environmental Regulation in China. 77-93 
33 See Ibid.  
34 Kagan and Scholz, "The "Criminology of the Corporation" and Regulatory Enforcement 
Strategies."  
35 Ibid. 69-70 
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benefits.36 The rational choice perspective to organizational compliance and 
violation behavior can be operationalized into four types of costs and 
benefits as seen in the perspective of the organization: the costs related to 
compliance, the benefits related to compliance, the costs related to violation 
and the benefits of violation.37 An emphasis on different costs and benefits 
leads to a different rational choice about compliance or violation. 
 There has been substantial criticism on the rational choice 
perspective to compliance and violation, first, by those who state that 
compliance behavior is not rational. Regulated actors suffer from irrationality. 
For regulated actors that are organizations, as many will be in case of 
regulatory law, irrationality may exist because of a sub-optimum internal 
management processes.38 A second point of criticism is that rational-choice 
does not explain the high level of voluntary compliance with rules for which 
violation does not bring much costs because the level of enforcement is 
low.39 Both points of criticism form the basis for the other two perspectives 
on compliance and violation in Kagan and Scholz’s approach: moral 
standards and competence. 
 The second perspective Kagan and Scholz describe for explaining 
the motivation for compliance and violation is based on the moral values of 
the regulated actor. 40  This perspective views behavior as moral and 
understands compliance and violation as the result of parallel or 
contradicting moral values of the regulation and the norm addressee.41 This 
perspective focuses on moral interests rather than economic concerns, when 
actors do not agree with legislation based on moral grounds there will be a 
higher chance of violation. This perspective questions the assumption that 
compliance and violation are purely amoral rational cost-benefit processes. If 
                                                     
36 A.M. Polinsky and S. Shavell, "Public Enforcement of Law," in Encyclopedia of Law and 
Economics, Volume V. The Economics of Crime and Litigation, ed. B Bouckaert and G De Geest 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000). 308 
37  H.M. Klaassen, "Nalevingsgedrag; verschillen tussen burgers en bedrijven (Compliance 
Behavior, differences between citizens and companies)," Justitiele Verkeningen, no. 2 (1999). 52-
3. 
38 In Chapter 3 we discussed theories of public decision making including Simon’s bounded 
decsion making and Cohen, March and Olsen’s Garbage Can Model or Kingdon’s policy 
streams all of which question an organization’s ability to come to a full rational weighing of 
costs and benefits when making a decision. This also applies to the point made here. See 
Cohen, March, and Olsen, "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice.", Kingdon, 
Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, Simon, Administrative Behavior. 
39  Huisman, Tussen Winst en Moraal, Achtergronden van Regelnaleving en Regelovertreding door 
Ondernemingen (Between Profit and Morality, The Backgrounds to Enterprise Compliance and Violation). 
40 Kagan and Scholz, "The "Criminology of the Corporation" and Regulatory Enforcement 
Strategies." 74 
41 Ibid. 74-5 Huisman, Tussen Winst en Moraal, Achtergronden van Regelnaleving en Regelovertreding 
door Ondernemingen (Between Profit and Morality, The Backgrounds to Enterprise Compliance and 
Violation). 232 
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this were the case, the moral perspective asks, why is compliance with costly 
regulation so widespread?42 The moral perspective’s answer is that there are 
many rules that concern moral interests that are important for the norm-
addressee. 43  The moral perspective argues that unreasonable legislation 
allows actors to violate it and creates a slimmer chance for compliance.44  
 Kagan and Scholz’s third perspective focuses on the regulated 
actor’s competence.45 This perspective holds that violation and compliance 
should be analyzed in terms of the ability to comply or violate. It is different 
from the moral and the rational-choice perspective because it does not 
explain the motivation but the opportunity for compliance and violation.46 
As Huisman writes: “Violation of law (following this perspective) thus 
derives from not being able to comply instead of not being willing to.”47 
Rules that require the impossible or rules that are difficult to comply with 
will lead to more violation and less or no compliance. So part of the ability to 
comply with the law comes from the law itself. 
 Kagan and Scholz’s three perspectives offer a general approach to 
understanding why actors comply or violate the law. In order to structure 
and analyze the case-based data a more specific framework of analysis is 
needed however.  
Internal Variables 
As a further specification, compliance theories distinguish several important 
variables that help explain compliance and violation of regulatory law. These 
variables can be grouped according to how they are related to the regulated 
actor: internal variables and external variables. It should be noted though 
that such distinction is not absolute, there is some amount of overlap, and 
there are mutual influences between external and internal variables. Internal 
variables include the regulated actor’s the manner of cost-benefit analysis, 
ethical norms, social responsiveness, amount of financial, and technical 
resources and size. 
                                                     
42 J. Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
349 
43  Huisman, Tussen Winst en Moraal, Achtergronden van Regelnaleving en Regelovertreding door 
Ondernemingen (Between Profit and Morality, The Backgrounds to Enterprise Compliance and Violation). 
234 
44 Kagan and Scholz, "The "Criminology of the Corporation" and Regulatory Enforcement 
Strategies." 75 
45 Ibid. 80-,1  
46 For these terms see Coleman, "Toward an Integrated Theory of White-Collar Crime."  
47  Huisman, Tussen Winst en Moraal, Achtergronden van Regelnaleving en Regelovertreding door 
Ondernemingen (Between Profit and Morality, The Backgrounds to Enterprise Compliance and Violation). 
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Manner of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Different regulated actors have different ways of measuring costs and 
benefits relevant for the rational choice perspective of what motivates actors 
to comply with or break the law. These differences are firstly related to the 
regulated actor’s (organizational) goals, by which costs and benefits are 
determined.48 Measuring cost-benefits is not always financial. Not all 
regulated actors are profit oriented; especially public or social organizations 
will have non-profit goals, but even private firms have secondary goals not 
related to making money.49 These regulated actors may not measure costs 
and benefits of compliance and violation in a financial manner, but based on 
other criteria such as social and public accomplishments instead. 
 Even for purely profit-oriented regulated actors there are differences 
in how costs and benefits are measured. Scholarship distinguishes the short-
term perspective and the long-term perspective. Short-term oriented actors 
will violate a rule if this is provides a direct benefit, without looking at the 
possible costs of violation in the long run. Long-term oriented actors will 
look at the total costs and benefits of their behavior in the long run, which 
are more likely to include the costs of violation such as having to pay for 
sanctions or image loss. 50  Another distinction is that between profit 
maximization and loss minimization. The former means that a regulated 
actor will violate the law if it brings any profit, and the latter means that 
violation will only occur if compliance leads to losses.51 Law and economics 
scholarship further distinguishes between risk preferring and risk averse 
actors; the latter can be influenced to comply with the law with less probable 
costs of violation that those preferring risks.52 
 In a developmental context, there is a higher chance that poverty 
and the related need for daily survival pressure regulated actors into a short-
term cost benefit perspective, which may negatively influence compliance of 
norms restricting income. This can even happen when such violations affect 
their long-term income security. An illustration is Auer et al.’s work on 
logging violations: “Poor people who live in and near forests also participate 
in illegal logging; many depend on it for their livelihood. In fact, these 
                                                     
48 Again this is an insight also noted in Public Administration see J.Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy, what 
government agencies do and why they do it (New York: Basic Books, 1989).. 
49  Huisman, Tussen Winst en Moraal, Achtergronden van Regelnaleving en Regelovertreding door 
Ondernemingen (Between Profit and Morality, The Backgrounds to Enterprise Compliance and Violation). 
144-5 
50 Ibid. 143 
51 G. Slapper and S. Tombs, Corporate Crime (Harlow: Longman, 1999). 134 
52 See Polinsky and Shavell, "Public Enforcement of Law." 
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artisanal scale illegal loggers hurt their own long-term interests by degrading 
the resource base they rely on.”53   
Ethical Norms of the Regulated Actor or its Organizational Management 
A second internal variable for explaining regulatory compliance are the 
regulated actor’s moral and ethical attitudes towards compliance. 54  For 
regulated actors that are organizations, especially the attitudes of their 
management are important. Kagan and Scholz have emphasized that the 
private law-abiding attitudes of managers of organizations also reflected 
upon their professional behavior in the organization.55 Moreover, Clinard’s 
study found that the ethical norms of management determined an 
organization’s norm conformity.56 A good non-Western illustration is Chege 
Kamau’s study of environmental regulation in Kenya showing that 
companies with a pro-environmental and law-abiding attitude complied 
beyond existing norms, even when there were no regulatory or community 
pressures, while companies without such moral attitudes, directly discharged 
into the local environment, in violation of local norms.57   
 In contexts where general non-compliance is widespread, violation 
of law, instead of law-abiding behavior may become the ethical norm. Such 
general non-compliance may exist especially in countries where the state and 
its legal system have a low level of legitimacy and acceptance. If most break 
the law, violation becomes acceptable and a culture of violation develops. 
Fjeldstad and Semboja’s research about Tanzanian tax evasion, which found 
that those who had many peers that evaded taxes were also more likely to 
evade taxes themselves, is a case to this point.58  
Social Responsiveness  
Another internal variable for explaining regulatory norm conformity 
concerns the degree of social responsiveness of organization-type regulated 
actors. The concept of social responsiveness comes from the Dutch 
                                                     
53 M.R. Auer et al., "Forest Law Enforcement and Governance: Resolve Needed from All 
Sides," Georgetown Public Policy Review  (2006 (Forthcoming)). 3 
54  Huisman, Tussen Winst en Moraal, Achtergronden van Regelnaleving en Regelovertreding door 
Ondernemingen (Between Profit and Morality, The Backgrounds to Enterprise Compliance and Violation). 
263-4 
55 Kagan and Scholz, "The "Criminology of the Corporation" and Regulatory Enforcement 
Strategies." 76 
56 M.B. Clinnard, Corporate Ethics and Crime; The Role of Middle Management (Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications, 1983). 35 
57 E. Chege Kamau, "Environmental Law and Self-Management by Industries in Kenya," 
Journal of Environmental Law 17 (2005). 
58 Fjeldstad and Semboja, "Why People Pay Taxes: The Case of the Development Levy in 
Tanzania."  
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criminologist Van de Bunt59, but derives some of its ideas on the work of 
Braithwaite on responsiveness. 60  It indicates “an organization’s ability to 
respond to existing social expectations, without ignoring its own 
responsibilities to its social context.”61 Van de Bunt provides two aspects of 
social responsiveness. First is the cognitive aspect, which means that 
responsive organizations have “an adequate perception of the possible 
dangers the organization’s operation may have for its context and a good 
inventory of the different social interests.” 62  Second, social responsive 
organizations act based on this knowledge and consider carefully what 
effects their operation may have on their social context.63  
 According to Van de Bunt, unresponsive organizations will have a 
higher chance of violating the law.64 He argues that organizations that are 
inwardly oriented underestimate the social consequences of violation, they 
are insufficiently aware of the interests that the norm protects and may even 
not be aware of the norms themselves. In addition if the regulated actor’s 
interests are strongly opposed to existing social concerns laid down in the 
law, unresponsive actors will be easier inclined to violation.65 Finally, and this 
follows logically from Van de Bunt’s other points, unresponsive actors will 
be less susceptible to outside pressures either from social protest or state 
enforcement. 
 Socially responsive organizations can be distinguished by their 
openness to their external context. There are many variables to make such 
distinction, including the manner in which information is managed, the 
internal cohesion within the organization, 66  the extent to which the 
organization’s operation is visible to the outside world, the extent to which 
the organization depends on its social context for its operation67, and the 
extent to which the social context can participate in the decision making of 
the organization. 
Resources to Comply and Size of the Regulated Actor 
Another internal variable is the regulated actor’s amount of resources to 
comply. Actors lacking the (financial, technical, informational and human) 
                                                     
59  H.G. Van de Bunt, Organisatiecriminaliteit (Organizational Crime) (Arnhem: Gouda Quint, 
1992). 
60 Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration. 
61 Van de Bunt, Organisatiecriminaliteit (Organizational Crime). 19 
62 Ibid. 20 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 21 
65 Ibid. 21 
66 Van de Bunt only mentions the first two. Ibid.  
67 Braithwaite makes this point. See Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration. 136 
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resources necessary for compliance will be more likely to violate. 68 
Compliance with regulatory law often costs money, however even if 
regulated actors have sufficient financial resources, they may still not be able 
to. Regulated actors may lack trained personnel to comply with norms 
demanding a high level of technical expertise; or they may not know or 
understand the law’s norms. Dasgupta et al.’s study of pollution compliance 
in Mexico found for example that worker education contributes significantly 
to higher compliance rates.69  
 For organizations, a regulated actor’s ability to comply with the law 
is closely related to its size.70 There has been some debate in the literature on 
regulatory law in the West about whether larger or smaller sized actors have 
a higher chance to comply. One strand of theory holds that larger 
organizations are more competent to comply with the law as they have more 
resources, which allows for investment in compliance and training 
specialized compliance personnel.71 Moreover, larger organizations are more 
motivated to comply with the law to protect their reputation.72 In contrast, 
several studies have demonstrated that larger organizations can use their 
resources and power to postpone compliance or even hide violation or to 
protect them against enforcement. 73  Especially large enterprises that are 
dominant employers—meaning that they are responsible for a significant 
amount of income in a given area—have a large amount of power when 
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Dasgupta, R.E.B. Lucas, and D. Wheeler, "Small Plants, Pollution and Poverty: New Evidence 
from Brazil and Mexico," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper  (1998). 
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(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1983). 139 and M. Punch, Dirty Business; Exploring 
Corporate Misconduct, Analysis and Cases (London: Sage Publications, 1996). 222, R.A.v.d. Peppel, 
Naleving van milieurecht; Toepassing van beleidsinstrumenten op de Nederlandse Verfindustrie (Compliance 
with environmental law, application of policy intsruments to the Dutch paint industry) (Deventer: Kluwer, 
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confronted with local law enforcement agents or local communities, thus 
making it easier for them to violate the law.74 Larger size also negatively 
influences compliance as larger organizations have less control over internal 
information flows and over individual conduct of employees.75  
 Studies about pollution in non-Western countries have also found 
that size matters. A study in Brazil and Mexico found for example that small 
plants pollute more per unit of output than large plants, and because of their 
small size have more difficulty reducing pollution and complying with more 
stringent legislation. Frijns and Van Vliet bring similar findings for small 
industries in Kenya76, as did Suligross’s study of pollution control in India :  
  
“Pollution abatement is a business expense. This cost can be 
substantial for the 90 percent of Indian industrial firms that employ 
twenty-five or fewer workers… If firms were forced to make an 
additional investment in new technologies, many would be forced 
out of business. This would lead to greater unemployment for all 
and, since most factory workers are low-wage earners, the hardest 
hit would be the poor.”77  
  
 Given the large amount and the economic importance of smaller, 
informal firms in non-Western countries, achieving regulatory compliance 
there will be extra challenging. A study by Wells, quoted by the World Bank 
found for example that in Mexico, only 4-6% of the smaller plants had the 
ability to monitor their own pollution.78 In addition, the regulated actor’s 
information about the law is bound to be lower in most non-Western 
developing countries with a low level of education and literacy rate, with 
differences between a variety of spoken vernaculars and the official written 
language, a large number of smaller regulated actors that need to be 
informed, and a weak legal system with weak mechanisms for legal 
dissemination. 
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As important as variables internal to the regulated actor for norm conformity 
are external variables. Both Western as well as non-Western studies 
emphasize the importance of the regulatory, the social and the economic 
context.79 In addition, some non-Western studies have added the political 
context, especially the will of politicians to attain compliance with 
legislation.80 The external context is important, because here policy makers 
can try to make changes that may improve compliance. Existing studies agree 
that achieving higher compliance requires a convergence of the different 
external factors.81 There is debate however about how such a convergence 
can be achieved and which factors are dominant in attaining a convergence.82  
Regulatory Context 
The regulatory context may influence actors to comply or violate the law. In 
most studies of regulatory law, the regulatory context is central. The 
regulatory context consists of legislation, application83 and enforcement.84  
 Legislation defines the objective costs and benefits of norm 
compliance and violation. The strictness of the norms influences how high 
the costs are for compliance, similarly the severity of the statutory 
enforcement sanctions influences the costs of non-compliance. Second, the 
norms in the law further influence how acceptable the law is to the regulated 
actor. Scholarship in the Netherlands has looked at how certain socially 
accepted behavior becomes prohibited in the law. These scholars have 
argued that mere prohibition of certain behavior in law does not mean that 
such prohibition has legitimacy.85  
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 Application institutions are the second part of the regulatory context. 
Such institutions apply the norms in practice, other than those of 
adjudication and enforcement. It is to these institutions regulated actors must 
go to register, apply for a permit or submit an EIA report. If such 
institutions are not functioning well, either being too costly, too slow, or 
inaccessible, compliance will be more difficult.86  
 Enforcement is a third part of the regulatory context.  The quality of 
enforcement, in terms of the probability of detecting violations and the 
likeliness of initiating sanctions for violations, will determine the actual 
expected costs of norm violation, through the detection probability and the 
sanction height.87 The regulatory context is thus important as it forms an 
important part of the cost benefit analysis, rational choice theorists believe, 
regulated actors will make when deciding on compliance or violation. 
 However, as Bardach and Kagan argued, unreasonable enforcement 
may similarly cause regulated actors to resist compliance even when faced 
with more costs than benefits.88 This is also recognized in studies about non-
Western countries such as Fjeldstad and Semboja’s work on Tanzanian tax 
collection enforcement: “From the standard theory it would be expected that 
the more severe the sanctions perceived by taxpayers, the higher the 
compliance. The survey results seem to point in the opposite direction: The 
more severe the sanctions observed, the more widespread the tax 
resistance.”89 
Economic context 
The second external variable influencing compliance behavior is the 
economic context. 90 This context comprises of how market forces of supply 
and demand affect a regulated actor. The economic context influences the 
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costs and benefits of compliance and violation. The economic context is very 
important, especially for profit-dependent actors. As Gunningham et al. 
write: “if a firm acts contrary to these economic license pressures, the 
consequences are often severe.”91  
 First, the economic context influences the costs and benefits of 
violation. The market may create a demand for illegal products, making 
violation profitable. Conversely, lack of demand can make violation non-
profitable and compliance the preferred option.  
 Secondly, the economic context influences the costs of compliance. 
Pollution law compliance, for example, largely depends on the costs of 
abatement. Blackman and Bannister’s work on small brick makers in Juárez, 
Mexico found for example that when prices of propane equipment were 
lowered, small polluting brick makers started to comply with local regulation 
and to use the previously unaffordable clean propane gas as main fuel. Later 
when state subsidies for propane were cut, all brick makers resorted to 
polluting illegal scrap-fuels again, as the abatement costs were unfeasibly 
high. 92  Similarly, Sonnenfeld demonstrates that Indonesian pulp mill’s 
enhanced compliance is partly the result of their business environment, 
which provided good prices for advanced abatement technologies, especially 
from Nordic countries.93 
 The economic context also influences how regulated actors look at 
costs and benefits. Actors that are doing well economically may be able to 
adopt a long-term perspective to such cost benefit analysis. Actors that are 
operating on the fringe of the market, may need to cut all costs possible, and 
as such operate on a day to day basis, fighting for survival. In criminology, 
this is called strain, which is understood as that actors who lack resources to 
attain their goals will be strained towards illegal means to achieve their aims. 
For organizations, the strain approach means that there is a tension between 
goals related to profit making and survival on the one hand, and compliance 
with the law on the other.94 So while organizations that are doing well will 
not feel a strain towards violation, in times of pressure and especially if their 
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survival is threatened, may opt for illegal means. Huisman states: 
“Circumstances may erode the normative support for compliance.”95  
 Scholarship has also argued that the economic context may also 
provide a stimulus towards compliance. Research about stock market 
reactions to environmental news in the Philippines, Mexico, Canada and the 
US, finds that negative environmental news affects the stocks of the 
company involved.96 Konar and Cohen find that firms who had experienced 
the greatest negative impact on stock prices did their best to reduce their 
pollution.97 Based on this, the World Bank argues that the market can be an 
important influence towards compliance. The bank propagates public 
disclosure of compliance information, arguing that such information will 
help the market put more pressure on regulated actors that are in violation of 
the law.98  
Social Context 
The third external variable is the social context of the regulated actor. This 
social context consists of the non-state organizations that may affect the 
regulated actor and those that may be affected by the regulated actor, 
including local communities, NGOs and the media. The social context’s 
effect on compliance can be positive and negative.  
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 Studies about both Western99, and non-Western countries100 have 
found that the social context is a potent force, pressuring regulated actors to 
comply with the law, even when regulatory mechanisms were weak. Such 
studies have demonstrated that collective action by local communities and 
NGOs, especially when working together with the media can be very 
effective to make regulated actors comply with the law. There are many 
examples. An extreme one occurred in Jakarta in 1980 when local farmers 
burned a heavily polluting factory the regulatory context had failed to 
address.101  In order to help the social context play out its full potential as a 
secondary compliance watchdog, scholars and policy makers propagate the 
use of public disclosure mechanisms, such as PROPER (Program for 
Pollution Control, Evaluation and Rating) in Indonesia or the Toxics Release 
Inventory (TRI) in the US.102  
 Violation accidents, such as big pollution spills, play an important 
role in initiating social pressure, and once initiated such accidents may be 
used to exert extra pressure. A severe pollution incident in Brazil in 1984, led 
for example to a “surge of social mobilization against pollution.” 103  In 
Indonesia similarly accidents, such as a lagoon burst in 1988 and a boiler 
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explosion in 1993 both at the Indorayon paper mill, helped NGOs create 
more effective pressure on governments to end violations.104  
 In some countries, the level of awareness about the effects of 
violations is too low to spark action until there has been a clear and visible 
sign of the effects such violations have. Resistance to industrial pollution, 
was only triggered in Kenya, for example, after the effects on personal health 
and economic welfare were clear, when in 1992 pollution discharges by  Kel 
Chemicals in Thika revealed themselves in the “rusting and rotting of iron 
sheets of residential houses”.105   
 Local community pressure does not always happen though. Huq and 
Wheeler’s study of Bangladesh demonstrates, for example, that local 
communities were only able to force chemical fertilizer plants to invest in 
cleaner production, in those cases where the community did not depend on 
such plants for their income. 106  In other words, if regulated actors are 
dominant employers, the local social context will be less inclined to act 
against violations of law.107 In case of such dependency only a well-organized 
non-local social context, often involving NGOs or national media may be 
effective in creating pressure.  
 In addition, some groups have more success than others. Group 
income and level of education matter. Pargal et al.’s study on informal 
regulation in Indonesia and the US has found that richer communities are 
more effective in influencing regulated actors. 108  A related finding from 
Pargal and Wheeler’s study of informal regulation in several developing 
countries, is that “plants in poor less educated areas are about 15.4 times 
more water pollution intensive than plants in affluent well educated areas.”109 
 Finally, in some cases the social context may even directly support 
violation of law. This happens when the norms in the law are not widely 
supported in society, when the law lacks local legitimacy. This occurs 
because either the norms themselves have little support, or worse because 
the legislator has a limited legitimacy110.  
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Scholarship’s most common frameworks on how the external context 
influences compliance behavior mainly mention the three contexts above 
(regulatory, economic and social) 111 . Studies about developing countries, 
however, often mention a third factor of influence, the political context, 
which consists of attitudes of political leaders and of the political system as a 
whole.112 The political context may affect compliance behavior in a variety of 
ways, often indirect though, through its influence either on the regulatory or 
on the social context. 
 First, the political context affects compliance behavior through the 
level of support for achieving compliance by important national and local 
political leaders. Many studies indicate that a lack of political support has 
caused weak law enforcement and thus non-compliance. An example is how 
president Cardoso delayed the enforcement of a new strict environmental 
criminal law in Brazil in the late 1990s.113 Another example has been how 
pro-growth leadership in India condoned the construction of 212 dam 
projects, of which 90 percent failed to comply with environmental 
regulations.114  
 In addition, in some studies the change of leadership, from those 
unwilling to those willing to support the implementation of regulation, has 
led to much stronger enforcement and pressure on the social and economic 
context and thus to better compliance. An example is the leadership change 
in Juárez, Mexico, that led to lower prices for abatement costs for brick 
factories and to stronger enforcement action.115 Another example is how 
after 1982 the new governor of São Paolo, Franco Montoro played an 
important role in getting local industries in Cubatão, which had polluted that 
region for years, to start to clean up and comply with the law.116  
 The political system as a whole, is also important for compliance 
behavior. It is the political system, which allows for public participation, for 
                                                     
111 See Gunningham, Kagan, and Thornton, Shades of Green, Business Regulation and Environment, 
World Bank, Greening Industry, New Roles for Communities, Markets and Governments. 
112 Benjamin, Criminal Law and the Protection of the Environment in Brazil ([cited), Carmen de Mello 
Lemos, "The Politics of Pollution Control in Brazil: State Actors and Social Movements 
Cleaning up Cubatão.", Stuligross, "The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation in 
India." 396-7 
113 Benjamin, Criminal Law and the Protection of the Environment in Brazil ([cited). 
114 Stuligross, "The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation in India." 397 
115 Blackman and Bannister, "Community Pressure and Clean Technology in the Informal 
Sector: An Econometric Analysis of the Adoption of Propane by Traditional Mexican 
Brickmakers.", Blackman and Bannister, "Pollution Control in the Informal Sector: the 
Ciudad Juarez Brickmakers' Project." 
116 Carmen de Mello Lemos, "The Politics of Pollution Control in Brazil: State Actors and 
Social Movements Cleaning up Cubatão." 76 
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the organizations of NGOs and for free media coverage. Undoubtedly, the 
social context can only flourish to its full potential of compliance watchdog 
if it is allowed a certain level of participation, organization and freedom of 
operation and direct influence on local governments in charge of 
enforcement through elections. 
Outline of Part II 
Proceeding chapters will present eighteen case studies of compliance and 
violation of land and pollution legislation at Lake Dianchi. These chapters 
will first discuss cases of compliance for land (Chapter 7) and then for 
pollution regulation (Chapter 8). Subsequent chapters on violation of land 
(Chapter 9) and pollution regulation (Chapter 10) will follow. In Chapter 11 
we will make conclusions based on the case studies and their linkages to the 




      7. Lawful Construction  
    Land Compliance Cases From Kunming 
  
Introduction 
The 1998 LMA is ambitious as it sets strict and specific rules to safeguard 
China’s arable land quantity. For land use at Lake Dianchi the most 
important rules are those concerning construction on collective land. The 
LMA stipulates that construction on such land is only allowed after a 
procedure involving use conversion, requisitioning, compensation and land 
use fee payment.1 The law makes an exception for collective construction 
that is closely related to collective use. 2  First, it allows farmers to build 
housing,3 and secondly, public buildings such as schools, infrastructure, but 
also TVEs.4 For rural housing construction, the LMA specifies that rural 
households are not allowed to build more than one house.5 Second, the 
LMA provides with regard to rural construction that collectives are not 
allowed to lease land for non-collective construction purposes but instead 
must follow the normal procedure of first converting collective land into 
state owned land, which also includes paying proper compensation to 
farmers for loosing their land.6 While violation is widespread7, in peri-urban 
Kunming there have also been noteworthy cases of compliance. Such 
compliance cases can help us understand under what circumstances the law 
has been successful in attaining its goals of arable land protection.  
The present chapter analyzes why actors have complied with land 
legislation. 8  The following sections will present five case studies on 
compliance with land regulation, each followed by a short sub-section 
structuring and analyzing the case findings. 
Religious Construction in an Atheist Environment 
In the most northern part of Jiacun village, a large gate opens to a courtyard.9 
The gate’s structure is traditional; a sign on top says Jingbaosi (Jingbao 
                                                     
1 LMA § 43-50, 53, 55 
2 LMA § 43.1  
3 LMA § 43.1 
4 LMA § 43.1 
5 LMA § 62.1 
6 LMA § 62.3 
7 For cases see Chapter 9. For data about China see Ho and Lin, "Emerging Land Markets in 
Rural and Urban China: Policies and Practices."699 
8 The data used here cover the period until june 2004. For the period between june 2004 and 
December 2004 see Chapter 14, which details the effects of 2004 enforcement campaigns.  
9 This section is based on interviews conducted in 2004 with monks and construction workers 
at the Jingbaosi Temple and villagers and village leadership of Jiacun village. 
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Temple). Unlike other temples in China, this one is not finished. The gate’s 
paint is fresh and new, and most of the buildings adjacent to the courtyard 
are still in their skeletal stages. An unpainted, magnificent Thousand-Arms-
Guanyin statue guards the inside of the gate. The courtyard is about twenty 
meters wide and one hundred meters long. In the courtyard, an old tree was 
preserved from the original village temple that was demolished to make 
room for the new complex. The present courtyard ends in what is to become 
the Bell Tower, a structure especially made to house a large ceremonial bell. 
If this courtyard were the whole temple, its small size would suit Jiacun 
village; it would not be much bigger than the old temple that once stood at 
the same place. A graphic representation of what the whole Jingbao Temple, 
about ten times the size of the courtyard, is to become is displayed in the 
only finished structure at the courtyard. This picture tells the story of a monk 
with a dream of the past and a vision of Buddhism in China’s future. 
Hua Zhongze is a relatively young monk, he is only thirty-four but 
he is already the vice-secretary of Yunnan’s Buddhist society and a member 
of the standing committee of China’s national Buddhist association.10 A few 
years ago, he had a comfortable life, as one of the leading monks of 
Kunming’s most important temple complex. He was also teaching Chinese 
Buddhism to young monks at the Buddhist school in Ningshi city together 
with teachers from the various Buddhist approaches still existing in China, 
including Tibetan and Dai Buddhists. However, Hua was not satisfied. The 
Kunming temple was too much of a tourist trap and had little to do with a 
pure approach to Chinese Buddhism that he longed for.11 Moreover, the 
Buddhist school in Ningshi was a melting pot of completely different 
interpretations diluting his own approach to Chinese Buddhism. Mr. Hua 
was nostalgic for imperial times when his religion had flourished in China 
and in the area around Kunming.12 In the Qing dynasty (1644-1911), the 
Kunming Diandong District area had had over two hundred temples that 
formed one religious network. At that time, these small temples had had 
their own land on which they grew crops for food and designated places for 
ceremonial cremation rites.13 In 2001, Hua gave up his life of comfort in the 
                                                     
10 Birnbaum has made an historical overview of Buddhist organizations and argues that the 
fact that leadership is often so young now is related to the period of religious persecution 
during the Mao period. R. Birnbaum, "Buddhist China at the Century's Turn," China Quarterly  
(2003). 
11 Such a pure approach does not include Daoist, Tibetan or other influences often found in 
other temples. See Ibid. 
12 The exception is the Taiping period, when many temples were destroyed in China. See Ibid. 
13 Land was very important for temples because it guaranteed their independence. At the start 
of the Cultural Revolution in March 1966, Yunnan province made strict rules forbidding land 
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city and set out in search for a suitable place to rebuild a temple as they had 
existed in the past; a temple that would serve to teach Chinese Buddhism 
and not cater for tourists; a temple that could be self-sufficient with its own 
land for agriculture and ceremonies without entrance fees (menpiao)14. His 
quest was not easy; almost all local governments refused their cooperation. 
In one case, in Diandong Town, a remarkably well conserved old rural town 
with a large old temple, the government was only interested in restoring the 
temple if the Buddhists would collect high entrance fees.  This refusal had 
brought Mr. Hua to Jiacun village where he found a completely run-down 
small temple that had long ceased to have a religious function. The temple 
had been built over two hundred years ago and it had once housed twenty 
permanent monks who lived off the land the temple had owned. In 
republican China (1911-1949), the temple was used to help China’s 
modernization and it was partly converted into a school. 15  During the 
Cultural Revolution, the temple lost all its religious functions and was used 
for grain storage while the school moved to a small building built on the 
temple grounds.16 When Mr. Hua first came to Jiacun in 2001, the Jingbaosi 
Temple was in ruins, only the tree in the central courtyard had weathered the 
storms of time.  
The Jiacun village CCP-party leader Mr. Yang warmly welcomed Mr. 
Hua and unlike his colleagues in other villages and towns saw potential in his 
plans. He believed that a temple, even if it was purely for teaching and not 
for tourism, would bring benefits to the village.  Such a temple, secretary 
Yang believed, would prevent social unrest and would create revenue 
through the visitors it would attract. Thus, a deal was struck and the party-
secretary and monk Hua forged a bond built on pragmatic politics and 
religious-idealism. At first Yang was only willing to lease out the 4 Mu of 
land that the existing temple was built on, in order  to start a pilot project of 
building the Bell Tower which would be part of the future temple complex. 
Hua was delighted and left Kunming city to set up a tent at the construction 
                                                                                                                        
use for supporting religious activities. See H. Wang, Yunnan Fojiaoshi (The History of Buddhism in 
Yunnan) (Kunming: Yunnan Meishu Chubanshe, 2001). 359 
14  Most other temples that were rebuilt in the 1980s and 1990s had financed their 
reconstruction through collecting entrance fees from tourists and in this manner had grown 
rich, but lost their authenticity. See Ibid. 364-5 
15 According to Wang’s study of Yunnan’s Buddhist history, this was not common practice. 
According to his study, the new republican government actively protected temples and even 
made rules to protect temples and their land through compulsory lease contracts with the 
surrounding villages.  See Ibid. 334 
16 Like many temples in China and Yunnan, the Cultural Revolution led to a destruction of the 
temple’s religious treasures. There have been some cases where active monks and brave 
citizens were able to safeguard such treasures from the destructive hands of the red guards, 
but not in such a minor village temple as here. See Ibid. 260-1 
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site, facing mosquitoes in summer and the cold in winter. Soon the old 
temple was demolished and construction of the Bell Tower courtyard was 
under way. 
When secretary Yang saw the progress Hua was making, he decided 
to sign an agreement for the full transfer of the use rights. According to the 
original planning, the temple would be 93 Mu, a large size to enable it to 
have its own land for agriculture. The whole complex itself would be about 
70 Mu and would be built at the site where the current temple was located 
(four Mu) and on the surrounding arable land. Land in this part of the village 
is of inferior quality because it is too wet due to recurring floods from the 
three small rivers that cross it. Unlike other construction activities, such as 
enterprise construction, where the Jiacun Village Committee illegally leased 
arable land to the development firm, in the case of the temple the Buddhists 
wanted to follow the official procedure of the LMA. Monk Hua was well 
aware of the difficult position religious activities had in China, and especially 
after the Falungong,17  control has been strict. His organization therefore 
opted to follow the law as closely as possible. This proved to be extremely 
difficult. 
The first part of the procedure consisted of conversion of the land 
use, from agricultural to construction.18  This was a cumbersome process 
involving many different bureaus including the State Land Resource 
Management Bureau, the Bureau for Religious Affairs, the Construction 
Bureau and even the Environmental Protection Bureau. Each bureau had its 
own complex procedures and its own fees. The involved bureaucrats seemed 
to know that this Buddhist organization had no option but to follow their 
demands to the letter. The EPB for example demanded 20.000 RMB for a 
“meeting with experts”, 10.000 RMB for “researching” the EIA report and 
another 20.000 RMB for the final approval of the EIA. All of this was done 
for a temple whose environmental impact was not expected to be more than 
that of several rural households combined. Next, the land had to be 
requisitioned (Zhanyong) by the state and converted from collectively owned 
into state owned.19 This procedure was originally initiated by signing the land 
transfer agreement with the VC. Then the project needed approval of all 
higher-level governments up to the provincial level. At first this was not 
difficult. However, in 2003, when the provincial level was finally to decide on 
approval, there had been an internal policy change requiring that the 
                                                     
17 P.B. Potter, "Belief in Control: Regulation of Religion in China," China Quarterly 174, no. 
June (2003). Human Rights Watch, Dangerous Mediation, China's Campaign Against Falungong 
(New York: Human Rights Watch, 2002). 
18 LMA § 44 
19 LMA § 43 
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township government should co-sign the original land transfer agreement 
now only signed by the VC. In 2004, the temple was unable to persuade the 
township government to co-sign because this government held that the 
existing contract with the VC was sufficient.  
All of the Buddhists’ efforts to operate according to law have so far 
been in vain. They will continue to ask for the Township’s cooperation, 
which they will probably eventually receive. Such cooperation will be costly 
though, as Mr. Hua’s organization has had to pay 230.000 RMB to the 
District Land Bureau as a huodongfei (activity costs) to convince the Township 
to sign.  
Pending the requisitioning approval, the Temple already 
compensated the collective farmers and land use right title-holders for the 
loss of their land use rights. For each Mu of the inferior quality arable land 
used a compensation of 200.000 RMB was paid, more than twice the amount 
that is usually paid for prime quality land in this area. Furthermore, the 
owners of two houses, which were located on the former temple premises 
and which were to be demolished for the construction, demanded 600.000 
RMB in compensation. Monk Hua expressed his frustration to me during 
one of our conversations: “Their houses cost no more than 80.000 RMB to 
rebuild. They know we are powerless to refuse their demands, so they just 
ask what they like.” This case was settled after long negotiations and the 
temple paid 300.000 RMB. The temple further helped pay for a new road 
from the highway to the temple that crosses Jiacun’s most important 
industrial area.  
Cynically enough the Buddhists’ generous compensation did not 
prevent village unrest directed at the new temple. In 2001 villagers believed 
that the temple had taken more land than it had compensated for and 
organized protests against the temple and their own VC leadership. The 
protests came to a boiling point during the 2001 democratic VC elections in 
which a majority of the farmers elected a mentally disabled villager as their 
village leader to show their dissatisfaction about local land practices.20 
                                                     
20 Our findings here are in contrast with Pastor and Tan who argue that free elections can be a 
source of stability in the Village. In Jiacun and surrounding villages elections have been highly 
contentious and have been used to vent dissatisfaction. Periods of election are quite unstable 
and unruly here. Compare with R. Pastor and Q. Tan, "The Meaning of China's Village 
Elections," China Quarterly  (2000). 511. Ordinarily, protests consist of petition letters or 
physical action, but as we see here election can also be used to protest. Compare with K.J. 
O'Brien and L. Li, "The Politics of Lodging Complaints in Rural China," China Quarterly  
(1995)., for an overview of how the village election system was set up in the 1980s and 1990s 
see K.J. O'Brien, "Villagers' Committees, Implementing Political Reform in China's Villages," 
The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 0, no. 32 (1994). Another case of election as a form of 
protest is described in Liu’s study, see Y. Liu, "Consequences of Villager Committee Elections 
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The 2001 unrest originated from a misunderstanding about the 
amount of land to be used for the temple construction. In the original plans 
the Buddhists would use 93 Mu of land, the VC however was only able to 
get them 63 Mu of land. Farmers thought that the temple had gotten 93 Mu 
but only paid for 63 Mu, while actually the temple paid for 63 and so far has 
only received 40 Mu.   
Mr. Hua could not fully realize his dream of a self-sufficient 
Temple21; he lacked sufficient land for agriculture and ceremonies. His only 
alternative was to look for another site on which to develop a temple mainly 
for agriculture and ceremonies to support the educational center in Jiacun. 
On the south side of Lake Dianchi in Jinxian District, he found a site located 
in mountainous land. The local VC had originally refused to cooperate, but 
now that Jingbaosi in Jiacun was under construction, they saw that they 
could trust Mr. Hua. Therefore, a second site was developed, this time an 
amazing 638 Mu located at a famous Buddhist location where a small temple 
used to be. Procedures at this site were also been problematic. The main 
issue here was compensation. As soon as local farmers knew of the 
development plans, they started to cultivate the mountain land that so far 
had lain barren. They also planted fruit trees that would yield extra 
compensation. Mr. Hua’s frustration was evident when he checked the new 
construction site: “You see this apple tree here, it will cost me 200 RMB 
instead of the regular 50 RMB and then the farmers still take away the tree.” 
According to Hua farmers are only after a quick profit but care little for the 
long-term development of their region that his temple can bring.22 
Mr. Hua is an idealist in a country of pragmatists. When asked  
about his compliance behavior and all the costs it brings him, Hua answered 
that the original law in Beijing is good, but once it arrives at the local level, it 
is subject to the dictates of local powerful leaders. “In Beijing the law is like a 
big river, but here we only get small drops,” he sighed. His ideas of building 
a temple purely for religion and not for profit do not resonate well with 
policy makers. He is aware of this and it makes him cautious not to do 
anything that can adversely influence the little cooperation he has received.  
                                                                                                                        
in China, Better Local Governance or Consolidation of State Power," China Perspectives 31, no. 
September-October (2000). 
21 Like temples had been in the Qing dynasty, see Birnbaum, "Buddhist China at the Century's 
Turn." 
22 We can question whether the local peasant resistance in this case was “rightful”, compare 
with K.J. O'Brien, "Rightful Resistance," World Politics 49, no. 1 (1996). 




The Buddhist construction at Jiacun village is mostly a case of compliance 
with the LMA. The Buddhists rigorously abided by the LMA’s complex 
and—in this case—costly procedures for land construction approval and 
compensation for farmers who have lost land and houses. Here, even though 
the law’s many procedures for land conversion and compensation posed 
near unfeasible demands on the Buddhists, they still tried and almost 
completely succeeded to abide by them. So, what factors explain both 
accounts of law-abiding behavior?  
Several external variables have influenced compliance in this case. A 
combination of the political, social and regulatory contexts affected 
compliance. The Buddhists relation with external factors was dominated by 
the fact that their ideas for a purely religious temple were politically sensitive. 
This sensitivity made Hua and his organization more dependent on VC 
leadership, villagers, the township government and on various bureaus. A 
lack in cooperation with any of these actors would have made Hua’s 
construction plans more difficult and perhaps impossible. Furthermore, 
because of the sensitivity, most of the actors Hua depended on for his 
construction seem to be extra careful and have operated strictly according to 
the law. Local governments, bureaus and local farmers further exploited the 
sensitivity by putting extra pressure on the Buddhists in order to extract as 
much money from them for compensating regulatory services or land use, 
often well beyond statutory amounts. All of this made that the Buddhists 
were left no choice but to try to comply with the law.23 It is interesting to 
note that compliance in this case involved the interaction between multiple 
actors, not just the directly regulated actor. In this case compliance occurred 
without enforcement action from land regulators.  
 A second set of explanatory factors for compliance in this case are 
internal variables related to Hua and his Buddhist organization. First, Mr. 
Hua continued the project and strictly abided by the legal procedures even 
though the costs were considerable. In his eyes, such costs were subordinate 
to achieving his goal of a purely religious temple. This is an example of a 
moral consideration rather than a calculation of economic costs and benefits. 
Second, the sensitivity of religious practices also affected the social 
responsiveness of Hua’s organization. The sensitivity made the Buddhist 
more careful when negotiating with governmental bureaus, governments and 
local farmers. Because of this, the Buddhists had to pay fees and 
compensation in excess of the statutory maxima. The Buddhist organization, 
                                                     
23 Here we see both Coleman’s opportunity concept and Kagan and Scholtz’s competence and 
moral perspectives. See Chapter 6. 
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because of its dependence on local governments and local communities, was 
a socially responsive organization that was easily influenced by its 
environment. Third, Mr. Hua organization was able to pay fees and 
compensation because it had sufficient financial resources due to the support 
of its Buddhist followers.  
Building a School Under Protest 
In the center of Jiacun village, right between the market and the VC 
headquarters there is a primary school. It is not what one would expect in a 
village in southwestern China. The school is brand new, four stories high, 
with a large playground and its own gates facing a newly paved road. Every 
morning, afternoon and evening, the road is jammed with the bicycles of 
parents delivering or picking up their children. A cacophony of sounds fills 
the air as the village children, all wearing red scarves, excitedly greet their 
friends. Street vendors have set up small stands selling school items and 
snacks. This happy scene shows no signs of the fierce conflict about the land 
the school was built on, when villagers actively and violently protested 
against their leadership. 
 In many ways, the school’s land conflict is related to the Jingbaosi 
temple construction in the far north side of the village. In the republican 
period, Jiacun village joined the country’s modernization drive 24  as it 
converted part of the Jingbaosi temple into a school in the 1930s. Jiacun’s 
children were educated in this run-down temple until the Cultural Revolution 
when the temple was converted into a grain storage facility and a school was 
built adjacent to the temple: a small two-story building constructed with 
cheap materials and without a courtyard or playgrounds, located in the far 
north of the village. At this time Jiacun was dependent on agriculture and 
most of the village consisted of arable land. By the late nineties, the existing 
school was far too small to accommodate the growing population and the 
building badly needed renovation. When the VC accepted Mr. Hua’s 
proposal to build a new enlarged Jingbaosi Temple the decision was made to 
demolish the old school and build a new one. By this time Jiacun village had 
industrialized and Kunming city’s urbanization had reached the outskirts of 
the village. Consequently arable land protection was not a priority and 
throughout the village former arable land was converted to build roads, 
houses and, of course, the temple complex. So far, new development had 
mainly occurred on the northwestern side of the town, next to the highway 
to Kunming, and in the center of town where the market was enlarged and 
three-story houses were built. This had created a gap between the village 
                                                     
24 J.D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: Norton, 1990). 
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center and the developed highway, a gap of arable land. Part of this gap had 
already been used to locate the new VC headquarters, but a large plot of land 
facing this was still used for farming. In 2001, the VC decided to use this 
land into for the new school. The VC wanted to invest in their future and 
believed that a large school with proper premises and playgrounds was 
necessary. Therefore 23 Mu of arable land was designated for development. 
 Construction for collective use is allowed for in the 1998 LMA. 
Unlike other construction, as in the case of the Jingbaosi temple, where a 
whole procedure for land use conversion, land requisitioning and land 
compensation had to be followed, in this case only compensation was at 
stake.25 The school’s planning started in 2001 and the VC involved various 
departments at higher levels for advice and necessary approvals including a 
construction permit and an EIA.  
Almost a year later, in 2002, when all necessary approvals had been 
obtained, villagers suddenly rallied in protest against the school.26 Some of 
the protesting villagers felt that building such a large school was not in their 
interests. The total costs of the school were about 8 million RMB and to be 
paid by the VC and all sub-villages collectively. They felt that the collective 
funds were wasted. Some farmers said for example that they did not have 
school-aged children and that the school should not be paid out of collective 
funds but by those villagers with school-going children.  
Other villagers, mainly from sub-village three, protested against the 
amount of compensation offered for their land use rights over the land on 
which the school was to be built. The VC had offered to pay them 100.000 
RMB per Mu of land for all 23 Mu. Just as with the farmland for the 
Jingbaosi temple, the land here was deficient, it often flooded and had been 
difficult to farm. The amount offered was generous by local standards under 
which about 80.000 RMB per Mu was usually paid for prime land. Moreover, 
the amount was well within the legal minimum compensation of about 
18.000 RMB (six times the annual output of the three proceeding years, 
which cannot have been higher than the 3000 RMB a year farmers make on 
Jiacun prime land in sub-village number seven).27 The villagers at sub-village 
three were dissatisfied with this amount because they thought it was unfair 
that other farmers in sub-village one had received 200.000 RMB per Mu 
                                                     
25 LMA § 43 
26 Peasant protests have been common in post-Mao China. According to O’Brien and Li this 
due to the rapid development that provided local cadres with opportunities for misuse of 
public office and public funds, while the same development and dismantlement of the 
communes and the old class system raised farmers’ awareness and access necessary for 
successful unrest. O'Brien and Li, "The Politics of Lodging Complaints in Rural China." 761-4  
27 LMA § 47.1 
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from the Jingbaosi temple construction project. At first, when the VC 
refused to pay more, the angry farmers turned to higher-levels of 
government. They wrote petitions (shangfang) 28  and the government sent 
teams to Jiacun to investigate the situation. Their petitions were in vain, as all 
higher-level government teams ruled in favor of the VC’s school project and 
found that compensation was in order. At this time, the VC decided to start 
construction and the land was cleared and prepared for building the school. 
The villagers of number three did not give up; they tried to sabotage the 
project itself by cutting down the power-lines at the building site. When this 
did not help to stop the project, they turned on the VC itself.29 One day, 
angry villagers surrounded the VC headquarters and blocked the gate so that 
no one could leave or enter. They even locked the only entrance to the 
building to force their demands on the village’s democratically elected 
leadership. This act of social unrest forced the VC to negotiate with the 
villagers. It was clear from the start that their demands could not be fully met 
because it would set a precedent for high compensation, precluding other 
construction projects in the village. Elected village head Mr. Yang was able 
to forge a compromise: farmers would get 100.000 per Mu land and retain 
small plots of land outside the school premises where they could open shops.  
The school was completed and has been in use. It houses about four 
hundred children, half locals and half from migrant families living in Jiacun 
and working in the local industry. Each student pays 100 Yuan a month in 
school fees. The large building is not used to capacity though. Students sit in 
large classes on the ground floor because the VC has not been able to attract 
sufficient teachers to form separate classes in the classrooms of the second, 
third and fourth floors.   
Nevertheless, now that compensation claims have been settled, 
villagers are proud of their new school in the center of their village. The 
former protesters now have shops and live in the urban part of the village in 
between the school and the market. But, village leader Yang still gets angry 
when he thinks back about this conflict: “These farmers misuse their new 
democratic rights. They just look at their own short-term interests instead of 
what is good for the village community. The new VC Organization Law is 
awful because villagers do nothing but question and stall our planning 
                                                     
28 This has been common practice in China, mainly for as a tool for powerless peasants to 
question unfavorable or illegal local policies but without questioning central level policy. See 
O'Brien and Li, "The Politics of Lodging Complaints in Rural China.", 759. For excellent 
examples read G. Chen and Y. Chun, Zhongguo Nongmin Diaocha (Research on Peasants in China) 
(Beijing: Renmin Wenxue Chubanshe, 2004). 
29 O’Brien has noted that protest in China is a question of forum shopping at as many for a as 
possible. See O'Brien, "Rightful Resistance." 43 
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without fully considering its merits.” He sighs: “Democracy needs time and a 
lot of education.”30 
Findings 
The Jiacun school construction is a case of beyond compliance with the 
LMA rules on compensation for arable land lost when converted for 
construction. In this case, the VC operated in compliance with arable 
protection legislation because it offered to pay a reasonable compensation 
for land used for construction well beyond the statutory minimum. The issue 
here was therefore not compliance, but the level of compliance.  
Beyond compliance in this case occurred following pressure from 
the social context when villagers rallied in protest. The political context 
helped to enhance the pressures from local villagers. First, village 
democratization in Jiacun offered the villagers’ possibilities for participation 
and exerting pressure on their leadership. 31  Second, generally speaking, 
superior governments exert strong pressure to guarantee village stability.32  
When the farmers started their protests, the VC came under strong pressure 
to negotiate a solution. In this case, beyond-compliance occurred without 
state enforcement action. 
Variables internal to the group of VC leaders were also influential. 
The VC evaluated costs and benefits of appeasing the farmers’ demands for 
a high compensation and thus an excessive type of compliance through a 
combination of short-term and long-term perspectives. The VC had to end 
unrest as soon as possible, while finishing the school construction it had 
started. On the other hand, it had to retain villagers’ support in the long run, 
while preventing to set a precedent for high land compensation. The 
combination of weighing these interests led to the compromise and the 
beyond compliance witnessed in this case. A second variable of influence 
here was the VC’s relative high level of social responsiveness, partly caused 
                                                     
30 In his eyes, this is perhaps, twisting O’Brien’s words, a form of “unrightful resistance”. 
Compare with Ibid.  
31 At least in Jiacun the election system seems to have this effect. In Licun village the situation 
is different and more “corporatist” with a group of families and friends keeping each other in 
power through control of resources and a network with township and county officials. The 
situation in Jiacun seems quite special because villagers have voiced active protest even though 
it is no longer purely agricultural and there are ample opportunities for non-local income. This 
is contrast with Oi and Roselle’s hypothesis that industrial and peri-urban villages should have 
less participation because farmers are less bound to the village. Compare with J.C. Oi and S. 
Rozelle, "Elections and Power: The Locus of Decision-Making in Chinese Villages," China 
Quarterly  (2000). 527-8 
32 M. Edin, "State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from 
a Township Perspective," China Quarterly  (2003). 
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by changes in the political system, which made that the VC was open to 
inputs from the local community.  
Why Sub-village Seven Never Developed 
It is only a five-minute walk, but it feels like twenty years back in time. The 
road from Jiacun’s central sub-villages to sub-village number seven is like a 
funnel. In the center just near the market, it is still broad but when it reaches 
the outskirts of sub-village number five it is no more than a paved footpath 
next to the tiny Baoxiang River. It is at this point that one leaves the 
urbanized part of Jiacun and goes into the village’s only remaining 
agricultural area. Where, before this point, the urbanized villagers are 
working on their cars, tending their shops or leisurely playing pool, after this 
point there are farmers busy cleaning their yellow jiucai (Chinese chive) crops 
or working hard in the fields. Gone also is the picture of large white tiled 
three-story houses that dominates central and northern Jiacun, in sub-village 
number seven many houses are still traditionally made of red earth. Unlike in 
the northwestern part of town there are no factories, instead there is arable 
land on both sides of the houses as far as the eye can see.  
 Sub-village Seven is the smallest of Jiacun’s seven sub-villages and 
only has 196 inhabitants and 54 households. The villagers’ main source of 
income is their arable land. Each household has 1.8 Mu of prime quality land 
on which most of them grow yellow jiucai . This crop, which is grown under 
sheets of plastic to filter out sunlight, is worth much more than the normal 
green type of jiucai, which is grown in areas of China with less favorable 
geographical conditions. Jiucai grows fast and farmers have several crops a 
year and can make up to 3500 RMB per Mu annually. This is more than 
three times as much as farmers in Kouxiang on the mountainous western 
side of the lake can make. For additional income, some of the male villagers 
have part-time employment in factories outside the village, while some of the 
women work in Jiacun’s boxes factories.  
By China’s rural standards, Jiacun number seven is not poor, but its 
income is far lower than that of other Jiacun sub-villages. Sub-village five, for 
example, has converted parts of its arable land into construction. 
Consequently, the village has generated a profit from land rented out to 
factories which is equally distributed (2000 RMB per person a year) among 
all sub-village inhabitants. Furthermore, in number five sub-village many 
villagers own two houses, one to live in and one to rent to outsiders, which 
generates another 2000 RMB a year. Some of the inhabitants of the other 
sub-villages have been able to set up shops and small industries from which 
they reap the profits. But in number seven there is only jiucai. 
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Why has village seven not developed like the rest of Jiacun? Was it 
because the LMA clearly forbids the land development that has taken place 
in these other sub-villages? Number seven’s leader, CCP secretary Yang says 
that the main problem is that this village lacks infrastructure. Cars cannot 
drive on the tiny road from Jiacun center to number seven, let alone trucks. 
Consequently, when the rest of the village developed and industrialized and 
urbanized, number seven lagged behind. The village was unable to attract 
investors to convert its arable land into factories. Because number seven did 
not participate in the industrialization, the villagers have remained dependent 
on agriculture here, even secretary Yang himself. While his fellow village 
leaders have become entrepreneurs busy with attending banquets and driving 
their Volkswagen Santanas to Karaoke parties, Mr. Yang sits in front of his 
house and washes his yellow jiucai just like all the others here. The 
dependence on agriculture and the impossibility of attracting investors and 
non-local residents has meant that the land is worth more for agricultural use 
than for construction.33 Therefore, villagers here have been keen to protect 
their arable land and have not built second houses. Instead many have 
continued to live in their old one or have built a replacement house without 
wasting arable land. 
Secretary Yang explained that he hopes that one day there will be 
sufficient infrastructure. If that happens he assured he would follow the 
example of Jiacun’s other sub-villages and lease arable land for enterprise 
construction and let farmers build second houses for extra income.  
Findings 
Jiacun sub-village number seven is a case of compliance with the LMA 
because unlike the other Jiacun sub-villages (see Chapter 9), number seven 
has not illegally rented out its land for industrial construction or illegally built 
second houses. In this case, the LMA’s rules prohibiting extra housing 
construction and industrial construction on leased land were feasible, as 
compliance brought no costs and violation no benefits. Here compliance was 
the result of the lack of opportunity to violate the law, not of the will to 
abide by the law.  
The economic context was characterized by a low demand for land 
for industry and housing due to Number Seven’s weak infrastructure. As a 
result, the VC and local farmers never stood to benefit from breaking the law. 
The lack of opportunity to break the law also depended indirectly on the 
                                                     
33  This finding is in agreement with research from Fujian province that emphasizes the 
relation between land use and the commercial value of such use. See D. Zhu, Shehui Bianqian 
Zhong de Nongcun Tudi Zhidu (The Village Land System in Social Transformation) (Xiamen: Xiamen 
Daxue Chubanshe, 2003). 232 
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political leadership in the neighboring village who refused to cooperate to 
build the necessary road. The regulatory context did not seem to be 
influential in number seven. Fear of enforcement measures and most 
probably knowledge about the existing legislation did not seem to play a role 
in number seven’s compliance.  
Compliance does not seem to a result of moral values as regulated 
informants expressed a willingness to build extra houses or lease land if such 
an opportunity would arise one day. It seems that regulated actors have made 
a cost-benefit analysis based on the present costs and benefits of different 
types of land use, finding that arable land was just worth more for agriculture 
than for construction. A lack of resources here explains compliance, as 
Village 7 may have been able to develop the road it needed if it had had the 
capital to make the necessary investments to get the neighboring village to 
cooperate. 
Living in Rural Kouxiang 
Although there are three different roads from Kunming to Kouxiang 
Township, getting to Kouxiang is not easy. 34 The shortest route is to take 
the old road along the lake straight south from Kunming to Kouxiang Town, 
however this road badly needs repairs and in the rainy season cannot be used. 
Then there is the road through the mountains of Dianxi making a detour 
through Ningshi. This road is twice as long as the direct lake road, but part is 
motorway. After that it turns into a small mountain road that is often 
jammed and becomes dangerous with rain in summer. The third option is to 
take a complete detour on the highway on the east side of the lake to Jinxian 
district, this route is much longer and still requires a drive from Jinxian to 
Kouxiang on an old bumpy road that is not suitable for traffic when it rains. 
Kouxiang is a remote area even though physically it seems so close to 
Kunming. 
 Kouxiang’s location has affected its development potential. Unlike 
Jiacun Township, which lies on flat land with good connections to Kunming 
and several other major cities in Yunnan province, Kouxiang is a backwater. 
If it had not been for its phosphor mines, which helped to develop a 
fertilizer industry, and for the fact that its remote location offered the benefit 
of attracting two military factories, this area would have remained completely 
underdeveloped. While there has been some industrialization, mainly large 
State Owned Enterprise (SOE) based, most villages in this area have 
remained agricultural. Unlike Diandong District villages such as Jiacun, 
                                                     
34 This section is based on interviews with Kouxiang Township leadership, Licun and Baocun 
villagers and village leaders conducted in 2004. 
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Kouxiang Township never developed a thriving Township and Village 
Enterprise sector that led to rural industrialization and attracted many non-
locals. 
 In Kouxiang’s Licun and Baocun villages, housing is different from 
the developed parts of Jiacun Village. Many houses, especially in Baocun, are 
still made of red earth and the villages, as a whole look rural not urban. Only 
village leaders or their relatives have built stone houses, three stories high 
with the characteristic white tiles of China’s rural modernization. Village 
households here only own one house and even the village leaders in 
Kouxiang do not own more than one house per household. Baocun’s leader, 
party secretary Chen, for instance, has built a huge house on the place of his 
ancestral home. He has demolished his traditional house when he 
constructed a new one equipped with all modern comforts, where he lives 
with his wife, daughter and his own parents.  
 Kouxiang has instituted a village procedure for housing 
construction.35 This procedure requires villagers who wish to build a new 
house to report their plans to their sub-village that then reports it to the VC, 
which then reports it to the township land bureau. This bureau checks 
whether the planned construction is within the total surface area of the 
existing construction. The villager then has to pay a deposit of 20 RMB per 
square meter for the planned construction which he loses if the actual 
building exceeds the planned amount. There have been minor infractions 
such as villagers building new houses without reporting or building houses 
which exceed the required surface area. Baocun or Licun do not have cases 
where villagers have built a whole second house and violated the LMA rules 
on rural housing. While there has thus been local regulation of housing 
construction, such regulation has been about the size of houses constructed, 
not the number of houses a household is allowed to construct. It is 
noteworthy that Kouxiang village regulation contains norms about the 
housing construction process but fails to provide that building a second 
house is prohibited. 36   Even though the village and superior level 
governments have not regulated second housing, villagers have still not built 
second houses. 
 A first reason for Kouxiang’s compliance with the LMA housing 
regulations is that this area has little demand for extra housing. The non-local 
workers that are attracted mainly work in the Huafei chemical fertilizer plant 
in Baocun or in the military factories in Licun. For the most part these SOEs 
provide their own housing facilities to non-local workers on land that is not 
related to the village collectives. In Baocun, there are also migrant workers 
                                                     
35 See Licun Village Self-Rule Statute § 17 and Baocun Village Self-Rule Statute § 23 
36 Ibid.  
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who work in the privately owned enterprises and even some contract farmers. 
For these few temporary workers there are some temporary shacks alongside 
the road to the factory. For the rest there is simply no demand for extra 
housing in Kouxiang. This means that building a second house does not 
bring the kind of extra revenue it does on the other side of Lake Dianchi in 
Jiacun.  
Another reason for compliance with the LMA’s ban on building 
more than one house per household is that in rural Kouxiang agriculture is 
an important source of income.37 This is especially so in Baocun village in 
which 90% of the villagers depend partly on agriculture. In Huajiao and 
Shimaxiao, Baocun’s sub-villages, in the mountains further away from the 
road and enterprises, very few people have a non-agricultural income. The 
remainder works on the land. In the past the state subsidized irrigation 
channels to build rice paddies there, but now that the subsidy has ended they 
mainly have to farm dry land. The land yields about 2000 RMB per Mu a 
year, while villagers have little over one Mu of land. In Licun, villagers have 
invested heavily in their land. They have been able to do so under the new 
land rights regime that grants them stable 30-year land use rights. They have 
invested in irrigation and in building plastic greenhouses. Farmers there have 
been producing crops for export, based on collective contracts signed by the 
VC on their behalf. Depending on the international prices, their income can 
be considerable; in 2004, tomatoes could earn them up to 6000 RMB a Mu. 
Arable land is thus still the main source of production in Kouxiang’s villages. 
Village leadership and villagers alike are aware that its protection is a priority. 
Unless other sources of income can be produced to replace agriculture, the 
main source remains land. Baocun’s CCP secretary Chen explains this point 
as follows: “Just like factories need machines, farmers need land.” A villager 
from Licun agrees with him and believes that land means security: “Even if 
they pay me well for my land, I would rather keep it, money you can waste, 
but land guarantees food and income for your family.”  
Findings  
Kouxiang’s Licun and Baocun villages are cases of compliance with the 
LMA’s rules on housing construction on collectively owned arable land. 
These villages have largely complied with these rules, as households have not 
illegally built second houses. In these villages, we can see that the regulated 
                                                     
37 Here our findings correspond with Zhang et al. study that found that farmers will only wish 
to relinquish their land rights once opportunities for non-agricultural income have developed 
sufficiently. See Q.F. Zhang, Q. Ma, and X. Xu, "Development of Land Rental Markets in 
Rural Zhejiang: Growth of Off-Farm Jobs and Institution Building," China Quarterly 180, no. 
December (2004). 1050 
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actors are village households who have decided not to build extra housing, in 
contrast with many villagers in Jiacun on the other side of the lake.  
Compliance is partly attributable to the villagers’ external variables.  
The economic context with a low demand for extra housing kept the 
possible benefits of violation of law to a minimum. The economic context 
made the price of land used for agriculture higher than land used for 
construction. Second is the regulatory context. Lacking a market for housing, 
the LMA’s ban on secondary housing was feasible in Kouxiang. While the 
local village regulatory framework kept a close check on the size of local 
housing projects, state law enforcement by the township land bureau or 
superior institutions on building second houses was absent.  
 An analysis of variables related to the villagers themselves shows 
that in the local cost benefit analysis, as it is influenced by the economic 
context, agriculture is central and arable land is precious. As a result, 
villagers’ values about the importance of protecting arable land resonate well 
with the LMA. Farmers in Kouxiang believe that land is security and state 
that they would not give up such security for money, which farmers in the 
more developed Jiacun all have done without a problem. In addition, again 
due to the economic context, many villagers lack resources to allow them to 
break the law: most Kouxiang villagers are too poor to build a second house.  
Converting Whole Villages 
Yunnan Steelworks (Yungang) is Yunnan’s largest factory and nothing short 
of impressive. It is not just a factory; it is a city. 38 This is an urban center 
complete with banks, restaurants, living areas, hospitals, schools and 
wedding ceremonies. The factory houses 150.000 workers about the same as 
the neighboring Ningshi City. Over the years, Yungang has grown quickly 
both in production output and in number of factory workers living on the 
premises. Growth has meant a need for arable land, both for building new 
steel production installations as well as for housing all workers and 
pensioners. In the past Yungang had a special department that managed real 
estate development and new construction. Since 1999, this section has been 
transformed into a limited liability company called the Yungang Real Estate 
Development Incorporated. This large development firm is now responsible 
for all of Yungang real estate development projects. It is one of China’s 500 
largest real estate firms with 3825 workers. About half of these workers are 
pensioners of whom the firm takes care. Apart from its activities for Yungang 
                                                     
38  This section is based on interviews with Kunming Steel Corporation Real Estate 
Development Incorporated management and Ningshi City officials carried out in 2004. 
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itself the real estate firm also seeks outside work and follows a norm of 40% 
revenue from Yungang and 60% revenue from other projects.  
Each time the steel factory expands, Yungang Real Estate arranges 
new land. Most of the land that is available for construction surrounding the 
factory is used for agriculture. Except for the northern side where the factory 
merges with Ningshi City, the factory is surrounded by traditional villages 
and their acres of corn, rice and lotus. Yungang Real Estate thus often has to 
use arable land for construction and deal with the provisions of the LMA on 
arable land protection and compensation for farmers’ loss of land use 
rights. 39  Whereas many smaller enterprises have obtained arable land for 
construction through illegal leases in order to avoid the high costs the official 
procedure would entail40, Yungang Real Estate has operated according to the 
book. According to management, this means that for each plot of land, the 
firm has applied for land use conversion, land requisitioning and then 
compensated the farmers involved. Yungang does not have to pay for the land 
once it has been requisitioned into state ownership because the state, here 
represented by Ningshi City, has delegated its land to Yungang to manage and 
to use without fee.  
An important difference between land development at Yungang and 
that at smaller enterprises to be discussed in Chapter 9 is that Yungang needs 
a lot of land, so much that it only develops new construction sites by 
converting whole villages at a time. Instead of the usual compensation for 
land rights to individual farmers, the factory compensates these farmers by 
making them factory workers with full health and pension benefits.41 Old 
farmers join the factory’s pension scheme directly and the children go to one 
of the factory schools. In this way, whole villages are incorporated into 
Yungang.  Over the last few years, the factory has converted six villages in this 
manner. 
Yungang’s compliance is related to its scale of operations. Converting 
whole villages is impossible if this is not done properly. This requires 
executing the proper procedures. Second, it means sufficiently compensating 
the villagers for their transfer to the factory. If this is not done properly, 
there may be protests and unrest. One of Yungang Real Estate’s managers, Mr. 
Wu, says that the last thing they want is trouble: “Yungang is a large factory; 
no it is more like a city. With so many people living and working here, and 
with so many old people that depend on us, maintaining stability is one of 
                                                     
39 LMA § 46-49 
40 For examples see Chapter 9. 
41  Compare with Cai who calls this “compensation through job allocation”. See Cai, 
"Collective Ownership or Cadres' Ownership? The Non-agricultural Use of Farmland in 
China." 666 
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our primary objectives. Because of this when we develop new construction 
sites here we do so by the book.”   
Findings 
Yungang is a case of compliance with the LMA because the factory has 
acquired land for construction according to the law’s procedures. Again 
external and internal variables were important, the latter more than the 
former though. In the political context, Yungang’s relationship with the local 
government that allowed the factory to use state land freely, made 
compliance less costly. The social context had an indirect effect on Yungang’s 
compliance, as the company wanted to prevent unrest. Compliance in this 
case seemed to occur without state enforcement.  
Yungang’s internal variables were very important for explaining 
compliance. First, the factory’s size and its economic success provide the 
factory with sufficient resources to comply with the LMA. The factory’s size 
further made it a long-term oriented organization. It rather invested in social 
stability and preventing trouble than jeopardizing its many workers and 
pensioners for a little extra profit through illegal land claims. Cost-benefit 
analyses at Yungang were therefore based on a long-term perspective. In 
addition, the enterprise seems to have developed a corporate culture of law 
abiding behavior and social responsiveness, which is special as the company 
did not depend directly on local communities.42  
Conclusion 
Compliance with the LMA’s rules on arable land protection occurred at Lake 
Dianchi as a result of interrelated factors. It is important to note that of the 
cases studied here, in most cases of compliance (except Yungang) with the 
LMA’s strict bans on building on collective land, compliance resulted 
because the regulated actor could not violate the law, even if it had wanted to. 
To understand compliance, variables both external and internal to the 
regulated actor have been important. 
The economic context played a role for understanding why some 
regulated actors were unable to break the law. Without a market for land 
needed for housing and industry, such violations were not feasible 
economically in Kouxiang and Jiacun Number Seven. The social context, 
more specifically protest by local villagers, was central for explaining beyond-
compliance in the Jiacun temple and school cases, and fear of such social 
                                                     
42 In similar cases in larger, former State Owned Factories (SOEs) in Kouxiang we found 
similar results with regard to LMA compliance behavior. As we will see below the size of the 
company cannot fully explain compliance with pollution regulation. 
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context influenced Yungang’s compliance. In these cases, the political context 
had an indirect influence, mainly through the effect village democratization 
had on the social context, empowering some local communities to pressure 
their leadership. In the Jingbao temple case, the political context was 
important for understanding such impossibility, as it dictated the sensitivity 
that forced them into compliance. The regulatory context played a minor 
role in explaining compliance. While state enforcement of the LMA rules did 
not occur in any of the cases researched, legislation had some influence on 
compliance. First of all in all cases, the law’s norms proved to be feasible. 
The law’s norms banning certain types of collective construction were mainly 
feasible, meaning not too difficult to comply with and acceptable, as the 
opportunity for violation did not exist and compliance thus did not lead to 
lost income. The law’s norms on land compensation were feasible as they 
were much lower than what was locally the norm for compensation. 
In addition to these external variables, variables internal to the 
regulated actors, consisting of their main characteristics in terms of size, 
moral values, economic position, resources and organizational culture were 
also important for understanding compliance in these cases. However no 
singular lesson can be drawn about the internal variables, noting that both 
non-profit and profit organizations, large and small organizations, rich and 
poor, short-term and long-term oriented, have all complied with the law, 
depending on the exact circumstances of the case. 
The present chapter provides conclusions in answer to the main 
research question about the impact of legislative and enforcement changes 
on compliance and goal attainment (arable land protection and 
compensation for arable land loss). As noted, first of all, changes in the law 
were in these cases not unfeasible. However, if the law had not been changed, 
most of the cases in compliance with the ban on housing and industry 
construction on leased land (except Yungang) , would probably still have 
occurred, simply because violation was not economically possible. For 
compensation compliance, changes in the law may have had a symbolic 
impact, as the LMA regulates that land should be compensated, however the 
level of compensation in the law is far beneath that what local villagers 
wanted and got in the end. Law enforcement did not occur in the cases 
studied. It is for this reason that enforcement campaigns have been 
organized since 1997 for land violations. (See Chapter 14) However, such 
post-1995 changes in land law enforcement did not affect any of the 
compliance cases studied here.  
   
 
 
8. Attempts at Abatement   
Pollution Compliance Cases from Kunming 
Introduction 
Since the second half of the 1990s, although maintaining many weak and 
vague norms, China’s legislators have passed increasingly stricter and more 
specific pollution prevention and control legislation. They did so hoping that 
stricter legislation would be more effective in stopping China’s increasing 
pollution problem. The 1996 WPPCL introduced strict specific norms 
banning the discharging, dumping, burying and storing of certain substances 
in such a way that they can harm surface or ground water.1 The WPPCL 
further prohibited the use of certain obsolete technologies and the 
establishment of new small heavily polluting enterprises.2 The 2000 APPCL 
introduced a strict norm banning pollution emissions exceeding the 
standards.3 In addition, it introduced pollution fees for all emissions, not just 
for those excessive of the standards. Moreover, the APPCL set very strict 
sanction minima to punish violations of its rules.4 The 2002 EIA law also 
brought stricter and more comprehensive rules. First, it widened the scope 
of application of the EIA system to make EIA mandatory for governmental 
planning. 5  More importantly for this research here, the EIA Law also 
established strict mandatory sanction minima for violations.6 
 Although pollution is still a serious problem at Lake Dianchi, and 
there are many violations of law (see Chapter 10), there are also cases where 
the regulated actor complies with pollution control legislation. In order to 
the effects of legislation and enforcement on such compliance, and in order 
to understand the reasons for compliance and violation at Lake Dianchi, this 
chapter will analyze cases where enterprises have complied with pollution 
regulation.  
How Farmers Badgered a Chemical Fertilizer Plant for 
Compensation  
Mrs. Li is honest7 : “Anybody who says you can make fertilizer without 
pollution is lying.”8 She sighs and looks me straight in the eyes. We are in 
                                                     
1 Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law § 29-34 and 41-42 
2 Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law § 22, 23 
3 Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law § 13 
4 Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law § 47,48 
5 EIA Law § 3, 7.1, 8.1. 
6 EIA Law § 31.1 
7 This section is based on interviews with NCFC management and Ningshi governmental 
officials.  
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Ningshi, only a few kilometers away from Yungang, in the hills that border 
the Tanglang River, upstream from Ningshi’s natural protection area, the 
Ningshi Wenquan (Ningshi Hot Springs). Mrs. Li is the vice-director of the 
Ningshi Chemical Fertilizer Company (‘NCFC’). Like many of the enterprises in 
the area southwest of Kunming her business depends on the phosphor 
mines that stretch from Jinxian District, through Kouxiang Township to 
Ningshi City. According to a Ningshi civil servant these mines harbor the 
largest phosphor reserve in Asia. NCFC’s location is well chosen, right next 
to one of the larger mines, with a road and railroad track for transport and 
adjacent to a river for water and a discharge location. 
 The factory’s history represents China’s post-1978 industrial 
development. Grasping the historical opportunities of Deng’s reform 
program and the favorable local geographical conditions, local entrepreneurs 
established a small chemical fertilizer plant in 1984. It started as a privately 
owned company that had a crew of only ten people. As China’s economy 
took off, so did the NCFC. Soon it became so big that it was transformed 
into a state-owned enterprise managed by Ningshi City. At its height, it 
employed 320 workers. However, in 2001 a SOE reform policy transformed 
ownership once again into private hands and established a corporate 
structure. 9  In 2004, the factory had downsized to only 210 workers to 
become more cost-efficient. With the reform, NCFC also lost its state 
subsidies. Factory management is, however, positive as they believe that their 
new privatized status has had a positive effect on the company. “In the past 
the factory belonged to the state, which actually meant it belonged to 
everybody. Too many people, inside and outside the company, had decision-
making power and management was difficult.” Mrs. Li says about the past. 
“Cynically enough, with all those bosses, in those days, no one took 
responsibility for mismanagement or losses. They did not need to, as they 
could always go to the state for help.” Now that state meddling and support 
                                                                                                                        
8 My interview with the Ningshi plant was special because of their willingness to discuss actual 
problems instead of merely giving socially desirable answers that the environment is so 
important. It seems that Fryxell and Lo’s study has been influenced by factory managers 
responding in a socially desirable manner, which they also recognize. In my experience the 
level of environmental commitment of firm managers is only high if there is enough pressure 
on them to keep it high, either from the local population, the local government or the media. 
So my findings are somewhat different from Fryxell and Lo’s survey based study. Compare 
with Fryxell and Lo, "Organizational Membership and Environmental Ethics: A Comparison 
of Managers in State-owned Firms, Collectives Private Firms and Joint Ventures in China." 
1951-4 
9  Such privatization is going on throughout China see Y. Lin and T. Zhu, "Ownership 
Restructuring in Chinese State Industry: AN Analysis of Evidence on Initial Organizational 
Changes," China Quarterly  (2001). 
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has stopped the company leadership structure is leaner and management is 
more direct with shorter lines of decision-making. 
 The company’s current situation is not all positive. NCFC still 
carries a burden from its state-owned past: pensioners. The factory must 
fully support 110 retired workers. Moreover, although the factory’s recent 
downsizing has cut costs, its financial books still show no profit. The market 
is partly to blame, as the costs for raw materials have risen dramatically and 
business in the increasingly competitive market has been difficult. The 
factory has been placed under further pressure by incidental investments. 
Recently it has invested 30 million RMB to build its own vitriol plant to 
replace the low quality vitriol small companies had supplied. The factory also 
spent 3 million RMB to build an on-site water treatment facility to cleanse its 
wastewater, which used to be discharged directly into the Tanglang River. 
This environmental installation takes a staff of ten to operate it, which costs 
another 300.000 RMB a year. The environmental investments make NCFC a 
weak competitor. Mrs. Li explains this angrily: “Small companies do not care 
for the environment and do not invest in such installations. We can never 
compete with their prices. Such small companies have no pensioners to think 
of and can run more risks as they do not care for their future.” 
 Indeed, NCFC’s retired workers and its medium-large size have 
determined its long-term perspective. The company knows that if it is to 
exist in the future, it must make investments now, even though these do not 
bring direct profits. The long-term perspective is one reason why NCFC has 
invested in costly water treatment facilities and ended the illegal10, untreated 
discharge of pollutants into the Tanglang River. Installing the water 
treatment installations did little to reduce pollution-related costs such as 
PDF.11 Factory management stated that PDF is calculated based on the total 
amount of fertilizer produced and not on the total amount of pollutants 
discharged or emitted. Factory management knows that pollution control is 
the future. If the factory is to remain in operation and support its retired and 
current workers it has to invest in pollution control or one day, like the 
outdated paper industry in the area, close down or be closed. 
 Another important reason why NCFC has invested heavily in 
compliance with pollution regulation is the factory’s relationship with 
                                                     
10 WPPCL § 29, 32, 46, DPR 2002 § 17.1 and 21.2 
11 Thus, here the cost of fees was a minor influence on compliance behavior. This is similar to 
earlier findings by Sinkule and Ortolano. See J.B. Sinkule and L. Ortolano, Implementing 
Environmental Policy in China (Westport: Praeger, 1995). 143, Dasgupta et al., "Industrial 
Environmental Performance in China, The Impact of Inspections." 3, but in contrast with 
Wang and Wheeler’s study, see H. Wang and D. Wheeler, "Endogenous Enforcement and 
Effectiveness of China's Pollution Levy System," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper May 
(2000). 20 
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neighboring farmers. Unlike farmers in Kouxiang, who as we will see later, 
are in many ways dependent on phosphor-related industry in their area, 
farmers in Ningshi do not depend directly on phosphor production. Ningshi 
City offers many opportunities for selling farm products, but also for non-
agricultural work outside of the phosphor industry. Consequently, farmers 
will not lose much income if the phosphor industry is threatened through 
strict pollution control regulation. Over the years, such independent farmers 
have actively protested against NCFC’s pollution discharge by involving local 
EPBs and local media. Farmers have increased pressure by writing shangfang 
petition letters12 to higher-level governments and by calling the EPB to come 
to inspect illegal discharges.  
Farmers also sought less legitimate means to gain as much 
compensation as possible. According to factory management, in one case 
local farmers cut holes into the plants’ main discharge pipes to make the 
dirty water stream onto their land to get extra money for their damages. 
Furthermore, farmers also started to grow Biba trees, a local kind of fruit tree 
that is extremely difficult to grow under the cleanest and best of 
circumstances. When the trees failed to grow, as could have been expected, 
farmers allegedly demanded another monetary reward for their losses. 
Factory management knew that if NCFC were to stay in operation in the 
future, it would have to come to terms with its neighbors. The factory’s long-
term perspective was thus partly the result of local pressure from 
neighboring farmers.13  
After the factory built its water treatment installations, local protest 
did not subside. In April 2004, farmers believing that the NCFC was 
responsible for a large illegal pollution discharge into the Tanglang River and 
the surrounding farmland, called the local Yunnan News to report an illegal 
spill. The following day this provincial newspaper ran a large front-page 
article reporting that the NCFC had caused a large environmental disaster 
destroying the local environment and farmer’s interests. The paper failed to 
verify the facts of the matter properly and blindly printed what local farmers 
had told them. It turned out that NCFC was not responsible. A nearly 
bankrupt neighboring enterprise’s rusted installations had caused the 
accident. The newspaper article had a negative impact on NCFC. Angry 
Kunming citizens called factory management to demand an explanation. 
Some of their clients also voiced their concerns and NCFC’s reputation was 
damaged. Even after the Ningshi EPB had found that NCFC had not caused 
                                                     
12  For more information on petitions see O'Brien and Li, "The Politics of Lodging 
Complaints in Rural China." 
13 Here compliance are related to local community pressure. Our findings are in line with 
Johnson. See Johnson, Clear Water, Blue Skies: China's Environment in the New Century. 61 
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the spill, local farmers still surrounded the factory for three days, not letting 
anybody in or out. 14  The police had to end the protest and rescue the 
terrified factory personnel. When factory management demanded that the 
newspaper print a rectification, the editor in chief flatly refused. I asked Mrs. 
Li why they did not go to court, she said, “The media is very powerful. If we 
would sue, their printed word could crush us long before the case would 
close.”15 
As far as is known, the factory is currently in compliance. In 
September 2004, the KMEPB completely checked the factory and found no 
violation. With extremely vigilant neighbors, illegal nightly discharges would 
be noticed and so far none have been reported. Furthermore, there are many 
fishponds in the direct vicinity of the factory. While in Baocun, see Chapter 
10, all fishponds in a radius far wider than those around NCFC had died 
because of continued fertilizer related pollution, here local farmers continue 
to grow fish. 
Findings 
NCFC  is a case of compliance with the law. The enterprise ended a violation 
of new discharge norms introduced by the WPPCL.16 In this case, the new 
stricter norms banning certain discharges in the WPPCL17 and perhaps even 
more so the strict local norms in the DPR banning discharges excessive of 
the norms and threatening to close enterprises that continue to fail to 
comply with the norms18 , have been successful in initiating a change to 
decrease pollution  
The social context, which here consisted of neighboring villagers 
and Kunming media, has made NCFC careful to break the law. 19  An 
important lesson here, when compared with the Huafei case to be discussed 
                                                     
14 Here we see again a case of what seems to be “ unrightful resistance” where farmers have 
tried to involve as many forms and for a of protest as possible, not shunning violence and 
involving the media. Compare with O'Brien, "Rightful Resistance." 
15  In Ningshi there has been much protest, and this case is comparable to Jing’s research in 
Gansu province where the pollution related health problems drove a local community to 
active protest against a local fertilizer plant. See J. Jing, "Environmental Protests in China," in 
Chinese society: change, conflict and resistance, ed. E Perry and M Selden (London: Routledge Curzon, 
2004). 
16 WPPCL § 29, 32, 46 
17 The norms in this case are the 1996 Integrated Water Discharge Standard, GB 8978-96 and 
the 1995 Discharge Standard of Water Pollutants for Phosphate Fertilizer Industry, GB 
15580-95. 
18 DPR § 17.1 and 21.2 
19  Sinkule and Ortolano also describe cases in which local pressure was an important 
motivation for compliance. See Sinkule and Ortolano, Implementing Environmental Policy in 
China.137-8 
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in Chapter 10, is that local farmers have rallied against the company because 
they do not depend on this factory as a main source of income. 20  The 
relation between the factory and local farmers is thus adversarial and not 
symbiotic, as it is between Huafei and Baocun village (see Chapter 10).  
The influential social pressures may in part have been possible 
because of the legislative changes made. Had the new norms not existed, one 
can doubt whether the local citizens and the media would have been able to 
exert the kind of pressure that they had. In addition, if the pollution had not 
been made illegal by the new norms one can wonder whether the company 
had feared for its survival in the future. Although the regulatory context may 
thus indirectly explain compliance, it is interesting to note that state 
enforcement itself was less influential than pressure from the social context. 
Direct threat of sanctions did not occur, only the expectation that regulation 
would become stricter in the future played a role. 
Internal variables of this chemical fertilizer plant are equally 
important for analyzing this case. First, NCFC is a factory that supports a 
large amount of workers and especially pensioners, similar to the case of 
Yungang in Chapter 7 (see also further in this chapter). This burden has made 
the factory risk averse and long-term oriented. Although NCFC’s 
compliance has put the company under a short-term competitive 
disadvantage with smaller companies that have not made such investments 
and operate in violation of the law (see Chapter 10), risk aversion and long-
term orientation have made the company invest in environmental pollution 
installations, which in the future law enforcement will force them to get. For 
the NCFC, profit-maximization is not tantamount, instead stability and 
survival is important for supporting retired and existing workers. Because of 
NCFC’s size and its relative economic success21, the company has been able 
                                                     
20 The local community thus had an important influence on compliance. Later we will see that 
when such local pressure does not exist the chances of violation are higher because state led 
enforcement alone has been too weak to create an incentive to comply.  It is interesting to 
compare my findings here with Tang et al. work on public participation and EIA, which 
found that public pressure can impact enforcement and compliance, but its influence is 
limited by China’s current non-democratic political system. See Tang et al., "Institutional 
Constraints on Environmental Management in Urban China: Environmental Impact 
Assessment in Guangzhou and Shanghai.", Tang, Tang, and Lo, "Public Participation and 
Environmental Impact Assessment in Mainland China and Taiwan: Political Foundations of 
Environmental Management." 23-4 
21  Compare with Arts et al., "Bestuurlijke Risico's bij een beperkte toelating van 
afvalstoffenbedrijven (Administrative Risks of a Limited Authorization of Waste Disposal 
Companies)." DiMento, "Can Social Science Explain Organizational Noncompliance with 
Environmental Law?" 70 
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to pay for such compliance costs.22  Finally, NCFC has been forced to adopt 
a socially responsive organizational culture, which in this case was conducive 
towards compliance. Their environment has literally forced them to consider 
their concerns. This is mainly because the NCFC is more dependent on good 
relationships with their neighbors than that these neighbors depend on them. 
From Paper to Boxes 
Opened brown cardboard boxes with red hand-stamped print stand in neat 
rows to dry in the strong Yunnan sun. 23 The enterprise’s small courtyard is 
so full of boxes that the owners have had to park their delivery vans on the 
street outside. Visitors must be careful not to topple the boxes like dominoes. 
This is Jiacun Cardboard Box Company (JCBC), one of Jiacun Village’s many 
cardboard box-producing enterprises. Such cardboard box enterprises are 
what remain of the village’s paper industry. 
Prior to 1996, Jiacun Village had had a paper and pulp factory. This 
paper factory was a collectively owned TVE, established in 1982, which also 
comprised of two box factories. At its height, this small paper factory 
employed about 90 workers, all locals from the village. Like many small 
paper and pulp enterprises, Jiacun’s paper factory was highly polluting. Its 
pollution was discharged untreated into Jiacun’s Daqinghe River that 
streamed directly into Lake Dianchi. This paper factory and many others in 
the same district were largely responsible for Lake Dianchi’s transformation 
from a clean vibrant sea in which people washed their clothes and went 
swimming, into a dead eutrophied pool full of blue algae. 
By 1996 the Jiacun paper factory got into trouble. The increased 
competition in the paper market with the rapid growth of other paper 
factories in the region, combined with company mismanagement made the 
company incur increasing losses. Meanwhile, in 1996 China witnessed a 
major policy shift with regard to environmental protection. As Chapter 14 
details, the State Council organized a nationwide campaign to close down 
small highly polluting enterprises, such as the small paper and pulp TVE in 
Jiacun.24 Around the same time, such small highly polluting enterprises were 
                                                     
22 Here our findings resonate with earlier research by Johnson, Fryxell and Lo. Johnson, Clear 
Water, Blue Skies: China's Environment in the New Century. 62, Fryxell and Lo, "Organizational 
Membership and Environmental Ethics: A Comparison of Managers in State-owned Firms, 
Collectives Private Firms and Joint Ventures in China." 
23 This section is based on interviews with factory management, former workers, villagers and 
village leaders. 
24 State Council, "State Council Decision on Several Problems concerning Environmental 
Protection (Guowuyuan guanyu Huanjing Baohu ruogan  Wenti de Jueding).", for an 
obverview of the campaign see Chapter 16 and  Van Rooij, "Implementing Chinese 
Environmental Law through Enforcement, the Shiwu Xiao  and Shuangge Dabiao Campaigns." 
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out-phased in the 1996 WPPCL amendment.25 Around this period, Jiacun’s 
only paper factory closed down. Some villagers and village leaders have said 
that it was closed down because of its pollution and as part of the campaign. 
Others, including former factory workers, stated that the plant had gone 
bankrupt and closed its own doors. Jiacun village leadership even stated that 
the campaigns only affected poor enterprises. In other villages in the vicinity, 
richer, similarly dirty enterprises could remain in operation to guarantee jobs 
and income. 
When the paper factory ceased to exist, Jiacun was left with the 
TVE’s clean components: the two cardboard boxes companies. In 2004 the 
box factories still existed. Making cardboard boxes has become one of 
Jiacun’s main industrial activities.  Paper box industry is important as its 
production complies with the new WPPCL and the new stricter 2002 
Dianchi Protection Regulations. 26  Furthermore, making boxes is light 
unskilled work, which provides an income of about 12 RMB a day for many 
local women.  
JCBC thus still exists but business has over the last years become 
increasingly difficult. Since 2003, the company has changed ownership, from 
collective to private.27 The two current owners have been able to acquire the 
enterprise through a management buy-out under which they paid 350.000 
RMB for the factory premises, installations, contracts and 50-year land rights. 
The factory currently employs thirty workers, all local women. The last years’ 
profits have declined as the prices of paper have risen. When Jiacun still had 
its own paper production, paper cost only 500 RMB per ton. Now they must 
buy it from the more remote Yiliang paper company that sells paper at 1500 
RMB per ton. The closer Fucun Company is too expensive, as it has started 
to ask 2000 RMB per ton, since moving its production facilities to the 
remote Minxian County. JCBC’s owners have made additional investments 
of 1 million RMB for two delivery trucks, but so far they are unhappy with 
the returns of 900.000 RMB a year that leave them only a small profit. Mr. 
Yang, one of the owners, says, “When we were still a collective TVE no one 
really cared for losses or profits. But now we must pay for our losses 
ourselves, just like we can get to keep the profits.” 
                                                     
25 WPPCL § 23 
26 DPR § 17.1 and 21.2 
27 Many of Jiacun’s enterprises were privatized recently some are now owned by locals and 
others by non-locals. The privatization of TVEs is a national trend, see H. Li and S. Rozelle, 
"Privatizing Rural China: Insider Privatization, Innovative Contracts and the Performance of 
Township Enterprises," China Quarterly  (2003). 




The transformation from paper and pulp to cardboard boxes production in 
Jiacun village has in fact been a transformation from violation to compliance. 
Had the company not closed down it would since the introduction of the 
WPPCL in 1996 (and later the DPR in 2002) have been in violation with 
these stricter rules, which ordered such companies to be abolished.28 The 
compliance process was complex and consisted of closing down existing 
industry because of a change in policy and for economic reasons. It also 
consisted of maintaining components of the old industry that were clean and 
could not violate regulation. Because of the uncertainty as to why the paper 
factory closed down and became a box factory, the analysis of compliance is 
difficult here. Still, one can carefully discern various external and internal 
variables at play. 
 The increased competition in the economic context attributed to the 
company’s increasingly bad performance and its possible bankruptcy and 
closure. The social context was not very influential. Even though the paper 
company had polluted the local environment, villagers had not rallied in 
protest, as villagers at NCFC had. A likely explanation is that the paper 
company had been an important local employer. Depending on what to 
believe, the regulatory context may have been influential, as the factory 
closed down around the time of an enforcement campaign. 
Internal variables were also important in this case. First of all, years 
of mismanagement had bankrupted the paper factory. Such mismanagement 
had been caused by the fact that the company was collectively owned and 
management consisted of non-professional locals, none of which were 
personally responsible for factory losses. In addition the factory lacked the 
resources for compliance. Compliance with the law while continuing as a 
paper factory of this size would have been economically impossible. Thus, 
the paper factory’s small size also influenced its transformation into a clean 
box factory. 
Bankruptcy Compliance 
It is a sad sight. 29 The factory’s windows are broken. The workers are gone 
and the only person there is an old man who has ventured from the 
neighboring village onto the enterprise’s premises. This is what is left of 
Yunzhi Paper Company (Yunzhi), once one of Yunnan’s larger SOEs, one of 
                                                     
28 Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law § 22, DPR § 17.1 and 21.2 
29 This section is based on interviews with former factory workers and friends of factory 
management. Furthermore, it is based on information provided on the YN EPB website and 
paper industry websites. 
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the largest paper producers in the region, located on the south west bank of 
Lake Dianchi right where the lake streams into the Tanglang river. What 
happened here is a story of Chinese enterprise reform with both tragic and 
positive consequences. 
 Yunzhi was Yunnan’s first paper and pulp factory when it was 
established in 1940. By 1999 the factory was one of China top-100 largest 
paper factories and employed over 2000 employees. At that time its 
production volume was over 500.000 tons a year and its total capital was 
reported to be 300 million RMB. Around 1999 Yunzhi ‘s ownership structure 
was reformed from a state-owned into a privately owned corporation. 30 
While in some companies, such as the NCFC, this transformation improved 
management, in the case of Yunzhi management only got worse. Soon it was 
no longer able to fully pay its employees. One former factory worker 
explained that at this time he only got 200 RMB a month in pay instead of 
the 800 RMB he was owed. Nevertheless, he continued to work. “They paid 
just enough to live off and finding another job is not easy,” he said irately. 
 Meanwhile, the company had been seriously violating environmental 
law.31 Its environmental installations had been built in the 1970s and were 
inadequate to meet present day’s standards. The Kunming city government 
that managed the factory thought that investments for new installations were 
unnecessary. The factory thus caused a considerable amount of pollution by 
discharging its wastewater into the Tanglang River. Farmers living in 
downstream Licun and Baocun still recall the incredible pollution. Once the 
YPC caused such severe pollution, that the Yungang Steel Factory had to halt 
production for several hours, as it could no longer use the water from the 
river. Yungang tried to claim compensation and involved the Kunming 
government in the negotiations. However, Yungang never saw a penny of the 
more than 10 million RMB it had suffered in damages. By this time, YPC 
would simply not have been able to afford it, even if it had been willing to. 
Around 2000, the Yunnan EPB placed YPC on a list of the thirty most 
polluting enterprises in the province. This brought increased pressure on the 
enterprise to install new EP installations to remain in operation. 
 In 2001, Yunzhi Paper went bankrupt when it could no longer pay its 
workers enough to keep production going. All of YPC’s 2000 workers were 
laid off. Although many workers had previously been farmers, they could not 
go back to agriculture because most had sold their land once they had landed 
the SOE job. The only thing the workers received was an incidental payment 
of 3000 RMB. However, Yunzhi ‘s demise ended years of extreme pollution 
                                                     
30 A reform ongoing in China, see Lin and Zhu, "Ownership Restructuring in Chinese State 
Industry: AN Analysis of Evidence on Initial Organizational Changes." 
31 WPPCL § 22, 29, 32 and probably § 35, 37. 
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and violations of law. Cynically enough Yunzhi only came in compliance after 
it had ceased to exist. 
Findings 
Yunzhi is a case of violation and a case of compliance because its bankruptcy 
ended years of violations of law.32 Compliance here was not an active choice 
of the regulated actor but born out of the impossibility to continue operation 
and thus violate the law. In Yunzhi’s case the stricter and more specific rules 
did not have an impact on ending the violation of law. Even though the new 
rules were introduced, clearly mandating the out-phasing of obsolete 
technology, Yunzhi remained in operation, supported by the local 
government that managed it until 1999. Compliance with the norms of the 
law would have meant making significant investments, which for such an old 
company as this one was not economically feasible. Compliance with the 
law’s strict provisions on obsolete technology would have meant closing 
down the company, had it not gone bankrupt itself. Such closure, which here 
happened because of bankruptcy, we saw, seriously affected the company’s 
2000 workers. In the light of the importance of appeasing such workers and 
given the years of unpunished violations of law and the unsuccessful 
resistance by pollution victims, it is doubtful whether enforcement 
authorities would have used the law’s new norms to close the company if it 
had done better economically and not bankrupted itself.  
Yunzhi’s bankruptcy, which marked its compliance, was closely 
related to changes in the country’s economic and political contexts, which 
changed from command to market. The company was unable to adapt to the 
market forces and eventually closed down. Although, the social context, 
which consisted of local pollution victims, tried to exert pressure on the 
company, its efforts failed to improve compliance or even attempts at it. The 
regulatory external context in terms of law enforcement was also not 
influential for compliance, as years of violations could occur without 
enforcement reactions, and continued even after campaigns had been 
initiated (see Chapter 14). Such violations could likely continue unaddressed 
due to support from the local political context (see Chapter 13), as local 
governments valued Yunzhi’s role in the local economy.  
 Yunzhi’s internal context explains the initial violation and the final 
compliance. For understanding the years of violations, Yunzhi is an example 
of a profit maximizing company caring more for the short-term income 
through violation of law than for long-term survival and compliance. In 
addition, we see that Yunzhi is a socially unresponsive company that is used 
                                                     
32 Mainly with the WPPCL § 22, 29, 32 and probably § 35, 37. 
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to polluting its environment and breaking the law. Even when its social 
context initiated action against Yunzhi, the factory continued to damage its 
immediate environment, without any apparent concern for its effects on the 
local population. In contrast with the NCFC and Yungang, Yunzhi, although it 
supports a significant amount of workers, has not invested in its future. This 
is perhaps so because the factory, after its restructuring did not have to 
support pensioners (similar to the Huafei case in Chapter 10 and different 
from Yungang and NCFC in Chapter 7 and 8). Also in contrast with NCFC 
and Yungang, Yunzhi’s large size was not beneficial for compliance.33 For such 
a large company, surprisingly a short-term perspective was dominant and 
management failed to invest resources for clean production. In the end, the 
company lacked resources to pay its staff, let alone invest in the installations 
necessary for clean production. Yunzhi’s continued violations and its final 
compliance are closely related to its management, that failed for years to curb 
pollution, and also let the company’s profits decline over the years causing 
the bankruptcy that ended the violations. 
From Fucun to Minxian: A Costly Move towards Compliance 
Fucun is a strange village. Long blocks of three story apartment buildings 
line the four-lane road to Kunming. People are dressed in the latest urban 
fashion. The village has a large high school and attracts students from the 
region. Moreover, Yunnan University and the Yunnan Academy of Arts have 
opened local departments here. Another strange thing is that the Village 
Committee’s headquarters are larger than those of the Township 
government. Furthermore, the village leader’s office is the most luxurious 
and spacious governmental office I have seen in all of China. In fact, Fucun 
is not an ordinary village. For years, it has been Yunnan’s most important 
model village of successful rural development. Fucun owes its prosperity to 
the rapid development of TVEs that have formed the motor of the local 
economy. Fucun was able to use its collective surpluses to invest in small 
industries that prospered because of their fortunate location close to 
Kunming and close to the lake. 34 
                                                     
33 This case is somewhat in contrast with other studies that find that larger and privately 
owned enterprises should do well. Compare with Johnson, Clear Water, Blue Skies: China's 
Environment in the New Century. 60-2 Compliance behavior is complex and not only related to 
the size or type of ownership or level of enforcement. For more see conclusions of this Part 
in Chapter 11. 
34 This section is based on interviews with a Fubao villager, Fubao village leadership, villagers 
from neighboring villages and Jiacun Township officials. It is also based on interviews with 
Kunming EPB personnel in charge of inspections and enforcement. Furthermore it is based 
on several visits to Fubao in 2004 and on several internet articles including: 
http://www.yn.xinhuanet.com/topic/2003-11/08/content_1170009.htm 
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 Fucun’s most important TVE was the Fucun Paper Company. This 
collectively owned factory was established in 1980 and used to be located 
right on the edge of Lake Dianchi. Until the late 1990s, this company was 
doing very well economically. It had grown to a moderate size and employed 
about 300 workers. By the late 1990s, it was the largest industrial employer in 
the village. However, FPC, like most other pulp-producing paper companies, 
had a major pollution problem. Its discharge flowed untreated into the 
Dianchi Lake causing serious harm to the lake’s ecological system. Although 
the enterprise had invested in building water treatment systems, it often 
failed to use them in order to cut costs, and polluting discharges continued. 
 A law enforcement campaign that was part of national policy to 
clean up major polluters especially at targeted rivers and lakes, of which Lake 
Dianchi was one 35 , brought an irreversible change for FPC. While the 
campaign originally planned to end pollution violations at medium and larger 
enterprises by the end of 2000, the 1999 Kunming World Horticultural Expo 
forced the Yunnan government to take action against pollution, earlier than 
the national campaign schedule demanded (see Chapter 14). Thus, in 1999 it 
was decided to carry out a “Zero Clean-Up” campaign targeted at 253 major 
polluting enterprises around Lake Dianchi. Fucun Paper was one of those 
enterprises and on the last day of the campaign, on 1 May 1999, a night 
inspection team found that the company was in violation and ordered it to 
close down. In fact, the EPB closed off the factory’s premises with a 
Kunming governmental seal. 
 After years of being able to discharge pollution into Lake Dianchi 
illegally, FPC now faced a sudden strict enforcement action. The Kunming 
EPB used these circumstances and negotiated with Fucun Paper about 
moving its production away from Lake Dianchi. With the strict enforcement 
of 1999, FPC management could do nothing but give in and cooperate in 
moving the factory. The move was not an easy process. First, because it 
involved firing most of the locally employed staff, only the specialized 
management and engineers could maintain their jobs. Closure or moving 
location, it was clear from the start that this would affect Fucun’s prosperity. 
A second problem was finding a suitable location that would welcome a 
medium sized collectively-owned enterprise with a pollution problem. With 
the help of the Kunming EPB, Minxian district northwest of Kunming 
agreed to support FPC’s move to their locality. Minxian is one of Kunming’s 
poorer districts because mountains used to obstruct a direct route to the city. 
Minxian therefore never developed industry, neither TVEs such as in Jiacun 
and Fucun village, nor SOEs such as in Kouxiang Township. Minxian mainly 
                                                     
35 State Council, "State Council Decision on Several Problems concerning Environmental 
Protection (Guowuyuan guanyu Huanjing Baohu ruogan  Wenti de Jueding)." 
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depended on agriculture. After a new tunnel was built in the late 1990s 
Minxian was suddenly quite easy to reach from Kunming and from 2000 
onwards it slowly attracted industrial development. Still Minxian is far less 
developed than other areas, and in 2000 it was more than willing to 
accommodate Fucun Paper’s move to their district, especially because FPC’s 
plant in Minxian did have all the necessary EP installations.36 
  Since FPC moved part of its production process to Minxian in 2000, 
the company’s profits have started to decline. Although the Fucun part of 
FPC is now in compliance and only carries out the clean parts of the 
production process, compliance has not come cheap. FPC’s financial 
situation is now very poor and a bankruptcy is feared. The investments in 
new premises and the considerable costs related to the move may have been 
too much for the medium sized TVE. With the loss of its most important 
enterprise, Fucun’s economic situation as a whole has rapidly deteriorated. 
The village has been unlucky because its new developmental direction, 
tourism, for which a resort was built at the lakeside right next to the now 
unused FPC premises, was hit hard by SARS in 2003 and had trouble 
recovering. Villagers were suddenly, after years of prosperity, so unhappy 
that they voiced their discontent during the 2004 VC elections. If Fucun was 
once a model of a TVE development based village, by 2004 surrounding 
villages pitied the poor Fucunnese who had lost their industry, prosperity 
and even feared that their officials had stolen much of their collective funds.  
Findings 
FPC is a case of compliance as the old polluting part of the company located 
at the sensitive and strictly regulated shore of Lake Dianchi was moved into 
new premises with approved EP installations far away from the Lake 
Catchment. Compliance ended Fucun’s violations of law.37 Compliance did 
not come cheap at FPC. However, continued violation was in this case not 
an option, as the EPB had already sealed off the factory and entered 
negotiations to move it. For this case, it is difficult to say what the effect of 
the newer stricter norms of the post-1995 pollution laws was. On the one 
hand, Fucun had been in violation of the existing pollution laws before 
                                                     
36  In such a remote location, one can wonder whether the FPC uses its installations or 
secretely discharges at night without the proper discharge treatment in order to cut costs as 
some other factories do in the region. See Chapter 10. 
37 Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law § 14.2, 29, 32, 35 and 37,  1998 State Council 
Regulations on Environmental Protection Management at Construction Projects § 16 
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stricter norms were introduced after 1996.38 As such, one could argue that 
the new norms were not necessary, as violation was already established under 
the old laws. On the other hand, one could argue that the newer stricter 
norms have had a positive effect as they provided even clearer guidelines for 
establishing the fact that the factory was in violation. Such rules may have 
enabled the environmental authorities to have a stronger bargaining position 
with the company when closing it down and negotiating its resettlement.  
For FPC the external regulatory context is influential for 
understanding compliance. The Fucun case remains special, because unlike 
other pollution cases, compliance occurred largely because of enforcement 
action aimed to make it comply with the law.39 In other cases, like the Yunzhi 
and the Jiacun Paper companies, compliance was the result of bankruptcy or 
part bankruptcy combined with the threat of enforcement. Here it was the 
direct enforcement threat that made the company move. The external social 
context had not pressured the FPC to comply, probably because it was a 
TVE owned by the local community and managed local leaders and 
providing jobs and income for local villagers. Law enforcement affected this 
social context because it marked Fucun’s economic decline, which had a 
significant impact on local livelihoods. Finally, the local political context was 
important. While the violations of the past were condoned by local 
governments, these governments were helpful in helping FPC move to 
Minxian ending such violations.  
FPC’s internal variables were also, but to a lesser extent, important 
for compliance. The company was too large to be closed down completely 
and too small to resist enforcement, as Yunzhi and others (see Chapter 13) 
did. Because of its direct link with Fucun village the company was socially 
responsive, however seemingly not in a way that fostered compliance with 
pollution law, but the opposite, leading to continued pollution in response to 
local needs for jobs and income. In addition, the company was doing 
economically well enough to prevent bankruptcy like Yunzhi and Jiacun, 
allowing it to move instead of close.  
                                                     
38  The company did not use its approved water treatment installations and was thus in 
violation of the old WPPCL and the 1989 EP Law, which both contain the 3T system which 
mandates the use of EP installations.  
39 This is the only case in which we found that enforcement is important for compliance, as 
indicated in many earlier studies. See Johnson, Clear Water, Blue Skies: China's Environment in the 
New Century. 60, Yang, Head, and Liu, "China's Treatment of Crimes Against the 
Environment: using criminal sanctions to fight environmental degradation in the PRC." 677 
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How a Steel Giant Invested in Compliance 
When asked to name examples of good compliance with pollution legislation, 
Kunming EPB personnel do not hesitate: “Yungang’s compliance record is 
excellent.” Of course it is difficult to be sure whether an enterprise the size 
of an ordinary city complies with all of China’s air, water, noise and solid 
waste pollution laws. However, the EPB informants’ honesty about 
violations at other factories and the many stories I had been told by 
informants living in the Ningshi area made me at least convinced that 
Yungang is a company that strives to comply with pollution law as it does 
with the LMA (as we saw in Chapter 7). 40 
 Yungang was established in 1939 as a small steel factory. Over the 
years it has grown to become one of China’s largest producers of steel and 
the single largest industrial enterprise of Yunnan province. Yungang’s steel 
production has always caused pollution, but it was not until the 1970s when 
China’s national leadership started to address environmental concerns that 
Yungang started in earnest to try to control its pollution. The abatement 
process was not easy and it was one of trial and error. At first, the enterprise 
took basic measures such as lengthening its smokestacks to diffuse air 
pollution over a larger area, and building small water treatment plants. Later, 
rigid measures were necessary because the existing steel production 
installations were not geared for clean production and new less polluting 
units had to replace them. Recently, for instance, new steel furnaces had to 
be installed when the factory converted from high sulfur content coal as to 
natural gas as a main source of heating. Environmental protection has not 
come cheap at Yungang and since 1972, and especially since the 1990s, it has 
spent 600 million RMB on pollution abatement. An important part of 
Yungang’s environmental investments is the company’s internal 
environmental protection bureau that employs a staff of 50 engineers.  
 According to Yungang’s head of the environmental protection bureau 
the increased costs of pollution have formed an important motivation for 
investing more in compliance. Unlike NCFC,  whose PDF was calculated on 
the basis of production volume and did not change because of 
environmental investments, Yungang’s discharge fees were calculated on 
pollution volume and have been important for making Yungang comply with 
the law.41 Over the last years the steel factory has had to pay an annual 
                                                     
40 This case is based on interviews with Yungang EP department personnel, district and 
municipal EPB personnel carried out in 2004. Moreover data was consulted in Kunming 
Kungang Inc. EP Department, Yungang Huanjing Baohu 30 Nian Jinian Wenji (Collected Documents 
Commemorating 30 Years of Environmental Protection at Yungang) (Kunming: Yungang Inc., 2002). 
41 So here our findings resonate with Wang and Wheeler, but not with Dasgupta et al. and 
Sinkule and Ortolano. See Wang and Wheeler, "Endogenous Enforcement and Effectiveness 
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amount of around 3 million RMB in discharge fees. With the new Air 
Pollution Prevention and Control Law discharge fees have increased because 
companies must also pay for discharges within the standards based on the 
total load rather than the concentration amount.42 The difference in PDF 
payment between Yungang and NCFC (Ningshi Chemical Fertilizer Company) can 
be explained by the fact that the Kunming EPB, Yunnan EPB and even 
SEPA collect Yungang’s fees, whereas for NCFC only the Ningshi EPB is in 
charge of fee collection.  
 Another reason for Yungang’s environmental investments has been 
pressure from local inhabitants. First, the increased environmental awareness 
of people living in the Ningshi area has led to increased complaints about 
pollution problems. Every time one of Yungang’s installations fails and the 
factory emits an irregular amount of dust particles or noise, citizens from the 
neighboring Ningshi city will immediately contact the authorities by 
telephone or through formal petitions. Yungang is forced to pay for all 
damages. The factory’s size means that local citizens will easily assume that 
pollution is related to it, and furthermore that it can and should pay for any 
related damages.  
The company’s exemplary status has meant extra scrutiny from the 
Ningshi, Kunming and Yunnan EPBs. According to Yungang environmental 
management officials, enforcement agents pay extra attention to ensure that 
Yunnan’s largest factory is in compliance. “They use us to set an example for 
smaller companies and therefore we feel extra pressure to meet the law to 
the letter,” one official states.  
Yungang’s business partners have been less influential; it has felt little 
pressure to invest in the environment from their clients. Steel is not a 
consumer product and Yungang’s clientele consists of businesses that need 
steel to make other products. Such buyers mainly care for price and quality 
but not about the impact such steel production has on the environment. 
According to Yungang environmental officials, only the international market 
emphasizes the environmental quality of their products. To engage in 
international business Yungang has recently applied for an ISO 14001 
certification to guarantee that they sell “green steel”.  
Yungang’s environmental management explains, their factory is the 
largest and one of the most successful in Yunnan. This has meant that the 
                                                                                                                        
of China's Pollution Levy System."3, Dasgupta et al., "Industrial Environmental Performance 
in China, The Impact of Inspections."3, Sinkule and Ortolano, Implementing Environmental Policy 
in China. 142. We can learn from this that there is great variation in how certain variables can 
influence compliance. In one region for one firm pollution levy is important, while for 
another it is not.  
42 For an explanation of the difference see Chapter 4. 
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company has a strong obligation to work according to the law and to 
produce as cleanly as possible. Of course it is difficult to ascertain whether 
their words are pure propaganda or contain truth, but it is the only enterprise 
where I have been told this reason for compliance. During the talks at 
Yungang it became apparent that this large factory is not about short-term 
profits only, but rather looks to its future and that of its 150.000 employees 
and pensioners. 43  The long-term perspective dictates stability and norm 
conformity. Furthermore, because of this long-term perspective, the law’s 
environmental protection is also in Yungang’s interest, because it calculates 
environmental costs within its overall economic costs, a calculation that a 
short-term perspective would not make. 44   
 This demonstrates another important reason for compliance: 
competence. The steel factory has sufficient resources to enable it to adopt a 
long-term perspective that enables it to invest in environmental protection. 
Its survival is not directly threatened if it spends a significant amount on 
pollution control installations. Its abundant resources have made it possible 
to set up a large environmental staff of well-trained engineers without whom 
compliance would be impossible.45 
Findings 
Yungang is a case of compliance with China’s pollution law. The law’s stricter 
rules affected the company’s behavior, as Yungang has over the years made 
considerable investments to keep in compliance with the law. It could do so 
as the law’s demands were feasible for this wealthy company. Yungang’s 
compliance can be explained by a combination of external and internal 
contextual variables.  
 The political context is important, as various governments have paid 
extra attention to Yungang’s because of its exemplary status. This affected the 
regulatory context, which even outside of campaigns has been quite 
influential. Regulatory agencies ensured compliance through effective fee 
collection and close regulation of the company. It is noteworthy that this is 
the only pollution case in which fees were of a significant influence towards 
compliance.46 As such, the APPCL’s new rules have had a positive effect on 
                                                     
43 See also Chapter 7. 
44  Arts et al., "Bestuurlijke Risico's bij een beperkte toelating van afvalstoffenbedrijven 
(Administrative Risks of a Limited Authorization of Waste Disposal Companies).", DiMento, 
"Can Social Science Explain Organizational Noncompliance with Environmental Law?" 70 
45 Here we thus find that size is important, comparable with Johnson’s findings. Johnson, 
Clear Water, Blue Skies: China's Environment in the New Century. 62 
46 Most of the literature has stated that fee levels are to low to make companies invest in 
compliance. For an overview of the literature see Van Rooij, "Implementing Chinese 
Environmental Law through Enforcement, the Shiwu Xiao  and Shuangge Dabiao Campaigns." 
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compliance and induced a continued behavioral change here. Similar to 
NCFC, the social context was important to make Yungang go by the book, as 
the factory feared unrest and damages if its pollution affected local citizens. 
The economic business context was less influential. Most of Yungang’s clients 
did not care for clean production.  
 Apart from these external contexts, compliance at Yungang is also 
related to internal variables. The factory’s economic performance made that 
it had the resources, both financially and technical, to invest in compliance. 
Its number of personnel and pensioners made that it had a long-term 
perspective that led to such investments. The firm’s exemplary status, 
combined with local and governmental pressures, made the company socially 
responsive and therefore more inclined to comply.  
Conclusion 
In these cases of compliance with pollution regulation, law-abiding behavior 
did not have single recurring causes, but rather, was case based and the result 
of interplay between different actors and factors.  
In the cases discussed above variables external to the regulated actor 
played an important role and compliance involved more than the norm 
addressee alone. In two cases compliance occurred when companies were no 
longer able to stay in operation economically. In both cases, changes in the 
economic context, with increased market influences and competition were to 
blame. Until such economic disasters occurred, such violating companies had 
not been pressured by enforcement action, nor by action from local 
community or pollution victims. In two cases pressure from local citizens 
and in one case even the media against (alleged) violations of the law led to 
increased compliance, changes in national policy led to pressure forced the 
polluting industry into compliance. State enforcement pressure also had an 
influence. In one of the cases studied compliance was largely the result of 
enforcement, while in three other cases a more distinct threat of 
enforcement seemed of influence. At the same time, there was one case 
where violations could go unpunished for years and where compliance was 
in the end the result of other factors. Here the local political context was 
likely to blame, as local governments had condoned violations of pollution 
law for years in order to secure local livelihoods, until such protection was 
no longer useful when companies bankrupted or moved. However, in some 
cases the political context also provided an impetus for compliance through 
its influence on the economic context, emphasizing market forces and 
privatization, which in two cases attributed to bankruptcies.  
Variables internal to the regulated actor were equally important. The 
size of companies does not provide a clear lesson about compliance. Some 
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larger companies did very well such as Yungang and NCFC, while others such 
as Yunzhi violated the law for years, and only stopped when bankruptcy 
forced them to. Smaller companies have had trouble complying with the law 
while remaining in regular operation. Fucun had to move its factory, while 
the Jiacun paper mill only complied after bankruptcy. Resources are 
important, the more resources the better. This is clearest for the case of 
Yungang. Lack of resources can lead to an indirect form of compliance 
through bankruptcy. An interesting finding is that especially companies with 
a large amount of pensioners such as NCFC and Yungang, thus companies 
that have retained an SOE-type structure or are still SOEs, care more for 
long-term survival than short-term benefits. Management attitudes were also 
important. Companies with bad management have violated the law, not 
caring about making investments to comply with it, while at the same time 
getting into trouble making profits and finally closing down because of 
bankruptcy. Finally, the company’s level of social responsiveness was 
important, where socially responsive companies, such as Yunggang and NCFC 
were more directly influenced by their social context to comply. In contrast, 
unresponsive companies such as Yunzhi proved to be difficult to influence 
and could violate for a long time. Social responsiveness was related to the 
firm’s dependence on its context and the context’s independence vis-à-vis 
the firm. It is important to note that social responsiveness need not always 
be good for compliance. In the case of Fucun Paper and JCBC Paper, the 
companies close ties with the local community had in the past not stopped 
them from polluting the local environment, as at the time villagers likely 
cared more for jobs than clean water and did little to exert pressure to clean 
up. 
For the main research question on the impact of changes in 
legislation and enforcement on compliance behavior there are also some 
conclusions. First, in two cases the post-1995 legislative changes had a 
possible impact on compliance. In the first case, the NCFC case the stricter 
norms of the law, both the WPPCL as well as the local DPR, may have 
helped farmers and media to organize protests against (alleged) violations of 
the law. A second case with a possible positive impact of the legislative 
changes, was the Yungang case where the stricter APPCL norms on PDF 
influenced management to invest in compliance. However, in several other 
cases compliance was not so much the result of changes in the law, but 
rather the impossibility to violate, following bankruptcies.  
Changes in law enforcement had more of an impact for pollution 
cases than for land cases. While regular enforcement was largely unimportant 
for compliance, special enforcement campaigns, organized since 1996 (see 
Chapter 12) did have some effect. In Fucun, an enforcement campaign was 
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solely responsible for FPC’s compliance. In addition, campaign type 
enforcement may have been the proverbial last straw forcing JCBC into a 
compliant bankruptcy.   
 
 
    9. Kunming’s Hunger for Land 
 Understanding Land Violation Cases 
 
Introduction 
Around Lake Dianchi, there is hardly a place without land violations. The 
LMA’s goal of protecting arable land seems a hopeless ideal when faced with 
Kunming’s rapid encroachment onto its rural surroundings. Driving around 
the lake catchment area one can see construction projects everywhere, as 
Kunming city expands around the lake into what city leaders hope one day 
will become an enlarged New Kunming (xin kunming) located not just north 
of the lake but surrounding it. New Kunming is just another step in 
Kunming’s recent construction craze caused by the rapid urbanization and 
industrialization. This construction hype has led to a large pressure on arable 
land, the same arable land for the protection of which the new 1998 LMA 
has provided strict norms. Cynically enough most of the construction on 
existing arable land occurred after the 1998 LMA with its stricter norms had 
been adopted.  
While some of the construction projects around the lake are in 
compliance with the law (Chapter 5), many are not, especially those on 
collectively owned land. Most of the village enterprise and housing 
construction around the lake is carried out in clear violation of the LMA’s 
strict prohibitions on non-agricultural construction on leased collective land 
and the construction of a second house per rural household. The main 
reason for violation is that the lake catchment is a rapidly developing peri-
urban area, which is far different from the purely rural area the law seems to 
have been made for. Especially in the most rapidly developing part, the 
eastern side of the lake, local village leaders and even most villagers do not 
share the lawmakers’ concern for protecting arable land. Here locals seem 
more worried that full compliance with the law would bring development in 
their region to a halt, just when it is about to take off with the new New 
Kunming policy. 
This chapter will look at why actors around Lake Dianchi have 
violated China’s arable land protection legislation. It will present four case 
studies in which the reasons for violation of such legislation are analyzed in 
detail.  
Jiacun’s Construction Craze  
In his office, Jiacun VC member Zhang shows a map of what his village used 
to look like in 1996. The map is too large to put on his desk; it covers almost 
his entire office floor. Looking at Jiacun’s past, it is shocking to see how fast 
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it has changed. In 1996 the village consisted largely of arable land, with 
housing and only a few small enterprises that formed a thin strip in the 
middle, running north to south. Eight years later little arable land is left and 
most of the village consists of housing, enterprises, a market, a school and a 
temple. Only sub-village seven still has a considerable amount of arable land, 
while sub-villages three and four have completely lost theirs. All of these 
changes happened around the time of the LMA’s amendment and in the 
years thereafter.  
 Jiacun Village, and most of Jiacun Township has a characteristic 
style of housing. Villages in this area have built entire neighborhoods of 
modern rows of two or three story stone houses based on planned unitary 
models. These streets give a strong urban impression as they lack the rural 
diversity that exists when each farmer can build as he sees fit. In Jiacun 
Village, the modern neighborhoods have dramatically changed large parts of 
town. The left side of the road from the market to the Jingbaosi Temple, for 
instance, now consists entirely of rows of white tiled houses built in two long 
parallel lines from north to south. Furthermore, Jiacun’s sub-village number 
five has a new modern neighborhood of unitary planned houses. Village 
leadership proudly brought me to look at these planned construction areas. 
However, not all of Jiacun looks like this, the village still has a remarkably 
high number of older mostly earthen houses that represent what village life 
once looked like, complete with combined pigsties and lavatories.  
The key to understanding Jiacun’s two faces is that village 
households have built new houses while keeping their old one.1 They have 
done so despite the fact that the LMA clearly forbids constructing more than 
one house per household.2 One reason for building an extra house is that 
having two houses generates income. Villagers who own two houses get 
extra income by renting their old house to migrant workers who have come 
to live and work in Jiacun.3  In this manner, villagers have been able to get 
                                                     
1 This has happened in many parts of China. See F. Tang, "Dangtu Chengwei "Tangshou de 
Shanyu" shi,  Hubeisheng Jingzhou shi, Jianlixian Wangshizhen Nongdi Diaocha Baogao  
(When Land Becomes a Burning Potato, Research Report on Arable land from Wangshi 
Town in Jianli County, Jingzhou City in Hubei Province)," in Nongcun Tudi Falüzhidu Yanjiu, 
Tianye Diaocha Jiedu (Research in the Village Land Legal System, an Analysis on the Basis of Fieldwork), 
ed. X e a Chen (Beijing: Zhongguo Zhengfa Daxue Chubanshe, 2003).149 and Sargeson, 
"Subduing "The Rural House-building Craze": Attitudes Towards Housing Construction and 
Use Controls in Four Zhejiang Villages." 
2 LMA § 62.1 
3 My study is different from Sargeson’s study, which focused more on the influence of social 
status, which I did not research in depth at the time of fieldwork. Compare with Sargeson, 
"Subduing "The Rural House-building Craze": Attitudes Towards Housing Construction and 
Use Controls in Four Zhejiang Villages." 
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2000 RMB a year, more than half of what they used to be able to make 
toiling on their land.  
Over the years, village and sub-village leadership has actively 
supported the illegal housing practices. All new construction is done 
according to well-prepared plans. Furthermore, the sub-village and the VC 
approve all housing construction. Even the Township government has been 
involved, because final approval for housing construction comes from the 
Township land bureau. However, none of these have enforced the law’s 
norms on second houses. For the leadership involved, the illegal 
construction of secondary houses has been an important means to generate 
extra income for the local population. In the interviews conducted before 
June 2004, many leaders emphasized the income from rent as one of their 
development successes. It almost seemed as if local leadership did not know 
of article 62 of the LMA, or at least that they purposefully forgot about it 
because it obstructed local development opportunities. An indication for this 
is that the Jiacun VC was smart enough to keep the locally unfavorable 
LMA’s housing provisions out of their village Self-Government Statute.  
Meanwhile all parties involved have been happy with the ongoing 
illegal practices. As most villagers in Jiacun, except those in sub-village seven, 
depend on non-agricultural income, there has been little concern about the 
loss of arable land there.4 Whereas Kouxiang’s farming villagers see land as a 
basic form of security, in Jiacun’s developed sub-villages locals only care 
about the monetary profit the land can bring. In their eyes, arable land 
conversion is no problem as long as they can earn more once it is used for 
construction. As one villager stated, “It is all about compensation, if I get 
enough money for the arable land we lose, it is fine with me.” This attitude is 
understandable in a village where a second house can raise more than half of 
what a hard-working farmer makes on his land.5 It is also not surprising that 
in sub-villages where there still is arable land, locals who no longer wish to 
work on it have rented it out to non-local laborers looking for extra income.  
Wealth is another reason for housing violations. Jiacun’s housing 
construction would never have happened if the villagers did not have 
sufficient income to build a new house. The modern three-story villas cost 
over 200.000 RMB to build, a sum that Jiacun’s recent prosperity has enabled 
                                                     
4 Here my findings also resonate with Zhang et al. that find a correlation between growth of 
non-agricultural jobs and farmers no longer caring for their land rights. See Zhang, Ma, and 
Xu, "Development of Land Rental Markets in Rural Zhejiang: Growth of Off-Farm Jobs and 
Institution Building." 1050 
5 In his case study in Fujian province, Zhu has argued similarly that the increased price of 
construction land has made many farmers care less for protecting arable land. The profits 
have become too high. See Zhu, Shehui Bianqian Zhong de Nongcun Tudi Zhidu (The Village Land 
System in Social Transformation). 232 
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many to pay. The main reason for the village’s new riches is the development 
of local industry, which also occurred in violation of the LMA. 
Jiacun’s industrial development took place in two phases. In the first 
phase, from the early 1980s until the late 1990s, Jiacun developed collectively 
owned TVEs. The most important enterprise at that time was the paper 
factory and two boxes factories. Then in the late 1990s industrial 
development really took off when Jiacun became connected to Kunming 
with the Diandong highway. During this period Jiacun designated a large plot 
of arable land at the northwestern part of the village, about 140 Mu, for 
industrial development. With the new road the value of this land shot up and 
soon the village was able to rent most of the land to new privately owned 
enterprises. The village now has about 230 enterprises employing 1400 
workers. Except for paper boxes, Jiacun’s factories mainly engage in food 
processing, plastic recycling, and electric cable production.  
Prior to June 2004, none of Jiacun’s enterprises had been built in 
accordance with the LMA. Enterprises had acquired the land for 
construction through leasing it from the sub-village that managed the land in 
question. This was in direct violation of the LMA that forbids leasing 
collectively owned farmland for construction to non-collective enterprises.6 
The problem with the LMA’s procedures is that the total sum enterprises 
have to pay is too high. They require use change approval, state 
requisitioning, compensation to farmers for loss of land rights and fee 
payment for using state land. By leasing it from the village collective the 
industry does not have to pay for requisitioning or for land use change 
approval; it only pays for land use. Instead of having to pay an enormous 
lump sum before starting up their business, by breaking the LMA and leasing 
land, enterprises only have to pay an annual amount.7 In a village such as 
Jiacun in which industrialization was only just starting in the late 1990s, the 
LMA’s procedures were just too costly and would have made attracting 
investors extremely difficult, if not impossible. This illegal manner of 
promoting industry was therefore actively used by all local levels of 
government under the banner of “Promoting the Economy instead of Grain 
Production”.  
While enterprises benefited from cheap land in a good location close 
to Kunming, Jiacun village and its villagers got richer from the employment 
opportunities and land income. Thanks to the industrial development many 
villagers have been able to leave agriculture and find employment in the 
                                                     
6 LMA § 62.3 
7 Ho and Lin’s study that argues that tax evasion was important for explaining violation of the 
LMA. In Jiacun that such tax evasion was related to development opportunities. Compare Ho 
and Lin, "Emerging Land Markets in Rural and Urban China: Policies and Practices." 
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factories or set up their own service or trade businesses. The industrial land 
revenue has also been important for villagers because it has provided a 
steady income. The sub-villages that collect the land revenue distribute it 
equally among all collective members. In 2004 such fenhong (distributing the 
red) ranged from 1000 RMB to 2000 RMB a year in those sub-villages lucky 
enough to rent out their land to industry. An average household (of five 
persons) in sub-village number five that receives fenhong and rent from their 
second house therefore has a standard income, without doing any work, of 
12000 RMB a year, without doing any work. This is twice as much as 
households make in sub-village number seven where a household has less 
than 2 Mu and can make 6000 RMB a year growing jiucai.    
 Jiacun’s construction craze illustrates how little sense the LMA 
makes in rapidly urbanizing8 and industrializing localities. Villagers who have 
left farming and have become rich, no longer care for protecting arable land.9 
Their private interests are to advance their families and they see that arable 
land has little to do with that.10 This contrasts with the ideas of China’s 
legislators who made a law to protect arable land. Protecting arable land is a 
concern that affects all Chinese in the future; however, it is not a concern 
that affects all Chinese today. In truly rural areas, or at least mostly rural 
areas such as Kouxiang, villagers are still farmers and their everyday interests 
are still best served through protecting arable land. An important factor in 
Jiacun is that the village is located in a peri-urban area in which non-
                                                     
8 For an overview of the urbanization process see G.C.S. Lin, "The Growth and Structural 
Change of Chinese cities: a contextual and geographical analysis," Cities 19, no. 5 (2002). 
R.C.K. Chan and S. Yao, "Urbanization and Sustainable metropolitan development in China: 
Patterns, problems and prospects," GeoJournal 49 (2000).  
9 Compare with Sargeson, "Subduing "The Rural House-building Craze": Attitudes Towards 
Housing Construction and Use Controls in Four Zhejiang Villages." My findings here are in 
contrast with findings from the past when rural taxes were still an important burden on 
peasants and a reason many of them did not wish to farm. In areas in which taxes were high, 
often rural and less industrial areas, richer villages with some industries had lower taxes so 
farmers kept their land and cared for it, while poorer villages had high tax burdens and 
peasants if they could left the land idle to find work elsewhere. In peri-urban Kunming rural 
tax levels have not been high the last ten years because of the abundant of industry related 
taxes there. Compare with X. Zhong, "Woguo Nongdi Falu Zhidu Yunxing Huanjing zhi 
Fenxi, Hubei Sheng Huangshishi Yangxinxian Nongdi Diaocha Baogao (An Analysis of 
China's Land Law Operational Environment, A research Report On Farmland in Yangxin 
County in Huangshi City, Hubei Province," in Nongcun Tudi Falüzhidu Yanjiu, Tianye Diaocha 
Jiedu (Research in the Village Land Legal System, an Analysis on the Basis of Fieldwork), ed. X e a Chen 
(Beijing: Zhongguo Zhengfa Daxue Chubanshe, 2003). 56 
10 My findings here are similar to what Zhang has found and argued based on fieldwork 
elsewhere in China. See Zhang, "Nongcun Jianshe Yongdi Shiyong Quan Zhidu de Faxue 
Fenxi (A Legal Analysis of Village Land Construction Rights)." 238 
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agricultural opportunities for development are abundant11, the LMA does 
not seem to fit such a peri-urban situation. Industrialization has changed the 
situation in Jiacun for all local actors involved: villagers, VCs, local 
governments, and enterprises benefit from violating the LMA’s stringent 
arable land protection procedures.12  
Findings 
Jiacun’s housing and enterprise construction is a case of violation of the 
LMA. The law’s new stricter norms on collective construction proved to be 
unfeasible and not adaptable to Jiacun’s circumstances. The law’s new norms 
did not lead to less arable land loss in this case. Violation brought 
considerable benefits, and the costs of compliance would have been so high 
that they would have severely slowed local development. At the same time, 
violation was easy and costless as it was actively supported by all local actors. 
Creating compliance  through enforcement in the present situation was 
equally unfeasible and unreasonable as it would mean to tear down private 
houses and to make enterprises pay for costly land conversion procedures, 
they could not easily or even not at all pay for (see Chapter 14). 
 It is noteworthy that the regulated actors here consist of multiple 
actors including VC leadership, sub-village leadership, enterprise 
management and villagers. The external context of these actors first 
comprises of the economic context. Rapid urbanization and industrialization 
throughout the country and in the region have changed the face of Jiacun 
village and have created a strong incentive to convert arable land into 
construction land. 13 The regulatory context, which consists of the legislation 
and the regulatory agencies was not able to prevent or stop violations. The 
legislation was unable to create compliance due to its local unfeasibility, as it 
                                                     
11  Ho and Lin have shown, arable land loss continues throughout China’s peri-urban areas, 
both near large cities as well as near secondary urban centers. Ho and Lin, "Non-Agricultural 
Land Use in Post-Reform China." 765-8 
12 The situation in Jiacun is such that arable land development, if well compensated is in 
everybody’s benefit, including the villagers. The distribution of land development profit has 
been quite equitable it seems. This is because villagers have been active in voicing their 
protests when compensation was too low in their eyes. Their ex ante actions have enabled a 
fair profit sharing system, similar to shareholding systems elsewhere in China. Compare with 
Cai, "Collective Ownership or Cadres' Ownership? The Non-agricultural Use of Farmland in 
China." 
13 My findings here are different from Sargeson’s research that focuses on family demographic 
structure and social aspirations. See Sargeson, "Subduing "The Rural House-building Craze": 
Attitudes Towards Housing Construction and Use Controls in Four Zhejiang Villages." 
Although I clearly found that development opportunities were a driving force in Jiacun’s 
construction craze, had I directly asked about family demography and social aspirations I 
might have come up with different findings than presented here. 
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would have stopped development in Jiacun village. Regulatory agencies were 
unable to prevent violation due to a lack in enforcement action and 
especially agencies at township and district level because they have actively 
condoned illegal practices for years, understanding their necessity for local 
development. For this last aspect the local political context was important, 
local governments have condoned and supported the ongoing violations and 
have not spurred their agencies to enforce the law.  
 Internal variables of the regulated actors were also influential. Most 
important was the manner in which costs and benefits were weighed in 
Jiacun. All regulated actors viewed such costs and benefits in short-term 
financial variables. In their view, protecting arable land was not an important 
value of its own. Even farmers did not mind losing their land, if they were 
properly compensated. Because these values were opposed to those that 
have informed the LMA, violation was widespread. The normality of 
violation of law and the fact that it was actively condoned by higher levels of 
administration made that a culture of violation seems to have developed and 
no one cared for the legal norms. Here it is interesting to note that an 
increased social responsiveness of VCs, because of the democratization, dads 
not lead to more compliance with the law, as the social context of the 
regulated actor was equally opposed to the law’s norms. A comparison with 
Jiacun number seven (see Chapter 7) shows that the ability to attract 
enterprises and to build new houses was another internal variable for 
explaining violation. Jiacun could develop because of its favorable 
geographical and infrastructural location and this development enabled 
villagers to save funds for building extra houses. Here again as in the case of 
Yungang (see Chapter 7) internal and external variables had a mutual influence 
on each other, in this case reinforcing violations of law. 
Why Farmers in Xiaocun attacked their Village Leaders  
Xiaocun village lies in Yixiang Township south of the rapidly urbanizing 
Jiacun Township and just North of Gongxian District where Kunming’s 
rapidly growing flower growing market is centered. Unlike its wealthy 
neighbors, Xiaocun’s development has stalled somewhat. Villagers largely 
depend on agriculture; in contrast with Jiacun, the township has not attracted 
much industry. Nevertheless, things are about to change. Kunming is 
pushing ahead with its New Kunming plans to connect all of the countryside 
around Lake Dianchi into one large urban center. For Xiaocun citizens this  
means that a large highway will cross their land. With a road, development 
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will come, Jiacun Township teaches14. However, it also means that Xiaocun’s 
farmers must sacrifice some of their precious arable land.15  
 Luckily, villagers were to receive compensation for such land losses, 
or at least were told they would. In 2003, the Kunming government struck a 
deal with the Diandong district government and the Yixiang Township 
government. In Xiaocun village, each villager was supposed to receive 50.000 
RMB. 
 However, farmers never received this amount. When the deal 
reached the village, the farmers were told that they would get 40.000. The 
corrupt Township officials thought that they could fool the villagers and the 
Xiaocun VC leaders by keeping 10.000 for themselves. Xiaocun’s farmers 
soon found out that the original deal had been 50.000, 16  but could do 
nothing while the road construction went ahead according to plan. 
 On October 13, 2003, the construction project reached Xiaocun 
village. By this time, the villagers’ anger about the compensation fraud had 
reached boiling point, especially since the Kunming government had not 
paid a penny of the 40.000 the township government had promised them. 
The construction workforce came prepared, accompanied by a 100 man 
strong police force. When they rolled their trucks into Xiaocun, the workers 
waved their copies of the LMA to the angry mob of villagers shouting that 
this project was legal and they had no right to obstruct it. Soon the first 
bricks flew through the air as the farmers took out their anger on the 
assembled police force and the road laborers. The police struck back hard 
and beat up the farmers, wounding about forty while arresting about ten of 
them.   
 Farmers, influenced by village politicians that opposed the current 
VC leadership, had been led to believe that their own VC had been involved 
in the compensation fraud. The farmers thought that the VC had struck a 
deal with the township to share the embezzled 10.000 RMB compensation 
money.  Thus, after their battle with the police the villagers formed a mob 
surrounding the VC headquarters and finally beat up their democratically 
                                                     
14 See the difference between development in Jiacun number seven and the other sub-villages. 
Also compare development in Jiacun and in Kouxiang. See Chapter 7 and 8. 
15 This whole section based on an interview with Zhu Xiaoyang, an anthropologist from 
Beijing University who has done extensive fieldwork in the region. He has published a book 
about this township which I have also consulted. For the rest I have verified what he told me 
through interviews in the neighboring Jiacun. Due to the continued sensitivity in Yixiang I 
have not carried out interviews there myself although I  have been there on several bicycle 
trips. X. Zhu, Zuoguo yu Chengfa, Xiaocun Gushi 1931-1997 (Crime and Punishment, Stories from 
Xiaocun 1931-1997) (Tianjin: Tianjin Guji Chubanshe, 2003). 
16  For a similar case see Cai, "Collective Ownership or Cadres' Ownership? The Non-
agricultural Use of Farmland in China." 671 
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elected leadership. After this incident, the village leader feared for his life and 
resigned. Two months later, in December, tensions still ran high and the 
police patrolled the streets to maintain calm. 
 Xiaocun’s compensation fraud is not remarkable in Diandong 
district, neither is the violent reaction to such fraudulent practices.17 In Jiacun 
village, as previously discussed, dissatisfaction with legal amounts of 
compensation had volatile results as in the case of the school construction. 
In this area, all land conflicts researched are related to monetary 
compensation and not loss of land per se. The Xiaocun case shows that 
township level governments believe they have the opportunity to profit from 
their uncontrolled position between VCs and higher-level governments. 
Township officials probably thought that no one would find out if they kept 
money for themselves. Under China’s undemocratic system of government, 
citizens have difficulties checking upon township level or higher 
governments. Township-level appointed officials are well known to engage 
in corrupt practices. In Diandong district, that includes Jiacun and Yixiang 
Township, farmers are highly suspicious and pro-active. There is a lively 
gossip circuit about malpractices in neighboring villages or even townships. 
In any case of strong suspicion of wrongdoing angry farmers have involved 
                                                     
17 In fact, it is a common type of problem in China that farmers get too little compensation 
for land requisitioning. See Chen, Nongcun Tudi Falüzhidu Yanjiu, Tianye Diaocha Jiedu (Research in 
the Village Land Legal System, an Analysis on the Basis of Fieldwork). 39, G. Xiao, "Woguo 
Nongcun Jiti Tudi Zhengyong Zhidu de Quexian jiqi wanshan (Problems and Sollutions of 
China's Collective land requisitioning System)," in Nongcun Tudi Falüzhidu Yanjiu, Tianye 
Diaocha Jiedu (Research in the Village Land Legal System, an Analysis on the Basis of Fieldwork), ed. X 
e a Chen (Beijing: Zhongguo Zhengfa Daxue Chubanshe, 2003).257-9 Recently there have 
been widely reported cases of fights between villagers and the police sometimes ending in 
mass arrests, and even in the wounding and killing of civilians. Examples are the incidents in 
Hanyuan, in Sichuan, Taishi and Dongzhou in Guangdong, Dangxi in Shandong and many 
more. See for example Editorial, The Shanwei (Dongzhou) Incident (9 December 2005 [cited 12 
January 2006]); available from http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20051209_1.htm. Editorial, The 
GMRQ Investigative Report of the Shanwei (Dongzhou) Incident (6 December 2005 [cited 12 January 
2006]); available from http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20060112_1.htm. E. Lafranco, China's 
hidden Hanyuan Incident (25 November 2004 [cited 12 January 2006]); available from 
http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20041124-031127-5324r.htm. J. Wang, "The Pit is 
Full of Ashes," China Rights Forum, no. 1 (2005). P. Hu, "Taishi Village: a Sign of the Times," 
China Rights Forum, no. 4 (2005). W. Pu, "Peasants on the Verge," China Rights Forum, no. 2 
(2005). L. Wing, "A Chronology of Unrest," China Rights Forum, no. 1 (2005). P.P. Pan, Chinese 
Peasants Attacked in Land Dispute (15 June 2005 [cited 17 January 2006]); available from 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/06/14/AR2005061401542.html. For video footage of a recent 
violent clash in Shengyou see  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/video/2005/06/14/VI2005061401932.ht
ml  
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municipal or provincial governments through complaint petitions18 and in 
some cases even risen in violent protest. Farmers have had ways of finding 
out about corrupt practices and have used these extra-legal methods to 
protect their rights. The Xiaocun case also shows how gossip and fact can 
mix once village politics are involved, and those opposed to the current 
leadership turn suspicions into undeserved accusations. This case of land 
compensation fraud in Diandong district illustrates how a lack of 
transparency in China’s bureaucratic system creates an opportunity for 
violation of law. The farmers’ violent reaction to the violation shows that 
compensation is important for them and that in this aspect the LMA is 
feasible and has local legitimacy, at least with the farmers.19 This case also 
demonstrates that on the eastside of the lake, in Diandong, farmers are much 
more actively engaged in securing their rights than in Kouxiang, as we will 
see in subsequent cases. Finally, it illustrates how little trust there is between 
farmers and their elected village leadership. 
Findings 
Xiaocun is a case in which township officials broke the LMA’s prohibitions 
about retaining compensation funds meant for villagers. In this case the strict 
rules the Legal Committee inserted into the draft LMA explicitly stating that 
it is forbidden to embezzle or divert compensation funds 20  were not 
successful in ending such practices. The changes in the LMA thus did not 
affect compliance behavior. Here violation continued because breaking the 
law could bring considerable benefits, while the regulated actors believed 
that such violation would go undetected without much cost.  
 In this case, the economic context explains the opportunity for such 
violation. Without urbanization and industrialization the road would never 
have been developed and therefore the compensation fund would never 
have come available for embezzlement. A weak regulatory context explains 
why township level officials of violation of law thought they could take the 
villagers money without punishment. As Chapter 13 details, land regulation 
authorities do not have enforcement tools to act against compensation 
violations. Here, the political context of weak democratic participation at the 
township level, combined with the relative autonomy of China’s local 
governments is important, as there have been weak checks and balances on 
                                                     
18 Compare with O'Brien and Li, "The Politics of Lodging Complaints in Rural China." 
19 Protest because of low compensation for land expropriation is common in China. See X. 
Guo, "Land Expropriation and Rural Conflicts in China," China Quarterly 166, no. June (2001). 
Cai, "Collective Ownership or Cadres' Ownership? The Non-agricultural Use of Farmland in 
China." 
20 Land Management Act § 49 
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Township level governments. The social context was finally influential as the 
farmers’ protest brought this case to light. In the end, the massive social 
unrest, this and other such violations caused may eventually lead to stronger 
regulation of these malpractices, perhaps improving compliance.  
 The internal variables of the regulated actor, the Yixiang township 
government were also important. In this case a culture of corrupt practices 
seems to have existed amongst these township officials who believed they 
could embezzle the funds without a problem. Furthermore, it shows how a 
low level of accountability and thus social responsiveness here led to 
violation. Finally, it demonstrates that the township officials had the political 
and factual power to embezzle the money because of their social 
connections and their role in the land conversion procedure. 
Developing Licun through Lease Contracts  
In Kouxiang Township, the 2004 Licun VC elections installed a new 
generation of village cadre. This new group of leaders consisted of young 
villagers. The youngest of them, Mr. Ma was only 29 when he was elected to 
the highest post, village leader. Most of his fellow committee members were 
all around thirty. They were a tight bunch of friends, not just because they 
had grown up together, like all villagers. Their bond went deeper: it was a 
friendship built on bloodlines and family alliances that went back a 
generation. The change in leadership did not mean breaking with past power 
structures. Licun’s new village head is the son one of the village’s former 
village leaders, a leader who had ruled the village for over twenty years. One 
of the new vice village leaders, Mr. Liu was a younger brother of a former 
village chief who now has an important post in the township government. 
Furthermore, the village’s most important post, that of CCP secretary was, 
of course, never democratically elected. The current secretary has been in 
power for a long time and his wife is family of Mr. Ma and Mr. Liu. Thus, 
the new VC and the existing CCP secretary represented a group of powerful 
families who have continued to control Licun despite village elections.21 This 
group of friends and families forms the dominant social power within Licun 
village. They are members of the CCP, proud owners of large houses, 
                                                     
21. There is limited participation in elections in the rural and isolated Licun and Baocun 
villages, while there has been more participation in the industrialized and peri-urban Jiacun. 
Here our findings contradict Oi and Rozelles hypotheses that villages that are more isolated 
and more rural have more participation because there is more at stake for villagers. From our 
data it seems that villagers in industrial and more developed villages close to the city are more 
independent of local power structures and thus have the ability to participate more actively 
and raise protest if they wish to. Compare with Oi and Rozelle, "Elections and Power: The 
Locus of Decision-Making in Chinese Villages." 529 
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Volkswagen Santanas and signs on their doors with long rows of gold stars 
indicating their party commitment and status. They have family and friends 
in the Township and even the District government.  
The new leadership is ambitious and wants to develop Licun. The 
village has never had its own industry and has not profited extensively from 
the neighboring SOE arms factories. Licun could only benefit from the 
SOEs’ few Arab customers that came to pray in their mosques or eat in their 
qingzhen (halal) restaurants. In order to promote development, Licun had 
started experiments with agricultural export contracts. In a true Chinese 
socialist market economy style, the leadership supported district investments 
in plastic greenhouses where farmers were to grow export-oriented crops 
that the VC sold through collective contracts with the export company of 
the Kunming Government’s Agricultural Bureau.22 However, Licun’s new 
leaders wanted more; they wanted to develop a service sector and small 
enterprises.  
In order to develop local enterprises Licun had to convert arable 
land, just as villages on the other side of the lake in Diandong district had 
done. The leadership believed that 2004 was the right time to begin doing so, 
because the new highway would soon create a fast connection with Kunming 
which would certainly bring business opportunities to the area.  
To develop Licun’s land, leadership made use of lease contracts. The 
VC leased several plots of arable land from farmers, who had the land use 
rights. In violation of the statutory compensation minima23 , the farmers 
received 500 RMB per year per Mu for wet land and 300 RMB per year per 
Mu for dry land, a total of 12.000 or 7.200 for the remaining 24 years of land 
rights that farmers still had usage rights.24 The VC then took this land and 
                                                     
22 Individual farmers were never signatories to these collective contracts so in case of conflict, 
if farmers suddenly decided to sell to another buyer, for example, as has happened outside of 
the Kouxiang area, the export company would find that it could do nothing against them. The 
reason for these collective contracts is that it saves the transaction costs of signing with each 
of the hundreds or thousands of small farmers by just signing with the VC. Farmers in some 
regions such as Kouxiang have duly followed the contracts signed by their VC as if they were 
still operating in a planned economy. The successful use of collective contracts in Licun 
shows that villagers here are less prone to insurgence and protest, or even breach of contracts 
that they are not party to, than in other areas. 
23 The legality of the compensation paid depends on the actual yield of the land taken. In 
Licun as we saw in Chapter 7 this yield can be up-to 6000 RMB/Mu for prime wet land on 
which tomatoes are grown in green-houses, and at lowest it is 2000 RMB/Mu for dry land. 
The LMA provides that at least 6 times the annual yield should be paid, which did not happen 
in this case where 7.200 RMB for dry land and 12.000 for prime wet land was paid. See LMA 
§ 47.1 
24 This is much less than farmers get in Jiacun village. They either get 2000 RMB per person 
per year where land is illegally leased through the VC. Farmers in Jiacun often have about 0.3 
Mu a person so the compensation is actually about 6000 a Mu per year. As we saw in cases 
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leased it to enterprises to construct premises on, for lump sums ranging from 
80.000 to 90.000 per Mu. According to the VC leadership the enterprises 
would receive land contracts for changqi (long term), which actually meant 
indefinitely. “We did this, because the law does not allow transfer of 
ownership, but we actually wanted to sell the land itself to the firms.” Licun’s 
CCP secretary explained one day. He knew that what they did was in 
violation with the LMA. “If we had gone by the book we would never have 
been able to sell the land of the  villages, all the costs of compensation and 
procedural fees to the land bureau would have raised the price to about 
170.000 RMB per Mu and there is no company willing to pay that.” This is 
the same story as in Jiacun and a similar problem exists in Baocun. 
Compliance with the law would have made the price of land too high to 
develop industry.  
However, what happened in Licun is different from Jiacun and 
Baocun. The violation of the law was not legitimate among most villagers. 
The problem was not so much the loss of arable land in itself but rather the 
unreasonably low compensation for the arable land loss. Whereas Jiacun’s 
villagers have received an annual fenhong amount that equally distributes the 
land related revenues, in Licun land revenue distribution was obscure. The 
total amount of compensation farmers got was, at most, 12.000 RMB per 
Mu, while the VC makes 90.000 RMB per Mu when leasing it to enterprises. 
The VC thus received 78.000 RMB per Mu and for the total 20 Mu of land 
so far converted made over 1.5 million RMB.25  In contrast with Jiacun, in 
Licun it seems that not all villagers benefit from the land conversion. 
Farmers stated that they do not know how the 1.5 million is used. They did 
not believe the VC’s explanation that the money is used in village 
development for roads and electricity projects. The farmers think that groups 
of family and friends who hold power over Licun use the money for their 
own personal benefit. They have no way of proving this and only voiced 
their anger private interviews with them. The men talked with stated that 
they have lost land in this manner and were not satisfied with the meager 
7.200-12.000 RMB the VC paid them in compensation. They felt helpless as 
they could not refuse land requisitioning, nor could they protest. They say 
                                                                                                                        
where land is officially requisitioned, such as for the temple or for the school a sum of 
between 100.000 and 200.000 RMB is paid in total, which is about 5000-10.000 per year per 
Mu. 
25 This phenomenon of local governments or VCs making high profits on land deals has been 
widely reported. See for example C. Ding, "Policy and Praxis of land acquisition in China," 
Land Use Policy  (2005 (article in press)). A. Subrahmanyan, "Land Use in China: the impact of 
the economic revolution," China Law & Practice, no. November (2004). P.N. Phan, "Enriching 
the Land or the Political Elite? Lessons from China on Democratization of the Urban 
Renewal Process," Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 14, no. June (2005).  
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that complaining to the Township is of no use because they are old friends 
with the VC. According to the unhappy farmers there is nowhere to go with 
their problems. Unlike Xiaocun’s active protesters, Licun’s farmers just 
accept the situation as a fact of life. Not even the new election system gives 
them hope, as they say it is dominated by the tight group of powerful Licun 
leaders who will be able to exclude anyone who threatens their dominion.  
The case of Licun demonstrates two things. First, it shows once 
again that the LMA does not suit Lake Dianchi’s urbanizing local 
circumstances.26 If the VC had acted according to the LMA the price of land 
would have been so high that development would have been impossible. 
Second this case also illustrates that violation of law is related to local power 
relations. The VC’s power is based on a network of family and friendship 
connections that go back at least two generations.  The VC’s power enabled  
the leadership to break the law without any apparent local protest. The 
institution of direct elections has not been able to change the existing power 
structure here.27  
Findings 
Violation in Licun consisted of the illegal lease of collective arable land to 
enterprises, the sub-standard compensation of villagers for loss of their land, 
and possibly the embezzlement of compensation funds. Here the LMA’s 
stricter rules banning collective land leasing for enterprise construction were 
again violated. The law’s increased adequacy and certainty were not able to 
stop violations. Again, the benefit of such violation was much higher than its 
costs. An analysis of the external and internal variables is useful for 
understanding violation in this case.  
 As a first external variable, the economic context of urbanization 
provided the opportunity for the violations. Without such economic 
development land conversion would not have been beneficial at all, vice 
versa in the light of the development opportunity compliance with the law in 
terms of following the proper requisitioning procedures seems unfeasible as 
it would probably have meant that such development could not occur. The 
weak social context, which here consisted of powerless villagers, made the 
illegal and unsatisfactory compensation possible. Villagers did not organize 
themselves or do anything to resist the illegal land taking. The local political 
structure disempowered villagers when trying to find redress for VC 
wrongdoings. The villagers’ powerlessness was  largely related to the VC’s 
                                                     
26 In peri-urban contexts in China arable land loss has continued, see Ho and Lin, "Non-
Agricultural Land Use in Post-Reform China." 765-68 
27 Thus, here elections have also not been able to foster stability and direct participation as 
some observers had hoped. Pastor and Tan, "The Meaning of China's Village Elections." 511 
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leadership’s good relationship with the political and regulatory contexts, 
most notably the Kouxiang township government and its land office, which 
failed to act against any of the violations.  
 An analysis of internal variables demonstrates that the VC was a 
socially unresponsive organization that despite recent democratization 
reforms paid little attention to its villagers. This lack of responsiveness 
enabled it to blatantly violate the law and farmers’ rights. During interviews, 
VC leadership did not express awareness of any moral issues in doing so. 
Moreover, the Licun VC operates on a short-term perspective, as it prefers 
making money today to long-term stability and slower development. Such 
short-term perspective explains the compensation abuses. Finally the VC’s 
social capital and its connections have enabled it to remain in power and 
exert such power for personal gains.28  
Baocun’s Industrial Land  
As introduced in Chapter 7, Baocun village in Kouxiang Township is largely 
agricultural. Unlike Jiacun village, most farmers still depend on land as a 
main source of income. This has precluded households building new houses 
while keeping their old one to rent out. However, the total amount of arable 
land in the village has decreased somewhat over the last years when privately 
owned enterprises started to build factory premises on the outskirts of the 
village. Currently Baocun houses one large enterprise, the former SOE, 
Huafei Company (Huafei), and four privately owned enterprises. All of these 
engage in chemical production related to phosphor. Local entrepreneurs 
from the village have set up these companies which is not surprising because 
the village is located near very large phosphor mines. 
One of the small companies is Baohua, a chemical factory located on 
the edge of Baita sub-village near Huafei on land bordering the phosphor-rich 
hills. Baohua is a family business run by father and son Zhang. The Zhangs 
established the company in 1997 as a small phosphor-mine. Since then, it has 
grown tremendously and business has moved from production of raw 
materials to processing such materials and making chemical fertilizer. The 
company even exports some of its fertilizer. At present, it has a staff of 
about 200 workers, mostly non-locals from neighboring provinces who are 
willing to do the heavy work. From its establishment the company has relied 
on co-operation with the village committee leadership. The company relied 
on their help to acquire the arable land it needed to establish its mining and 
factory installations. Part of the land the factory has been built on used to be 
                                                     
28 For a comparable case see Cai, "Collective Ownership or Cadres' Ownership? The Non-
agricultural Use of Farmland in China." 669-70 
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arable. The LMA provides that construction on collectively owned arable 
land is only possible after a complete procedure involving land use 
transformation, state requisitioning, land compensation and payment of land 
use fees to the state.29 Originally, Baohua Company did not acquire its land in 
compliance with these stipulations. Like enterprises in Jiacun and Licun, this 
Baocun enterprise leased the land from the village. Zhang junior explained: 
“When we were just setting up the company we did not have the kind of 
capital to do it according to the procedure. If we had done that we would 
have had to pay one big lump sum ahead to compensate the farmers once 
and for all, on top of the state fees for land use transformation and land 
use.” Baohua like many other starting companies used land for which it only 
had to pay an annual fee to the VC in compensation for the land the 
collective lost. At first, the VC could compensate farmers by giving them 
other collective land use rights on land (jidong di, flexible land) that the VC 
had set apart to carry out small land readjustments.30 When the VC had used 
up all of its flexible land it just paid monetary compensation to the farmers. 
Over the last years, Baohua Company has tried to legalize part of its illegally 
rented land by acquiring land use rights through the official procedure. It has 
done so because it now has the funds, and because the official rights provide 
better collateral for bank loans. However, it still has not fully legalized its 
land and continues to use 60 Mu illegally through lease contracts with the 
VC. 
The VC participated in this illegal land practice, as it enabled 
companies like Baohua to set up business in their village even though this 
practice violated the LMA. Furthermore, the township and district level land 
bureaus in charge of land law enforcement condoned this practice for years 
in Baocun. The VC knew that the costs of going by the book were high and 
if following the rules the village would not be able to attract starting 
companies as they would have been unable to pay for the expensive land 
procedures. 31  Although the village’s secretary repeatedly emphasized how 
important agriculture and arable land is in Baocun, this did not stop him 
breaking the law and decreasing the amount of arable land. As in Jiacun and 
Licun, Baocun’s leadership and the township and district land officials 
allowed the illegal situation to occur because of the importance of industrial 
development, a development that in the end, especially with the new road 
                                                     
29 LMA § 43-50, 62 
30 In Baocun when the land rights were issued to individual households part of the land 
remained in the hands of the collective to be used especially for compensating farmers who 
somehow lost their land.  
31 Again here we see that tax evasion was a means of developing the local economy rather 
than an end in itself, in contrast with research by Ho and Lin, "Emerging Land Markets in 
Rural and Urban China: Policies and Practices."  
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from Kunming to Kouxiang, will help Baocun and the region to transform 
itself from agricultural to industrial production. Perhaps Baocun’s leadership 
also had personal reasons, similar to Licun’s leaders, for breaking the law. 
Although no direct proof of personal gain due to such illegal land 
transactions in Baocun was found, VC leadership has been closely connected 
with the owners of the local enterprises. The present CCP secretary of 
Baocun, the most influential leader, has worked for one of these enterprises 
for many years. The leadership’s wealth is apparent, because they form a 
small group of people who have modern three story houses while most 
villagers live in old earthen homes. Thus violation of law involved both local 
enterprises, unable or unwilling to pay the formal fees, as well as local 
leadership and township land officers who actively cooperated in the 
practices or at least condoned them.  
Findings 
With the Baocun case, it becomes clear that in all three research villages 
(Jiacun, Baocun and Licun) the LMA has led to violations of law. 
Furthermore, in all these cases the law did not fit local circumstances that 
called for small-scale construction with minimum investments. In Baocun, as 
in Jiacun and Licun, enterprises could only start business in violation of the 
LMA, acquiring land through cheap leases rather than through the costly 
legal procedures. The benefits of breaking the law were much higher than 
the costs of such violation, which again without proper law enforcement did 
not amount to much.  
The economic context of industrial development in the region 
provided the incentive to break the law, as without such development 
Baocun could never have attracted enterprises that wanted to build on their 
land. Furthermore, the opportunity to break the LMA existed because local 
land authorities at the township and the district level condoned the illegal 
practices for years. They were partly condoned because economic 
development was supported politically. In addition, like Licun, the regulatory 
authorities and the Township government were closely connected both 
socially as well as economically with Baocun village. Thus, the political and 
regulatory contexts were equally conducive to violation. The local social 
context here, which consists of local villagers, did not press the VC and the 
enterprises to comply with the law; most likely, because the violations here 
did not affect local villagers, who received reasonable compensation for land 
loss.   
Internal variables of Baocun’s VC and its enterprises were also 
important. First, the regulated actors cost benefit analysis favored direct 
economic development over the protection of arable land. The enterprises’ 
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small size explains violation of law as the small companies initially lacked the 
resources to pay for the high fees of formal land conversions. The fact that 
Baohua later did legalize some of the illegally leased land, suggests that the 
impossibility of complying with the law fully from the start may indeed have 
been a motivation to violate the LMA. 
Conclusion 
In the land violations cases discussed in this chapter violation behavior 
depended on the circumstances of the case. Compared to the land 
compliance cases discussed in Chapter 7, the violation cases display more 
uniformity in the lessons they teach.  
 In three of the four cases32, the violation of the LMA was directly 
related to the fact that the law’s strict stipulations on collective construction 
did not fit local circumstances. 33 The three villages in question could not 
have developed economically as they have, had they complied with the law.34 
As such the law’s lack of feasibility and adaptability, as predicted in Part I, 
made that regulated actors did not want to comply with the law. Largely, this 
was because violation brought the benefits of development and came with 
minor or no costs.  
 To further understand violations, the external context of the 
different regulated actors is important. In contrast with the land compliance 
cases, the social, regulatory and economic contexts played a different role. 
The economic context created the opportunity to make benefits from 
violating the norm, instead of prohibiting it as happened in some of the 
compliance cases in Chapter 7. Rapid urbanization and industrialization 
created the opportunity to break the law by leasing out land to enterprises 
and using land for secondary housing to lease to non-local migrants. 35 
Villages, village leaders, villagers, entrepreneurs and various local 
governments could grow richer from developing land for enterprises and 
houses. Consequently, unlike in some of the compliance cases described in 
                                                     
32 In the Xiaocun case which concerned compensation only and not arable land protection, 
compliance would not have affected local development.  
33 This is a problem that China is facing on a wider scale than discussed here, see Zhang, 
"Nongcun Jianshe Yongdi Shiyong Quan Zhidu de Faxue Fenxi (A Legal Analysis of Village 
Land Construction Rights)." 238 
34 Here our research corresponds with Guo, "Woguo Chengshihua Fazhan Zhong de Gengdi 
Baohu (Protecting Arable Land in Urbanzing China)." It shows further that while tax evasion 
was an important reason for illegal development of enterprises, such evasion was also 
necessary because the enterprises could not have started operation had the full fees for 
transformation been paid. Compare with Ho and Lin, "Emerging Land Markets in Rural and 
Urban China: Policies and Practices."704.  
35  Our findings here also resonate with Guo’s research. See Guo, "Woguo Chengshihua 
Fazhan Zhong de Gengdi Baohu (Protecting Arable Land in Urbanzing China)." 
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Chapter 7 and 8, the social, political and regulatory contexts were less or not 
at all aligned with the interests of the LMA’s bans on industrial and housing 
construction on collective land. As a result, the regulated actors received little 
pressure from local communities to comply with the law. Quite contrary, 
such communities, as long as compensation was properly arranged, even 
stimulated and participated in violations. Similarly,   state enforcement action, 
at least until the campaigns in 2004 (see Chapter 14), was absent . Without 
such external pressure the costs of violation were low, to non-existent.36 In 
two cases, when compensation was involved, the LMA’s rules on 
compensation were important for local communities. However, local 
communities were unable to use these rules to prevent or completely end the 
taking of their land without proper compensation. Here the political context 
was important. In both cases the local distribution of power, combined with 
the weak system of checks and balances made that regulated actors could act 
in relative autonomy, not having to care about the interests of local farmers, 
nor having to fear sanctions from superior governments or regulatory 
agencies. 
Variables internal to the regulated actors were also important. In all 
cases, regulated actors, when measuring costs and benefits, strongly favored 
economic concerns over the protection of arable land. Similarly, in all cases 
local development was more important than ensuring the long-term food 
safety of the whole country. For violations of the LMA’s ban on industrial 
construction on leased collective land, the lack of enterprise resources to pay 
for the costly legal procedures was an important reason for compliance. In 
two cases the regulated actor’s ethical norms were definitely deficient as the 
actors willingly violated the law causing direct harm to local villagers whose 
land was taken without proper compensation. In both cases, the regulated 
actors, the VC in one and the Township government in the other, were 
socially unresponsive, as these actors were largely independent of their social, 
regulatory and political environment. In three cases, because of the law’s 
unfeasible stipulations, violation had become so widespread among all local 
actors, including those at township and district level, that a culture of 
violation existed. 
 For the main question on the influences of legislation and 
enforcement on compliance (see Chapter 1) this Chapter provides several 
findings. First, the LMA rules on collective construction are not feasible and 
not flexible enough to be implemented in a peri-urban rapidly industrializing 
and urbanizing context. The interests of most local actors, not only the 
regulated actor, but also local communities and governments were opposed 
                                                     
36 This is similar to what He argues, see He, "Gengdi Baohu Ying Zuodao "Liu Ge Bixu" (The 
"Six Must Be Dones"of Arable Land Protection)." 
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to such rules, making the chances for voluntary compliance low. Combined 
with Chapter 7, it becomes clear that these rules largely led to compliance for 
those actors that never had the opportunity to break them. In the villages 
where the opportunity for developing land for construction arose, the rules 
were violated. For rules on compensation, the analysis is somewhat different. 
Here some leaders were tempted to break the law, given the possible benefits. 
Local farmers tried to use these rules to protect their interests and get proper 
compensation by opposing violations, but failed due to local power 
constellations and weak checks and balances.  
 For both types of rules, collective construction or compensation, 
there has not been much law enforcement in the cases studied. Since 1997 
the national government has tried to enhance arable land enforcement 
through campaigns, however at least until 2004, they did not affect the 
ongoing violations described in this chapter. It was not until the 2004 
campaign that arable land enforcement action came to the villages. However, 
as Chapter 14 details, due to the significant impact expected from the 
proposed enforcement campaign by the end of this research in December 
2004, it seemed unlikely that the proposed action would be carried out. The 
lack of state enforcement is important, especially for the collective 
construction rules, where only enforcement seems to be a way to create 
more compliance in a context where most local actors support violation.  
 
 
10. Why Contamination Continues 




Although China has tried to improve its pollution prevention and control 
legislation and has produced stricter rules to combat industrial pollution, 
polluting practices at the local level have continued. Lake Dianchi is 
illustrative. On all sides of the lake there is industry, ranging from  large 
SOEs, such as cement factories and chemical fertilizer plants, to small 
privately owned enterprises making plastic pots or chemicals. Coming closer 
to the factories one can see, smell and sometimes even hear their pollution. 
The village houses surrounding some of the cement factories and chemical 
fertilizer plants are white because of the small dust particles they have 
emitted, the small plastic pot plant is full of paint fumes, to which workers 
inside are continually exposed, the small chemical enterprises have discharge 
pipes through which their untreated still smoking hot industrial waste is 
directly dumped in the Tanglang River running from the lake up into the 
Ningshi Hot springs nature reserve.  
 While some of Kunming’s enterprises comply with China’s 
pollution laws and regulations (Chapter 8), many do not. At Lake Dianchi, 
there have been several types of violations of pollution regulation, ranging 
from chemical fertilizer plants not using their environmental installations and 
discharging at night when there are no inspections, to small inner-city 
restaurants operating without the proper noise and smell installations causing 
significant nuisance for the inner-city population. In some cases, the effects 
of the pollution violations have been dramatic: destroying local crops, 
sickening local water buffaloes and disrupting production at local enterprises 
because they can no longer use polluted water. Even in cases where pollution 
damage has been considerable, violation has not stopped. Unlike what some 
scholars believe1, industrial pollution is far from controlled in Kunming and 
legislative and enforcement efforts have not been effective.  
                                                     
1 The cases discussed in this Chapter show that although much effort has been invested in 
ending Dianchi Lake’s industrial pollution, the problem has remained persistent, contrary to 
what some scholars have stated. Compare with Liu et al., "Policy and Research Efforts for 
Agricultural Non-point Source Pollution in Yunnan Dianchi Watershed." 349 
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Why Small Chemical Factories have continued to Pollute the 
Tanglang River 
In October 2003, production at China’s oldest hydraulic power plant, the 
Shilongba station built by Siemens in the 1930s, came to a grinding halt. 2 
The large turbines that formed the centre of this small electricity station had 
corroded completely and could no longer function. For the fourth time in 
that year the Shilongba station had to change its expensive metal turbines, 
while normally only one such change a year had been necessary. In this 
manner, the station incurred damages of nearly 4 million RMB.  
 Management knew exactly what the problem was: not their turbines 
but the water that flowed through them. The water from the Tanglang River 
contained acid levels far beyond those allowed in China’s water standards. 3 
This acidic water had caused the turbines to rust and break down. Factory 
management had even been able to trace the source of the acidic water; it 
had driven up-stream along the Tanglang until they found small factories 
that discharged acid smelling water directly into the river. 
 The hydraulic power station was not the only pollution victim. 
The factories’ acidic discharge also reached Ningshi city and thus Yunnan’s 
largest factory, the Yungang Steel Company. Here the acidic water halted 
production several times because the water from the Tanglang, normally 
used for in the steel manufacturing process, could no longer be used. 
Yungang’s losses quickly rose to several million RMB. The factory’s 
environmental management personnel also got in their cars to discover what 
had caused the pollution. Head of Yungang’s environmental department Peng 
recalls: “When we found these small and dirty enterprises I felt so frustrated 
that I could not shut them down myself, as I am not an EPB agent.” Even 
suing the companies for damages was of no use, because they lacked 
resources to pay for the large damages the company had suffered. “We could 
do nothing, but complain to the various local and municipal governmental 
authorities,” Peng concluded. 
 In the meantime, pollution continued. The hydraulic power station 
and Yungang had been right: small chemical factories were responsible for 
sudden acidification of the Tanglang. These small factories were located in 
                                                     
2 This section is based on national news reports and interviews with EPB personnel and 
Yungang factory. See L. Song and X. Zuo, "Yinshui Wuran Shebei Yanzhong Fushi Woguo 
Shouzuo Shuidianzhan Tingchan (China's Oldest Water Power Station Closes Operation 
Becuase Pollution hass Severely Corroded its Installations)," Renmin Ribao, Haiwai Ban (People's 
Daily, Overseas Edition), 23 December 2003., CCTV, "Jinri Shuofa" Fushi de Beihou ("Talking of 
Law Today" Corrosion's Background) (CCTV, 17 March 2004 2004 [cited 18 March 2004]); 
available from http://202.108.249.200/news/society/20040317/100967.shtml. 
3 According to the water standards, the PH levels should be between 6 and 9 PH, while here 
they were below 6. See 1996 Integrated Water Discharge Standard, GB 8978-96 and the 1995 
Discharge Standard of Water Pollutants for Phosphate Fertilizer Industry, GB 15580-95.  
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the north of Kouxiang Township, bordering Ningshi city. The factories 
produced Fluor Sodium Sillicate (FSS) a necessary substance for the 
production of chemical fertilizer. Unfortunately the FSS production process 
is very polluting and manufacturing it in a clean manner in compliance with 
the law is very costly. In order to cut the costs larger chemical fertilizer 
companies, like the ones in Ningshi and Huafei in Baocun Village, have 
outsourced the manufacturing of this substance to these smaller companies 
that were willing and able to produce it without using the costly 
environmental installations. With a demand for cheap FSS, soon the 
northern less-inhabited area of Kouxiang witnessed the rapid development 
of small privately owned chemical factories. The factories were conveniently 
located near the river so that they could directly discharge wastewater. They 
were small-scale factories requiring little capital to set up and little to operate, 
about 300.000 RMB per enterprise. Currently there are eleven such 
enterprises in the Kouxiang/Ningshi region. Since 1999, enforcement 
campaigns have forced these enterprises to invest in environmental 
installations (see Chapter 14). However, the cost of operating these machines 
is almost half the initial investment of the whole enterprise. Consequently 
few of the enterprises use the environmental installations regularly and most 
only switch them on during EPB inspections (see Chapter 13). Because of 
the small scale of production and the considerable costs of environmental 
protection, operation in compliance with the law has never been 
economically feasible for these enterprises. 
Even though such factories continually violated environmental law4, 
the local (township and district) government and the local district EPB failed 
to close down production5, not just as some would say for protection of tax 
income6, which is not considerable, or jobs related to these small enterprises7, 
which are also few. Rather, a sudden halting of the small enterprises would 
severely affect all phosphor related production and thus most livelihoods in 
the area. Local inhabitants form a chain of interdependencies: phosphor-
mines depend on local resources and on local chemical factories; large 
chemical fertilizer plants depend on the mines, on smaller factories 
producing necessary side-products, and on local farmers who provide cheap 
labor; smaller chemical factories depend on the larger plants, on the mines, 
and on local labor; local farmers and laborers depend on jobs in the mines, 
                                                     
4 The enterprises violated the following sections: WPPCL § 14.2, 22, 23, 29, 35 and 37, DPR § 
17.2 and 21.2. 
5 Which the law demands in this case, see DPR § 21.2.  
6 T. Saich, Governance and Politics of China (New York: Palgrave, 2001).152-163 
7  S. Yao, "Huanjing Xingzheng Zhifa zhong Cunzaide Wenti he Duice (On the Problems and 
Countermeasures in Administrative Enforcement of Environmental Law)," Environmental 
Protection, no. 7 (1999).14, Bachner, "Regulating Pollution in the People's Republic of China: 
An Analysis of the Enforcement of  Environmental Law." 16 
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plants and factories and on income related to selling their farm products to 
the industry workers; local governments at the township or district level and 
to some extent even city level, depend on the local industries for tax revenue 
and providing local livelihoods which help to maintain social stability, while 
the local industries need local governments and their bureaus, including the 
EPB, for regulatory support; local villages depend on the larger plants for 
their infrastructure and on all industries for land related revenues, while all 
factories need the village land to expand their production sites. The result is 
that most actors in the Kouxiang area directly or indirectly depend on 
phosphor related income. Most of them do not support strict enforcement 
of environmental regulation, as they fear that this will break the phosphor 
chain of interdependencies and adversely affect their interests. 
Violation in this case could continue unpunished because there was 
no effective enforcement. First of all this was because enforcement agents 
recognized the important role these companies had in the local economy and 
thus refrained from the tough action the law demanded.8 However, even 
when the EPB, under pressure of national media decided to address these 
enterprises, it had difficulty finding evidence for violations. In late 2003 the 
Tanglang pollution case gained national media attention. Film crews and 
investigative reporters came from Beijing to report about the pollution case 
that had stopped China’s oldest hydraulic station and Yunnan’s largest 
factory.9 The pressure of their coverage, later influenced the Kunming EPB 
to target these companies as a priority during a national campaign. (See 
Chapter 14) Even with the extra efforts, aimed at finding evidence that 
would enable the municipal EPB to end to the violations, it took several 
months before the inspections were successful and evidence for violations 
was found. The problem with inspecting such small enterprises is their 
location. It is extremely difficult to reach this area at night, which gives the 
enterprises an opportunity to secretly discharge nocturnally, while complying 
with the law during daytime when inspections took place.10 Even after the 
EPB, had ordered the factories to halt production (in September 2004) 
violations continued. (See Chapter 14) By late 2004, driving past the factory 
premises one could still see the hot discharge flowing untreated into the 
Tanglang River. 
                                                     
8 DPR § 21.2 demands closure. 
9 CCTV, "Jinri Shuofa" Fushi de Beihou ("Talking of Law Today" Corrosion's Background) ([cited), 
Song and Zuo, "Yinshui Wuran Shebei Yanzhong Fushi Woguo Shouzuo Shuidianzhan 
Tingchan (China's Oldest Water Power Station Closes Operation Becuase Pollution hass 
Severely Corroded its Installations)." 
10 For more detail, see Part III. 




The case of these small polluting companies shows the importance of 
feasibility of the law for compliance and enforcement. Although the WPPCL 
and the DPR provided stricter norms with strict sanctions to end pollution at 
small enterprises, in practice such pollution continues in clear violation of 
the law. Such violation first originates from the fact that these companies 
cannot abide by these laws, as compliance is economically not feasible. In 
addition, more importantly, violation continues because enforcement is not 
feasible, because of its possible effect on the local economy and the difficulty 
of detecting violations in such remote areas.  
The continuing severe pollution violations of small chemical 
factories in the Tanglang River area demonstrate that violation of law is not 
only related to the interests of these companies themselves. This case shows 
that such violation must be understood by looking at the role of these 
enterprises in the local and regional economic networks. In this case, 
violation has continued until a viable alternative for the companies’ 
production is found, in order to safeguard local economic development.11 As 
long as there are no real compliance alternatives for cheap FSS, or alternative 
sources of income that are not dependent on phosphor production, illegal 
production of this substance will not end. 12  In this aspect, the case is 
somewhat different from the paper compliance cases (see Chapter 8), where 
the local economy was not as dependent on it as a source of income and 
where, to some extent, alternatives were developed. 
The economic context is important for explaining why the FSS 
companies started to violate pollution law in the first place. Larger 
enterprises wanted to cut costs and outsourced the dirty and costly FSS 
production to companies that could do so cheaply but not in a manner in 
compliance with the law. Thus, the initiative for violation came from the 
economic business environment. The social context, consisting of local 
farmers and inhabitants provides a double explanation. The direct social 
environment of villagers living in the vicinity of the FSS factories and those 
working or depending on the Phosphor industry most likely supported these 
companies as their livelihoods depended on them. However, those living 
further away and also some enterprises using the Tanglang’s dirty water 
started to complain. Their complaints, after they were picked-up by national 
media, were in the end an important force for enforcement action taken later. 
Thus, the social environment both stimulates and restricts violation here. 
                                                     
11 Wright also looks at alternative incomes when discussing how to tackle China’s many mine 
accidents. See T. Wright, "The Political Economy of Coal Mine Disasters in China: "Your 
Rice Bowl or Your Life"," China Quarterly  (2004). 
12  Compare with Blackman’s study of informal enterprises in Mexico, see Blackman, 
"Informal Sector Pollution Control: What Policy Options Do We Have?" 
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The regulatory and political contexts are also important. In this case, 
regulatory agencies only pressured the company following national political 
pressure, first in 1999 during a campaign and then later in 2004 again. Apart 
from this, local governments and their EPBs did not act against violations, 
partly because local leaders seemed to condone violations for their necessity 
for local development and partly because regulatory agents was unable to 
detect evidence for violations. While the campaign type pressure was able to 
make the companies invest in environmental equipment, the difficulty in 
maintaining such pressure explains why such installations have not been used 
and violation and pollution continued.  
Variables internal to the FSS companies are equally important. First, 
the size of these companies explains their violations, as their small size 
makes compliance economically not feasible and secret illegal nightly 
discharges a necessity for survival. Furthermore, violation seems to be a 
morally accepted practice in these enterprises where violation and pollution 
are part of business.  Finally, these small enterprises operate on a day to day 
basis, only making investments necessary for immediate survival and profit 
maximization but not for the long term.13  
Chemical Fertilizer Industry in Baocun Village  
Baocun is a picture of pollution. 14 From miles away, Huafei Company’s two 
enormous smokestacks can be seen to emit a white smoke over Kouxiang’s 
mountainous landscape. First time visitors are surprised when nearing the 
chemical fertilizer factory that it is actually located in a tiny village. A cloud 
of white dust hovers above the factory’s premises showing that not all air 
pollutants are emitted through the long smokestacks. As a result, the 
buildings in the village center have all turned white. The Village Committee 
headquarters is located right next to the factory and has windows facing the 
fertilizer plant. There is not much to see through the windows, as the 
factory’s white dust particles have made them as white as snow. Opening a 
window, which the VC leadership never does because of the noise, shows 
how the village’s agricultural land is, in part, located right below the industrial 
giant. Apart from Huafei, Baocun village also houses several smaller chemical 
                                                     
13 Here our findings resonate with Johnson’s and Fryxell and Lo’s studies that have found that 
larger sized and state owned enterprises generally do better in terms of compliance or care 
more for the environment. See Johnson, Clear Water, Blue Skies: China's Environment in the New 
Century. and Fryxell and Lo, "Organizational Membership and Environmental Ethics: A 
Comparison of Managers in State-owned Firms, Collectives Private Firms and Joint Ventures 
in China." 
14 This section is based on interviews with Baocun villagers, village leaders, Huafei and other 
factories management and workers and EPB personnel, carried out in 2004. 
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enterprises including phosphor mines and small scale chemical fertilizer 
plants that have further enhanced the village’s pollution problem. 
 It all started with the establishment of Huafei Company, or Hunan 
Phosphor as it was called before privatization. Huanan Phosphor was established 
as an SOE in 1973 in order to profit from the region’s rich phosphor 
resources and produce chemical fertilizer. Over the years, the company grew 
steadily and continued to do so after it was converted to a privately owned 
company in 2001. The privately owned Huafei Company is now in the hands 
of three stockholders, themselves also former SOEs. Huafei is one of 
Yunnan’s largest producers of phosphoric chemical fertilizer with an annual 
production of 1.8 million tons of fertilizer. The company’s success has 
moved beyond China as it now exports fertilizer to other countries including 
Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia and India. Huafei has even established a joint 
venture with an American enterprise to develop a separate production plant, 
also located in Baocun village. Privatization at Huafei has enabled the 
company to cut out some of its past burdens. Unlike Ningshi Chemical 
Fertilizer and Yungang Steel, Huafei no longer supports pensioners, who have 
been entered into a privately administered social security system, and the 
company only needs to take care of its 2010 permanent staff. In 2004, the 
factory produced more than 1 billion RMB and made a profit of 120 million 
RMB. Its most important costs are raw materials, mainly phosphor stone, 
which is bought from local mines. Huafei’s success has attracted small 
enterprises to the area. Baocun now has six privately owned chemical 
factories owned by wealthy villagers. These small enterprises could flourish 
in Baocun as they could profit from local village support (see above about 
land violations), the good location, with abundant phosphor reserves, a 
reasonable infrastructure and a local river for waste disposal, and the 
opportunity to work for the large Huafei Company. The local owners have 
become rich and influential with close ties to the village government. 
 The effect of the chemical fertilizer industry on the village 
environment has been serious. Local farmers first started to notice pollution 
effects when their water buffaloes became seriously ill in the mid-1980s. 
Since then, Baocun’s farmers had to get rid of their cattle and work the land 
by other means. Soon, farmers like Mr. Yang (see introduction section of 
Chapter 6), also noticed that part of their rice turned red. Because of 
pollutants in the air and in the water, Baocun’s best land, wet land close to 
the factory, could no longer grow healthy rice. About 60% of all rice grown 
near the factory had to be thrown away. In addition, crops further away from 
the factory in Baocun’s more remote sub-villages were also affected. 
Depending on the direction of the wind, Huafei and the other factories’ air 
pollutants diminished crops and destroyed fruit trees. The pollution also 
destroyed local fish production, when all of the fish in Baocun’s fish ponds 
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located between the Tanglang River and the factory died out because of 
water pollutants. 
 Violation of law15 seemed apparent but until autumn 2004 the local 
industry was still registered as being in compliance.16 Villagers knew better. 
During the many trips to Baocun Village I gradually gained enough trust to 
hear about the ongoing problems. Where at first all trouble was denied, 
gradually I learned about the livestock diseases and the failed rice and fruit 
crops. Villagers talked about accidents. Huafei Company had for example 
constructed a disposal site for its Phosphor Gypsium, a white solid residue of 
the fertilizer production process. Instead of building this disposal site as far 
away from human settlement as possible, the company had let convenience 
prevail and had chosen a location near the factory but also right above one 
of Baocun’s sub-villages. Ironically enough, the disposal site is now located 
right above Baocun’s CCP secretary Chen’s house. Standing on top of the 
roof of his impressive three-story villa, one can see the white mountain made 
of chemical waste right above. When I first met him, Chen assured me that 
this chemical dumpsite was safe and that there were no problems. Later, 
villagers told me that after heavy rains the mountain had leaked and chemical 
waste had seeped into their homes and onto their agricultural land. Villagers 
also told me about accidents at the smaller factories that affected their 
livelihood. One of them, Mr. Wang, developed a plot of land on the outskirts 
of the village, far away from Huafei and the privately owned enterprises. On 
his land he grows a variety of crops including corn, pumpkins and several 
kinds of fruits. Subsequent accidents at one of the privately owned 
enterprises destroyed part of his crop when the wind brought the pollutants 
all the way from the factory to his land. Even Huafei Company acknowledges 
that it knows about the dangers of living close to their factory, as it has 
located the factory’s residential area far away from the production site, 
outside of Baocun in a neighboring village. In autumn 2004, during an 
annual enforcement campaign (see Chapter 14), the EPB finally caught up 
with local knowledge, when during a first nightly inspection it finally found 
that Huafei was secretly discharging without using its environmental 
installations in order to cut costs.17 
                                                     
15 WPPCL § 14.2, 29, 37, APPCL § 13, DPR § 17.1, the 1996 Integrated Water Discharge 
Standard, GB 8978-96 and the 1995 Discharge Standard of Water Pollutants for Phosphate 
Fertilizer Industry, GB 15580-95.  
16 This is based on the Yunnan EPB website’s data on compliance, issued in 2004.  
See http://www.ynepb.yn.gov.cn/html/wrkz/wrkz_szfdbpf1_1.htm 
17 There are many cases where companies that have the proper equipment fail to use it. One 
example is the Kertas Bekasi Teguh paper factory in Indonesia which was at first “cited as a 
prime example of responsible pollution control” and it was later “discovered that the waste 
treatment works were only used when a government inspection was due.” See Cribb, "The 
Politics of Pollution Control in Indonesia."1129  
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Villagers also understand why the local industry was so long still 
registered as being in compliance. “For me it is no surprise that Huafei has 
more production at night than during the day,” one of the villagers told me. 
“During the day they have to use their costly environmental installations 
because the EPB may come down to inspect, while at night they can just 
produce cheaper without the environmental costs.”18 Just as with the small 
FSS enterprises Baocun’s industry has thus violated environmental law 
through secret discharges (toupai). It could do so because Baocun is not easy 
to reach at night and EPBs have hardly ever made evening or nightly visits 
here.19 Not surprisingly, Huafei’s violation was detected during one such rare 
nocturnal inspections.  
Baocun’s environmental violations are more complex though. 
Contrary to Ningshi fertilizer plant (see above), the villagers of Baocun have 
rarely complained about local pollution and have never involved the local 
media to help them.20 This is strange because the industry has clearly been 
responsible for considerable economic losses these farmers have suffered. 
Furthermore, these farmers have health concerns, seeing that the pollution 
affected large mammals such as their water buffaloes, but no one likes to talk 
or perhaps think too much about this.21  
The difference between the farmers in Ningshi and Baocun is key to 
understanding the continued violation of law in the latter village. The main 
difference between these two groups of farmers is their dependency on local 
industry. Whereas Ningshi farmers are not dependent on the industry, the 
livelihoods of farmers in Baocun are in many ways linked to the industry 
located in their village. First, some of Baocun’s villagers work in one of the 
enterprises. Huafei Company is the most important employer. It provides a 
                                                     
18 We have talked with Huafei about their environmental problems. They assured us that they 
are 100% committed to the environment and had invested heavily in clean production. Their 
answers reminded me of Fryxell and Lo’s study in which the environmental commitment of 
China’s enterprise managers was demonstrated. In this case, which I believe is not exceptional, 
the firm, which I knew had been breaking environmental law just to cut costs and with 
considerable harm for its surrounding villagers remained convinced of its own environmental 
stewardship. We agree with Fryxell and Lo’s analysis that there are obstacles that block 
compliance, including high costs of clean production and doubts about the benefits of 
environmental investments. Compare with Fryxell and Lo, "Organizational Membership and 
Environmental Ethics: A Comparison of Managers in State-owned Firms, Collectives Private 
Firms and Joint Ventures in China." 1951-3 
19 For more about this see Chapter 16. 
20 Compare also with research from other places in China peasant resistance etc and the case 
from Gansu and the recent pollution related revolt, Economy has also written about this I 
believe. Something missing here 
21 Several villagers affirmed that they had such concerns when I directly asked about this, but 
they did not like my line of questioning much, neither did they voluntarily wish to speak about 
health problems related to the pollution. 
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total income of 3 million RMB a year to villagers doing heavy manual labor. 
Second, farmers mainly sell their farm products at the local markets where 
Huafei’s wealthy employees buy their products. Therefore, even the 
agricultural income depends on the local industry. Third, the industry has 
provided the village with income related to illegal land leases (see above). 
Fourth, the village receives income from compensation related to pollution. 
The Baocun VC has signed a compensation agreement with Huafei Company 
through which the factory pays a set annual amount of 66.000 RMB in 
pollution damages to the sub-village closest by.22 As part of the agreement, 
Huafei Company has also built local roads and water irrigation systems.  
Farmers in Baocun are aware of their dual relationship with the local 
industry and have been careful not to bite the hand that feeds them. Part of 
the reason why they have remained passive is also because ordinary farmers 
feel that they are powerless. Mr. Wang, for instance, said, “The enterprises 
here are good friends with the village leaders and have good connections 
with higher level governments. Complain would be useless.” Indeed, 
Baocun’s leadership has a close connection with the local industry. Huafei 
Company has let Baocun’s leaders administer the 3 million RMB fund for 
paying for manual labor. It is not entirely clear how much the village leaders 
keep as management fees, but their houses and cars show that they earn well 
above village average income. Village leaders also have close ties to the small 
privately owned enterprises. Baocun’s CCP secretary and VC chairman have 
both become rich from working for such small enterprises. Finally, local 
industry forms an important part of the phosphor chain (see above) that 
supports most of Kouxiang Township. As a result the township government 
and the Dianxi District government support these enterprises. Without them 
not only the livelihood of the village but of the whole area is threatened. 
Violation in Baocun is the opposite of compliance in Ningshi, a lack of local 
pressure to comply has enabled Baocun’s industry to continue to pollute. 
The lack of local resistance 23  to pollution problems has meant that 
compliance only depends on EPB law enforcement which, as we saw, (and 
will see Chapter 16) is very difficult to apply when there is not enough 
support from local villagers and local governments. 
                                                     
22 Compensation does not cover the full costs though. Those who grow rice close to the 
factory get a compensation of 132 RMB per Mu land. However this does not cover the 60% 
loss of rice that per Mu amounts to about 1200 RMB. 
23 Our findings in this case are in contrast with Jing’s study of peasant resistance to a chemical 
fertilizer plant in Gansu, which argues that health problems and local culture made peasants 
actively protest. In Baocun there were probably similar health problems, and a similar culture 
emphasizing reproduction, however there was no protest, as we have argued because the 
villagers were too dependent on the factory in their midst. Compare with Jing, 
"Environmental Protests in China." More comparative research is necessary to evaluate these 
contrasting findings.  




An analysis of the influence of legislation and enforcement on non-
compliance in this case yields several findings. First, Huafei Company could 
easily have complied with the law, but chose not to. The laws’ norms24, even 
though they had become stricter and more specific, were thus feasible for 
this company.  Second, Huafei could and did break the norms of the law 
because enforcement was weak. Because of Huafei’s remote location and the 
dependency of local communities on Huafei and their close relationship with 
the local government, law enforcement agents had trouble finding out what 
was going on at Huafei and could not easily know about their nightly 
violations. In addition, Huafei’s importance for the local economies and its 
good governmental connections precluded strong enforcement action, even 
when violation was discovered. (see Chapter 13 and 14)  
In contrast with NCFC’s local community (see Chapter 8), Huafei’s 
social context, which consisted of the local community, was too dependent 
on income Huafei provided to protest strongly about ongoing violations and 
pollution. A second reason that Baocun’s enterprises were able to violate the 
law without apparent problems was the weak regulatory context. Due to 
their remote location and the weak local checks and balances from the social 
context, Kunming’s regulatory institutions were for a long time not able to 
detect ongoing violations.  The political context was also important, as 
Baocun’s chemical industry is supported by various local governments, as it 
is an essential part of the local phosphor production network.  
To understand violation in this case, variables internal to the 
regulated actors are also important. Huafei, first, is a large company, but is in 
several aspects different from other large companies that were in compliance. 
One important aspect is that Huafei is fully privatized and it no longer needs 
to worry about supporting a large group of pensioners,25 unlike the Ningshi 
Chemical Fertilizer Company (NCFC) and Yungang Steel. NCFC explicitly stated 
that it invested heavier in environmental protection because it emphasized 
long-term development instead of short-term profits. (Chapter 8) Perhaps 
because Huafei does not have this social responsibility, it looks less at stability 
and long-term profit rather than at cutting costs on an everyday basis. Huafei 
did not depend as much on its local environment as it depended on Huafei, 
creating the possibility for socially unresponsive behavior. For this, it is likely 
                                                     
24 WPPCL § 14.2, 29, 37, APPCL § 13, DPR § 17.1, the 1996 Integrated Water Discharge 
Standard, GB 8978-96 and the 1995 Discharge Standard of Water Pollutants for Phosphate 
Fertilizer Industry, GB 15580-95. 
25  Here, our findings resonate with Johnson, Fryxell and Lo. See Fryxell and Lo, 
"Organizational Membership and Environmental Ethics: A Comparison of Managers in State-
owned Firms, Collectives Private Firms and Joint Ventures in China.", Johnson, Clear Water, 
Blue Skies: China's Environment in the New Century. 
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that an emphasis on short-term profits and weak ethical standards of factory 
management were influential. The case of Huafei is extreme because the 
company did have the financial and technical resources to comply, but still 
chose not to. Whereas Huafei at least had the competence, Baocun’s small 
enterprises may have been motivated to violate the law because they lacked 
these resources for compliance and violation was the only way to maintain 
business. Smaller enterprises have thus had to make a short-term cost benefit 
calculation similar to the FSS companies.  
Why there are many minor EIA violations  
Mr. Yu, enforcement agent at the Kunming EPB answers directly: “Apart 
from the heavily polluting violations, we are facing an enormous amount of 
small enterprises that continually break environmental law.” He explains that 
he means the many small collectively and privately owned enterprises that 
have developed around Lake Dianchi since the 1980s. While some are very 
polluting, many of these enterprises have no or a very limited impact on the 
environment. A good example is the boxes factory in Jiacun (see Chapter 8), 
which has no pollution. Even enterprises that have a limited impact on the 
environment, the law dictates, should carry out certain procedures, such as a 
limited type of EIA. 26  For example, even Jiacun’s temple construction 
project had to comply with EIA procedure, at considerable cost. While the 
temple construction project was pressured to operate exactly to the letter of 
the law (see Chapter 7), many other small enterprises Mr. Yu says have 
violated environmental law in various minor ways.27 This is so despite the 
official numbers on compliance which lead us to believe that in 2003 
compliance with EIA and 3T requirements has been at 99.7% and 96.2% in 
Yunnan province.28  
                                                     
26 EIA Law § 16.3, for the exact list of which activity should carry out which type of EIA see 
SEPA 2002 Classified Directory for Environmental Protection Management of Construction 
Projects, SEPA 2002 No 14. 
27 Several other enforcement agents both from Yunnan as well as from Sichuan have indicated 
the many violations of EIA laws. Our findings here are different from positive EIA 
compliance cases from the 1990s. See Sinkule and Ortolano, Implementing Environmental Policy in 
China. 105 
28  In previous years, the official data on compliance in Yunnan Province have recently 
recovered after a steep decline. The decline is probably because in 1999 rounds of strict 
inspections started in this province and many violations of EIA were found. (See Chapter 16) 
Based on SEPA, Zhongguo Huanjing Tongji Nianbao 1998 (China Environmental Statistical Report 
1998) (Beijing: SEPA, 1999). SEPA, Zhongguo Huanjing Tongji Nianbao 1999 (China Environmental 
Statistical Report 1999) (Beijing: SEPA, 2000), SEPA, Zhongguo Huanjing Tongji Nianbao 2000 
(China Environment Statistical Report 2000) (Beijing: SEPA, 2001), SEPA, Zhongguo Huanjing Tongji 
Nianbao 2001 (China Environment Statistical Report 2001) (Beijing: SEPA, 2002), SEPA, Zhongguo 
Huanjing Tongji Nianbao 2002 (China Environment Statistical Report 2002) (Beijing: SEPA, 2003), 
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The discrepancy between Mr. Yu’s statements based on everyday 
enforcement work and the official data is significant. 29  First there is the 
problem of official data collection in China in general, which with China’s 
fragmented bureaucratic structure and weak vertical management (see 
Chapter 13), has been problematic.30 Nevertheless, there is more to it; these 
data are based on what the EPB think is the number of construction projects 
in compliance with the law. It is based on the number of construction 
projects that the EPB knows of that are going on and for which an EIA has 
been requested. But the EPB has no way of knowing how many construction 
projects are ongoing beyond those that have been reported to them or those 
that they find during inspections. Furthermore, many project managers fail 
to report changes made to the construction made after it has been finished, 
as they are obliged to do. It is in the area of inspections where the problem 
of small violations such as EIA lies. As Chapter 13 details, environmental 
protection bureaus lack the personnel resources to inspect all possible 
violators of law, this is especially so for EIA and 3T law that is directed at a 
very wide group of possible violations. EPBs thus introduced a policy for 
making pro-active inspections, which they focus on major polluting 
enterprises, including the chemical factories discussed above.31 For small, less 
polluting enterprises, EPBs carry out few inspections and rely on reactive 
enforcement techniques based on citizen complaints, which will not occur 
when there is no ignorant nuisance to report.  
The sheer number of possible violators makes detecting violation 
difficult and the chances of receiving a penalty for non-compliance low. In 
addition, the case of the temple construction in Jiacun shows that the costs 
of compliance can be considerable (see Chapter 7). Third, small enterprises 
do not necessarily know that they must report construction work to the EPB, 
especially clean companies such as the boxes factory (see Chapter 8) or non-
industrial companies, especially service sector businesses such as real estate 
companies. According to the strict letter of the law, new service companies 
must also assess their impact on the environment, even though such impact 
may be limited to the toilet water. Not surprisingly, many new companies do 
not know this. Such enterprises will be able to break the law only if relevant 
departments do not cooperate with the EPB. Construction permits, for 
                                                                                                                        
SEPA, Zhongguo Huanjing Tongji Nianbao 2003 (China Environment Statistical Report 2003) (Beijing: 
SEPA, 2004). 
29 For a critical assessment of these overly positive data see Sinkule and Ortolano, Implementing 
Environmental Policy in China. 105, Vermeer, "Industrial Pollution in China and Remedial 
Policies." 235 
30 See Cai on official data and other sources Y. Cai, "Between State and Peasant: Local Cadres 
and Statistical Reporting in Rural China," China Quarterly  (2000). 
31 For a list of major polluters see: 
 http://www.ynepb.yn.gov.cn/html/wrkz/wrkz_szfdbpf1_1.htm 
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instance, should only be given in case the enterprise has obtained EIA 
approval;32 in practice there have been many instances where construction 
bureaus have given permission for construction without EIA approval. In 
such cases violation has only occurred because it was made possible by 
certain governmental actors. 
Findings 
At Lake Dianchi there are many minor violations of EIA law. The adoption 
of the EIA law in 2002 is partly to blame. The new law failed to address the 
wide scope of application of the original regulations. Instead, it even 
enlarged the amount of activities for which some form of EIA must be done. 
This has not only led to violations but also made enforcement difficult due 
to the large amount of possible violators. Enforcement agencies simply lack 
sufficient resources to enforce these kind of widely violated regulations and 
may not want to issue sanctions because of the strict minimum sanctions the 
2002 EIA law prescribes. (See Chapter 4 and 13).  
 The regulatory context is thus an important external variable for 
explaining these minor violations. The political context has also been 
important. Local governments and their construction bureaus have approved 
of new construction projects even when the EIA applications had not been 
approved. There was limited pressure from the social context, likely because 
minor EIO violations normally do not lead to nuisance for people living in 
the area. The economic context, with the extreme economic growth has led 
to a tremendous growth of new construction projects, making the number of 
possible violators difficult to control.  
 Internal variables related to the violators also explain ongoing 
violations. First, a lack of information is important. Regulated actors whose 
operation is normally not expected to affect the environment, have a lower 
chance of knowing that they have to apply for an EIA nevertheless. Second, 
because violation of these rules is so widespread, there may be a culture of 
violation, meaning that enterprises do not see compliance of these rules as an 
important value. 
Restaurants cause Air and Water Pollution 
Like all Chinese, eating out is a favorite activity for many Kunmingnese. 33 
Since the reform program started in 1978, restaurants have changed the face 
of Yunnan’s capital. From the smallest outdoor mixian (rice noodle) stalls to 
the luxurious huoguo (hot-pot) dining halls, restaurants have flourished with 
                                                     
32 EIA Law § 25, 26 
33 This section is based on interviews with EPB personnel, interviews with Kunming residents 
and personal observation and conversations with restaurant owners. 
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the development of a new middle class with money to spend on food, tired 
of eating in collective cantinas, but no longer accustomed to cooking at 
home. In most areas of the city restaurants were built at the first floor level, 
right below housing on the floors above. From morning to late at night these 
places are packed serving delicious Yunnan dishes. 
 Although Kunming citizens could not live without the convenience 
of a wide array of options to dine out, recently some of them have 
complained about the nuisance the restaurants have caused. According to the 
Kunming EPB, since 2000 there has been a sharp increase in complaints 
about restaurant pollution. Of all pollution related complaints in 2003, 80% 
concerned restaurant nuisance.34 At Yuanxi Road, Kunming’s most popular 
street for student restaurants, a couple explained how their lives are affected 
by the restaurant below them. The halal (qingzhen) restaurant run by Hui 
Chinese is open from early in the morning serving breakfasts of noodles and 
rice noodles until late at night for full dinner. Throughout the day, but 
especially at peak hours around noon and in the early evening, the restaurant 
is packed with students drawn by the low prices and excellent quality of food. 
The couple that lives above the restaurant on the third floor suffers from the 
noise that the kitchen staff make when cooking in hot oil. The noise clearly 
penetrates the poorly insulated walls of their apartment. “At night there is so 
much noise that we cannot sleep, the sizzling oil just makes us crazy,” the 
husband explains. It is not just the noise; the hot oil emits a smoke that rises 
up into the houses above. As a result the smell is unbearable, penetrating 
into the apartments located there. “It is disgusting, all our clothes smell of 
burnt oil, many of our friends ask what the smell is when they come here, 
and even when they see us,” his wife adds. 
 Because of the complaints, the Kunming EPB and the Dianchi 
Management Bureau (DMB) have made restaurant environmental violation a 
priority in their enforcement work (see Chapter 13, 14). The local 
government has even made special rules to control the restaurant related 
pollution that form a specification of norms of the APPCL (see Chapter 4). 
However, violations continue. New restaurants are still opened underneath 
residential buildings, even though the new Kunming rules strictly prohibit 
this practice. Furthermore, few of Kunming’s restaurants have the proper 
water pollution filters, to filter out oil residues that can cause harm to the 
city’s sewers. Kunming’s restaurants also rarely have the mandatory air 
pollution installations as prescribed in the APPCL and the new municipal 
rules. Just as in all of the cases described above, new stricter legislation, and 
even enforcement prioritization, has not led to compliance and widespread 
violation of law has continued. 
                                                     
34 Based on an interview with KEPB staff, December 3, 2004 
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 As in some of the cases discussed above, the reason for the 
continuing violation here is also that the law does not fit local circumstances. 
First, the new municipal norm prohibiting new restaurant construction 
underneath apartment buildings is unfeasible. Much of Kunming’s city center 
developed in the 1980s and 1990s when housing quarters, shops, small 
businesses and restaurants were all located in long five story apartments 
blocks. While some people have moved out of the center into expensive 
“gated communities” purely residential without shops or restaurants, most of 
the people still live in the center where most of the restaurants are located. 
There simply is too much demand for food in the centre and the only place 
to build restaurants is underneath apartments. As the market fluctuates, 
people are always looking for the latest culinary fad; old businesses fail and 
new ones open. Under these circumstances the strict letter of the law makes 
no sense, and new restaurants have continued to open their doors even 
though they are located right below residential buildings.  
 For existing restaurants the law also places unreasonable demands. 
This is especially so for smaller eateries. According to EPB enforcement staff 
who understand the problems of the regulation, small restaurants have 
invested 10.000 RMB to start operation. The mandatory environmental 
installations will cost them more than half that amount: about 6000 RMB for 
an oil smoke installation with a smoke stack. Apart from the financial 
problem there is also a practical issue at stake here. Even if restaurants can 
pay for the installations, building them is not always possible. While citizens, 
who live right above the restaurant, complain about smoke penetrating their 
house, those living at the top floors do not wish to cooperate when the 
restaurant wishes to construct a smoke stack behind their apartment. 
Without such cooperation compliance is simply impossible.  
 Finally, there are many restaurants in Kunming, and violation is 
widespread. Enforcing the law has placed a considerable burden on the EPB 
and it is only able to carry out inspections at the largest restaurants or at 
those that have received considerable numbers of complaints. For all those 
other polluting eateries enforcement has remained weak and there is a slim 
chance of receiving a penalty for violation. Furthermore, the municipal rules 
have enabled the EPB to reduce fines to 200 RMB instead of the mandatory 
minimum of 10.000 of the APPCL35. As a result, the costs of violation have 
remained low for most restaurants.36   
                                                     
35 APPCL § 48 
36 According to the EPB some were closed down in 2004, but in a neighborhood outside of 
the center in a street with considerable complaints. Interview with EPB staff December 3, 
2004. 




Many of Kunming’s restaurants operate in violation of pollution law 37 . 
Changes in national legislation and even local regulation did not lead to more 
compliance, on the contrary many cases are in violation of newer stricter 
norms recently introduced. Some of the changes made proved to be 
unfeasible and not adaptable to Kunming’s context. Faced with such rules 
enforcement agents have had trouble enforcing the law, because when 
strictly enforced this would severely affect many of the city’s restaurants. 
Variables external and internal to the regulated restaurants help to further 
understand violation.   
 The social context had some influence. Complaints from local 
citizens have led to an increased regulation of restaurants. The social context 
affected the political and regulatory contexts. This led to stricter regulation, 
even at the local level. Unfortunately the local rules did not pay enough 
importance to the feasibility of the proposed norms. It seems that a strong 
signal to control restaurant nuisance was more important than actually 
making norms that could be feasibly implemented. As a result, enforcement 
institutions have not acted strictly, as they understood the law’s unsuitability 
to local circumstances. In addition, enforcement bureaus lack staff to inspect 
all possible violators. The economic context demands the existence of 
restaurants in the city center therefore creating a market in which violations 
of law are profitable. In this market there is not only demand for larger 
richer restaurant, but also for smaller eateries that cannot comply with the 
rules. Similarly, the market demands new restaurants in the center where they 
cannot be built in compliance with the law.  
 Many restaurants are too small to comply with the law as they lack 
sufficient resources for the necessary investments. Such small restaurants 
operate on a short-term profit oriented basis, which precludes making large 
investments. Although restaurants are by their nature open and socially 
responsive, they have not responded much to neighborhood complaints. 
This may be partly because in China, noise and smell nuisance have for a 
long time been morally acceptable, and may continue to be still in the eyes of 
restaurant owners and staff. 
Conclusion 
Pollution continues at Lake Dianchi, despite the stricter norms in the laws 
and despite efforts to enhance their enforcement. In the pollution cases 
analyzed above norm conformity was case based and there were different 
reasons why violation continues in each case.  
                                                     
37 APPCL § 14, KMREP § 8, 11, DPR § 21.2 
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 A first insight is that not just the regulated actor itself was involved 
in the non-compliance but that violation occurred through an interaction of 
the enterprise and its economic, social, political and regulatory contexts.  
 For the pollution violation cases, the social context was not 
successful in pressuring the regulated actor into compliance. In two of the 
four cases there has been little or no action from the local social context, in 
the case of Huafei because local villagers were dependent on the regulated 
actor and in the case of minor EIA violations because there had been little 
pollution. When the social context successfully rallied political support, this 
led to initial changes while failing to solve the pollution problem at hand. In 
case of the FSS companies social pressure led to stronger enforcement action, 
that in the end did not create compliance. Similarly, in case of the restaurant 
pollution community complaints led to stricter legislation, which due to its 
unfeasibility has been difficult to enforce.  
 Until the 2004 campaigns, the regulatory external context has not 
been successful at enforcing the laws in such a way that compliance resulted. 
For three of the four cases this was so because enforcement of norms was 
not locally supported. Lacking such support, and due to the remote locations, 
the many violators, limited enforcement personnel and the active cheating 
practices of some firms, detection of violations was difficult.  
 The political context had some effect. Some violations have been 
condoned by local governments, especially those of the FSS companies and 
Huafei. When political pressure increased, as happened during the 
enforcement campaigns or for the restaurant pollution legislation, there was 
more attention for violations, affecting existing legislation and enforcement. 
Village democratization did not affect rural pollution violations researched 
here. Local power in these cases was distributed in such a way that villagers 
felt they could do little against violations.  
 For this point, the economic context is important. Regulated actors 
that were dominant employers in the region were much more powerful when 
resisting their social, regulatory and political contexts. Enterprises that have 
been important for local livelihoods have been more difficult to regulate. 
The economic context had a second adverse influence. In two cases, FSS 
companies and restaurants could only deliver wanted products by breaking 
the existing legislation. Without alternative sources of income or production 
of locally necessary goods, local actors, including local governments, 
continued to condone and even support the ongoing violation.  
 Variables related to the internal context again offer mixed 
explanations for violation behavior. First, size mattered in individual cases, 
although it offers no yardstick for understanding violation. In three cases, 
the small size of some the enterprises involved helped continue violations. 
First, because the small size made compliance economically not feasible. 
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Second, because small enterprises lack the knowledge to comply. Third, 
because the large number of small violating enterprises makes them difficult 
to inspect regularly.  However, the Huafei case demonstrates that large 
enterprises with sufficient resources and knowledge sometimes still violate 
the law, and have used their size to make inspections difficult and their 
power to keep complaints and sanctions to a minimum. All violating 
enterprises were privately-owned or privatized enterprises. However because 
the same applies to most compliant enterprises discussed in Chapter 8, this 
does not mean much. What is meaningful is that in contrast of the compliers, 
none of the violating enterprises had to support pensioners and thus worry 
about future survival. The cases discussed here further show a strong profit 
maximizing way of viewing costs and benefits and in some cases a clear risk 
seeking attitude of cutting legal corners in order to enhance profits.   
 So what effect did the legislative changes and enforcement efforts 
have on these violation cases? Legislative changes do not seem to have had a 
positive effect on the violations studied here. In all cases, the law lacked in 
terms of feasibility. First, in two cases it lacked feasibility because it 
demanded behavior that the regulated actor was not able to carry out while 
remaining in operation. In addition, in the same cases it lacked in feasibility 
because the norms were not acceptable locally, as local communities largely 
depended on such polluting activities for income or for consumption. Third, 
the norms lacked feasibility in terms of enforcement. In all cases, this was 
due to the fact that the costs of enforcing the norms were high, while in 
three cases enforcement was difficult because of the law’s local opposition 
and the support that existed for violations. In reaction to weak regular law 
enforcement, China organized enforcement campaigns since 1996. While the 
campaigns had some effect on the compliance cases studied in Chapter 8, 
until 2004 campaigns left the violations described in this chapter 
unaddressed. When in 2004 campaigns finally addressed the FSS companies 
and Huafei, violations of law were detected. However, for Huafei  a bargain 
was struck and only a limited sanction was issued, while the FSS companies 
were ordered to close down but resumed operation not a month later. (See 
Chapter 14) As such even the 2004 campaign, which did initiate a change, 









11. Law and the Complexity of Reality 




Law in practice is complex and diverse. Even around one lake, even in one 
village, the same rules led to different outcomes. In each case, determining 
factors were found in figurations of variables both internal and external to 
the regulated actor. Understanding compliance and violation behavior 
requires understanding the norm-addressee itself and in its social, economic, 
political and regulatory contexts, which unfortunately are not limited and 
therefore can never be fully studied. With unlimited research capacity, the 
analysis above would have been able to discover many more linkages 
explaining norm conformity that have remained obscure now. However, 
even with the limited analysis the present research has been able to make, it 
is clear how difficult it is to make singular observations about why the law 
led to compliance or violation in the Dianchi area. The relatively small and 
homogenous area of Lake Dianchi contained sufficient variation to allow for 
different outcomes in similar but different cases.  
The study on compliance and violation at Lake Dianchi has been 
explorative. Although representativeness was strived for, the limited number 
of cases studied cannot fully reflect all regulatory compliance practices at the 
lake. In addition, the limited access and time, has precluded a full analysis of 
all variables that possibly influenced the cases. Recognizing these limitations 
and the explorative nature of this study, the present chapter will try to draw 
conclusions about the findings from the cases studied. First, it will present 
general observations about why actors complied with or violated the law at 
Lake Dianchi. In part, these findings will be compared with earlier studies 
about arable land loss and pollution in other parts of China. Second, it will 
discuss what effect the post-1995 legislative changes and efforts at 
enforcement have had on compliance. Third, it will compare the findings 
from Lake Dianchi with findings from studies about compliance and 
violation in Western and non-Western countries.  
Why Compliance and Violation Occurred at Lake Dianchi 
The data gathered during a year of fieldwork at Lake Dianchi was structured 
into eighteen case studies. The richness of the data makes it difficult to draw 
lessons that apply to all cases. Some findings may apply generally to some 
cases, while not applicable to others. Meanwhile interesting insights can be 
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derived sometimes from single cases, not repeated in others. Taking this in 
mind, the most important findings, in terms of their generality and the 
insights they bring will be presented here.  
Economic Context 
Compliance and violation of pollution and arable land law at Lake Dianchi 
were closely related to the economic context, which consisted of the market 
forces affecting the local economies.  
 A first finding is that the economic context sometimes influenced 
the opportunity to violate the law. In some of the land cases studied, in Sub-
Village Number Seven in Jiacun, regulated actors could not violate the law as 
there was no demand for illegally constructed houses or enterprises. In some 
of the pollution cases studied, formerly polluting enterprises were no longer 
able to break the law when they faced bankruptcies, in part due to increased 
market forces and privatization.  
 A second finding is that in some of the cases studied the economic 
context made violation lucrative when there was a demand for illegal 
products. An example is the demand for illegal land conversion for 
enterprises and extra houses in Jiancun. Another example are the small FSS 
enterprises and the restaurants in Kunming for whose products, which could 
largely be made only in violation of pollution regulation, there was a high 
demand.  
 When there was a homogenous local economy with dominant 
employers or sources of income, the social, political and regulatory contexts 
became more dependent on such employers or sources of income. The study 
finds that when such employers or sources of income violated the law, social, 
political and regulatory actors were less willing or found it more difficult to 
address their violations.  A good example is the difference between NCFC’s 
independent and actively protesting farmers and Huafei’s dependent and 
meek local population. Similarly, the lack of protest or political pressure on 
violations of housing and enterprise construction regulation in Jiacun was 
caused because income from these violating activities benefited most local 
villagers and governments, and land conversions had become an important 
local source of income.  
 The economic context sometimes affected the internal context of 
the regulated actor and especially how costs and benefits were weighed and 
the moral attitudes related to such weighing. Here the clearest example is the 
difference in how farmers deciding on building extra housing thought about 
protecting arable land between urbanizing Jiacun where land was not 
perceived to be important and the remote and rural Baocun where land was 
still seen as sacred and not built on for second houses.  
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 Because of its influence on the opportunity to violate, the benefits 
of violation, and other external and internal variables, the economic context 
has been a central factor for explaining compliance and violation in many of 
the cases studied. The findings here resonate with existing studies about 
arable land loss from other parts of China, arguing that land loss and 
pollution continue due to economic growth, urbanization and 
industrialization.1 However, studies about pollution in China have paid little 
attention to how the economic context is related to pollution. In addition, 
the fact that violating activities can be dominant local sources of income, 
which are more difficult to regulate, has not been recognized in the literature 
assessed here.2 
Social Context 
Compliance and violation at Lake Dianchi were also related to the social 
context, consisting of local communities living in the vicinity of the regulated 
actor or local and national media. First, pressure from the social context led 
in some cases to compliance. A good illustration are the beyond compliance 
cases concerning compensation for farmers who lost arable land for 
construction. In Jiacun village local protests led to higher compensation. 
Another illustration was NCFC’s compliance with pollution law following 
local protest and media involvement. 
 A second, related, finding is that when there was no social pressure, 
the chances for violation increased. A good example of this point is the lack 
of local social protest about Huafei’s continued violation of law, even though 
the company could easily have complied with the pollution standards. Other 
examples are the lack of protest in the land violation cases in Licun, Baocun 
and Jiacun. 
 Social protest in the cases studied mainly occurred when the social 
context opposed to the violations and when it was sufficiently independent 
of the regulated actor. Especially in the land violation cases in Jiacun and 
Baocun, local communities were never opposed to the violations, and 
sometimes even directly benefited from them. The dependence on regulated 
actors first of all concerned dominant employers. An example of this is 
Huafei, who dominates all local income in the Baocun region. Such 
dependence also existed in villages where most farmers had local jobs and 
were dependent on the VC leadership and where such VC leadership was 
well connected in the village as well as with superior governments. A good 
example of this is Licun, where local villagers did not protest against illegal 
land practices of their own VC.  
                                                     
1 For an overview of sources see Chapter 6.  
2 Compare with Chapter 6. 
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 In those cases where there was social pressure, such pressure was 
localized of a nimby3 type and not organized, without involving NGO-type 
organizations. An exception was the national media attention for the FSS 
pollution cases. 
 The findings on the social context are in line with research from 
other parts of China. Studies about pollution control have found that lack of 
community pressure correlates with continued pollution.4 China has been 
witnessing increased action against pollution though5 and similarly there have 
been many protests against low compensation for arable land loss6. As at 
Lake Dianchi, most of these protests are local though and national NGOs 
have played a limited role in helping victims of local pollution or arable land 
conversions defend their rights. The media has also played an increasing role 
in other parts of China, similar to what happened in the case of NCFC and 
the FSS companies. According to a 1998 survey, since 1995, the Chinese 
media have paid increasing attention to environmental concerns and have 
played an increasingly important role in getting polluters to comply. 7 
Political Context 
The political context also played a role in compliance and violation at lake 
Dianchi, as the political system as a whole, local political institutional 
changes, local leaders, and local power configurations affected regulated 
actors and local communities.  
 A first finding is that local governments have played an important 
role in condoning violations that were an important part of the local 
economy. This happened in many of the land and pollution violation cases. 
Until late 2004, local governments, from township to provincial level, never 
urged their land bureaus to act against violations of the LMA in Jiacun for 
example. Local governments also condoned severe violations at Yunzhi and 
the FSS companies, even after receiving complaints. Without local 
governmental support law enforcement has in most cases been more difficult. 
                                                     
3 Not in my backyard. See J. Broadbent, Environmental Politics in Japan, Networks of Power and 
Protest (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
4 See Chapter 6 
5 For an overview of recent pollution protests see A. Rothman, "Thirsty China, Its Key 
resource constraint is water," CLSA Asia Pacific Markets, no. Summer (2006). Compare also 
with Jing, Jun. "Environmental Protests in China."  
6 For an overview see B. Van Rooij, "The Return of the Landlord, Chinese Land Acquisition 
Conflicts and Tenure Security illustrated by Peri-Urban Kunming," Journal of Legal Pluralism  
(forthcoming). 
7 See Friends of Nature (Ziran zhi you), Zhongguo Baozhi de huanjing yishi (Survey of Environmental 
Reporting in Chinese Newspapers) (Beijing: Ziran Zhiyou, 1998)., consulted through C.W.H. Lo 
and S.W. Leung, "Environmental Agency and Public Opinion in Guangzhou: The Limits of a 
Popular Approach to Environmental Governance," China Quarterly  (2000). 682 
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 A second finding is that the local power configuration prevented 
local villagers from protesting when violations damaged their interests in 
some of the cases studied. Such local power configurations were to a large 
extent related to China’s political system under which local governments 
have a considerable amount of autonomy from superior authorities (see 
Chapter 13), while also lacking democratic participation and control by local 
citizens. Local power configurations were also related to local family and 
connections (guanxi) networks. An example is Licun, where the local 
figurations of power that connected leaders in the village with leaders at the 
township and district level, made protest even through elections difficult. 
Another example is Baocun where Huafei and the other local enterprises had 
close relationships with village and township leaders making protest extra 
difficult. 
 Village democratization had in some cases a positive effect on 
compliance while in others it had no effect. In the land cases in Jiacun, 
villagers actively used the increased room for participation rural 
democratization had given them, while in Licun such democratic powers 
were not used even though formally available. The reason for the difference 
is most likely the dependence of Licun farmers on their leaders and the 
strong power networks of such local leaders. 
 China’s national political system has also been influential. As stated 
above, non-local NGOs did not play a role at Lake Dianchi and protest 
against violations only occurred on a local basis.  A likely reason for this is 
that the state provides strict limitations on the organization of non-state 
interests groups, and as a result non-state groups working on sensitive issues 
have had trouble to organize in a manner that they have reach throughout 
the country. 
 National political support to act against violations can potentially 
help enhance compliance. Shifts in national policy led to enforcement 
campaigns, which, as we saw, influenced compliance in one and possibly two 
pollution cases, and may after 2004 have affected some of the land violation 
cases, especially enterprise construction violations (see Chapter 14). 
 Studies on pollution and arable land from other parts of China, have 
found some similar findings, most notably the impact of decentralized 
political structures on violations of law and local governments condoning 
violation.8 However, in the current literature there has been little attention 
for the effects of democratization, local power structures, political campaigns 
and the political limitations to organized protest on compliance and violation, 
or even the continuation of pollution and arable land loss.  
                                                     
8 See Chapter 6. 
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Regulatory Context: Enforcement 
In most of the cases studied, compliance and violation occurred without 
enforcement action. There was only one compliance case (the FPC pollution 
case) where enforcement action formed the most important reason for 
compliance. In one case, the Jiacun Paper factory, enforcement may have 
directly led to compliance, depending on what to believe. In these two cases 
where enforcement likely led to compliance, such enforcement action was 
closely related to policy changes at the nation level (see Chapter 14); showing 
how such policy changes can influence local compliance behavior. For all 
other cases, the distinct threat of enforcement action may have had some 
influence (examples are the Temple case, Yungang, and NCFC ) but such 
influence was likely subordinate to other factors, such as the inability to 
violate the law (due to a lack of development opportunities or bankruptcy) 
or non-state anti-violation action by local citizens.  
 At the same time, we also saw that in most violation cases 
enforcement was weak, at least until 2004 (see Chapter 14), making the costs 
of violation lower than the expected benefits. This teaches that while 
enforcement is not an important variable for explaining compliance, in the 
cases studied a lack of enforcement does correlate with violation behavior 
and increased enforcement may have an influence towards compliance. 
 Present studies about arable land loss and pollution in other parts of 
China have held similarly that these practices continued due to weak 
enforcement.9 However, none of the studies consulted have looked at what 
the effects of enforcement on compliance are.  
Multiple Regulated Actors 
The next finding is that compliance and violation in the cases at Lake 
Dianchi were often the result, not of the decision-making of a single 
regulated actor, but of several regulated actors that all had their own internal 
and external contexts.10 In most of the construction violation cases plural 
actors were responsible for the illegal activities in question: local villagers 
building houses, enterprises building factories, village leaders approving of 
original building plans, and township leaders approving of final building 
plans. For EIA violations, we saw the same: violations involved enterprises 
but also construction departments giving illegal construction permits. This 
shows that violation of law at Lake Dianchi may involve illegal application of 
law by official state organs. For finding ways to end violations it is important 
to recognize which actors are in which way involved in the illegal activities 
                                                     
9 See chapter 6.  
10 The existing literature has paid little attention to this phenomenon, with the exception of 
Zhang. See Zhang, "Ecologizing Industrialization in Chinese Small Towns".183-5 
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and concentrate remedial action on the whole chain of violating actors 
incorporating their internal and external contexts. So far there has been little 
recognition of this point in the studies of pollution and arable land loss in 
other parts of China.11 
Size of the Regulated Actor 
Except for the external variables and the fact that often multiple actors are 
involved, the cases analyzed here also brought forward findings related to the 
internal context of the regulated actor. The first variable is its size. For 
pollution cases, larger enterprises complied better with the law. They did so, 
first because they had the resources, and second because they were more 
focused on long-term interests than smaller firms. Yungang and NCFC are 
illustrative. However, in one case, the Huafei Company, a large enterprise 
with sufficient resources, shows the opposite. Huafei’s size gave it the power 
to dominate local actors enabling it to violate the law undetected.  
 Small sized companies were in general more prone to violation. 
Some small companies, such as the FSS companies and restaurants were so 
small that compliance was economically not feasible and only violation of 
law or closure could result. Smaller sized companies also had a lower chance 
of being inspected because of their sheer number and the limited 
enforcement personnel. Finally, some smaller companies lacked the 
competence to comply with the law because they did not know the law, as 
we saw with EIA violations. 
 The findings here are largely similar to existing studies of pollution 
from other parts of China.12 There has however been limited attention for 
bad apples such as Huafei, large companies that could and should easily 
comply with the law but that use their power to violate. 
Manner of Cost Benefit Analysis 
The manner in which the regulated actor viewed costs and benefits affected 
compliance and violation. First, there was a difference between attitudes that 
purely stressed economic goals and those that stressed non-economic values. 
Compliance in the temple construction project, for instance had little to do 
with direct economic gains of the various norm-addressees involved, 
especially not the Buddhist organization. In contrast are cases in which quick 
profit maximization led regulated actors towards violation, as happened for 
example in the FSS and Huafei pollution cases, and the Licun and Xiaocun 
construction case.  
                                                     
11 See Chapter 6 
12 See Chapter 6. 
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 Second, there was a difference between actors with a long-term 
perspective and those with a short-term outlook on costs and benefits. This 
was especially relevant for understanding differences in pollution cases. 
Huafei for example chose to violate the law because it put short-term cost 
saving over long-term stability, while NCFC and Yungang complied because 
they operated on a long-term perspective. In general, larger companies seem 
to have had the ability for long-term cost benefit decision making, simply 
because they had sufficient resources to do so. Smaller companies, or those 
under extreme strain, lacked such long-term perspective and violated the law 
in order to cut costs and stay in operation. However, while most larger 
companies operated on a long-term perspective, some did not. A possible 
explanation the data offer for this is that large companies that have a lot of 
pensioners (such as Yungang and NCFC) complied with the law out of a long-
term perspective, while large firms that did not have such burden (such as 
Huafei) violated the law following a short-term cost benefit approach. For 
land cases, in most cases a local short and mid-term perspective prevailed 
among all norm addressees (including local governments and land bureaus), 
and none of the actors involved had the long-term interests of food security 
in mind that had influenced the original legislation (see Part II, Chapter 4). 
 Studies from other parts of China resonate some of the findings 
here. Such studies found for example that farmers in Zhejiang did not 
support arable land protection, especially as farming was seen as unprofitable. 
Studies about pollution found that enterprise management have a high 
amount of environmental commitment, which however did not translate into 
action because of economic business concerns. 13  However, none of the 
pollution studies have looked at the influence of pensioners on compliance 
behavior.  
Social Responsiveness and Moral Values 
In several cases, the regulated actor’s level of social responsiveness and its 
moral values played an important role for explaining compliance or violation 
behavior.  
 In several cases, socially responsive regulated actors complied with 
the law. Their responsiveness consisted of the level of participation of local 
communities—through democratization or other channels—as well as their 
leaderships’ attitudes towards the social context. Examples are compliance 
cases with compensation rules in Jiacun and pollution compliance at NCFC. 
 Meanwhile socially unresponsive actors, in some of the cases studied, 
violated the law, not caring for what it did for local social concerns. Their 
unresponsiveness can be characterized by an independence from their social 
                                                     
13 Chapter 6 
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context, and a dependence of such context on them. In addition, 
management at such unresponsive actors did not take social concerns into 
account, so it seemed. Huafei, for example, knew that its pollution had a large 
negative impact on the surrounding village, and although it had the resources 
to stop violation, yet it chose to ignore the health concerns of the local 
villagers who were powerless to stop them. Another example are Licun 
village and Yixiang Township, where independent, powerful local leaders 
violated the LMA and exploited local villagers out of their rightful 
compensation.  
 Socially responsive actors did, however, also violate the law in some 
of the cases studied. This happened when socially responsive regulated 
actors became influenced by social concerns not aligned with the legislation 
involved. A good example was the illegal development of industry on leased 
land in Jiacun and Baocun, from which the local community also benefited.  
 As becomes clear from all of this, the moral values of the regulated 
actor or its leadership were important. It seems that in some compliance 
cases such as the Temple construction, Yungang , and NCFC regulated actors 
had values that were oriented to abiding the law. In some of the violation 
cases, regulated actors involved knew they were breaking the law, sometimes 
with significant social consequences, without necessity, but chose to do so 
nonetheless, and as such law abiding was not likely important for them. 
Examples are Huafei, Xiaocun and Licun. In certain cases, especially in the 
rural construction in Jiacun village, violation was so widespread that is had 
become the norm. The law’s lack of feasibility and local legitimacy created a 
culture of violation that facilitated a wide support for continued violation. 
Getting compliance under these circumstances is extremely complicated. 
 Existing studies from other parts of China, as stated above, have 
looked at moral attitudes of regulated actors, finding that for land there was 
little support, at least in Zhejiang, for arable land protection, while for 
pollution environmental commitment did not lead to environmental 
protection because of economic concerns.14 However, none of the existing 
studies has looked at how the social responsiveness of an organization 
affects its compliance or violation. Neither have there been studies of general 
moral values and values about law-abiding behavior, all of which were only 
touched upon in the present study. 
The Impact of Changes in Legislation  
Within the overall reasons for compliance and violation, the present study is 
in particular interested in the effects of post-1995 changes in legislation and 
enforcement. Enforcement, this part of the book already noted, was largely 
                                                     
14 See Chapter 6 
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absent, both in violation and enforcement cases. Only in one case was law 
enforcement a direct cause for compliance. In this case, post 1995 changes in 
the form of a political campaign had initiated such enforcement. Part III will 
look in more detail at the effects of changes in enforcement on compliance. 
Here we will look in more detail about what effects the post-1995 changes in 
legislation have had on compliance and violation.  
 Changes in legislation did in several cases correlate with compliance. 
This could lead one to think that legislation had a positive impact on norm 
conforming behavior, different from what was hypothesized in Part I. A 
closer analysis of the compliance cases made in Chapters 7 and 8 
demonstrates that this is not fully true. In most cases analyzed, compliance 
occurred not because the regulated actor conformed its existing behavior to 
the law, and also not because the regulated actor refrained from changing its 
existing norm-conforming behavior where it would have had the law not 
been made. First, there were several cases in which the existing behavior was 
allowed by the law, and as such there was no behavioral change because of 
the law. The cases of beyond-compliance with the LMA’s rules on 
compensation and the JCBC box factory’s compliance with pollution 
regulation are examples. In several other cases, the economic and internal 
contexts made it impossible to engage in the behavior prohibited by the law. 
This was especially so in the land compliance cases from Sub-Village Seven 
and Kouxiang.  In other cases, the regulated actor could no longer break the 
law, as it had ceased to exist due to mismanagement and economic reasons, 
as we saw in several pollution compliance cases.  
 It is not all bad though. In some cases where the regulated actor was 
law abiding, with a long-term outlook on costs and benefits and where the 
social and political and regulatory contexts asserted pressure, the norms of 
the new laws influenced compliance behavior. The case of Yungang was one 
where the changed norms of the law influenced this law-abiding company to 
pollute less. Another example was NCFC where local citizens and the local 
media made the company abide by the laws new norms. A third possible 
example were the cases of beyond-compliance with land compensation rules 
which happened following strong social pressure in Jiacun.  In those cases in 
which the social and political contexts played a dominant role in compliance, 
and the one or perhaps two cases where the regulatory context was 
dominant, the law’s stricter and more specific rules may have made such 
pressure easier to assert. It is important to note that the possible, more 
indirect communicative influences of the law have not been studied here 
yet.15  
                                                     
15 Compare with Chapter 2.  
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 Second, changes in the legislation correlate with violations of law. 
Here the analysis reveals a relation between changed norms and deviant 
behavior. The main problem with the law’s new norms was their feasibility, 
which as we anticipated in Part I, was sometimes problematic in practice. 
Some of the norms prohibited behavior that was beneficial to most actors 
involved, not only the regulated actor, but also the social and political 
context. This was most clearly the case with the LMA’s norms on collective 
construction16, especially in rapidly urbanizing contexts such as Jiacun village. 
For pollution, this was most apparent with the WPPCL17, the APPCL18, the 
DPR 19  and the KMREP 20  when applied to small enterprises for whose 
products there is a high demand, such as the FSS companies and Kunming’s 
restaurants. Compliance with such rules could only come at considerable or 
even insurmountable cost not only for the regulated actor but also for its 
contexts. As a result, violation of these rules was widespread and such rules 
were not, or less, invoked by the local communities, or used by local 
governments or enforced by their law enforcement agencies.  
 This brings us to the second problem of feasibility, the norms’ 
unfeasibility in terms of enforcement. First, those rules which were contrary 
to existing behavior or widely accepted behavior, such as those just 
mentioned, but also the EIA rules with their wide scope of application, led 
to a large amount of violations. Detecting such violations and collecting 
evidence for them is costly and unfeasible given the limited enforcement 
capacity that exists in Kunming. (See Chapter 13) In addition, for those rules 
prohibiting widely condoned or even supported behavior, issuing strict 
sanctions especially those ending such behavior as some rules demand,21 
forces enforcement officials to oppose not only to the regulated actor, but 
also to their social and political contexts, which is not easy to do.  
 Second, some of the rules were not adaptable enough to enforce in a 
manner that the circumstances of the cases could be taken into consideration. 
In these cases, enforcement agents were left with a near binary choice, 
enforcement to the letter of the law, or breaking the law and not enforce and 
adapt to circumstances. Examples are the LMA’s rules on rural housing and 
construction on leased collective land, which leaves no room for 
interpretation and are not adaptable to Kunming’s peri-urban context and 
thus not enforced. Other examples are the APPCL minimum sanction 
                                                     
16 LMA § 62.1, 62.3 
17 WPPCL  § 14.2, 22, 23, 29, 35, 37 
18 APPCL § 13 
19 DPR § 17.1, 21.2 
20  Kunming Municipal Management Rules on Environmental Pollution Prevention and 
Control for Restaurants and Food Business (KMREP) § 8, 11 
21 WPPCL § 23, DPR § 21.2 
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requirements22 when applied to small restaurants, influencing enforcement 
agents to bend the law and follow the KMREP.23  
 The third way in which rules were not feasible for enforcement was 
that they regulated behavior for which the existing enforcement institutions 
lacked the capacity to detect violations or collect evidence. This was 
especially troublesome for norms whose violations are not easily detectable. 
The best example of this were the water pollution norms, which at remoter 
enterprises, such as Kouxiang’s FSS plants and Huafei, were difficult to 
inspect, especially because local enterprises had many ways of fooling 
inspection agents lacking resources to carry out frequent inspections. In 
addition some of these companies were dominant local sources of income  
Comparative Findings 
The present research on compliance behavior has used an analytical 
framework based on studies about compliance behavior from Western and 
non-Western countries. (See Chapter 6) When comparing the data collected 
at Lake Dianchi with these studies from Western and Non-western contexts, 
some further insights become clear.  
 A first finding was that external factors affect internal factors. In the 
study of cases at Lake Dianchi we saw this most clearly for the economic 
context and its effect on how costs and benefits are weighed by regulated 
actors. Similarly, external factors affected other external factors. At Lake 
Dianchi, the economic context was an important factor; changes in 
economic conditions can have a large effect on how the social, political and 
regulatory context reacts to non-compliance. Studies of Western and non-
Western cases of compliance, mainly with pollution law have also noted the 
effects different external contexts have on one another. Gunningham et al. 
have called this convergence and have argued that compliance with pollution 
legislation requires a convergence from the social, economic and regulatory 
context.24 Similarly, the World Bank’s new model of pollution control for 
developmental contexts is based on a convergence of these contexts.25 
 A second finding from Lake Dianchi was the important role the 
economic context played in this convergence, affecting the social, political, 
and regulatory contexts to play a strong role for compliance. This is in part 
contrary to what Gunningham et al. have shown happened with the 
regulation of paper industry in the West, where the regulatory context 
influenced the other contexts into a convergence that led to compliance.26 
                                                     
22 APPCL § 48 
23 KMREP § 11.2 
24 Gunningham, Kagan, and Thornton, Shades of Green, Business Regulation and Environment. 
25 World Bank, Greening Industry, New Roles for Communities, Markets and Governments. 
26 Gunningham, Kagan, and Thornton, Shades of Green, Business Regulation and Environment. 
222       Compliance and Violation 
 
 
However, studies from developing countries do show that economic 
contexts can be dominant and a cause for continued violation. One recorded 
example is the case of Mexican brick kilns that restarted violations after the 
market negatively affected the costs of abatement, and had weakened the 
pressure from the social, political and regulatory contexts.27 A related way in 
which the economic context influences compliance is when the regulated 
actor is a dominant employer, we found in several cases at Lake Dianchi. 
The difficulty of regulating such dominant employers has been well 
recognized in existing studies from Western and non-Western countries.28 
A third finding from Lake Dianchi, clearly resonating findings from 
other countries is the importance of the social context. In part, our findings 
here are similar to recent findings from Kagan et al. demonstrating the 
strong push towards compliance social contexts can have.29 In addition they 
reaffirm findings from Hettige et al. demonstrating the importance of 
informal networks have on compliance of polluting enterprises in their 
analysis of case studies from India, Indonesia and Bangladesh.30 There is a 
difference though between these cases and the case of Lake Dianchi. China, 
at present does not have a lively civil society with organized interests groups 
supporting pollution victims and exerting direct pressure on polluting 
enterprises. Instead, China has its own type of social context, which very 
much in an ad-hoc manner and only when independent of the regulated 
actor and not hindered by the administrative context has been successful in 
exerting pressure towards compliance. Here China’s special political context 
is important, which allows for much less participation and freedom of 
association even when compared to many non-Western countries. 31  A 
second difference is that the social context in some of these cases actually 
supported violation and was an important reason why it continued. Here 
Lake Dianchi’s economic context is important. This context is one of rapid 
development, offering opportunities for improved livelihoods for many, 
while exerting pressure on the environment. As a result of this, there have 
been cases in which the protection of natural resources was opposed to local 
interests, not just of the regulated actor but also of the wider social context it 
exists in. 
                                                     
27 Blackman and Bannister, "Community Pressure and Clean Technology in the Informal 
Sector: An Econometric Analysis of the Adoption of Propane by Traditional Mexican 
Brickmakers." 
28 See Chapter 6 
29 Kagan, Gunningham, and Thornton, "Explaining Corporate Environmental Performance: 
How does regulation matter?" 10-11 
30 H. Hettige et al., "Determinants of Pollution Abatement in Developing Countries: Evidence 
from South and Southeast Asia," World Development 24, no. 12 (1996). 
31 G. Hyden, J. Court, and K. Mease, Making Sense of Governance, Empirical Evidence from Sixteen 
Developing Countries (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004).64 
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 A fourth finding from Lake Dianchi is that in most cases larger 
enterprises performed better than smaller enterprises. While there has been 
some debate in the literature, this finding is largely recognized in other 
studies of pollution compliance from other countries.32 There has however 
not been much attention to the influence of pensioners on compliance 
behavior and this may be a new finding warranting more comparative study.  
 Fifth, social responsiveness helped explain compliance in several 
cases. Regulated actors that were more open to their context could be 
influenced better and in some cases this led to better compliance. However, 
in other cases, mostly land violations, open, responsive organizations such as 
the Jiacun VCs, responded to interests opposed to the law, as local 
communities stood to benefit from violating the law and leasing out arable 
land to enterprises. These types of cases show that social responsiveness 
does not always lead to compliance and less violation. Enhancing social 
responsiveness, does thus not necessarily mean that regulated actors will be 
less likely to violate the law, partly questioning suggestions made by Van de 
Bunt and Braithwaite.33 
 Finally, the study of compliance and violation behavior at Lake 
Dianchi demonstrates how varied such behavior can be. Understanding 
compliance and violation required understanding a whole range of variables 
and their mutual interactions. Even a year of fieldwork proved to be very 
limited to make such a study in a relatively small area as Lake Dianchi. 
However, for achieving behavioral change through regulatory law 
understanding compliance behavior is essential, an understanding that the 
complexity of such behavior in practice severely limits.  
                                                     
32 See Chapter 6 
33 Van de Bunt, Organisatiecriminaliteit (Organizational Crime). 23 Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and 
Reintegration. 144 
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Introduction 
“Enforcement is difficult (Zhifa Nan),” Chinese say to vent their frustration 
about the law’s inability to achieve its ideals in practice. This deterministic 
statement from China portrays the powerlessness lawmakers may feel when 
their efforts to make “good” legislation fail to have the expected effect in 
practice because violations are not met with sanctions. As Sims writes about 
pollution law enforcement, “NEPA seldom can deploy the state’s tanks and 
planes in its battle to protect China’s environment. Instead, as a relatively 
junior agency, it often faces polluters with the barehanded bravado of a kung 
fu novice.”1 The lack of natural resource protection law enforcement at Lake 
Dianchi is illustrative. In Part II of the book, enforcement only played a 
minor role in motivations for compliance and violation behavior. In most 
cases, law enforcement was weak or even absent. In the cases in which 
enforcement did play a role, it was largely campaign driven enforcement. 
 Enforcement is here defined as the state’s actions to detect 
violations, to stop them, and to prevent further violation from occurring in 
the future.2 Compliance is thus the main goal of enforcement. Part III aims 
to look in more detail at how enforcement of natural resource protection law 
was organized at Lake Dianchi. It will analyze both regular enforcement 
work (Chapter 13) as well as the enforcement campaigns that have been 
organized since 1996 (Chapter 14). It aims to understand why enforcement 
had a limited effect on compliance at Lake Dianchi, and in addition analyze 
what role campaigns have had to boost regular enforcement.  
 Enforcement work at Lake Dianchi is studied by a combination of 
local interviews (with enforcement agents, village leadership, enterprise 
management , and other relevant local actors), with the use of local and 
national policy documents regarding enforcement work, and national reports 
with statistical data related to enforcement work comparing Yunnan 
province with others.   
                                                     
1 Sims, "One-fifth of the Sky: China's Environmental Stewardship." 1227 
2  This definition recognizes the difference between general and specific 
deterrence/compliance noted in the literature. See K.R. Williams and R. Hawkings, 
"Perceptual Research on General Deterrence: A Critical View," Law & Society Review 20, no. 4 
(1986). S. Shavell, "Specific versus General Enforcement of Law," Journal of Political Economy 99 
(1991).  
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The data gathered will be structured and analyzed using an analytical 
framework based on existing studies on regulatory law enforcement, both 
from Western and non-Western countries. The present chapter introduces 
such a framework on enforcement. First, it will look at two general styles of 
regulatory law enforcement.  Subsequent sections will then discuss in more 
detail what factors influence how law enforcement functions and how this 
may affect compliance. 
Enforcement Styles 
Scholars studying law enforcement in Western countries have noted that 
different legal and regulatory systems have particular ways to optimize 
limited enforcement resources to create maximum enforcement result. The 
literature distinguishes two different enforcement styles: deterrence and 
cooperation. 3  Following, May and Winter, these two styles can be 
distinguished through two variables. First the level of formalism, ranging 
from strict rule adherence, to highly informal practices. Second the level of 
penalties, from stringent to non-stringent.4  
 The deterrence style is based on a rational choice approach to 
regulation (see Chapter 6). To change violation into compliance the norm 
addressee’s costs of violation should be made higher than his costs of 
compliance.5 Deterrence thus tries to maximize both detection rate and the 
sanction level. Therefore, this type of enforcement is relatively stringent, 
favoring strict sanctions. The level of stringency in the deterrence style is 
dependent on the costs of compliance, and thus the strictness of sanctions is 
relative and may range from very strict to a little strict. Deterrence will also 
be formal. The reason is that deterrence aims to achieve higher detection 
rates and sanction levels by limiting the amount of discretion agencies and 
agents have when enforcing the law. 6  The ideal-type is that deterrence 
enforcement agents go strictly by the book, without looking at the special 
circumstances of the violating actor in question. Thus, deterrence has been 
typified to place regulators in an adversarial role towards the regulated actor. 
                                                     
3 A.J. Reiss, "Selecting Strategies of Social Control over Organizational Life," in Enforcing 
Regulation, ed. K Hawkins and J M Thomas (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing, 1984).  
4  P.J. May and S. Winter, "Regulatory Enforcement and Compliance: Examining Danish 
Agro-Environmental Policy," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 18, no. 4 (1999). 
5 This approach originates from the efficiency based optimum enforcement or regulatory 
economics which argues that optimum enforcement should not be based on compliance but 
on the general cost benefits of society. See Bentham, "An Introduction to the Principles and 
Morals of Legislation.", Becker, "Crime and Punishment, An Economic Approach." And 
Polinsky and Shavell, "Public Enforcement of Law."  
6 N. Gunningham, "Negotiated Non-Compliance: A case study of regulatory failure," Law & 
Policy 9 (1987). Quoted through Kagan, "Regulatory Enforcement." 385 
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However, it recognizes that enforcement requires prioritization.7 For priority 
violations, those the agency’s strategists believes should be addressed first, in 
order to create more compliance, the enforcement will be strict.  
 In contrast with deterrence, the cooperation enforcement style holds 
that in order to get sustained compliance the agent and the regulated actor 
should understand each other and together work towards compliance. 
Cooperation enforcement agents make the law’s goals central not its letter. 
The issue in this type of enforcement is not whether a situation is in 
violation or not but rather how to get the regulated actor to come into 
compliance with the law and stay that way. For this, cooperation and mutual 
understanding are deemed crucial. Punishment is not the preferred method, 
instead persuasion and education, and only if these fail penalty. This style is 
thus characterized as relatively non-stringent to a little stringent. In contrast 
with deterrence, cooperation enforcement only succeeds if enforcement 
agents and agencies have considerable discretion. Such discretion is 
necessary to find workable solutions for sustainable compliance, in which the 
circumstances of the regulated actor play an important role. Without 
sufficient discretion, agents will not be able to cooperate with the violator in 
finding such solution. Hence, cooperation enforcement is informal.  
 Both styles have been criticized. Deterrence with its overly legalistic 
adherence to the law made in the books is not adaptable enough to the 
complexities of reality and thus does not lead to sustained compliance. 
Scholars have argued that it may lead to unreasonable situations in which the 
regulated actor is frustrated to the extent it no longer will comply. 8  In 
addition, deterrence may not be feasible in practice because it requires 
comprehensive strict and specific legislation, expensive frequent 
governmental inspections to detect violations, most of which are difficult to 
find or find proof for, and the willingness of enforcement agents to act as 
“policemen” in an adversarial relationship with the regulated actor. 9  Its 
economic paradigm, critics hold, is flawed, because compliance behavior is 
not merely rational-choice type, but can also be grounded in incompetence 
or moral objections. 10  (See Chapter 7)  Williams and Hawkins add that 
economic models of general deterrence have not incorporated how regulated 
actors actually perceive expectations about costs and benefits of norm 
                                                     
7 Kagan, "Regulatory Enforcement." 205, M.K. Sparrow, The Regulatory craft: Controlling risks, 
solving problems, and managing compliance (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000).  
8 Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement, Regulation and the Social Definition of Pollution. 
9  Aalders, "Moving Beyond Command and Control: Reflexivity in the regulation of 
occupational safety and health and the environment." Aalders, "Self-Regulation and 
Compliance with Environmental Law from a Global Perspective." 
10 Kagan and Scholz, "The "Criminology of the Corporation" and Regulatory Enforcement 
Strategies.", Kuperan, "Blue Water Crime: Deterrence, Legitimacy, and Compliance in 
Fisheries." 309 
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conformity.11 Furthermore, empirical studies also found, contrary to the non-
empirical work of Bentham and Becker, that the correlation between 
compliance and harsh punishments coupled with high detection rates is not 
as strong as theorists hold.12 Braithwaite and Makkai’s empirical study testing 
deterrence theory’s assumptions further found that there was no proof for 
the relation between compliance and “the certainty or severity of 
sanctioning.”13 This study even found that deterrence styled enforcement did 
not even work better in cases in which compliance costs are low.14 A finding 
from a non-Western context here is Fjeldstad and Semboja’s study of tax 
levy in Tanzania. This study found that strict enforcement rather than a 
deterrent had the opposite effect and caused widespread resistance and non-
compliance.15  
On the other hand, cooperation type enforcement has also been 
criticized. Critics have worried about how close ties between the regulator 
and the regulated can lead to lax compliance. 16  Already in the 1950s, 
Bernstein’s book on independent commissions raised this issue when 
discussing how agencies can become captured by their regulated actor.17 A 
recent study on agro-environmental law enforcement in Danmark by May 
and Winter, for example, discovered that cooperative enforcement was 
undermined by capture-like effects.18 Of course, we can add, especially for 
countries high on Transparency International’s corruption perception index19, 
                                                     
11 Williams and Hawkings, "Perceptual Research on General Deterrence: A Critical View." 
547-8 
12  Gray and Scholz, "Does Regulatory Enforcement Work? A Panel Analysis of OSHA 
Enforcement." 178, R. Lempert, "Organizing for Deterrence: Lessons from a Study of Child 
Support," Law & Society Review 16, no. 4 (1981/1982). 516-7, 564, D. Nagin, "General 
Deterrence: A Review of the Empirical Evidence," in Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimating the 
Effect of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates, ed. A Blumstein, J Cohen, and D Nagin (Washington 
D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1978).Quoted through Gray and Scholz 
13 Braithwaite and Makkai, "Testing an Expected Utility Model of Corporate Deterrence." 7 
See also A.N. Doob and C.M. Webster, "Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null 
Hypothesis," Crime and Justice 30 (2003). 143 
14 Braithwaite and Makkai, "Testing an Expected Utility Model of Corporate Deterrence."  7 
15 Fjeldstad and Semboja, "Why People Pay Taxes: The Case of the Development Levy in 
Tanzania."2068 
16 Gunningham, "Negotiated Non-Compliance: A case study of regulatory failure." Bardach 
and Kagan, Going by the Book, The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness. May and Winter, 
"Regulatory Enforcement and Compliance: Examining Danish Agro-Environmental Policy." 
646 
17 Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission. 
18  May and Winter, "Regulatory Enforcement and Compliance: Examining Danish Agro-
Environmental Policy." 646 
19 Transparency International, Frequently Asked Questions: TI Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI 
2004) (Transparency International, 22 10 2004 [cited 17 1 2005]); available from 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2004/cpi2004_faq.en.html, Transparency International, 
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 (Transparency International, 22 10 
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that a high degree of discretion, as exists in compliance style enforcement, 
coupled with a monopoly on sanctions and issuing permits for sanctioned 
acts, can also have corruptive effects.20 For non-Western countries, with their 
prevalent overlapping formal and informal structures, 21  favoritism, 
cooptation, and corruption have been extra troublesome.22 Many studies of 
regulatory enforcement in such countries blame corruptive influences as one 
of the most important factors for weak enforcement.23 Here Oposa’s study 
of environmental enforcement in the Philippines is interesting. It details how 
certain cultural values have reinforced favoritism and undermined effective 
law enforcement.24  
 Given the drawbacks of both deterrence and cooperative strategies, 
it is no surprise that recent scholarship and practitioners advocate a mixed, 
flexible enforcement style, with deterrence in some cases and compliance in 
others.25 “Sanctions are imposed frequently enough to establish credibility of 
threat, but are usually withheld as long as violators work hard at coming into 
compliance.” Kagan writes. 26  As May and Winter write, “coercion is a 
necessary ingredient” of a cooperative approach.27  Braithwaite agrees with 
them that adhering to one style is not as good as flexible enforcement styles: 
“Both consistent punishment and consistent persuasion are foolish 
strategies.”28 Ayres and Braithwaite, describing an ideal-typical enforcement 
pyramid, conclude that successful enforcement requires that a full range of 
enforcement options, ranging from intrusive to lenient, from legal to 
informal, should be available.  They write, “The bigger and more various the 
                                                                                                                        
2004 [cited 17 1 2005]); available from 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2003/cpi2003.en.html. 
20 Klitgaard has summarized this point in a formula: Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – 
Accountability, see  Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption. 75, A. Ogus, "Corruption and Regulatory 
Structures," Law & Policy 26, no. 3 (2004). 341-2 
21 Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries, The Theory of the Prismatic Society. 
22 A good indicator of this is that non-Western developing countries feature high on the 
Corruption Perception index. See Transparency International, Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 ([cited). 
23  J. McCarthy and Z. Zen, "Environmental Regulation in an age of regional autonomy: 
Managing Industrial Pollution in the Plantation Sector in North-Sumatra," ed. A Bedner and J 
McCarthy (2007 (Forthcoming)). A.A. Oposa, A Socio-Cultural Approach to Environmental Law 
Compliance: A Philippine Scenario (INECE, 1998 [cited 1 August 2005]); available from 
http://www.inece.org/5thvol1/5thTOC.htm. Auer et al., "Forest Law Enforcement and 
Governance: Resolve Needed from All Sides." 
24 Oposa, A Socio-Cultural Approach to Environmental Law Compliance: A Philippine Scenario ([cited). 
25 Kagan, "Regulatory Enforcement." 387 
26 Ibid. 387, Referring to his earlier study in Bardach and Kagan, Going by the Book, The Problem 
of Regulatory Unreasonableness. Ch 5 
27  May and Winter, "Regulatory Enforcement and Compliance: Examining Danish Agro-
Environmental Policy." 628 
28 J. Braithwaite, "Rewards and Regulation," Journal of Law and Society 29, no. 1 (2002). 19 
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sticks (sanctions), the greater the success regulators will achieve speaking 
softly” 29 . Braithwaite believes that successful enforcement starts with 
informal and less intrusive enforcement options, such as persuasion and 
warnings, and should only when those fail try punitive options such as fines 
or even criminal prosecution.30 Shavell, has argued that the greater the harm 
the higher the sanction should be, and that maximum sanctions should only 
be reserved for high harms.31 One of the reasons for withholding stricter 
sanctions is that they may be more costly to impose. Bentham and Becker 
have for example warned against using costly criminal incarceration other 
than for the most harmful offences.32 Enforcement agents from the US and 
the UK have stated that they reserve deterrence style enforcement through 
strict sanctions only for uncooperative actors.33 Scholz’s study of the US 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) enforcement and 
Braithwaite’s study on US law enforcement at coalmines found that flexible 
enforcement is more effective in securing compliance than either full 
deterrence or cooperation styles of enforcement.34  
 In studies of non-Western enforcement there has been less eye for 
mixed enforcement styles, as some scholars have advocated stronger 
deterrence type enforcement with limited agent discretion to prevent 
corruption35, while other scholars have argued for a more cooperative style, 
with more informal, non-state law enforcement practices. 36  As an example 
of the latter, World Bank sponsored studies of pollution enforcement in 
developing countries advocate a new compliance type model of enforcement 
in which the environmental agency “becomes more like a mediator and less 
                                                     
29 I. Ayres and J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
p. 19 
30 Braithwaite, "Rewards and Regulation." 20 
31 Shavell, "Specific versus General Enforcement of Law." Quoted in Polinsky and Shavell, 
"Public Enforcement of Law." 320 
32  Bentham, "An Introduction to the Principles and Morals of Legislation." 183, Becker, 
"Crime and Punishment, An Economic Approach." 193, quoted in Polinsky and Shavell, 
"Public Enforcement of Law." 310 
33 Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement, Regulation and the Social Definition of Pollution. Scholz, 
"Cooperative regulatory enforcement and the politics of administrative effectiveness." C.S. 
Russell, "Monitoring and enforcement," in Public Polciies for Environmental Protection, ed. P 
Portney (Washington: Resources for the Future, 1990). quoted through Kagan, "Regulatory 
Enforcement." 387 
34  Scholz, "Cooperative regulatory enforcement and the politics of administrative 
effectiveness." 118,  
35 McCarthy and Zen, "Environmental Regulation in an age of regional autonomy: Managing 
Industrial Pollution in the Plantation Sector in North-Sumatra." Oposa, A Socio-Cultural 
Approach to Environmental Law Compliance: A Philippine Scenario ([cited). Auer et al., "Forest Law 
Enforcement and Governance: Resolve Needed from All Sides." 
36 World Bank, Greening Industry, New Roles for Communities, Markets and Governments. 
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like a dictator.”37 In the World Bank view, regulators then function through 
facilitating how social organizations, consumers, bankers and stockholders 
negotiate with the regulated actor to achieve compliance and better 
environmental performance.38 
 What enforcement style is actually adopted in practice and how 
enforcement actually works depends on various variables, including the 
bureaucratic context, personal variables related to the agent, the type of 
violator and violation and pressure from the social and political contexts. 
Subsequent sections will introduce these variables. These contexts are similar 
to those in Part II, although here they are the contexts of the enforcement 
agent and not the regulated actor.  
Bureau Structure 
Understanding enforcement involves analyzing the bureaucratic context in 
which it takes place and understanding the interaction between such context 
and the individual enforcement agents. If the bureau in charge of 
enforcement work suffers from goal displacement, a lack of resources, weak 
internal management structures and enforcement procedures, enforcement 
will be problematic. 39  The interaction between the bureau and its 
enforcement agents is equally important and involves the question of how 
the bureau limits agent discretion in practice while allowing sufficient 
decision-making power to keep enforcement adapted to the circumstances of 
the case.  
In the organizational perspective of enforcement, the enforcement 
agency’s organizational goals are central. Enforcement will become difficult 
if the enforcement agency has to attain conflicting goals. This can first 
happen if the primary goals of the organization are conflicting.  Such primary 
goals are those the organization formally tries to attain. They are laid down in 
legislation or in official policy documents. 40  Depending on the type of 
enforcement agency the official goals can vary between the general welfare 
of the local community (in case the agency is a local government or a police 
type organization) or a specific goal such as the protection of the 
environment (in case the agency is for example a specialized EP agency). 
                                                     
37 Ibid.147-8 
38 Ibid.148 
39  For this list of factors we have been influenced by M.J. Esman, "The Elements of 
Institution Building," in Institution Building and Development, from concepts to application, ed. 
J.W.Eaton (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972), J.M. Otto, Aan de voet van de Piramide, 
Overheidsinstellingen en plattelandsontwikkeling in Egypte: een onderzoek aan de basis (1987), Wilson, 
Bureaucracy, what government agencies do and why they do it. 
40 Wilson, Bureaucracy, what government agencies do and why they do it. 129 
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Most organizations have multiple goals.41 If an enforcement agency, such as 
a local government, delegated with environmental law enforcement but also 
responsible for economic growth, has to attain conflicting primary goals 
enforcement will become difficult.  
Apart from outright conflicting primary goals, agencies may also 
face what Merton calls “goal displacement.” 42  This occurs when 
organizations no longer pursue their primary goals, which should be 
compliance, but focus on, what Wilson names, contextual goals instead.43 The 
best-known type of goal displacement is if an enforcement agency makes 
formal, procedural rules more important that the substantive outcomes to be 
achieved. This can happen in a deterrence style enforcement context in 
which the enforcement agency just enforces according to the letter of the law 
without regard for whether this has a positive effect on compliance. It can 
also occur when internal organizational procedures become so complex that 
the agency no longer gets to enforce the law, but instead ends up in vicious 
circles of formalistic meetings about how to enforce the law. Here the 
contextual goals of internal organizational management replaces the formal 
goal of compliance.  
A different kind of goal displacement occurs when an organization’s 
existence becomes threatened, in most cases, because of a lack of funding. 
When this happens, organizations will shift from pursuing the primary goals, 
i.e. enforcement, to contextual goals of gaining sufficient resources to pay 
the staff employed. This happened for example with environmental 
regulatory agencies in North Sumatra, Indonesia, after decentralization, who 
lacked resources and became to depend on the industry they regulated, 
which led to corruption and agency capture.44  
The second variable of an enforcement organization is its resources. 
Enforcement bureaus can only enforce the law if they have sufficient 
resources to do so. Above we saw that resources form a structural constraint 
that explains why full enforcement is impossible. Furthermore, we saw that if 
an organization lacks resources it may shift its focus from enforcement to 
resource allocation. In enforcement work, the largest cost is personnel. A 
lack in financial resources often means having less enforcement personnel 
                                                     
41  H.G. Rainey, Understanding & Managing Public Organizations (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass 
Publishers, 1997). 127 
42 R.K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," in Reader in Bureaucracy, ed. R K 
Merton, et al. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1940 (reprinted 1952)). 
43 Wilson, Bureaucracy, what government agencies do and why they do it. 129 
44 McCarthy and Zen, "Environmental Regulation in an age of regional autonomy: Managing 
Industrial Pollution in the Plantation Sector in North-Sumatra." 24, See also Nolet’s study on 
environmental enforcement in Latin America, which found that fines are important part of 
the agency’s budget, which makes continued violations important. See G. Nolet, Environmental 
Enforcement in Latin America and the Caribbean (1998 [cited 14 September 2006]). 539 
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and less enforcement equipment. This mainly affects violation detection 
work. Organizations that lack resources will have less inspection agents and 
are forced to rely more on citizen complaints (a reactive detection style), 
rather than on carrying out their own regular inspections (pro-active 
detection style). 45 In addition agencies that have sufficient agents but lack 
cars or other detection equipment, will also not be able to achieve a high 
detection rate.  
Kagan has argued that enforcement bureaus with insufficient staff 
may be inclined towards a deterrence enforcement style.46 In the US, for 
example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reacted to 1982 
budget cuts by more stringent enforcement action.47 Kagan, however, also 
recognizes that budget constraints can lead to cooperative enforcement.48 
Lacking funding, stringent enforcement action becomes difficult because the 
costs for more severe sanction decisions are higher due to prosecution costs 
and the costs of collecting evidence. 49  As Lipsky has stated, without 
cooperation between street-level bureaucrats and their “clients” the costs for 
carrying out governmental policy will increase.50 This applies to detecting 
violations. The regulated actor possesses resources needed for enforcement 
work, without which the costs of enforcement, especially detection of 
violations will become more costly. An environmental enforcement agent, 
for example, would have to spend additional enforcement resources in order 
to detect, let alone find evidence, for violations of law in complex industrial 
premises. Without the help of such industry, inspection agents could not 
enter such premises easily, and get to know to the same detail as the 
enterprise staff themselves.  
Budget constraints are a well recognized problem in studies about 
non-Western countries. A lack of financial resources for personnel and 
equipment may exist. 51  Such lack may exist when politicians have not 
                                                     
45  Kagan, "Regulatory Enforcement.", Reiss, "Selecting Strategies of Social Control over 
Organizational Life."  
46 Kagan, "Regulatory Enforcement." 405 
47  Wood, "Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcement." 
Routinization as a result of budget constraints can also occur during the application of law 
phase. See Wilson, Bureaucracy, what government agencies do and why they do it. 74-5 
48 Kagan, "Regulatory Enforcement." 405 
49 Ibid. 405, quoting Hull’s study of regulatory boards in California 
50  M. Lipsky, Street Level Bureaucracy, Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services (New York: 
Russel Sage Foundation, 1980). 57 
51  Stuligross, "The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation in India."395 N. 
Darbinyan and H. Ashikyan, The Role of Environmental Enforcement in the Republic of Armenia: Steps 
Toward Sustainable Development (INECE, 2002 [cited 1 August 2005]); available from 
http://www.inece.org/conf/proceedings6th_2.html.135, F. Grenade-Nurse, Decentralized 
Agencies with Overlapping Jurisdictions, A Problem for Enforcement (INECE, 1998 [cited August 1 
2005]); available from http://www.inece.org/5thvol1/5thTOC.htm. 535, V. Ter-Nikoghosyan 
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provided sufficient budget and staff allocations to enforcement bureaus. In 
addition, budget constraints may originate from decentralization, as local 
governments have insufficient income to fund local enforcement agencies.52 
An example is the Delhi Pollution Control Committee, which mainly 
depends for its resources on the city’s budget. The Delhi bureau only has an 
annual budget of US$ 450.000, which only allows it to recruit three senior 
environmental engineers, 25 junior environmental engineers and 12 assistant 
environmental engineers. As Tang et al. write: “Given the sheer magnitude 
of pollution activity in Delhi, such manpower falls short of what is needed 
for effective enforcement.”53 In such countries, there is often also a shortage 
of technical equipment, making pollution related enforcement especially 
difficult, as it requires sampling tools and laboratories to run tests. Lacking 
proper equipment enforcement is severely weakened. An example is how 
Chege-Kamau describes inspection work at a polluting Kenyan firm: “The 
company administrator…has never seen inspectors themselves carrying any 
equipment, but rather, they just ‘ go round, write their report and leave’”.54  
Apart from the amount of financial resources, the quality of human 
resources is important. What type and what level of education do 
                                                                                                                        
and N. Karamian, Armenian Bottleneck: Building Authorities and Public Groups Capacities for 
Environmental Enforcement (INECE, 1998 [cited August 1 2005]); available from 
http://www.inece.org/5thvol1/5thTOC.htm. 86, 90, Masilingi, Social-Economic Problems 
Experienced in Compliance and Enforcement in Tanzania ([cited). 70, Agarwal, "The Barefoot 
Lawyers: Prosecuting Child Labour in the Supreme Court of India." 686, M.J. McGuinness, 
"The Politics of Labor Regulation in North America: A Reconsideration of Labor Law 
Enforcement in Mexico," University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 1, no. 1-
40 (2000). 22, 24, N.J. Sama, Criminal Law and Environment, Prosecutors, Inspectors and NGOs in 
Cameroon (2005 [cited 13 September 2006]); available from 
http://www.inece.org/conference/7/vol1/Sama.pdf#search=%22sama%20criminal%20law
%20cameroon%20environment%22. 6, S.C. Nonna, The Environment and its Regulation in 
Argentina (INECE, 2002 [cited 1 August 2005]); available from 
http://www.inece.org/conf/proceedings6th_2.html. 68, Nolet, Environmental Enforcement in 
Latin America and the Caribbean ([cited). 536 
52 Grenade-Nurse, Decentralized Agencies with Overlapping Jurisdictions, A Problem for Enforcement 
([cited). 535, Nolet, Environmental Enforcement in Latin America and the Caribbean ([cited). 537, 
McCarthy and Zen, "Environmental Regulation in an age of regional autonomy: Managing 
Industrial Pollution in the Plantation Sector in North-Sumatra." 2, 15 McCarthy further states 
that decentralization in Indonesia brought other enforcement problems including lower status 
of enforcement officials, unclear authorities, difficulty in fidning proper staff, less 
accountability surprisingly. For a good overview of the effects of decentralization and some 
critical comments see P. Oxhorn, "Unraveling the Puzzle of Decentralization," in 
Decentralization, Democratic Governance and Civil Society in Comparative Perspective, ed. P Oxhorn, J S 
Tulchin, and A D Selee (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004). 13-5 
53  S.-Y. Tang, V. Prakesh, and C.-p. Tang, "Local Enforcement of Pollution Control in 
Developing Countries: A Comparison of Guangzhou, Delhi and Taipei," Journal of Public Policy 
18, no. 3 (1998). 273 
54 Chege Kamau, "Environmental Law and Self-Management by Industries in Kenya." 233 
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enforcement agents have? To what extent do they form a professionalized55 
group and how does this influence their enforcement work? Scholars have 
demonstrated how enforcement work of enforcement agents is influenced by 
their educational background and their type of professionalization. 56 
Katzmann’s study of the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found that 
FTC staff with a legal background worked more formalistic, focusing on 
cases with sufficient evidence, while FTC economists focused on those cases 
which would have the largest impact on price developments.57 Wilson writes 
that FTC lawyers further looked at their career opportunities in the future, 
trying to be noticed as professional prosecutors to promote to jobs in 
politics or big law firms. Having a certain type of professionalized personnel 
can define how an enforcement agency functions.58 Having many different 
types of professionals introduces heterogeneous values to enforcement work, 
which if not well checked can undermine its impact.59 The lesson is that 
different types of educational backgrounds or professionalizations influence 
the way in which the bureau carries out enforcement work.60 Hence it may 
also influence the enforcement style the agency or its agents adopt. As said, 
lawyers tend to be more legalistic and therefore deterrence oriented than 
non-legally trained economists and scientists. Another example is the US 
Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA) lenient enforcement. Wilson 
summarizes research showing that the TVA was not captured by industry 
interests as suggested by Selznick61, but rather was captured internally by its 
scientific personnel that were less likely to use stringent and formal 
measures.62  
Staff education and professionalization may be extra troublesome in 
non-Western countries. In general, enforcement staff, especially at lower 
level and devolved agencies will be less educated and less specialized than 
similar staff in Western contexts.63 In addition, professionalization in modern 
type bureaucracies in such countries may be based more on values related to 
                                                     
55 For an overview of professionalization see generally: E. Freidson, Professional Powers, A Study 
of the Institutionalization of Formal Knowledge (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986). 
56 Kagan, "Regulatory Enforcement." 407 
57  R.A. Katzmann, Regulatory Bureaucracy: The Federal Trade Commission and Antitrust Policy 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980). Quoted through Wilson, Bureaucracy, what government 
agencies do and why they do it. 60 
58 For more examples see Kagan, "Regulatory Enforcement." 407 
59 Wilson, Bureaucracy, what government agencies do and why they do it. 
60 Ibid.  
61 P. Selznick, TVA and the Grassroots (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949). 
62 Wilson, Bureaucracy, what government agencies do and why they do it. 73 
63 Sama, Criminal Law and Environment, Prosecutors, Inspectors and NGOs in Cameroon ([cited). 6 
Grenade-Nurse, Decentralized Agencies with Overlapping Jurisdictions, A Problem for Enforcement 
([cited). 534 
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the former colony the country was part of than those that exist in the 
country.64 Because of this, there may be a polynormative structure in which 
the professionalized norms are very different from the existing local 
practices, that may be based on values related to family, ethnicity or other 
local groups.65 In addition, the level of professionalization may be lower as 
the highly specialized professions working in enforcement agencies may have 
had a relatively short history. It is possible however to enhance and influence 
professionalization in a non-Western context. Quah’s research has 
documented how in 1959 a reform led to a new type of professionalization 
within Singapore’s civil service, abandoning the old colonial model for a 
modernized one. The reform was made possible through a combination of 
training, participation in civil projects, selective recruitment, retention and 
retirement and a new system of disciplinary control.66  
This brings us to the third organizational variable of enforcement 
bureaus, the internal organizational structure. The actual enforcement work 
in the bureau takes place through its personnel and a critical question in 
organizational studies of enforcement has been how organizations can get 
their staff to enforce in the manner that the bureau wants them to. Law 
enforcement work generally comprises of two activities, detecting violations, 
and deciding on appropriate sanctions for the violations found. In general, 
the detection takes place outside of the bureau and agents will have 
considerable freedom from the agency’s rules when carrying out inspections. 
In many regulatory systems, agents even have the authority to make 
enforcement sanction decisions for minor infractions. Such sanctions are 
often minor, such as persuasion or informal warnings, and sometimes even 
small fines.  
Enforcement agencies thus face the problem of how to control their 
agents while in the field. They have difficulty seeing the outputs of 
enforcement work,67 especially for enforcement that takes place in remoter 
areas such as for examples forests.68 Furthermore, enforcement organizations 
                                                     
64 F. Heady, Public Administration, A Comparative Perspective (New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 
1996), J.S.T. Quah, "Transforming the Singapore Civil Service for National Development," in 
Democratization and Bureaucratic Neutrality, ed. H K Asmerom and E Reis (Houndsmills, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan Press LTD, 1996). 
65  See for example Oposa, A Socio-Cultural Approach to Environmental Law Compliance: A 
Philippine Scenario ([cited). 
66 Quah, "Transforming the Singapore Civil Service for National Development." 
67 Wilson, Bureaucracy, what government agencies do and why they do it. 158 
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may also not be able to see the outcomes of enforcement, or be able to 
measure the quality of such outcomes.69  Enforcement work can only be 
measured in terms of compliance, but compliance is a complex process (See 
Part II) which is not easily linked back to enforcement action alone, 
moreover compliance itself is often not easily verified, and if so at a 
considerable cost. Without being able to see what enforcement agents do 
(outputs) and how what they do affects compliance (outcomes), enforcement 
agencies have difficulty in controlling agent discretion.70 In order to cope 
with this problem, agencies may try to make enforcement work measurable 
in terms of number of inspections carried out or the number or height of 
sanctions issued.71 Attempts at making enforcement work measurable can 
easily lead to goal displacement as agents try to meet detection quota or fine 
quota, rather than sustaining compliance, which good enforcement should be 
about. 72  The International Network for Environmental Compliance and 
Enforcement has established a working group on compliance and 
enforcement indicators. This network, which comprises of environmental 
enforcement agencies from most countries in the world, has tried to 
establish a method of making enforcement and compliance measurable. The 
documentation on their website teaches that output indicators on inspections 
and sanctions do not help to document compliance, instead this working 
group argues for outcome indicators. One example mentioned is the amount 
of industrial pollution reduced through enforcement action.73  The problem 
here is still a lack in information. First, a bureau has difficulty knowing 
exactly what enforcement action was undertaken, or whether the data on the 
reduced pollutants is correct. It can only get such information at 
considerable enforcement costs. Second, establishing the causal relationship 
between enforcement action and pollutant reduction may not always be 
straightforward. In sum, measuring the quality of enforcement is difficult. 
                                                                                                                        
Palmer, "The Extent and Causes of Illegal Logging: An Analysis of a Major Cuase of Tropical 
Deforestation in Indonesia," CSERGE Working Paper 2001 (2001).23 
69 Wilson, Bureaucracy, what government agencies do and why they do it. 158 Wilson calls organizations 
that cannot see the outputs and outcomes coping organizations. Actually Wilson believes that 
enforcement organizations can see the outputs but not the outcomes (p. 163). Enforcement 
research has however highlighted the problem of overseeing field agents, as we saw above. 
70 K. Hawkins, Law as Last Resort, Prosecution Decision-Making in a Regulatory Agency (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002). 63, 73 
71 Lipsky, Street Level Bureaucracy, Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services. 51 See also Kagan, 
"Regulatory Enforcement." 408 
72 Lipsky gives the example of police officers who have been forced to meet arrest criteria and 
as a consequence start to look for easy arrests instead of pursuing priority cases necessary for 
combating crime and ensuring general safety. See Lipsky, Street Level Bureaucracy, Dilemmas of the 
Individual in Public Services. 51-3 
73 See the INECE website, http://www.inece.org/forumsindicators.html. 
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Still, organizations cannot preclude some form of measuring the 
quality of field enforcement work74; such measures are necessary for using 
internal structures that provide incentives for good work and disincentives 
for bad work. Such measures include praise, criticism, promotions, 
demotions, bonuses, and even termination of employment for severe cases. 
Public administration scholars have demonstrated that public organizations 
are more restrained in their incentive and disincentive management 
mechanisms because of general rules that apply throughout the 
bureaucracy. 75  Therefore, enforcement agencies can only promote and 
reward proper enforcement behavior based on tight civil service personnel 
schemes that have not been made for the agents’ particular tasks. In case of 
agent negligence demoting or discharging a governmentally employee will in 
most bureaucracies be especially cumbersome or even impossible. 76 
Concluding, internal rewards and sanctions to influence proper enforcement 
behavior will be difficult to apply fairly because performance measures are 
difficult and, second, will not be as effective because they are dictated by 
bureaucratic rules.  
The literature agrees that prioritization is an essential internal 
management tool for effective enforcement.77 First, an agency needs to make 
policy about how to use its scarce resources for pro-active inspections. The 
agency needs to define what major and minor categories of violations are. 
Inspections should be reserved for the major categories only. This means 
that the agency makes a choice on what parts of the regulation to focus work 
on.78  Second, the agency needs to prioritize in what regulated actors should 
be targeted. Scholars, including May and Winter79, and Gray and Scholz80 
hold that this should be done by establishing which actors have the highest 
risk for major violations. Such identification can be done historically or 
                                                     
74 Lipsky, Street Level Bureaucracy, Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services. 52 Again we can 
refer to efforts made worldwide towards such indicators in the field of environmental law 
enforcement. See http://www.inece.org/forumsindicators.html. 
75 Wilson, Bureaucracy, what government agencies do and why they do it. Chapter 8,  Lipsky, Street Level 
Bureaucracy, Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services. 23-4 Rainey, Understanding & Managing 
Public Organizations. 74, 145, 189, 241-2,  
76 Kagan and Scholz, "The "Criminology of the Corporation" and Regulatory Enforcement 
Strategies." 23-4, Wilson, Bureaucracy, what government agencies do and why they do it. 145 
77  May and Winter, "Regulatory Enforcement and Compliance: Examining Danish Agro-
Environmental Policy." 629, Bardach and Kagan, Going by the Book, The Problem of Regulatory 
Unreasonableness. E. Helland, "The Enforcement of Pollution Control Laws: Inspections, 
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79  May and Winter, "Regulatory Enforcement and Compliance: Examining Danish Agro-
Environmental Policy." 629 
80 W. Gray and J.T. Scholz, "Analyzing the Equity and Efficieny of OSHA enforcement," Law 
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based on other methods, May and Winter write cryptically. They conclude 
that prioritization is important for enforcement effectiveness but it is 
difficult to establish the right priorities in advance.81 Prioritization forms the 
backbone of internal directions from the agency to the enforcement agent 
about how to carry out enforcement work.  
In non-Western countries the strategy of targeting has been 
successfully used. In Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, the local pollution law 
enforcement agency developed a system of targeted enforcement in which 
polluters were assigned a letter (A, B or C) according to the severity of their 
pollution. The categories were based on extensive research which found that 
60% of all local pollution could be controlled by controlling only 50 type A 
factories, while another 20 % of the pollution was attributable to 150 type B 
plants. The other thousands of type C plants only amounted to only 20% of 
the total pollution. 82  Similarly successful (semi-)informal enforcement 
programs in Indonesia, Colombia, Bangladesh, the Philippines and Malaysia 
have used similar targeting techniques when setting up alternative regulatory 
systems such as pollution charges and public disclosure mechanisms. 83  
 Other mechanisms to enhance enforcement agents’ accountability 
are internal review mechanisms, and external administrative law review 
procedures. Internal review mechanisms obviously also face the challenge of 
getting reliable information about agents’ outputs and their work’s outcomes. 
Meanwhile, external legal review will only occur if interested parties bring the 
case to a higher administrative agency (in case of legal administrative review) 
or to court (in case of administrative litigation). For enforcement sanctions 
that were too strict the punished party itself will likely do so. However, for 
cases in which enforcement was lax, external review only works if there are 
third party organizations that care for such enforcement action and that have 
legal standing to question such cases under administrative law. In formal 
review cases, the plaintiff will also face a lack of information about what 
agents did during their enforcement, and furthermore will face legal 
                                                     
81  May and Winter, "Regulatory Enforcement and Compliance: Examining Danish Agro-
Environmental Policy." 629 
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83 Afsah, Blackman, and Ratunanda, "How do Public Disclosure Pollution Control Programs 
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problems because in most jurisdictions decisions about inspections and 
sanctions are granted a considerable amount of legal leeway. 
 In some non-Western countries, most notably India and to some 
extent Indonesia, NGOs and other social groups have tried to make use of 
litigation, and even public interest litigation, in a reaction to weak 
enforcement action. In India, courts have been open to this sort of action 
and have engaged in strong judicial activism, forcing the Central Pollution 
Control Board to close 168 factories in inner cities.84  
The only solution to deal with such lack of overview of enforcement 
outputs and outcomes is through creating a certain working environment 
that builds trust between agency and agents.85  If an agency is able to achieve 
a certain organizational culture, or even a sense of mission, in the words of 
Wilson, its employees will be easier dedicated to the organizational goals.86 
This can be achieved through hiring a certain type of professionals, well 
adapted to the kind of enforcement needed, or by on the job 
professionalization through peer pressure and pairing experienced agents 
with those just out of school. Another way is by having a certain type of 
bureau leadership. Wood and Waterman’s study of seven law enforcement 
agencies in the US has demonstrated how a change in bureau leadership can 
dramatically affect the whole organization, either towards less stringent 
enforcement as happened in the case of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission’s Reagan appointed chief enforcement leader, 87  or towards 
stricter enforcement which happened when all Reagan appointed leadership 
at the EPA was replaced by more pro-regulation leaders in 1983.88 A change 
in leadership in the São Paolo state environmental enforcement bureau, led 
to a concentrated effort to control pollution in Cubatão, once described as 
“the most polluted city in the world”, which led to controlling pollution at 
288 of the 320 main pollution sources there.89   
Concluding, enforcement agencies face considerable difficulty in 
limiting the discretion of their agents, a difficulty that may make the 
organization start to pursue formalistic procedural goals of detection and 
sanction quota, rather than compliance.  
                                                     
84 Stuligross, "The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation in India."398 
85 Wilson, Bureaucracy, what government agencies do and why they do it. Chapter 6  Lipsky, Street Level 
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Agent Behavior: Coping with Cooperation, Corruption and 
Formalism 
Hence, unless agencies employ strict detection and sanction quota, or are 
able to achieve a certain organizational culture, enforcement agents will have 
a large de facto discretionary power because the agency cannot directly verify 
their enforcement outputs and outcomes. The next level of analysis for 
understanding how enforcement works and why it may be difficult is then to 
know how enforcement agents use this relative freedom in their day-to-day 
enforcement work. 90  At this level, generalizations become even more 
difficult than those made in the preceding sections. Enforcement agents are 
individuals that deal with individual cases under different regulatory regimes 
in different bureaucratic settings in different parts of the world. Nevertheless, 
when read cautiously, some general remarks about how enforcement agents 
cope with their work can be made.  
Enforcement agents, in my opinion, are wedged between a rock and 
a hard place. They have to enforce legislation, with insufficient resources 
compared to the number of violations present, dealing with a regulated actor 
they need to cooperate with in order to be able to enforce in the first place. 
Meanwhile, enforcement agents have to pursue the conflicting goals of their 
agency, or the rapidly shifting aims of the political context their agency exists 
in (see next section). Furthermore, their agency may force them to pursue 
measurable goals instead of compliance-oriented goals, or worse they are 
supposed to ensure real compliance, while they lack the variety of 
enforcement options and enforcement information necessary to get violators 
to comply. There has been surprisingly little research about how 
enforcement agents themselves deal with the discretion and restraints of 
carrying out enforcement work in practice.91 
The literature teaches that enforcement agents develop strategies of 
coping with such situations. 92  The best-documented strategy has been 
recorded in Hutter’s study of enforcement agent behavior in the UK.93 Her 
study shows that enforcement agents choose to make full use of their 
                                                     
90 We follow May and Winter, emphasizing that enforcement analysis should distinguish the 
agency and the agent. See May and Winter, "Regulatory Enforcement and Compliance: 
Examining Danish Agro-Environmental Policy." 625-6 
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discretion and even to some extent disregard the constraining legal and 
institutional rules, and carry out enforcement based on their interaction with 
the regulated actor. In Hutter’s study, agents deal with their discretion by 
making their own definitions of what constitutes compliance.94 They make 
their definitions based on variables including the costs of compliance for the 
regulated actor 95 , the national and local economic circumstances 96 , the 
financial state of the regulated actor, the risk of damages to general welfare97, 
public concern98 , temporary changes in circumstances, and the regulated 
actor’s commitment and ability to compliance. 99   Thus, for example, 
regulated enterprises that were in financial trouble would be treated with 
temporary lenience through a flexible definition of compliance.100 Following 
this, the whole enforcement process is one in which the enforcement agent 
tries to balance the circumstances of the regulated actor with the aims of the 
law. In line with this approach, Hutter’s study also found that when the law 
left little discretion to make their own definitions of compliance, inspection 
agents still distinguished between acceptable non-compliance and acceptable 
compliance101 For acceptable non-compliance, which is also based on the set 
of factors just mentioned above, enforcement sanctions will be lenient, while 
for non-acceptable compliance, enforcement agents will try to exercise as 
much pressure as is possible to get the regulated actor to comply in the spirit 
of the law instead of just its letter. Conversely, industry engaging in what 
McBarnet and Whelan call “creative compliance”102, meaning that they are 
formally in compliance with the law’s letter but not its spirit, can expect 
enforcement pressure even though there is no legal ground for it.  
Using the term “enforcement career”, Hutter has described how 
relations between the regulator and the regulated are long term. Individual 
sanction decisions in this type of micro-enforcement are seen as part of a 
long-term cooperative process towards compliance, and will be based on the 
existing relationship. Because the agent is in closer contact with the regulated 
actor, in this ideal type micro enforcement situation, he will have a better 
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understanding of why there is a violation and be able to adopt appropriate 
measures against the type of violation found (for more see below).  
The danger of this cooperative type of micro enforcement style has 
been mentioned above; agents may come too close to the violating actor and 
sacrifice their enforcement work for their relationship with the regulated 
actor.103 Close contact between regulated actor and enforcement agent may 
lead to favoritism, capture or outright corruption. A close relationship, 
combined with the high level of autonomy and the authority on sanction 
decisions and a low income104 can easily tempt the enforcer to corruptive 
practices.105 Corruptive practices can exist everywhere, but some societies 
may suffer more from them than others. 106  Agents working in contexts 
where corruption and favoritism based values are more pervasive have a 
higher chance of themselves engaging in corruptive practices. Oposa’s study 
of environmental law enforcement in the Philippines provides a good 
description of how certain values can influence favoritism and corruption 
and undermine enforcement.107 He describes how a low level, lowly paid 
enforcement agent goes to a factory for inspections. The agent is received by 
a well-educated manager who in the value system there demands a certain 
amount of pagagalang (respect). The two make “personal connections” by 
exchanging where they are from and how they are. Following the detection 
of a violation, the director makes a “request” invoking  pakiksama (preserving 
good relations) to give them a break and let the matter go. If the agent 
chooses to grant the request, utang na loob (debt of gratitude) is created, a 
form of social capital the agent now has vis-à-vis the factory manager, which 
can be called in any time in the future. Similarly such favor seeking behavior 
may work indirectly through a third person, such as a local politician the 
manager is connected with who uses his political clout to get the agent to 
grant a favor of limited enforcement action.108  Decentralization may worsen 
favoritism and corruption. Auer et al. argue for example that in Indonesia, 
                                                     
103 Compare with Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission. 
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decentralization has worsened logging related corruption because the greater 
number of officials involved in law enforcement has made bribery cheaper, 
as there are “more points of contact and power is diffused.”109 
In contrast with the cooperative strategy, or succumbing to 
favoritism, agents may also choose a formalistic approach.110 Lipksy’s study 
of street level bureaucrats teaches that one way of handling the conflicts of 
lower level enforcement work is through rigid adherence to the legal and 
agency procedures, disregarding the original goal of law enforcement: 
compliance.111 As we saw, this may happen when bureaus are pressed for 
resources and agents simply do not have the time to get to know the 
regulated actor and build the trust necessary for the cooperative approach.112 
Thus, individual agents may adopt a formal and rigid style focusing on 
numbers instead of content. This is more likely to happen if bureaus have set 
up schemes to measure enforcement outputs. Agents can then opt to only 
focus on attaining high scores in terms of these measures, without actually 
working on attaining compliance of the spirit of the law itself. In criminal 
law enforcement, this happens when policemen focus on easy arrests for 
minor offences, instead of going after more serious crime, in order to be 
noticed for their good enforcement work in terms of number of arrests.113 A 
major motivation for this type of agent behavior is risk aversion. 114 
Enforcement agents avoid risking problems with their agency because they 
strictly follow the law or agency targets. Furthermore, when agents only go 
after easy cases they have less trouble in dealing with the regulated actor. 
They can keep their distance and refrain from getting too involved between 
the conflicting interests of the law and those of targeted actors. The 
advantages for the agent are clear, he stays out of trouble and just produces 
his cases. For the quality of enforcement, which can only be measured in 
terms of compliance, results are bleaker. Enforcement agents will carry out 
quick and easy inspections to meet their quota; issuing sanction decisions for 
cases they can easily find evidence for, instead of those that have the most 
negative impact on compliance behavior in general.115  
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Except for the conscious agent decision to enforce the law by the 
book, Hawkins has shown that even if there is considerable discretion, 
experienced enforcement agents may limit their own discretion 
unconsciously because they enforce by routine. Years of working experience 
influence enforcement agents to view new cases based on their decisions 
made in the past. Thus agents frame enforcement decisions within their own 
narrow historical experience based frames. Respondents in Hawkins’ study 
have stated that contrary to the fact that they have a large amount of 
discretion in their work, in practice they do not feel it this way because of the 
strict routines they have developed over the years.116 
Violator and  Violation 
Enforcement work is also influenced by variables related to the violator and 
violation. The existing literature has made a number of observations about 
the influence of violators and violations on enforcement work. 
A first observation is that the type of violator is important. Public 
violators are more likely to be addressed more leniently than private ones, as 
it is difficult for the state to punish its own institutions. In addition, the 
chances for collusion and weak enforcement are higher if a public actor is 
involved.117  The type of business regulated is also important. If, for example, 
compliance is in the direct interest of the regulated industry, the enforcement 
agent tends to take a more cooperative approach. An example is chemical or 
oil industry, whose hazardous installations could in case of regulatory 
violations cause much harm to the industry itself.118 
 The regulated firm’s costs of compliance form another variable. If 
costs of compliance are higher, Hutter’s UK research has found, agents are 
more likely to use stringent measures. 119  However, as Gunningham has 
argued, when compliance costs are so high that they threaten the viability of 
the firm in question, agents will refrain from strong sanctions, especially in 
“job-poor areas”.120 This is an important finding as it demonstrates that the 
economic context can affect the regulatory context (see Chapter 6). It 
demonstrates that dominant employers are more difficult to regulate and will 
be treated more leniently. This finding resonates with research about non-
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119  B.M. Hutter, "Variations in regulatory Enforcement Styles," Law & Policy 11 (1989). 
Quoted through Kagan, "Regulatory Enforcement." 
120  Kagan, "Regulatory Enforcement." 398 quoting Gunningham, "Negotiated Non-
Compliance: A case study of regulatory failure." 
248       Enforcement and Political Campaigns 
 
 
Western countries where the economic survival of dominant employers 
precluded strong formal and informal enforcement action.121 
 The amount of trust enforcement agents have for regulated actors is 
also important. Trust is an essential aspect of the cooperative enforcement 
strategy and such trust is only possible if there is frequent contact between 
regulators and regulated. Shover et al’s US nationwide comparison between 
east coast and west coast strip mining enforcement has demonstrated this 
point.122 The fact that the western part of the US has far fewer enforcement 
agents than the east coast enabled west coast agents to have frequent 
contacts with the mines and adopt a cooperative style. Grabovsky and 
Braithwaite’s research about Australian regulatory enforcement and Hutter’s 
study of UK environmental and health enforcement styles, have also 
demonstrated a correlation between frequency of contact and cooperative 
enforcement style.123  Scholz has explained the influence of frequency of 
contacts using game theory. In his analysis, enforcement agents use a so 
called “tit-for-tat” strategy.124 This means that agents will at first treat all 
actors cooperatively and without sanctions, as long as the regulated actor acts 
in a cooperative manner in return. Once the regulated actor betrays the trust 
thus established though, the enforcement agency will respond with strict 
sanctions. The flexible “tit-for-tat” enforcement strategy can only work if the 
enforcement agent is able to build such trust and verify whether the trust is 
validated. This can only happen if there is sufficient frequency in contact, 
Kagan has analyzed based on Scholz’s work.125 Thus, a lack of frequent 
interaction forces regulators to adopt a less cooperative style. 
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 Closely related to trust are the attitudes of the regulated actor’s staff 
and management towards compliance and the past record of compliance. 
The worse the attitudes of staff and management, and the worse the 
compliance track record the higher the chances for stricter and more 
deterrent enforcement styles would be.126  
Scholarship further found that the size of the regulated actor 
matters.127 Shover’s US strip mining enforcement research is again illustrative. 
East-coast strip mines were smaller and did not have the technical personnel 
necessary to attain compliance, while the owners sometimes did not even 
know the relevant regulations.128 The result was an adversarial relationship 
resulting in deterrence type enforcement. Grabosky and Braithwaite’s 
Australian research also supports the relation between small size and 
deterrence.129 Stuligross’s research of small firm environmental enforcement 
in India brings forth the same conclusion: smaller enterprises are more 
difficult for enforcement work. First they are less likely to be able to comply. 
And second enforcement action against smaller enterprises is less efficient, 
the same amount of  enforcement work addresses much less pollution at a 
smaller firm than at a larger one.130  
The type of violation or the possible risk of violations obviously also 
influence enforcement work. Generally speaking, enforcement should and 
often will be stricter for more serious violations or activities with a higher 
risk of violation and damages.131 The seriousness of violations first depends 
on the amount of damage caused or possibly caused, and second on the 
number of complaints received as a result of such violation132. The expected 
damage of different types of violators has been used for targeting 
enforcement resources. Examples from non-Western contexts have 
demonstrated that more monitoring resources are spent on firms whose 
environmental impact is likely to be high. 133  This finding resonates with 
bureau approaches targeting their scarce resources for possible more serious 
violations.134  
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Finally, the visibility of the violation is an influential variable on 
enforcement work. The more visible violations are, the easier it is for the 
regulator to know whether the regulated is in compliance and thus whether 
he can be trusted. 135  Thus, Kagan argues, if agents can easily verify 
compliance, they can gain the trust needed for a cooperation style without 
having to meet the regulated actor frequently.136   
The External Context of Enforcement: State Politicians and 
Public Support 
Preceding sections demonstrated that there are contrasting views about the 
manner in which enforcement should take place. There are economic, 
bureaucratic and practical limitations to attaining such enforcement ideal in 
practice. So far, the external political and social contexts137 of enforcement 
have not been discussed. These contexts are crucial for understanding the 
available enforcement resources and the choices made by enforcement 
agencies and agents in applying those in enforcement work.138 The influence 
of the political and social contexts on enforcement has not attracted the 
scholarly attention one would expect. Scholz and Wei write, “case studies of 
enforcement agencies have tended to discount political influences over 
bureaucratic activities.”139 The present book aims to highlight how external 
political and social influences affect enforcement work. As noted above, the 
social and political contexts discussed here are similar but different from the 
social and political contexts in Part II, as they are the contexts of the 
enforcement agent, not the regulated actor. 
                                                     
135 Compare with Auer et al., "Forest Law Enforcement and Governance: Resolve Needed 
from All Sides." 11 
136 Kagan, "Regulatory Enforcement." 397 
137 We did of course look briefly at the relationship between regulators and regulated and the 
influence of the type of violation. Here the external context indicates the actors outside of the 
enforcement agency, other than the individual regulated actor or the victim of the violation in 
question.  
138 Prior studies have suggested that the political context is more influential on enforcement 
agencies than on their individual agents. See C.W.H. Lo and G.E. Fryxell, "Enforcement 
Styles Among Environmental Protection Officials in China," Journal of Public Policy 23, no. 1 
(2003). 84 summarizing Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement, Regulation and the Social Definition 
of Pollution. Kagan, "Regulatory Enforcement.", P.C. Yeager, "Industrial Water Pollution," in 
Beyond the Law: crime in complex organizations, ed. M Tonry and A J Resis Jr. (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1993). For this section we are heavily indebted to Kagan’s summary of the 
literature and his clear analysis of the external processes at hand. See  Kagan, "Regulatory 
Enforcement." 
139 J.T. Scholz and F.H. Wei, "Regulatory Enforcement in a Federalist System," American 
Political Science Review 80 (1986). 1251 
  The Enforcement Gap       251 
 
 
Political Support and Constraints 
The literature recognizes that external support, by elected politicians (or 
governmental politicians in non-democratic states)140 is important.141 At first 
blush, external support may have a purely positive connotation because it 
can strengthen enforcement. Lo and Fryxell state, following Helland, Hunter 
and Waterman, that external support is necessary because it shapes “the 
legitimacy and power of enforcement officials”.142 Kagan has argued that 
without such support enforcement bureaus and agents may adopt a risk 
averse, rigid formalistic style (“retreatism”) replacing compliance with 
procedure.  
 In developing countries, governmental support is perhaps extra 
important, because enforcement institutions, especially environmental 
protection bureaus, tend to have less authority and public awareness about 
the importance of their work is likely less developed.143 In such countries 
political support can greatly boost law enforcement, as for example in Juárez 
Mexico a newly elected mayor initiated a stern enforcement campaign to end 
the severe pollution of local informal brick factories.144 Similarly in the 1980s, 
the governor of the state of São Paolo, Brazil was an important factor for 
stronger pollution control.145 In contrast lack of support can be disastrous, as 
happened for example in Brazil in the mid 1990s when president Cardoso 
prevented stern enforcement action in the state of São Paolo, when he 
decided not to support a local strict enforcement campaign.146 
State politicians can also influence enforcement through making 
new legislation. Because the law forms the backbone of law enforcement, 
those in power to change the law can influence the law’s enforcement. The 
law provides the substantial norms by which violation is judged and 
furthermore the procedural norms that govern the legal options and legal 
practices of enforcement. A good example is the law that the US Congress 
passed in June 1980 increasing the maximum penalty for nuclear regulation 
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violations from five thousand to a hundred thousand US dollars. This 
change led to a substantial increase in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s 
enforcement activities.147 Another example is that the new mayor in Juárez, 
Mexico initiated a change when he promulgated a local rule banning all dirty 
types of brick making and a rule forcing brick kilns to adopt propane fuels.148 
As a last illustration, in the late 1990s a new national law in Brazil was to be 
the basis of sterner enforcement action in the state of São Paolo, involving 
over 7000 enterprises, many of which would face severe economic 
consequences as their polluting behavior had been condoned for years.149   
External political support influences enforcement in a more 
complex manner than just through legislation or strengthening the legitimacy 
and authority of the agency and its agents though. The most important 
governmental support is financial: in most cases150, the enforcement agency’s 
resources are paid directly by an external governmental organization. 151 
Bardach and Kagan have studied how political authorities can set priorities 
favoring some enforcement agencies and neglecting others, when 
appropriating their budgets. Their study found for example that OSHA had a 
ratio of inspectors compared to sites to be inspected of 1:1515, while the US 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission had one of 1:6. 152  Another example is 
Wood’s study of the Reagan administration’s impact on EPA enforcement. 
This study found that the administration’s 1982 24% EPA budget cuts led to 
a decrease of 41% in monitoring activities and 69% in abatement actions.153 
Clearly, the authorities that decide on resource appropriation can make or 
break enforcement through their power over funding.  
The external governmental context may also directly affect the 
appointment of bureau leadership. Through such appointments, political 
authorities can exercise direct influence through their protégées. 
Furthermore, they can determine which type of leader runs the agency, 
someone prone to formalism and stringency or one that will try to listen to 
concerns in the regulated actor. A famous example is how the Reagan 
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administration tried to curb EPA’s regulatory zeal in 1981 by appointing “an 
anti-environmentalist attorney” Ann Burford as EPA administrator and “a 
former paper industry lobbyist” Kathleen Bennett was made in charge of 
EPA’s clean air division.154 Another flagrant example is Reagan’s meddling in 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission leadership, getting a 
known pro-corporation lawyer, Michael Connelly appointed as General 
Council, in charge of all litigation. Connelly soon announced that “he would 
no longer be pressing sexual harassment, age discrimination, equal pay, and 
class action suits.” 155  Sure enough, enforcement action did reduce 
significantly. Finally Reagan’s appointment of the conservative economist 
James Miller III to head the FTC in 1981 led to a 50% decrease in the 
commission’s enforcement cases. 156  In a non-Western example, governor 
Montoro of São Paolo, appointed a pro-regulation environmental engineer as 
head of the environmental bureau in the highly polluted region of Cubatão, 
in the hope that under his direction strong industrial interests groups could 
be tempered.157  
Kagan has rightly pointed out that agency leaders are not mere 
puppets of their political masters. 158  Wood’s study of the effects of the 
Reagan EPA appointments is illustrative. He found that contrary to what 
was expected, the new appointments at first led to an increase of air-
pollution enforcement activities, probably because the existing bureaucracy 
attempted resistance against the meddling in their enforcement and until 
their budgets were cut in 1982 still had sufficient resources to do so.159 The 
external governmental context is not restricted to political authorities directly 
in charge of agency funding or appointments. Some studies have 
demonstrated how local political influence affects national law enforcement 
programs. Scholz et al.’s studies of OSHA found for example that local 
politics affects federal law enforcement at the local level. 160  Similarly, 
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Gormley’s analyses of childcare regulatory enforcement in the US also 
demonstrated the impact local politics has on enforcement.161 
Social Support or Constraints 
The social context, which consists of local communities directly affected by 
violations, or non-state interest groups, may also affect law enforcement. 
The first manner is through complaints by those directly affected. As we saw 
above complaints influence how an agency sees a violation, the more 
complaints the more serious such violation is taken.  
 Support for or pressure on enforcement may also come from non-
state organizations, lobbying either for or against stricter enforcement. 162 
Organized public interest groups can cause stronger enforcement.163 This 
mainly happens because such groups are able to organize complaints 
combined with lobbying pressure. Following Gallanter’s observations of 
successful litigants, we could say that interest groups are “repeat players” 
rather than “one-shotters”164 in terms of making complaints, and therefore 
their complaints have more effect. Scholz and Wei’s study has for example 
demonstrated how a high level of organized labor correlates with stricter 
enforcement. 165  Furthermore, Frank and Lombness and Gunningham’s 
studies found that lax enforcement happens when there are no organized 
groups of complainants.166 Public interest groups can also cause less stringent 
enforcement. Originally the literature held that specialized enforcement 
bureaus would eventually succumb to the organized interests of their 
regulated actor, and become “captured”. 167  Although later political and 
economic changes have made that capture is no longer inevitable,168 anti-
regulation lobby groups or strong pro-industry organizations can cause less 
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stringent enforcement.169 For many types of regulatory law, but especially for 
natural resource protection law, developing countries may lack the interests 
groups or even the general public awareness necessary to influence stronger 
regulatory enforcement.170  
In non-Western countries, strong NGO-organized social action, 
sometimes even involving public interest litigation has had some success in 
improving law enforcement. In Juárez, Mexico, collective action, organized 
in part by NGOs, combined with the election of a new mayor led to a more 
concentrated enforcement effort.171 In Colombia, years of pollution went 
unchecked, until finally under the influence of community pressures, a 
reform was initiated under which a targeted system of pollution charges was 
enforced. 172  Similarly in Cubatão, Brazil, local communities have tried to 
pressure agents to initiate stronger environmental enforcement against power 
local industries.173 As noted, in India social groups have resorted to litigation 
to push for better environmental enforcement. 174   Similarly, Indonesian 
NGOs have tried to sue government officials for lax enforcement. Although 
losing the case, the court accepted standing for NGO-type social 
organizations.175 
Factors that Influence the Political and Social Contexts to Support or Constrain 
Enforcement 
 So what drives actors in the political and social contexts to support or 
constrain enforcement? There have only been a few studies about this 
important question. Kagan has provided an overview176, showing that major 
changes in external influences are rooted in four variables.  
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 The first, and most important, variable are widely publicized 
catastrophes, scandals, or crises that have a relation to the agency. Such 
events can “trigger agency changing political intervention”. 177  In general, 
catastrophes will lead to public and political outrage and demands for more 
formal and stringent enforcement.178  Pro-enforcement interest groups are 
bound to take the opportunity such events offer for demanding action. 
Consequently, political authorities will respond by replacing leadership, 
demanding stricter legislation (see Part II) and vigorous enforcement. 179 
Good examples from the Netherlands are the law enforcement campaigns 
that started after a fireworks factory exploded in Enschede in 2000 and after 
eleven teenagers got killed in a pub-fire in Volendam in 2001.  
 There are also examples from non-Western contexts. In 1984, a 
700.000 litres gasoline leak, killing 10 people in the state of São Paolo, 
provided the local environmental enforcement authorities “ammunition to 
pressure the industries into compliance”, which until then had been difficult 
due to strong resistance.180 The Central Pollution Control Board, the main 
environmental enforcement institution in India, was created in 1986 as a 
reaction to the massive Bhopal accident.181 Observers in some countries wish 
they had an accident as this would initiate a change. Oposa writes about law 
enforcement in the Philippines for instance: “No thousands have died 
because of smoke or water pollution and neither has there been a Bhopal-
like incident that creates the impetus for people and politicians to sit up and 
take serious cognizance of the industrial environmental issues.”182 
 Whether accidents actually lead to a solution for structural 
problems related to the enforcement and the legislation that is to be 
enforced is questionable. Following Cheit: “Accidents precipitate strong 
political pressures for regulatory change, but they provide little factual basis 
for making meaningful improvements.”183  
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Apart from disasters, economic opportunity or economic crisis184 
may also influence political authorities to meddle in enforcement affairs.185 In 
the UK, the development of off-shore oil drilling sparked politicians to urge 
for laxer worker safety enforcement. 186  Niemeijer’s research about Dutch 
building regulations has demonstrated that enforcement was more lenient for 
projects deemed important by municipal politicians.187 This also happened in 
India where states enforced environmental law leniently to attract 
investment. 188  Kagan notes that economic opportunity driven lax 
enforcement has only happened when opposition from influential public 
interest groups or other political actors was not expected.189 As Hawkins 
reports, an economic crisis in the form of a recession also affects regulatory 
enforcement. The British Health and Safety Executive was forced to take a 
laxer enforcement stance facing a severe economic crisis in the 1980s.190 The 
Indonesian economic crisis strongly affected environmental performance of 
firms, and likely affected enforcement. 191  In Juárez, Mexico, the initial 
success made through stronger law enforcement, community pressure and 
the lower abatement prices for burning clean propane fuel in the highly 
polluting scrap-fuelled brick kilns was short lived. A local economic crisis 
erupted as the state subsidies for fuels, including propane were annulled. As 
a result, industry reverted back to dirtier fuels and stopped using propane, 
something which was condoned by local law enforcement agents.192  
Political controversy surrounding the enforcement agency or its 
enforcement work forms Kagan’s third variable that may influence political 
actors to meddle with enforcement.193 American scholarship again provides 
examples. Both President Carter and President Reagan reacted strongly 
against OSHA’s deterrence styled enforcement, the first by demanding less 
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enforcement for minor infringements and the second by replacing OSHA’s 
director. 194  Coal mining regulation witnessed a similar pattern, when 
members of Congress, Carter and Reagan subsequently meddled with what 
they believed was an overly legalistic enforcement style at the Office of 
Surface Mining.195 Similarly, but this time with the opposite effect, President 
Reagan was forced to appoint new EPA leadership after Democrats in 
Congress had organized oversight hearings about the agency’s lax law 
enforcement.196 The EPA’s director Burford, a known anti-environmentalist 
had to resign when “it was alleged that she was not only failing to execute 
the law but may also have been encouraging pollution sources to violate the 
law.”197 In a non-Western example, mentioned above, the governor of São 
Paolo appointed an environmental engineer as head of the local 
environmental enforcement agency in Cubatão after this agency had been 
criticized by local communities and attacked in the media for not taking a 
stern stance against pollution.198  
Electoral change forms Kagan’s last variable for explaining why the 
external political context will meddle in enforcement affairs.199 The clearest 
shifts are partisan. Changes from Labor to Conservatives, from Democrats 
to Republicans, or from Social-Democrats/Liberals to Christian-
Democrats/Liberals may make the incumbent leaders wish to change the 
existing enforcement practices. In the US,  for example, OSHA enforcement 
is more legalistic in Democrat controlled States.200 Another US example is 
the shift from the Democratic Carter Presidency to the Republican Reagan 
administration, which in an anti-regulation effort, as noted above, replaced 
EPA leadership, reorganized the agency and severely cut its budget. 201 
Similarly, environmental law enforcement in the UK is stricter under Labor 
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than under Conservative governments.202 As stated above even micro-level 
electoral shifts can make a difference.  
Even in non-Western countries where democratic participation has 
been generally weaker, electoral shifts have affected enforcement. In Juárez, 
Mexico, citizens elected a new mayor mainly on the issue of controlling 
pollution, as former mayors had been too closely connected to some of the 
factories to initiate strong regulation. As noted above, the new mayor made 
cleaning up the city’s pollution one of its prime policies, initiating stricter law 
enforcement. 203  In Brazil, in 1982, Franco Montoro, the newly elected 
governor of São Paolo, sparked stricter enforcement action in Cubatão, 
detailed in examples above.204 Also in Brazil, but more than a decade later, 
president Cordoso, who, as we also saw above, had just tried to prevent stern 
environmental enforcement by delaying the coming into force of a new 
criminal environmental act for ten years, had to back down when elections 
came up and cut the deadline back to six years.205  
The external social and especially the political contexts are of great 
influence on the cross-regulatory prioritization that takes place to distribute 
the state’s limited enforcement resources. The result is that regulatory 
enforcement in general fluctuates between regular law enforcement and law 
enforcement following increased political attention. 206  This makes that 
regulatory law enforcement is characterized by conjunctures of peak 
enforcement following major pro-regulation pressures after political events, 
regular enforcement during quiet times and weak enforcement during anti-
regulation pressures arising out of electoral changes or economic 
opportunities.  
Conclusion  
The studies outlined above provide a list of variables that influence how 
regulatory enforcement works in practice and they provide a general 
typology of such work. The remainder of this part of the book will use these 
frameworks to structure and analyze data on natural resource law 
enforcement at Lake Dianchi. Chapter 13 will first look at why regular 
enforcement of environmental and arable land protection law has been so 
                                                     
202 Hawkins, Law as Last Resort, Prosecution Decision-Making in a Regulatory Agency. 117-9, Hutter, 
"Variations in regulatory Enforcement Styles." 
203 Blackman and Bannister, "Pollution Control in the Informal Sector: the Ciudad Juarez 
Brickmakers' Project." 
204 Carmen de Mello Lemos, "The Politics of Pollution Control in Brazil: State Actors and 
Social Movements Cleaning up Cubatão." 76 
205 Benjamin, Criminal Law and the Protection of the Environment in Brazil ([cited). 231 
206 This is comparable with Haines and Gurney’s concept of regulatory conflict. See F. Haines 
and D. Gurney, "The Shadows of the Law: Contemporary Approaches to Regulation and the 
Problem of Regulatory Conflict," Law & Policy 25, no. 4 (2003). 
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difficult. It will discuss the functioning of the enforcement agency and its 
agents in relation with the regulated actor, complainants and the wider 
external political and social contexts. Chapter 14 will then look at how 
political events change regular law enforcement into law enforcement 
campaigns, again for both environmental and arable land protection law. 
Chapter 15 will bring forth the findings about regular and campaign 
enforcement, comparing them with existing studies from other Western and 
non-Western countries as outlined in this chapter. 
 
13. Punishing Violations 
 Regular Enforcement in Kunming and China 
Introduction 
Jiacun’s arable land was largely converted illegally for construction without 
enforcement reaction. Meanwhile, Licun’s leadership could illegally profit 
from their farmers’ land by leasing it to enterprises without legal 
repercussions. Right next door, the Yunzhi paper factory could break the law 
and pollute undisturbed for years, causing severe damages without having 
received significant fines or sanctions. Similarly, the small FSS factories at 
the Tanglang River continued their illegal discharges without paying for the 
consequences. Enforcement was also absent while the Huafei factory cut 
costs through its nightly discharges. Of the compliance cases, only the Fucun 
paper factory’s forced move to compliance was the direct result of 
enforcement action. The enforcement pressure at Fucun was part of a 
national enforcement campaign (See Chapter 14) and not of the regular 
enforcement program. The present chapter is about why the regular 
enforcement, that takes place outside of the nationally organized 
enforcement campaigns has been so difficult.  
Regular natural resource protection enforcement in Kunming is 
vested with three bureaus: the Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) (at 
provincial, municipal and district levels), the State Land Management Bureau 
(SLB) (at provincial, municipal, district and township level), and the Dianchi 
Management Bureau (DMB) (at municipal, district and soon, also at 
township level).  The present chapter will make an analysis of natural 
resource enforcement by these three bureaus in Kunming based on the 
theoretical and comparative insights from the literature discussed in Chapter 
12. The study is based on data collected during interviews with enforcement 
bureaus staff, regulated actors and local communities. It addition, it uses data 
from studies about natural resource enforcement in other parts of China, as 
well as from policy reports and statistical yearbooks. The data we were able 
to collect for this Chapter are somewhat unbalanced as much more 
nationwide data was available about EPBs than about land bureaus.  
After a short introduction to Yunnan’s enforcement record 
compared with other parts of China, a section follows about the relation 
between the three enforcement bureaus and the local government. The next 
section will look at the internal bureaucratic context of the three 
enforcement bureaus in Kunming, looking at goals, resources and internal 
procedures. Finally a section describes law enforcement practice, detailing 
inspections, sanction decision making and review procedures, followed by a 
short conclusion. 
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Pollution Enforcement Performance Yunnan in Comparative 
Perspective 
In order to make a general evaluation of enforcement performance in 
Kunming we would need data not readily available in China. First, we would 
need to know the total amount of violations.  Then we would need data 
about the total amount of violations actually detected. And finally, we would 
need to know what type of sanctions have been issued for what type of 
violations. The problem, of course is, that in no legal system one is able to 
know how many violations there are in total. Second, in China data of the 
number of violations detected are not published. Third, the data on 
enforcement cases published provide no detail about what kind of sanctions 
have been issued for what kind of violations.  
 All we have is data on the total number of administrative sanctions 
for pollution violations issued by EPBs. These data are problematic in many 
ways. First, they are based on self-reporting within China’s EPB bureaucracy, 
which means that they may not be fully valid. 1  Second, they do not 
differentiate between types of cases so they contain major water pollution 
cases, but also minor noise violations. Even when such limitations are 
considered, the data are still useful for discerning general trends and 
differences between provinces. Lacking other nationwide data, the present 
section will still use these data to get some idea of general trends in 
enforcement performance. These trends help to add a comparative 
dimension to our Kunming based fieldwork findings to be discussed in later 
sections.  
Table 1 contains data on the total number of enforcement cases and 
the relative number of enforcement cases in relation to five main industrial 
pollution indicators. We use this enforcement/pollution ratio to compare 
enforcement performance across provinces. By using the five industrial 
pollution indicators as a relative variable, we can get closest to ascertaining 
the performance of enforcement in relation to the seriousness of the 
industrial pollution problem in each province. Table 1 contains data from all 





                                                     
1  All official data in China are to be doubted. Compare with M.F. Johnston and H. Li, 
"Estimating China's Urban Unemployment Rate: Background, Mechanics and an Alternative," 
Journal of Contemporary China 11, no. 31 (2002). C.A. Holtz, ""Fast Clear and Accurate": How 
reliable are Chinese Output and Economic Growth Statistics?" China Quarterly  (2003). 





Ratio  Province Pollution Cases
Enf 
Ratio 
Liaoning 182 31016 170,4  Shandong 334 3427 10,3 
Fujian 78 4445 57,0  Hebei 331 2920 8,8 
Shanghai 49 2295 46,8  Xizang 0,5 4 8,0 
Heilongjiang 100 4319 43,2  Hunan 305 2211 7,2 
Zhejiang 174 5928 34,1  Chongqing 255 1846 7,2 
Tianjin 40 1193 29,8  Shaanxi 193 1394 7,2 
Jiangsu 253 5782 22,9  Hainan 6 33 5,5 
Henan 275 4900 17,8  Gansu 137 740 5,4 
Hubei 153 2720 17,8  Xinjiang 163 872 5,3 
Beijing 29 451 15,6  Neimenggu 260 980 3,8 
China 6322 92818 14,7  Yunnan 198 533 2,7 
Anhui 126 1811 14,4  Qinghai 23 61 2,7 
Guangdong 225 3017 13,4  Guangxi 369 703 1,9 
Sichuan 416 5038 12,1  Shanxi 903 1614 1,8 
Jilin 69 827 12,0  Ningxia 70 101 1,4 
Jiangxi 115 1193 10,4  Guizhou 427 444 1,0 
 
 Table 1 Pollution Enforcement Sanctions, Five Main Pollution Indicators and  
 Sanction/Pollution Ratio3 
 
The data show that Yunnan’s pollution enforcement performance 
ranks among the lowest in China. The bottom of the enforcement/pollution 
ratio list is occupied by provinces located in the less developed areas of 
Western China. Based on this we can hypothesize that less developed areas 
have more trouble in enforcing environmental pollution law.4 Of course Part 
II already demonstrated how weak enforcement has been in Kunming, both 
pollution as well as land related enforcement. Subsequent sections will 
explain why enforcement has been troublesome in Kunming, addressing the 
correlation of underdevelopment and weak enforcement as well as other 
variables not covered in the data presented in Table 1. 
                                                     
2 The pollution here refers to 10.000 tons of 5 main industrial pollution indicators (COD, 
Solid Waste, SO2, Smoke and Dust). 
3 SEPA, Zhongguo Huanjing Tongji Nianbao 2003 (China Environment Statistical Report 2003). 
4 Compare with Lo and Leung who argue that in less developed countries environmental 
enforcement bureaus have less authority and resources, which hampers their enforcement 
effectiveness. Lo and Leung, "Environmental Agency and Public Opinion in Guangzhou: The 
Limits of a Popular Approach to Environmental Governance." 681 
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The Fragmented Bureaucratic Set-up of Resource Protection 
Enforcement in Kunming: Why Local Protectionism Causes 
Weak Enforcement 
The main reason for weak natural resource protection enforcement in China, 
most scholars agree, has been local protectionism, local governments 
protecting local political, economic and social interests while resisting non-
local policies and laws5. Our findings are similar. In the Huafei and Tanglang 
cases, the Kouxiang Township and the Dianxi District governments have, 
until recently (see Chapter 14), not pressed their EPBs for stricter 
                                                     
5 For environmental enforcement see Railton, "The Rhetoric and Reality of Water Quality 
Protection in China." 872, Sun, "Controlling the Environmental Consequences of Power 
Development in the PRC.", Johnson, Clear Water, Blue Skies: China's Environment in the New 
Century. 1233, Ma and Ortolano, Environmental Regulation in China., Howlett, "Striking the Right 
Balance: The Contrasting Ways in Which the United States and China Implement National 
Projects Affecting the Environment." 34, Ferris and Zhang, "Reaching out to the Rule of Law: 
China's Continuing Efforts to Develop an Effective Environmental Law Regime." 595,  
Zhang, "Ecologizing Industrialization in Chinese Small Towns".183-5. Jahiel, "The 
Contradictory Impact of Reform on Environmental Protection in China.", Jahiel, "The 
Organization of Environmental Protection in China." Sinkule and Ortolano, Implementing 
Environmental Policy in China, Tang, Lo, and Fryxell, "Enforcement Styles, organizational 
commitment, and enforcement effectiveness: an empirical study of local environmental 
protection officials in urban China." Ma and Ortolano, Environmental Regulation in China. Li, 
"China's Compliance with WTO Requirements Will Improve the Efficiency and Effective 
Implementation of Environmental Laws in China." 166-7, Bachner, "Regulating Pollution in 
the People's Republic of China: An Analysis of the Enforcement of  Environmental Law." 
383, Tang et al., "Institutional Constraints on Environmental Management in Urban China: 
Environmental Impact Assessment in Guangzhou and Shanghai." 868-9, Lo and Leung, 
"Environmental Agency and Public Opinion in Guangzhou: The Limits of a Popular 
Approach to Environmental Governance.", K.E. Swanson, R.G. Kuhn, and W. Xu, 
"Environmental Policy Implementation in Rural China: A Case Study of Yuhang, Zhejiang," 
Environmental Management 27, no. 4 (2001). Lo and Fryxell, "Enforcement Styles Among 
Environmental Protection Officials in China." 107, Yao, "Huanjing Xingzheng Zhifa zhong 
Cunzaide Wenti he Duice (On the Problems and Countermeasures in Administrative 
Enforcement of Environmental Law)." 14 
 For arable land protection enforcement see: Sargeson, "Subduing "The Rural 
House-building Craze": Attitudes Towards Housing Construction and Use Controls in Four 
Zhejiang Villages."929, quoting Yan, "Nongmin Jianfang Yongdi Zhon de "Cunpi Xianxiang 
Toushi (The Phenomenon of 'village approval"for farmers'use of land for housing 
construction)."41 See also Wang, "Gengdi Baohu Yu Zhengfu Zhineng de Xiangguanxing 
Fenxi (A Relational Analysis of Arable Land Protection and Governmental Powers)." 57 Ho 
and Lin, "Emerging Land Markets in Rural and Urban China: Policies and Practices." 705, H. 
Ye, "Zui Yange de Gengdi Baohu Zhidu Shi Shenmo, Cong Bashi Nian de Tudi Guanlishi 
Kan Woguo Tudi Guanli Tizhi, Zhengce Fazhan Bianhua Yu Hexin Qushi (What is the 
Strictest System to Protect Arable Land, Looking at Developments, Changes and Core Trends 
in China's Land Management System and Policies from an Historical Perspective from the 
1980s)," Zhongguo Tudi 2004, no. 1~2 (2004). 6 
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enforcement, and perhaps6 on the contrary have even prevented stricter EPB 
action. Furthermore, the highly visible, land violations in Jiacun happened 
right under the nose of the Township government headquarters. A reform 
was implemented in 2003, the Jiacun Township Land Bureau was directly 
funded and managed by the local government. Until this time, the land 
bureau never strictly inspected the LMA offences and a large proportion of 
Jiacun Township’s arable land was illegally sacrificed for local development. 
The head of the Jiacun Land Management Bureau explains: “Before the 
reform, we were subordinate to the Township government, and mainly 
looked at the Township interests, most importantly social stability and 
economic growth.” 7  As we will see in the following sections, local 
protectionism affected enforcement both indirectly through the local 
governments influence on bureau resources, but also directly through its 
meddling in enforcement decision making protecting violators against the 
law. Before we look at how it has affected enforcement, we will first look at 
why local protectionism exists in China. 
How is it possible that in a centrally administered party-state like 
China, local governments are able to oppose national legislation? The answer 
to this fundamental question is that reform has led to a fragmentation of 
governmental power,8 or as Cohen writes “contrary to American images of 
the PRC as a ruthlessly effective authoritarian regime whose writ runs from 
the Standing Committee of the Politburo in Beijing to the most remote 
hamlet, in many respects contemporary Chinese government resembles a 
series of feudal baronies more than a totalitarian dictatorship.”9 In the early 
seventies, after the chaotic period of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969), 
                                                     
6 Because of the sensitivity of the subject we have not been able to speak about these cases 
directly with the governments involved here. However, national newsreports have blamed the 
lack of enforcement in these cases on these local governments protecting their own interests. 
See CCTV, "Jinri Shuofa" Fushi de Beihou ("Talking of Law Today" Corrosion's Background) ([cited). 
Song and Zuo, "Yinshui Wuran Shebei Yanzhong Fushi Woguo Shouzuo Shuidianzhan 
Tingchan (China's Oldest Water Power Station Closes Operation Becuase Pollution hass 
Severely Corroded its Installations)." 
7 Interview with Jiacun SLB official, 17 November 2004, Jiacun Township, Kunming 
8 Lieberthal and Lampton have used the term “fragmented authoritarianism”to describe this 
phenomenon. See K. Lieberthal, "Introduction: The "Fragmented Authoritarianism" Model 
and Its Limitations," in Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China, ed. K G 
Lieberthal and D M Lampton (Berkely: University of California Press, 1992). K. Lieberthal, 
Governing China, From Revolution through Reform (New York: W.W.Norton & Company, Inc., 
1995). D.M. Lampton, ed., Policy Implementation in post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1987), K. Lieberthal and M. Oksenberg, Policy Making in China, Leaders, 
Structures and Processes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).  
9  J. Cohen, Statement to U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on China 
Trade/Sectoral and WTO Issues (14 June 2001 [cited); available from 
http://www.uscc.gov/textonly/transcriptstx/tescoh.htm. 
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local level governments initiated a gradual process of change.10 In 1978 the 
state’s new leadership took over the process and turned it into a reform 
program. 11  This brought a number of changes to China’s governance 
structures, which increased the autonomy of governmental actors at all 
administrative levels.12 First, economic reforms allowed the private sector to 
develop closely managed by local governments.13 This created local sources 
of production and revenue outside of the centrally controlled public sector.14  
Second, a change in the fiscal system effectively decentralized tax revenue, 
shifting “powers away from central government agencies to those at lower 
levels.” 15  Third, the administrative entities went through a number of 
changes such as downsizing of the central state bureaucracy, 16  partial 
separation of the party and the state,17 development of a professional less-
ideological civil service system, 18  and decentralization of leadership 
appointments.19 The professionalization of the bureaucracy, the decrease in 
ideological based appointments and the increase of local appointments 20 
seem to have decreased the vertical CCP party cohesion throughout different 
                                                     
10 Saich, Governance and Politics of China. 52-6 L.T. White III, Unstately power, Vol. 1, Local causes of 
China's economic reforms (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharp, 1998). 13 
11 Saich, Governance and Politics of China. 52-6, White III, Unstately power, Vol. 1, Local causes of 
China's economic reforms. 13 
12 Shirk has described how local governments were able to gain power during the reform 
because their cooperation was needed to support the changes made at the center. See S.L. 
Shirk, "The Chinese Political System and the Political Strategy of Economic Reform," in 
Bureaucracy, Politics and Decision Making in Post-Mao China, ed. K G Lieberthal and D M 
Lampton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic 
Reform in China. 
13 S. Zheng, Party vs. State in Post-1949 China, The Institutional Dilemma (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997).  216 
14 Saich, Governance and Politics of China. 52-54 
15 Ibid.  152, Zheng, Party vs. State in Post-1949 China, The Institutional Dilemma. 216 
16 Peerenboom, China's Long March toward the Rule of Law. 205 
17 Zheng, Party vs. State in Post-1949 China, The Institutional Dilemma. 212-5 
18 H.Y. Lee, "China's New Bureaucracy," in State and Society in China, The Consequences of Reform, 
ed. A L Rosenbaum (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992). 56, C.H. Tong, J.D. Straussman, and 
W.D. Broadnax, "Civil Service Reform in the People's Republic of China: case studies of early 
implementation," Public Administration and Development 19 (1999). 193-4 L.T. White III, Unstately 
Power, Vol. 2, Local causes of China's intellectual and governmental reforms (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharp, 
1998). 485 
19 C. Li and D. Bachman, "Localism, Elitism and Immobilism: Elite Formation and Social 
change in Post-Mao China," World Politics 42, no. 1 (1989). 64, 87, J.P. Burns, "Chinese 
Nomenklatura System," Problems of Communism 36 (1987). 36-38, 40-41, H.S. Chan, "Cadre 
Personnel Management in China: The Nomenklatura System, 1990-1998," China Quarterly  
(2004). 
20 Li and Bachman, "Localism, Elitism and Immobilism: Elite Formation and Social change in 
Post-Mao China." 86,  
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levels of administration, creating local and departmental autonomy.21 Fourth, 
the central government set up a system of self-government at the rural grass-
roots in 1987.22 During the 1990s the officers at the self-government were 
increasingly elected democratically.  In 1998 the new Organic Law on Village 
Committees further strengthened democratic elections at the village level. 
Even though the CCP party organization has remained central in village 
leadership, the system of self-government has led to a near autonomous 
grassroots structure of up to 900.000 villages.23  In the past, governments at 
township level exercised direct vertical control over the village-level.  Now 
villagers themselves choose their own leaders and villages are less vertically 
controlled.  These four changes fragmented government power over 
different local governments and bureaux (fragmented authoritarianism), 24 
creating a certain degree of local and departmental autonomy. Recent 
research has, however, revealed some exceptions: for priority policy, 
including population control, economic development, and social stability, the 
vertical and horizontal relationships can be strengthened through CCP party-
responsibility systems and leadership bonus structures. 25  These systems 
motivate local leadership to achieve priority policy goals through job 
performance based incentives and sanctions.26 
As we saw, natural resource protection law enforcement is not 
vested with the local government itself but largely with three specialized 
bureaus, the EPB, SLB and the DMB. If these three bureaus have the 
authority to enforce national and local legislation, how have local 
governments been able to influence them? The answer to this question is 
that China’s functional bureaucracies have become defacto decentralized with 
the reform’s local autonomy. This means that most of the specialized 
                                                     
21 White III, Unstately Power, Vol. 2, Local causes of China's intellectual and governmental reforms. 510-
511 
22 For an overview of this process see general: O'Brien, "Villagers' Committees, Implementing 
Political Reform in China's Villages." K.J. O'Brien and L. Li, "Accomodating "Democracy" in 
a One-Party State: Introducing Village Elections in China," China Quarterly 162, no. June 
(2000). T. Shi, "Village Committee Elections in China: Institutionalist Tactics for Democracy," 
World Politics 51, no. 3 (1999).  M. Manion, "The Electoral Connection in the Chinese 
Countryside," The American Political Science Review 90, no. 4 (1996). Liu, "Consequences of 
Villager Committee Elections in China, Better Local Governance or Consolidation of State 
Power.", W. Xu, "Mutual Empowerment of State and Peasantry: Grassroots Democracy in 
Rural China," Word Development 35, no. 9 (1997).  
23 Ibid. 
24 Lieberthal, "Introduction: The "Fragmented Authoritarianism" Model and Its Limitations." 
25 See Edin, "State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from 
a Township Perspective.", Y. Huang, "Central-Local relations in China During the reform Era: 
The Economic and Institutional Dimensions," Word Development 24, no. 4 (1996). 
26 Id. 
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departments at the local level are governed by the local government:27 the 
local government pays for most of their resources (see next sections) and the 
local government is in charge of the appointment of leadership positions at 
these bureaus. Formally, there is a dual management structure, both for the 
EPBs and the SLBs. This means that these bureaus are subordinate both to 
the functional department at a higher level of administration, but also to the 
government at their own level of administration. In Kunming, the Kunming 
EPB is thus formally subordinate to the Yunnan Provincial EPB, but also to 
the Kunming Government. Similarly the Kunming SLB is subordinate to the 
provincial SLB and the provincial government. In practice, of these two 
“masters” the local government is the strongest, because it controls the 
bureau’s budget and leadership appointments (see next sections). 28  The 
Dianchi Management Bureau (DMB) is different: it is a local bureau, solely 
subordinate to the Kunming government and has the same rank of a city 
district. It is fully funded by the municipal government and not subordinate 
to any functional department. 
The lack of vertical “reach” within China’s functional bureaucracy 
has been cause for concern.29 Some have wondered whether the Chinese 
central government and its departments could still control the local 
bureaucracies. 30  In response to these concerns, in the 1990s, the central 
leadership embarked on experiments with partial recentralization. The first 
was to set up a parallel tax bureau structure of deconcentrated centrally 
funded and controlled bureaus in addition to the existing locally funded tax 
branches. 31  Moreover, the ongoing failure to implement arable land 
protection law has caused central leadership to initiate a similar reform in the 
land management bureaus. In this reform, called the “vertical management 
reform”, the provincial level’s control over land management and 
enforcement is to be strengthened.32 The reform has just started, but from 
                                                     
27  Saich, Governance and Politics of China. Lieberthal, Governing China, From Revolution through 
Reform. 
28 Most literature on environmental enforcement in China recognizes these issues. See fro 
example Jahiel, "The Contradictory Impact of Reform on Environmental Protection in 
China." Jahiel, "The Organization of Environmental Protection in China." Sinkule and 
Ortolano, Implementing Environmental Policy in China. Ma and Ortolano, Environmental Regulation in 
China.  
29 S. Wang, "The Rise of the Regions: Fiscal Reform and the Decline of the Central State 
Capacity in China," in The Waning of the Communist State: Economic Origins of Political Decline in 
China and Hungary, ed. A G Walder (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). S. Wang 
and A. Hu, The Chinese Economy in Crisis: State Capacity and Tax Reform (Boulder: Westview Press, 
2001). White III, Unstately power, Vol. 1, Local causes of China's economic reforms. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Wang and Hu, The Chinese Economy in Crisis: State Capacity and Tax Reform. 228 
32 In general see Ye, "Zui Yange de Gengdi Baohu Zhidu Shi Shenmo, Cong Bashi Nian de 
Tudi Guanlishi Kan Woguo Tudi Guanli Tizhi, Zhengce Fazhan Bianhua Yu Hexin Qushi 
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Kunming we know that there the lowest levels of land management 
administration, city district level bureaus were converted into offices directly 
subordinate to the municipal level SLB, which will allocate their resources 
and appoint their personnel.33 So at this moment, apart from this new reform, 
for all three bureaus we can still say that a combination of local autonomy of 
the local governments and their control over most local state bureaucracies 
has created the opportunity for local resistance to national legislation.  
So why have local governments, from township to provincial levels, 
engaged in local protectionism? Surprisingly, most scholarship has ignored 
this important question. Our findings demonstrate that the answer is that 
there are conflicting interests between the formal goals of the laws involved 
(i.e. natural resource protection) and the social and economic interests in the 
local context. As we saw in Part I and II, China’s central legislator has made 
legislation that is partly against local interests. The Land Management Act, 
for example, if strictly implemented, would limit local development 
opportunities in Kunming because it restricts construction of industries, 
roads and houses needed for growth. Furthermore, land development has 
been a major source of local government income34. For environmental law 
this is the same. Some of the provisions in the WPPCL, APPCL, the EIA 
Act and the DPR, when fully implemented would have a negative effect on 
Kunming’s phosphor industry or restaurant sector for example, and would 
thus affect local livelihoods. In Part II we saw, that local economic growth 
occurred in Kunming partly in violation of the LMA’s arable land protection 
regulations. These regulations were not suitable for such a rapidly developing 
peri-urban context. Kunming’s industrial growth was largely at odds with 
environmental protection. Industrial sectors such as phosphor production or 
the paper industry developed while environmental law was weak or weakly 
enforced. For the paper industry, once enforcement became stricter, the 
sector was nearly extinguished in peri-urban Kunming. Phosphor production, 
which forms the most important source of income in Kouxiang Township, 
continued while violating Beijing’s pollution laws. Without alternatives, the 
local need for violating, but dominant sources of income has been so high 
                                                                                                                        
(What is the Strictest System to Protect Arable Land, Looking at Developments, Changes and 
Core Trends in China's Land Management System and Policies from an Historical Perspective 
from the 1980s)." 6 
33 Based on an interview with the Kunming SLB, Personnel Department 3 December 2004. 
This is also what the State Council Notice of 2004 orders SLBs to do. See S. Council, 
Guowuyuan Guanyu Zuohao Shengji Yixia Guotuziyuan Guanli Tizhi Gaige Youguan Wenti de Tongzhi 
(State Council Notice on Solving Problems Related to the Management Reform of State Land Management 
Institutions Below the Provincial Level) (Chinalawinfo.com, 2004 [cited 20 September 2005 2005]); 
available from http://law/chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/SLC.asp?Db=chl&Gid=53188. 
34 Ho and Lin, "Emerging Land Markets in Rural and Urban China: Policies and Practices." 
694 
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that local governments and even local communities, if completely depended 
on such industries, condoned their violations. There seems to be a logic to 
local protectionism: without it Beijing’s national legislation would adversely 
affect local livelihoods and dominant local sources of income.35 
Why do local governments care for short-term local development 
more than for the long-term interests of the national level resource 
protection legislation? In other words, how does the conflict of interests 
affect local governments? The answer to these questions is twofold. First, 
local policy prioritization is rooted in the local social, economic and political 
context. From this perspective the answer to why local governments care 
more for short-term local economic and social development than for the 
long-term interests of natural resource protection law is that local 
development provides local resources and legitimacy that help to strengthen 
their position. The local government itself stands to benefit directly from 
local short-term profits of locally owned 36  and/or taxed businesses. 37  In 
addition, such funds are necessary for maintaining the local bureaucracy on 
which a large part of the local government’s power is based. Furthermore, 
and this point is less recognized in the literature, local development is 
necessary for guaranteeing support of local stakeholders, from farmers to 
entrepreneurs.38 Such support, we believe, is essential for the operation of 
local government, even in a country where there is no direct open 
participation in the political arena.  
China’s vertical management system, which emphasizes economic 
growth and social stability, provides a second perspective for understanding 
local priority for short-term growth. Under this system, local governments 
                                                     
35 Before we continue, we must admit though that the conflicts of interests have not been 
absolute in Kunming. This is clearest for environmental regulation. Now that Kunming has 
started to develop alternatives for its industrial sector, through the development of flower 
industry and service industries including tourism, protecting the environment actually fosters 
economic development. However, for those areas in which such alternatives have not (yet) 
developed the underlying conflict of interests remains a strong influence. The data presented 
in Table 1 provide support for this point. Similarly, our fieldwork findings support the 
hypothesis we made above based on the data in Table 1: economic underdevelopment 
correlates with weak natural resource protection enforcement in China.   
36 Although reforms have addressed this issue and have tried to separate enterprises from 
governments, old ties remain influential. Furthermore while the management has been 
separated, the ownership remains governmental and so do the profits or losses the enterprise 
makes. For the link between ownership and weak enforcement see S. Liu, "Obstacles of the 
Environmental Law Enforcement System and their Countermeasures (Huanjing Zhifa Tizhi 
Zhuangai ji qi Xiaochu Duice)," Environmental Protection, no. 1 (2000). 1 
37 Swanson et al. provide an example of how this has influenced enforcement action in rural 
Zhejiang. See Swanson, Kuhn, and Xu, "Environmental Policy Implementation in Rural 
China: A Case Study of Yuhang, Zhejiang." 486, 489 
38 Liu, "Obstacles of the Environmental Law Enforcement System and their Countermeasures 
(Huanjing Zhifa Tizhi Zhuangai ji qi Xiaochu Duice)." 1 
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are evaluated based on certain performance indicators. If they do well local 
leaders can get bonuses and promotions if they fail they may be fined.39 In 
the evaluation system (kaohe), economic growth and social stability are always 
the two main yardsticks against which success or failure are measured.40 The 
evaluation system is the exception to the rule that China’s center has little 
vertical reach:41 for a limited amount of policy areas, including economic 
growth and social stability, the center does have control over localities by 
using this vertical management system. Thus, local governments, Kunming is 
no exception, are always evaluated based on their economic and social 
performance.42 Bureau leadership at both the Kunming EPB and the SLB 
have stated that such kaohe has made local governments look more at 
economic and social development instead of environmental and arable land 
protection.43  
In Kunming, as the case studies in Part II have shown, and as the 
following sections will further elaborate, preference for short-term local 
economic and social development has been apparent. Local governments, 
from township to municipal, have opted repeatedly to let enterprises and 
housing take priority over the protection of arable land, air and water. In 
sum, local governments may sometimes stand to benefit from a sub-
optimum enforcement of natural resource protection law and they may use 
their power over enforcement bureaus to influence their enforcement. 
Subsequent sections will detail how exactly this works in practice and what 
other variables add to the existing problems.  
How Internal Organizational Factors Influence Enforcement 
Agencies 
Understanding why law enforcement has been so weak in Kunming and how 
this problem is related to local protectionism requires understanding the 
internal structures of the three bureaus, the EPB, SLB and DMB, and their 
relation to the local government introduced above. So far, most scholarship 
has failed to open up such law enforcement agencies’ “black boxes” and to 
analyze law enforcement bureaus as complex organizations instead of as 
                                                     
39 For more detail see B.K.P. Chou, "Implementing the Reform of Performance Apraisal in 
China's Civil Service," China Information XIX, no. 1 (2005). 45-7 
40  Huang, "Central-Local relations in China During the reform Era: The Economic and 
Institutional Dimensions." Edin, "State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP 
Cadre Management from a Township Perspective." For the link between this and weak 
enforcement see Liu, "Obstacles of the Environmental Law Enforcement System and their 
Countermeasures (Huanjing Zhifa Tizhi Zhuangai ji qi Xiaochu Duice)." 1 
41  K.-y. Tsui and Y. Wang, "Between Seperate Stoves and a Single Menu: Fiscal 
Decentralization in China," China Quarterly  (2004). 72, 75-76 
42 Saich, Governance and Politics of China. 157-8 
43 Based on interviews with Kunming EPB and Kunming SLB officials autumn 2004.  
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singular actors.44 This section will analyze the three enforcement bureaus in 
Kunming. First, it will look at goals and resources, and then it will look at the 
internal structure and internal management procedures.  
Goals have become Displaced because of the Origin and Lack of 
Resources 
Although all three bureaus’ primary goals45 bear a close relation to the goals of 
the LMA, the APPCL, the WPPCL and the Dianchi Management 
Regulations (as discussed in Part II), resource restrictions have caused goal 
displacement.   
Primary goals look so good on paper. The Kunming EPB’s newly 
published brochure on its internal functioning states: “The Kunming EPB 
was established in December 1979 and it is the city government’s most 
important environmental department. Its main tasks are: 1 Implementing 
National Environmental Policy, Laws, Regulations, Administrative Decrees 
and Standards…”46 The Kunming SLB’s website is similar as it states that the 
Kunming land bureau’s main task includes the “Dissemination and 
implementation of National, Provincial and Municipal State Land 
Management laws and regulation.” 47  The Dianchi Management Bureau 
(DMB)’s website finally informs us that the bureau should “Propagate and 
Implement Relevant National laws and regulation and the Dianchi 
Protection Regulations and supervise the enforcement of the Dianchi 
management administrative enforcement unit.”48 
In practice, the bureaus have trouble meeting their primary goals. 
The origin of bureaus’ resources has caused goal displacement. The first 
manner in which the resources’ origin influences goal displacement is 
because they come from the local government that cares for more than just 
natural resource protection.49 This is the clearest for Kunming’s local EPBs 
at district and perhaps even at the municipal level. As we saw above, EPBs 
are paid by the local government at their level of administration. Thus, the 
                                                     
44 In contrast with this method of research, Seidman et al. warn that organizations should not 
be studied as if they were singular actors. See Seidman and Seidman, State and Law in the 
Development Process. A notable exception is Lo and Fryxell, "Enforcement Styles Among 
Environmental Protection Officials in China." and Sinkule and Ortolano, Implementing 
Environmental Policy in China. 
45 Wilson, Bureaucracy, what government agencies do and why they do it. 
46 Kunming Environmental Protection Bureau, Zhengwu Kongkai Shouce (Publication Leaflet on 
Public Affairs) (Kunming: Kunming Environmental Protection Bureau, 2003). 9 
47 http://www.kmpg.gov.cn/kmland/intro.asp 
48 http://www.dianchi.gov.cn/docc/about.htm 
49 Compare with Sinkule and Ortolano, Implementing Environmental Policy in China., Tang et al., 
"Institutional Constraints on Environmental Management in Urban China: Environmental 
Impact Assessment in Guangzhou and Shanghai." 868 
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Kunming EPB is funded by the Kunming government, and the Diandong 
and Dianxi District EPBs by the Diandong and Dianxi District governments. 
By controlling enforcement budgets, local governments have been able to 
exercise control over local regulatory agencies and engage in local 
protectionism. EPB officials have told me confidentially that the fact that 
their EPB gets all of its funds from the local government, has enabled this 
government to exercise considerable influence on their bureau. Officials at 
the land bureaus have told me a similar story. Township land offices, for 
example, used to be managed and funded directly by the township 
government. Under this structure, the land offices failed to play a pro-active 
role as agencies detecting and reporting illegal land practices. The township 
land office followed its township government closely, and made land 
management subordinate to local economic development and social 
stability.50 As one SLB agent said: “The land office would be crazy to bite the 
hand that feeds it.” Since the 2003 vertical management reform, the offices 
have become directly managed by the district SLB, however part of the staff 
is still paid locally. According to KMSLB staff, vertical management reforms 
have not yet been successful because they have failed to change funding 
structures fully. 
A second reason why the origin of bureau resources may lead to 
goal displacement is that part of the bureau’s resources is derived from 
continued violations of law. This problem is most apparent for EPBs. The 
Kunming EPB, for example, depends for 30% of its resources on pollution 
discharge fees. The bureau collects such fees as part of their work to 
implement national law. Fees are paid based on how much pollution 
enterprises discharge. EPBs are thus dependent on continued pollution, 
without which they are no longer able to pay for 30% of their staff.51 The 
Kunming SLB shows similar problems. Its enforcement department has a 
staff of 22, of which only 16 are paid for through regular funds. 52  The 
problem is historical; when EPBs were established in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, environmental protection was a novelty lacking strong local support. 
The newly established bureaus soon faced tasks they could never accomplish 
with the limited staff they had been assigned officially. EPBs nationwide 
have been creative in using the pollution fees, the 1979 EP law and later 
legislation allowed them to collect for paying extra staff. In Kunming regular 
                                                     
50 Based on an interview with Jiacun Township Land Office, 17 November 2004.  
51 See Ma and Ortolano for good examples from other regions in the 1990s and how this 
problem affected enforcement there. Ma and Ortolano, Environmental Regulation in China. 123-
126 Compare with Sun, "Controlling the Environmental Consequences of Power 
Development in the PRC." 1028 He argues that not just fees but also regular enforcement 
fines form part of the normal bureau budget causes enforcement agents to favor violations 
over compliance. 
52 Based on an interview with enforcement staff of the Kunming SLB. 
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EPB staff is now officially appointed (bianzhi) and paid for directly by the 
local government. Staff working at non-regular departments and part of the 
EPB material budget is paid through PDF fees. Cynically enough, the EPB’s 
enforcement work is carried out by one of such non-regular service 
departments (shiye danwei), the inspection and processing department 
(jianlisuo). Enforcement agents therefore depend on continued violations, a 
clear case of conflicting primary and contextual goals.53 This problem has 
received significant attention by scholars and practitioners.54 A recent reform, 
partly applied through new regulation 55 , fails to solve the fundamental 
contradiction though.  The reform forces EPBs to transfer all fees collected 
to the local government’s finance department. If the EPB wishes to use the 
fees for its own budget, it needs to apply with the finance department. 
Because most EPBs, like the KMEPB, are still significantly dependent on 
PDF funding, practice has remained much the same. The difference is that 
EPBs are now also dependent on the local government (through their 
dependency on the finance department) for the 30% of the budget they used 
to control themselves in the past. Of course, it is true that if the local 
government actively supports natural resource protection, such as in 
Guangzhou, the PDF reform can strengthen the EPB’s financial condition.56 
However if the local government is more concerned with maintaining 
economic growth and social stability even if this is at odds with 
environmental protection, the results will be the exact opposite. Concluding, 
the reform has strengthened local protectionism, without changing existing 
EPB pollution dependency.57 
An absolute lack of resources has been another reason why the three 
bureaus have not always been able to do what their brochures or websites 
say they should do.58 Excuse or not, the Kunming EPB’s first reaction to the 
                                                     
53 Except for pollution levies bureaus have also come to depend on consultancy work for 
enterprises, for example advice about EIA requirements. Often this work is conducted by 
semi-independent service units. Such units are linked with the bureau though and the bureau’s 
funds are thus partly linked with the polluting enterprise. See Tang et al., "Institutional 
Constraints on Environmental Management in Urban China: Environmental Impact 
Assessment in Guangzhou and Shanghai." 871-2 
54 Ma and Ortolano, Environmental Regulation in China. Jahiel, "The Contradictory Impact of 
Reform on Environmental Protection in China." 96-98 
55 § 4 State Council Regulation on the Use of Pollution Discharge Fees, 2003 
56  C.W.H. Lo and S.-Y. Tang, "Institutional Reform, Economic Changes and Local 
Environmental Management," Environmental Politics  (2006 (Fothcoming)). 
57 Here we are less positive than Lo and Tang. Compare with Ibid. 
58 Compare with Sinkule and Ortolano, Implementing Environmental Policy in China. 69, Jahiel, 
"The Organization of Environmental Protection in China." 59, Lo, Yip, and Cheung, "The 
Regulatory Style of Environmental Governance in China: The Case of EIA in Shanghai." 314, 
Swanson, Kuhn, and Xu, "Environmental Policy Implementation in Rural China: A Case 
Study of Yuhang, Zhejiang." 487 
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nationwide coverage of the Tanglang River pollution scandal (see Chapter 
10), was that they lack the resource capacity to find violations of law.59 
Nationwide, an absolute staff shortage has limited the EPBs’ violation 
detection capabilities.60 Agents at the Kunming SLB and the DLB have also 
complained that their resources are insufficient compared to the bureau 
workload.61 We can analyze the bureau’s resources first by looking at the 
financial resources. The best indicator of financial resources, while lacking 
data on the bureaus’ budgets, is their number of staff. The best data available 
is that of EPB staff, as SEPA has published detailed figures on bureau staff 
nationwide. Table 2 below contains data for all of China’s provinces, except 
Hainan and Tibet. The data are both absolute as well as in relation to the 
total amount of main pollution.  
 
Province Staff Staff/Poll  Province Staff Staff/Poll 
Jilin 4929 71,4  Shaanxi 5344 27,7 
Henan 18396 66,9  Qinghai 620 27,0 
Hubei 8401 54,9  Zhejiang 4575 26,3 
Beijing 1517 52,3  China 156542 24,8 
Liaoning 8739 48,0  Hunan 7128 23,4 
Tianjin 1703 42,6  Gansu 2749 20,1 
Fujian 3306 42,4  Yunnan 3259 16,5 
Guangdong 9365 41,6  Xinjiang 2588 15,9 
Shanghai 2038 41,6  Neimenggu 3626 13,9 
Heilongjiang 3979 39,8  Sichuan 5728 13,8 
Anhui 4769 37,8  Ningxia 670 9,6 
Jiangsu 9074 35,9  Shanxi 8489 9,4 
Hebei 11238 34,0  Guangxi 2910 7,9 
Shandong 10887 32,6  Chongqing 1826 7,2 
Jiangxi 3700 32,2  Guizhou 2074 4,9 
 
 Table 2 Number of EPB Staff and Staff in Relation to Five Main Pollution Indicators.62 
 
Yunnan EPB’s staff pollution ratio is significantly lower than that of 
China, and as Table 2 demonstrates, is amongst the lowest of China in 
general. Table 2 shows that provinces below China’s average staff/pollution 
ratio are all located in the less developed areas of Western China. Finally, if 
we read Table 2 together with the enforcement/pollution ratios in Table 1 
                                                     
59 CCTV, "Jinri Shuofa" Fushi de Beihou ("Talking of Law Today" Corrosion's Background) ([cited). 
60 Swanson, Kuhn, and Xu, "Environmental Policy Implementation in Rural China: A Case 
Study of Yuhang, Zhejiang." 488 
61 Based on interviews with KMSLB and DMB staff.  
62 SEPA, Zhongguo Huanjing Tongji Nianbao 2003 (China Environment Statistical Report 2003). 
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we see that there is some sort of connection between the staff/pollution 
ratio and the enforcement/pollution ratio. Taking into account the 
untrustworthy nature of these data (see above) and the fact that enforcement 
is much too complicated to be analyzed in comparing a mere two variables, 
the data seem to indicate that there is a correlation between the 
staff/pollution ratio and the enforcement/pollution ratio. Thus, these data 
help to support our Kunming informants’ statements that a lack of staff has 
caused sub-optimum enforcement.  
The reason why the EPBs in poorer areas of China lack staff is 
obviously related to the ability and willingness of local governments to 
provide their funding. Local governments in less developed areas of China 
have not invested as much in their EPBs, perhaps because they lack such 
resources, or perhaps because they fear that strong EPBs would not be 
beneficial to local development or other local interests.  
In Kunming, the municipal SLB enforcement division has been 
trying to get more staff and has applied for funding with their government to 
increase the officially assigned bianzhi staff. So far, without success though. 
In contrast with the understaffed EPB and SLB, the Kunming government 
has been generous in its recent funding of DMB staff, enlarging its total 
enforcement staff from 40 to 110 a near 300% increase.  
However, the case of the DMB shows the next problem of funding: 
material budgets. Staff can only work if it has the equipment to do so. 
Natural resource protection law enforcement requires transportation. All 
three bureaus have complained that they lack cars to let their personnel carry 
out a maximum amount of inspections. The municipal level DMB, which has 
a relatively large amount of enforcement staff, 40 fully paid bianzhi, only has 
four cars.63 Furthermore, it does not get sufficient funding to operate its cars. 
For each car assigned, it gets 12.000 RMB annually for insurance, repairs and 
gas. According to an informant: “This money is not nearly sufficient to use 
our cars on a daily basis, as we should for making the most effective use of 
the staff we have.”64 Of course, with only one car for every ten enforcement 
agents, the bureau cannot make full use of its staff no matter how much gas 
it has.  
Of the three bureaus, the EPB seems to be most pressed for 
resources. The Kunming municipal EPB headquarters is located in one of 
the city’s drabbest areas in a run-down building that badly needs a paint job. 
Most offices lack computers, and the computers available are old. In stark 
contrast, the municipal SLB’s staff is happy in its recently renovated building. 
Marble floors welcome visitors on the ground floor, and luxurious and 
                                                     
63 Based on an interview with DMB enforcement staff, 17 September 2004. 
64 Based on an interview with DMB enforcement staff, 15 November 2004. 
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spacious offices are found on the floors above. All rooms visited had the 
newest computers and shining comfortable furniture. The DMB, similarly, 
has a new building with a modern architecture shaped like a laying arch made 
of glass. The offices, though small, are new and complete with computers. 
  
 
 Table 3 Level of Staff Education at EPBs65 
 
All bureaus have had problems in attracting the right kind of staff. 
In the post-Cultural Revolution 1980s and early 1990s, China, and especially 
peripheral provinces such as Yunnan, did not have a high amount of 
university graduates at Bachelors (benke), let alone Masters (suoshi) level. The 
EPBs and the predecessors of the SLBs were established during this period. 
Therefore, they had to start by employing staff with a lower level of 
education, at most with professional two-year degrees (dazhuan) or several 
years of working experience. 66  Recently, staff educational standards have 
been raised, especially for enforcement personnel. First, all new staff must 
have passed the civil servants exam, for which a Bachelors education is 
compulsory. Enforcement agents also need an enforcement permit, which 
                                                     
65 SEPA, Zhongguo Huanjing Tongji Nianbao 2003 (China Environment Statistical Report 2003). 
66  Compare with Li, "China's Compliance with WTO Requirements Will Improve the 
Efficiency and Effective Implementation of Environmental Laws in China." 167, Tang et al., 
"Institutional Constraints on Environmental Management in Urban China: Environmental 














Ningxia 12,4 21,0 66,6  China 4,7 14,7 80,6 
Tianjin 11,3 17,1 71,6  Jiangxi 4,4 11,7 83,9 
Beijing 10,6 27,4 62,0  Hubei 4,3 18,6 77,1 
Heilongjiang 9,1 18,9 71,9  Neimenggu 4,2 17,8 78,0 
Zhejiang 7,9 22,1 70,0  Sichuan 3,8 14,1 82,1 
Shanghai 7,6 31,3 61,1  Xinjiang 3,8 13,2 83,0 
Guangxi 7,0 25,2 67,9  Guizhou 3,7 12,6 83,7 
Liaoning 6,3 17,3 76,3  Guangdong 3,4 14,4 82,2 
Jilin 6,1 16,3 77,6  Hainan 3,3 9,7 87,0 
Fujian 6,1 20,8 73,1  Hebei 3,2 8,4 88,4 
Chongqing 5,6 17,0 77,3  Hunan 3,1 13,7 83,2 
Yunnan 5,6 19,4 75,0  Gansu 2,4 9,0 88,7 
Anhui 5,3 13,4 81,3  Shanxi 2,0 11,9 86,1 
Shandong 5,2 14,5 80,3  Shaanxi 2,0 7,8 90,2 
Jiangsu 5,0 22,3 72,7  Henan 1,4 6,7 91,9 
Qinghai 5,0 21,6 73,4  Xizang 1,4 3,6 95,1 
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requires extra education.67 The Kunming SLB, perhaps because it seems to 
have more status and authority than the EPB and the DLB, has recently 
been able to attract two new enforcement agents with a Masters degree. 
Meanwhile, the EPB, which seems to have the lowest status among the three 
bureaus, has had more trouble getting young well educated staff for starter 
positions. To provide a comparative overview Table 3 contains data on EPB 
staff levels of education. We see that provinces with a low enforcement ratio 
do not necessarily have fewer higher educated staff. Ningxia for example, 
scores low in terms of enforcement performance (See Table 1) but has the 
highest amount of higher and middle level educated staff (Table 3). 
Moreover, we see that Yunnan’s EPB staff level of education is above 
country average. Perhaps this is so because the Yunnan EPBs have been 
established relatively late. 
The bureaus have been dissatisfied with their recent recruitment 
though. One middle level manager at the DMB explains that their 
enforcement division wanted to recruit new agents, preferably males. 
“Enforcement work requires going into the field on inspections all day, we 
believe that male enforcement agents are better suited for this job than 
females.” Cynically enough, female students score better on the civil servants 
exams and the bureau has been forced to hire seven female and only one 
male recruit recently.  
Recent stricter requirements in administrative procedures further 
forced all three bureaus to favor recruits with a law degree. In the past, the 
bureaus did not recruit many lawyers. The EPB for example mainly had 
environmental scientists.68 “Attracting law graduates is not easy though”, one 
of my EPB informants explains, “Yunnan has no special courses in 
environmental law and most generally educated lawyers want to become 
solicitors, judges or prosecutors.”69  
At this moment the three bureaus are in a transitional phase in 
which their enforcement staff is becoming a more homogenously 
professionalized group of legal specialists. Whether this influences 
enforcement practices remains to be seen.70 In prior research in Sichuan, a 
municipal vice-director did explain to me that there is a big difference 
between enforcement staff with a non-environmental degree and staff with 
an environmental science education. The latter, in contrast with the former, 
                                                     
67 Based on interviews with KMEPB, KMSLB and DMB enforcement and personnel staff, 
autumn 2004. 
68 Here the Kunming EPB is different from those in Zhejiang studied by Swanson et al. See 
Swanson, Kuhn, and Xu, "Environmental Policy Implementation in Rural China: A Case 
Study of Yuhang, Zhejiang." 487 
69 Based on an interview with two Kunming EPB managers, 22 October 2004. 
70 We saw in Chapter 12 that professionalization has had a big impact on enforcement in the 
US’s FCC and TVA.  
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will enforce the law much more strictly while disregarding non-
environmental concerns such as economic development and social stability.71 
Internal Structure and Procedures provide Weak Incentives for Job 
Conformity 
Weak personnel incentives and controls also help explain Kunming’s 
enforcement performance. The internal structure and management 
procedures in all three bureaus are insufficient to ensure job conformity of 
enforcement agents. Consequently bureaus risk that their agents shirk their 
duties. Furthermore, the enforcement bureaus are largely centrally managed 
institutions in which the bureau’s leadership has a final (direct or indirect) 
influence on almost all (except for their own positions) major personnel 
decisions. This has strengthened local protectionism, because local 
governments, through their power on appointing the bureau leadership, have 
a strong indirect influence on all bureau personnel decisions. This sub-
section will first discuss hiring personnel, then it will look at decisions on 
salaries and finally shortly at promotions.  
In the decision-making on hiring staff, the bureau leadership and the 
local government exercise considerable influence. For lower, starter positions, 
all three bureaus hire externally, preferably recent graduates. The recruitment 
procedure starts by filing an application with the local government’s 
Department of Personnel Affairs that will place an advertisement and let 
candidates do a civil service examination.72 As we saw, the bureaus are forced 
to take the candidates that score highest on the civil service exam. China’s 
civil service system has aimed to professionalize the bureaucracies, requiring 
objective recruitment standards and eliminating advantageous opportunities 
for the well connected. Although one can be skeptical of how this ideal is 
realized in China’s context of influential personal networks (guanxi),73 the 
                                                     
71  Based on an interview with a vice-director of a municipal EPB in Sichuan Province, 
summer 2002.  
72 For more information on the Chinese civil service system see: J.P. Burns, "The Civil Service 
System of the People's Republic of China" (paper presented at the Civil Service Systems in 
Comparative Perspective, Bloomington, Indiana, April 5-8, 1997 1997). and J.P. Burns, 
"Changing Environmental Impacts on Civil Service Systems: The Cases of China and Hong 
Kong," in Handbook of Comparative Public Administration in the Asia-Pacific Basin, ed. H Wong and 
H S Chan (New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1999). 
73  Y. Bian, "Guanxi and the allocation of urban jobs in China," China Quarterly 140, no. 
December (1994), T. Gold, "After comradeship: personal relationships in China since the 
Cultural Revolution," China Quarterly 104, no. December (1985), D. Guthrie, "The Declining 
Significance of Guanxi in China's Economic Transition," China Quarterly 154 (1998), A.B. 
Kipnis, Producing Guanxi (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), P.B. Potter, "Guanxi 
and the PRC Legal System: From Contradiction to Complementarity," in Developing Civil Society 
in China: From Rule by Law Toward Rule of Law, ed. P B Potter and M W Dowdle (Washington, 
D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2000), A.G. Walder, Communist 
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DLB’s failure to recruit male enforcement agents also shows that the new 
objective standards cannot be discarded easily in practice.  
For intermediate and higher functions (all those except the top 
leadership positions), the EPBs and the SLBs will try to find internal 
candidates. Finding a new EPB processing and inspection department 
(jianlisuo) head, for example, involves an internal procedure. First all bureau 
staff write down the name of a person they think is most apt to fill that 
position. Then the bureau leadership will make a final choice amongst the 
qualified candidates on this list. The appointment of the DMB head of 
enforcement is different, because the enforcement bureau is not subordinate 
to the DMB but directly to the Kunming government, which directly 
appoints the enforcement leadership.  
All three bureaus have a rotational system for such intermediate 
positions, which means that all departmental leaders will have to change 
positions every two or three years. Such a rotational system has a significant 
impact on enforcement work. Every two or three years a new enforcement 
leader is appointed. Such a new leader does not necessarily have prior legal 
or enforcement working experience. Hence, the rotation of leadership 
prevents the development of a professionalized culture, as different leaders 
have different educational and working experience backgrounds. How this 
exactly affects law enforcement is not yet clear from the present research. 
Rotation may help to prevent capture of the whole enforcement department 
by the regulated actor, because new leadership has no prior connections with 
the regulated actors.74 However, rotation may also lead to a constant lack of 
experienced leadership and to new leaders without sufficient understanding 
of the complexities of dealing with the regulated actor. Furthermore, new 
leaders may have more trouble establishing the trust of their enforcement 
agents needed to stimulate good job performance, or worse the knowledge 
necessary to verify and control their job performance.  
 The third type of position for which there exists a specific method 
of hiring is that of bureau director and vice-director. For this position, 
candidates can be from within the organization or they may be external, 
from another governmental department. The local government has the 
authority to decide on the appointment. It makes the decision by establishing 
a committee for recruitment, which consists of relevant governmental 
                                                                                                                        
Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1986), Y. Yan, The Flow of Gifts: Reciprocity and Social Networks in a Chinese Village (Palo 
Alto, CA: Standford University Press, 1996), M. Yang, "Gifts, Favors, and Banquets: the Art 
of Social Relationships in China," Ithaca, NY Cornell University Press (1994), M. Yang, "The 
Resilience of Guanxi and its New Development: A Critique of Some New Guanxi 
Scholarship," China Quarterly 170, no. June (2002). 
74 Compare with Swanson, Kuhn, and Xu, "Environmental Policy Implementation in Rural 
China: A Case Study of Yuhang, Zhejiang." 489 
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leaders. In case of the EPB or the SLB, the decision is made after 
consultation with the superior functional department, the EPB or SLB at the 
higher level of administration. All leadership appointments must also be 
approved by the local CCP committee. Apart from the regular leadership, all 
three bureaus also have a CCP Party Secretary, who represents the CCP’s 
highest authority within the organization. Such a secretary is nominated by 
all bureau CCP members and then chosen from the nominees by the local 
CCP Committee.75 Through its leadership appointment the local government 
has a firm control over the three bureaus. Bureau leadership will show 
allegiance first and foremost to the leaders that have appointed him or her, 
especially because they also control the budget of the organization they 
manage. The allegiance to the local government is further strengthened 
because most career opportunities will also be controlled by the same 
government, in part through its use of the cadre management and the civil 
service evaluation systems (see below).  
The second personnel management system is staff salaries. The 
salaries of staff are decided by the bureaus’ personnel affairs department. 
The salary decisions are based on the personnel policy documents issued by 
the national Ministry of Personnel. The policy contains a detailed description 
of functions and appropriate salaries. For the SLB and the DMB for example, 
the basic salary ranges between 1000 and 2000 RMB/month.76 In the past, 
bureaus would provide housing for their staff. With the danwei (work unit) 
reforms, staff must now get their own housing. However, the bureau 
provides subsidies for its employees, such as a beneficial loan to buy housing, 
which means that most employees have little or no living expenses to pay.77 
To get an idea of the total amount of benefits employees have, an average 
EPB staffer gets about 30.000 RMB a year, which includes the basic salary, 
health insurance, pension funds and rent subsidies.78 The centrally dictated 
personnel rewards schemes have very flat scales that allow bureaus little in 
terms of job incentives through regular salaries. In the EPB for example, the 
difference between the bureau leader’s salary and a starting recruit is only 
7000 RMB on a yearly basis, 23% of the average income, and that for an 
extraordinary career, most never attain. Apart from this, the absolute amount 
of salary, while not low, is not high, especially considering the level of 
knowledge needed to carry out enforcement work. It is no understatement 
that the present salary system at the three bureaus provides staff no incentive 
                                                     
75 Based on an interview with the Kunming EPB CCP party secretary, 22 October 2004. 
76 Based on an interview with the Kunming SLB enforcement agent, 26 October 2004 and 
DMB enforcement agents 15 November 2004. 
77 Based on an interview with DMB enforcement agents 15 November 2004, Kunming EPB 
personnel management staff, 22 October 2004. 
78 Based on an interview with Kunming EPB personnel management staff, 22 October 2004. 
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for surplus work performance. Salaries improve annually, while bigger raises 
only occur through promotions. Direct superiors can arrange for staff 
promotion by applying with the bureau leadership. In fact, the bureau’s 
leadership has authority over all promotion decisions and thus exercises 
considerable power in personnel management affairs. As promotions only 
slightly affect income, they do not form strong incentives for good 
performance, it seems. 
The third personnel management system is the staff evaluation 
system (kaohe), which forms the basis for bonuses, promotions and 
dismissals. Under this system all personnel is evaluated annually by their 
direct superiors. Based on the evaluation, bureau management decides on 
performance of the past year, ranging from outstanding (youxiu), regular 
(chengzhi), to insufficient (buchengchi).79 The system is used for deciding on 
bonuses and demotions. Staff members that score outstanding for three 
years in a row are eligible for a bonus, which depending on the bureau ranges 
from several hundred RMB to one thousand RMB. Meanwhile, bureau 
agents who get an insufficient score three times in a row are supposed to be 
dismissed. On paper, the personnel evaluation system seems a strong tool to 
stimulate job performance. In practice, its effects have been disappointing. 
EPB and SLB personnel officers have informed me that the bonuses are too 
low to make people work harder to get an outstanding grade.80 Furthermore, 
three consecutive unsatisfactory evaluations rarely, if ever, occur.81 Perhaps 
the last is understandable because the superiors in charge of the evaluation 
system rotate every three years and therefore lack sufficient experience and 
knowledge to verify their staff’s work. Furthermore, as we will see in the 
proceeding section, enforcement work mainly takes place outside of the 
bureau, where the superior cannot see what agents do. This gives agents a 
large amount of discretion, and an opportunity to self-report in a fashion 
that pleases their boss back at the office.82 Without sufficient experience, 
such a superior will easily be duped to believe agents were successful in their 
work.  Furthermore success or failure of the work done is not easily 
measured because of the complex causal relationship between enforcement 
and compliance behavior (see Chapter 11).83 
                                                     
79 See Chou, "Implementing the Reform of Performance Apraisal in China's Civil Service." 
51-2 
80 Based on an interview with the Kunming SLB personnel department, 3 December 2004, 
Kunming EPB personnel department 22 October 2004. 
81 Ibid. Here Kunming is comparable to China in general. See Chou, "Implementing the 
Reform of Performance Apraisal in China's Civil Service." 52 
82  For this point see also Lo and Fryxell, "Enforcement Styles Among Environmental 
Protection Officials in China." 106 
83  Lo and Fryxell have tried to analyze the way in which China’s EPB officials define 
enforcement effectiveness and relate it to political and public support. However, they have 
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Concluding, Kunming’s natural resource enforcement bureaus have 
problems stimulating staff job performance. The rewarding system is too low 
and too flat, evaluation is difficult because of the job rotation and the nature 
of enforcement work, and bonus and sanction systems fail because they offer 
too little incentive or disincentive. Moreover, personnel management, based 
on national policy guidelines, does not offer middle level management 
sufficient tools to control their agents. The strongest personnel management 
systems are directly controlled by the bureau’s leadership, the local 
government and its personnel department. They decide on recruitment, and 
promotions. Thus, personnel management at these bureaus is centralized, 
which strengthens the local government’s influence on the bureau and its 
enforcement work. The actual enforcement procedure in practice, as we will 
see in the next section, exacerbates the centralist bureau mechanisms, while 
also allowing significant agent discretion at the bottom of the organization. 
Inspections: Resource Shortage and Local Protectionism Lead 
to Reactive and Cooperative Detection Practices 
Enforcement work first of all comprises of detecting violations. All three 
natural resource protection bureaus carry out inspection work. Bureaus at the 
lowest level of administration, carry out most inspections. For the EPB this 
is the district level EPB84, in our research the Diandong District, the Dianxi 
District and the Ningshi District EPBs. For the SLB, district level land 
bureaus used do most inspections; in our research, again the same districts 
are relevant. However, since the vertical management reforms, township 
level land bureaus have been delegated inspection authority. DMB inspection 
work is carried out by the district level Dianchi Management Offices, which 
are subordinate to the DMB and in the future the new township level 
Dianchi Management Stations may take over part of this work. 
Municipal, provincial and national bureaus also carry out inspections, 
though. They do so in order to verify the work of subordinate agencies. This 
is necessary because local bureaus may shirk their inspection work when 
local interests are at stake. A good example is the Tanglang FSS pollution 
case. The original inspection authority for these small enterprises was vested 
with the Dianxi District EPB. When local complaints reached national media, 
and the reporters found that so far enforcement had been lax, the Kunming 
and even the Yunnan provincial EPBs immediately carried out their own 
                                                                                                                        
not tried to define what is effective enforcement and how it can be measured.  Instead they 
have left the interpretations of such definitions to their respondents. See C.W.H. Lo and G.E. 
Fryxell, "Governmental and Societal Support for Environmental Enforcement in China: An 
Empirical Study of in Guangzhou," Journal of Development Studies 41, no. 4 (2005). 
84 Based on an interview with the Kunming EPB Processing and Inspection Department Vice 
Director, 10 September 2004. 
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inspections, fearing that the Dianxi EPB had shirked its work in order to 
protect local industry in the region. For arable land enforcement, the 
problem of local protectionism is also relevant.85 In Jiacun Township for 
example, the newly reformed SLB Township office is worried about its new 
inspection responsibility. As one of the agents told me, “In the past our 
work was easy, we just did what our Township government wanted, but now 
we have to inspect for the District SLB and they do not want to consider our 
local conditions. We fear that there will be conflicts between our new 
superiors and our local leaders.” The vertical management reform has not 
taken away the conflict of interests that lies at the heart of local 
protectionism so it seems. For arable land inspections, the vertical 
management reform is risky. It places great authority with the Township 
bureau that for years has been part of the Township government and still 
partly depends on it for funding.  
 
Province Complaints Compl/Poll  Province Complaints Compl/Poll 
Shanghai 76385 1558,9  Ningxia 4958 70,8 
Beijing 12803 441,5  Jiangxi 7989 69,5 
Tianjin 17384 434,6  Sichuan 27299 65,6 
Guangdong 68800 305,8  Gansu 7903 57,7 
Fujian 20763 266,2  Hebei 16868 51,0 
Jiangsu 61459 242,9  Hunan 15155 49,7 
Jilin 16379 237,4  Guangxi 17128 46,4 
Zhejiang 39046 224,4  Xinjiang 6987 42,9 
Chongqing 38707 151,8  Yunnan 8278 41,8 
Liaoning 27520 151,2  Shaanxi 7882 40,8 
Heilongjiang 13148 131,5  Neimenggu 7912 30,4 
Hubei 18197 118,9  Henan 8267 30,1 
Shandong 36291 108,7  Qinghai 398 17,3 
China 611016 96,6  Guizhou 5022 11,8 
Anhui 10315 81,9  Shanxi 5847 6,5 
Table 4 Number of Pollution related Complaints and Complaints in Relation to Five Main  
 Pollution Indicators86 
 
Kunming inspectors have first coped with their lack in human and 
material resources through reactive enforcement techniques.87 This means 
                                                     
85 For general examples from China see Ho and Lin, "Emerging Land Markets in Rural and 
Urban China: Policies and Practices." 694. They argue that the new LMA would solve the 
existing problems, our research however shows that a mere change of law in the books fails to 
affect law in action, at least not in Kunming. 
86 SEPA, Zhongguo Huanjing Tongji Nianbao 2003 (China Environment Statistical Report 2003). 
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that they carry out inspections based on citizen complaints. Engaging the 
public in enforcement work helps to make efficient use of scarce 
enforcement resources. 88  Citizens become informal inspection staff, 
providing direct information about local violations not readily available to 
agents. 89  Furthermore, complaint driven inspections help the bureaus to 
focus on those violations that have the largest social impact. Nationwide data 
on pollution complaints, as portrayed in Table 4, on complaints shows that 
provinces with a large number of complaints in relation to pollution, also 
have more enforcement action (for this compare Table 4 with Table 1).  
However, a reactive complaint driven inspection strategy is not 
without problems. Wheeler and Dasgupta’s study of the impact of 
complaints on environmental enforcement in China demonstrates that 
complaints only help to detect the most visible violations and those with the 
greatest effect on general welfare.90 Our research adds to their argument. In 
Part III we saw that Baocun’s farmers were too dependent on local industry 
to complain about their pollution. As a result, Huafei could continue its 
nightly discharges undetected. For arable land violations in Jiacun Township, 
complaint driven detection strategies also do not work, as most local citizens 
stand to benefit from the illegal land practices in the village. The data in 
Table 4 show that for pollution there will be less complaints in the lesser 
developed areas of Western China, reaffirming the hypothesis that natural 
resource law enforcement is more difficult in a context of underdevelopment. 
In such a context, we can wonder whether more public participation in the 
implementation process would benefit natural resource protection.91  
In recent years, Kunming’s natural resource protection enforcement 
bureaus have started to prioritize their pro-active enforcement work. Pro-
                                                                                                                        
87 Based on interviews with the Kunming EPB Processing and Inspection Department Vice 
Director, 10 September 2004, the SLB Enforcement Department Director, 26 October 2004. 
88 Dasgupta et al.’s study also found a positive correlation between complaints and inspections. 
Dasgupta et al., "Industrial Environmental Performance in China, The Impact of 
Inspections." 3 See also Johnson, Clear Water, Blue Skies: China's Environment in the New Century. 
61 
89 For an example where EPBs actually tried to make citizens informal inspection staff, see the 
Chapter 14. 
90  Dasgupta and Wheeler, Citizen complaints as environmental indicators: evidence from China, 
Dasgupta et al., "Industrial Environmental Performance in China, The Impact of 
Inspections." 
91 Compare with Swanson, Kuhn, and Xu, "Environmental Policy Implementation in Rural 
China: A Case Study of Yuhang, Zhejiang.", Lo and Leung, "Environmental Agency and 
Public Opinion in Guangzhou: The Limits of a Popular Approach to Environmental 
Governance." 679, Lo, Yip, and Cheung, "The Regulatory Style of Environmental 
Governance in China: The Case of EIA in Shanghai." 313-4, Tang, Tang, and Lo, "Public 
Participation and Environmental Impact Assessment in Mainland China and Taiwan: Political 
Foundations of Environmental Management." 24 
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active enforcement means regular inspections at suspected sites of violations. 
For violations that are easily visible, such as illegal construction on arable 
land, air pollution or illegal land reclamation at Lake Dianchi, inspections can 
be carried out by driving through a certain area and observing any irregular 
activities. The SLB and the DMB have made schedules of areas to inspect by 
car.92 For less visible violations, such as illegal water pollution discharges, 
inspections need to get close to the source of the illegal activity. For water 
pollution, this means that EPBs need to carry out regular inspections inside 
factory premises. The bureaus’ lack of resources has forced them to 
prioritize which sites to inspect. Prioritization has been most influential for 
pollution inspections by EPB agents. For these bureaus, it seems that 
prioritization started as a result of national short-term enforcement 
campaigns (see Chapter 14). The Kunming EPB, for example has made a list 
of key enterprises, which must be inspected at regular intervals once a 
month.93 Recently, also in response to the campaigns, prioritization has been 
linked with complaints: inspection work is focused on those violations that 
generate most complaints. In Kunming’s pollution enforcement work this 
has led to a shift away from large polluters, located in densely populated 
areas, to small polluters, mainly restaurants in the city center. The Kunming 
EPBs now spend considerable time and thus rare resources in checking 
minor violations at restaurants. Time thus spent is lost for detecting 
industrial pollution violations at remoter factories.94 
The problem with pro-active inspections at Lake Dianchi is that the 
frequency of inspections remains low and that enterprises seem to know 
when the inspecting teams will come. The absolute lack of enforcement 
resources keeps the detection probability for industrial pollution violations 
quite low, especially in remote areas, where resistance to inspections is easier.  
In addition, our research has found that inspection work meets with 
considerable resistance and obstruction. First of all, even land inspections are 
resisted; the SLB’s land enforcement inspections have met with resistance. 
Especially at larger construction sites, inspection agents are sometimes not 
let onto the premises and have to force their way in by getting police support. 
Such resistance is particularly cumbersome for pollution inspections. A good 
example is the Huafei factory, which as we saw in Chapter 10, could illegally 
discharge its pollution without detection. The factory was until late 2004 
listed as being in compliance, although most citizens knew that the factory 
was discharging secretly (toupai) at night. Huafei did so to evade daytime 
                                                     
92 Based on an interview with the Kunming SLB Enforcement Department Director, 26 
October 2004. 
93 Based on an interview with the Kunming EPB Processing and Inspection Department Vice 
Director, 10 September 2004. 
94 Based on interviews with Kunming EPB agents, autumn 2004. 
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inspections, as it knew well that nightly inspections were practically not 
feasible. The Dianxi District EPB, the Kunming and the Yunnan EPB are all 
located in Kunming city. All roads from Kunming to Baocun village, where 
Huafei is located are not easy to travel and very dangerous at night. Nightly 
discharges were therefore never detected during regular inspections. 
Furthermore, EPBs carry out few nightly inspections anyway because 
personnel costs are higher and there is a significant chance that factory 
management is not present to let agents into the factory. 95  Some miles 
further down the Tanglang River, the FSS companies have taken resistance a 
step further into full obstruction. (Chapter 10) “Those enterprises engage in 
a Guerilla Warfare with us”, a frustrated EPB inspection agent remarked. If 
before the media coverage, enforcement action never stopped the ongoing 
violations because of local protectionism, after the coverage the Kunming 
EPB made a real effort to detect their violations. They have even installed 
24-hour discharge monitoring equipment at one of the smaller enterprises to 
prevent the possibility for secret nightly discharges.96 This particular factory 
however, they found out later (see Chapter 14), was bold enough to build an 
extra illegal discharge pipe circumventing the full-time detection 
equipment.97 Thus, it took months before the EPB was able to gather proof 
for violations. Circumvention of discharge pipes is a regular problem and 
SEPA even convened a national workshop for EPB agents on this topic.98 
Other smaller FSS factories simply closed shop when inspections came, only 
to open up again at a different location of the Tanglang River.99   
In other cases, the regulated factories have stalled inspection agents 
at their gates, while they sabotaged their electric installations in order to use a 
power-cut as an excuse for why the pollution installations were not in use. 
The vice director of the Kunming EPB inspection and processing 
department told me that an experienced officer who knows his way around 
the premises can easily show that the pollution installations were out of use 
                                                     
95 Based on an interview with the Kunming EPB Processing and Inspection Department Vice 
Director, 27 September 2004. 
96 Based on an interview with the Kunming EPB Processing and Inspection Department Vice 
Director, 10 September 2004. This respondent told me that the EPB uses 300 such 24-hour 
installations. They are not very trustworthy, however and often falter and as we saw from the 
FSS factory case, can be tempered with. Another problem is that this equipment just measures 
the flow of discharge through the pipes but not what the flow contains. Based on interviews 
with DMB Enforcement Staff 17 September 2004 and  Kunming EPB Inspection and 
Processing Department Vice-director, 27 September 2004. 
97 Based on an interview with the Kunming EPB Processing and Inspection Department Vice 
Director, 27 September 2004. 
98 Based on an interview with the Kunming EPB Processing and Inspection Department Vice 
Director, 27 September 2004. 
99 Based on an interview with the Kunming EPB Processing and Inspection Department Vice 
Director, 27 September 2004. 
288       Enforcement and Political Campaigns 
 
 
for a longer time than the power-cut. “You just go to the main pipe between 
the pollution installations and the main water discharge. You put your hand 
at the bottom of the pipe and you show the dust you find there to the 
factory manager.” The problem is that agents may have difficulty finding 
their way around complex factories without the help of factory staff or 
management. Inspections therefore cannot preclude some form of 
cooperation with the regulated actor.100  
Sanction Decision Making: Legal Options, Procedures, 
Practice, Review 
Regular sanction decision-making at all three bureaus is cooperative: 
informal and non-stringent. 101  In practice, enforcement agents have 
considerable discretion, which they use to consider the circumstances of the 
case and the various stakeholders. During this process, enforcement agents 
and violators engage in bargaining. The decision process further strengthens 
the role of bureau leadership, which has the final authority to decide on all 
but minor sanctions.  
Legal Enforcement Options: Administrative Sanctions are Most 
Important, Minimum Fines are Too Strict 
First, we will take a closer look at the legal options available for enforcement. 
According to the law, enforcement agents, at all three bureaus, have a range 
of sanction options to choose from for reacting to violations detected. The 
most important sanctions, in the sense that they are used most, are 
administrative penalties. The least stringent administrative penalties are the 
formal, written warning (jinggao) 102 and the restitution of illegal profits103. 
More stringent, depending on the height, are fines.104 As we saw in Part II, 
the natural protection laws have two kinds of rules on fines. First are 
maximum fines.  In national water pollution legislation for example, such 
                                                     
100 Swanson et al. have analyzed this as part of what they call guanxi. Their work states that this 
is a Chinese phenomenon which means that social actors must cooperate. Through our 
comparative study in Chapter 12 we know that cooperation is a normal phenomenon in all 
enforcement work. Compare with Swanson, Kuhn, and Xu, "Environmental Policy 
Implementation in Rural China: A Case Study of Yuhang, Zhejiang." 488 
101 For these terms see Chapter 12 
102 Law on Administrative Sanctions § 8.1, for examples see SEPA Administrative Measures 
on Administrative Sanctions for Environmental Protection § 2.1, APPCL § 46, WPPCL § 46   
103 Law on Administrative Sanctions § 8.3, for examples see SEPA Administrative Measures 
on Administrative Sanctions for Environmental Protection § 2.3, LMA §73, EIA Law §49.2, 
APPCL § 47.2 
104 Law on Administrative Sanctions § 8.2, SEPA Administrative Measures on Administrative 
Sanctions for Environmental Protection § 2.2 
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maximum fines range from 2.000 RMB for minor pollution violations105  to 1 
million for violations causing major damage.106 National land law prescribes 
relative maximum fines such as for example 50 per cent of the illegal profits 
made in the illegal land transaction (on top of the full restitution of such 
profits).107 Maximum sanction provisions offer agents large legal discretion. 
Therefore, when lawmakers sought to strengthen the effectiveness of 
existing laws (see Part II), one measure they adopted was to limit the legal 
discretion about administrative fines. Consequently, some of the laws now 
also contain provisions with minimum and maximum sanctions. An example 
is the 50.000 RMB minimum and 200.000 maximum fine for general EIA 
violations,108 the 10.000 RMB to 100.000 RMB fine range for air pollution 
violations,109  or the 5 to 20 percent of illegally obtained profits fine for 
illegal rent of collective land.110 During the deliberations about minimum 
sanction in the APPCL amendment, local actors feared that such minima 
would be unfeasible in practice. (See part II) In Kunming, especially the 
50.000 RMB minimum for general EIA violations has been unacceptable to 
enforcement agents. One informant told me, “We do not dare to even fine 
one fifth of such an amount, really it is unreasonable that the law demands 
that we do so. Companies in Kunming are under a lot of pressure, if we treat 
them this strictly we risk severe social consequences with all the workers 
involved.”111 
Local legislation, as we saw in Part I, also contains sanction 
provisions. According to the Law on Lawmaking and the Administrative 
Sanctions Law, sanctions in local legislation may not be more or less 
stringent than prescribed in national law.112 While most local legislation’s fine 
provisions abide by this rule, Part I demonstrated that some of Kunming’s 
local legislation violates it. First of all, the Kunming Regulations on 
Restaurants and Environmental Protection (KMREP) prescribe a maximum 
fine of 5000 RMB for restaurants that fail to meet the pollution standards, 
even though the APPCL sets a minimum fine of 10.000 RMB for the same 
violation. 113 Here, Kunming’s legislator has tried to soften China’s strict 
national enforcement minima on pollution violations by enacting its own 
local rules. However in other regulation, in the Dianchi Protection Rules 
(DPR), a provincial level law, we saw in Part I, the local legislator issued 
                                                     
105 WPPCL Implementing Regulations § 39.6-7 
106 WPPCL Implementing Regulations § 43.2 
107 LMA § 73, LMA Implementing Regulations § 38 
108 EIA Law §31 
109 APPCL §47 
110 LMA §81  and State Council LMA Implementing Regulations §39 
111 Based on an interview with a KMEPB enforcement agent  27 September 2004. 
112 Law on Lawmaking §64, 73, Law on Administrative Sanctions §31.2, Constitution §100 
113 Compare APPCL§ 48 and KMREP §11.2 
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sanctions with minimum sanction requirements.114 As such, these sanctions 
were stricter than those in the WPPCL, which never contained such 
statutory minima.  
Apart from fines and warnings, Chinese administrative law provides 
several other, more stringent administrative penalties: ordering a halt to the 
illegal activity115, permit revocation116, closure of the violating enterprise117, 
and destruction of the illegally built premises118. While most sanctions are 
administered by the bureaus themselves, pollution sanction of permit 
revocation and closing of enterprises can only be ordered by local 
governments.119 Demolition of illegally built premises can only be executed 
after it has been approved in court.120 
Apart from the widely used administrative sanctions, Chinese 
resource protection law also offers criminal law enforcement options. For 
pollution law the Chinese Criminal Code has two relevant stipulations on 
criminal responsibility for severe environmental accidents and gross 
negligence by EPB personnel.121 Criminal law pollution enforcement is rare: 
between 2001 and 2003 there have only been seven cases of criminal 
prosecution following pollution accidents and three cases of EPB staff 
prosecution for gross negligence.122 Apart from the LMA stipulation, that 
embezzlement and misuse of compensation or other land related funds can 
be prosecuted under criminal law,123 the criminal code also provides that the 
illegal conversion of arable land for construction is punishable with a 
maximum penalty of five years incarceration.124  
                                                     
114 DPR § 44-46 
115 Law on Administrative Sanctions §8.4, see for example APPCL §46, EIA Law §31, 
116 Law on Administrative Sanctions §8.5 
117 See for example APPCL § 49, 50, WPPCL §49, 50, 51, 52,  
118 LMA §73, 76, 77 
119 Permit revocation is a severe sanction which has the same consequences as closing the 
enterprise. Although the law has vested the authority for EP permit revocation with the EPBs, 
in practice it is the local government that decides on revocation, based on interviews with 
EPB agents in Kunming 2004, Sichuan 2001-2002, and SEPA staff, 2000. For the authority 
for ordering closures see EP Law §39, see also for example APPCL §49, 50, WPPCL §49, 50, 
51, 52 
120 Based on an interview with the Kunming SLB, 8 December 2004. 
121 Criminal Code § 338, 408 
122 Based on SEPA, Zhongguo Huanjing Tongji Nianbao 2001 (China Environment Statistical Report 
2001), SEPA, Zhongguo Huanjing Tongji Nianbao 2002 (China Environment Statistical Report 2002), 
SEPA, Zhongguo Huanjing Tongji Nianbao 2003 (China Environment Statistical Report 2003). See also 
Yang, Head, and Liu, "China's Treatment of Crimes Against the Environment: using criminal 
sanctions to fight environmental degradation in the PRC." 677-8 
123 LMA § 79, which is to be prosecuted under Criminal Code §382, 384 (for government 
officials), 271, 272 (for non-government officials) 
124 Criminal Code § 342.  
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Regular Enforcement Procedures offer Discretion to Agents and 
Leadership and Strengthen Local Protectionism 
Once violations are detected, the sanction decision-making procedure 
starts.125 In this procedure, street-level agents and bureau leadership play a 
considerable role. There are two types of procedures 126 , a simplified 
procedure for minor violations for which the agent fines up to 1000 RMB 
for legal persons, or 50 RMB for natural persons127, or the normal procedure 
for all other cases.128 The simple procedure takes place completely on-site 
during the inspections: after detecting minor violations, the inspecting team 
collects the evidence and decides on appropriate sanctions. 
 Collecting evidence is not easy.129 It requires a certain amount of 
cooperation with the regulated actor. This is especially so at fenced sites such 
as large construction areas or factories. Furthermore, complex installations at 
larger factories can hide complex violations. Enforcement agents can only 
access such premises and find evidence for such violations with some sort of 
help from regulated actors. For pollution violations, evidence linking the 
damage to the violating act is not easy to find. Pollution can dilute over a 
large area and it is difficult to find proof establishing a relationship between 
its effects and its source.  
Once back at the bureau, the agents submit the evidence together 
with a sanction report to the legal affairs department for verification. 
Because the simple procedure takes place in the field, the bureau cannot 
witness its agents’ enforcement work, or its “outputs”. Thus, the bureau has 
no way of knowing whether what the agents bring back to report is in 
accordance with what actually took place. Consequently, the simple 
procedure offers street level agents much discretion, which is exacerbated 
because of weak verification procedures (see below). A Sichuanese EPB vice-
director once explained to me how his bureau deals with this problem: 
“When inspection agents come back from the field and have issued a minor 
sanction decision, I immediately interview them. I drill them about their 
decision and about the circumstances at the factory. I know most factories 
well, so I have a good understanding of what takes place there.” The director 
did admit that real control is not possible: “Even if we find out that the 
decision made is too lax, we cannot change it for a stricter decision because 
                                                     
125 Except where otherwise indicated, this paragraph is based on a series of interviews with 
enforcement agents at all three bureaus, carried out in autumn and winter of 2004 in Kunming. 
126 Law on Administrative Sanctions §33-43 
127 Law on Administrative Sanctions §33 
128 Law on Administrative Sanctions §36 For major violations, a more elaborate procedure, 
which includes hearings can also be followed.   Law on Administrative Sanctions §42-43 
129  Compare with G. Liu, "Problems and Solutions in Environmental Administrative 
Punishment (Huanjing Xingzheng Chufa zhong Cunzaide Wenti yu Duice)," Environmental 
Protection, no. 4 (1999). 17 
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that would legally not be possible.”130 What his and other bureaus try to do is 
set procedures for how work should be carried out to get some kind of 
control. First, agents should always work together to limit chances of 
collusion and to get two sides of the story. Second, bureaus set strict rules 
for accepting gifts in any form from the regulated enterprises. “They are not 
allowed to accept anything. The exception is lunch and diner, only when the 
factory is far away and they have to stay there until the evening. All other 
gifts are to be refused.” Although such rules make sense, the bureau has no 
way of knowing whether its agents, whose salaries are not considerable and 
whose future career prospects offer little extra reward, refrain from receiving 
kickbacks131 or other favors in practice.132 
Under the normal procedure, the inspection team also collects the 
evidence, but then returns to the bureau to prepare a sanction proposal, 
which they, together with the evidence, submit to the legal affairs 
department. The lawyers at this department then check the evidence and the 
legal basis of the sanction proposal made. If the evidence is insufficient the 
inspection team has to go back to try to collect more. Otherwise, the 
sanction proposal, as amended to the law, will be sent to the bureau’s 
leadership team that makes a final decision on the appropriate sanction. Such 
final decision can be based on the sanction proposal, however leaders are 
completely free to ignore the proposal made. We thus see that apart from the 
street-level agents, China’s regular enforcement practice also offers great 
decision making authority to the bureau leadership. This leadership, which is 
also in charge of the most important personnel decisions for the whole 
                                                     
130 This because of the ne bis in idem rule, which prevents making a new stricter sanction 
decision for weak sanctions. Law on Administrative Sanctions §24 
131 Corruption has increased considerably since reform see A. Wedeman, "The Intensification 
of Corruption in China," China Quarterly  (2004). 895, Van Rooij, "China's War on Graft: 
Politico-Legal Campaigns Against Corruption in China and Their Similarities to the Legal 
Reactions to Crisis in the U.S." 
132 Based on an interview with a vice-director of a municipal EPB in Sichuan, summer 2002. 
The Kunming EPB follows a similar practice of checking on site enforcement sanctions right 
after agents come back to the bureau. Based on an interview with an enforcement agent 
KMEPB, 10 September 2004. Similarly the DMB also checks upon simple procedure 
enforcement decisions, based on an interview with DMB enforcement agents, 17 September 
2004. Governmental officials have been worried about agents taking gifts and favors. See 
Wang, "Vice Minister Wang Jirong's Speech at the National Environmental Inspection Work 
Summit." 4, Xie, "Shuli he Luoshi Kexue Fazhanguan Tuidong Huanbao Gongzuo Zai Xin 
Taijie (Establishing and Implementing a Scientific Development Doctrine to Promote 
Environmental Work onto a New Level)." 14 Consequently SEPA officials have considered 
introducing stronger internal reporting and disciplinary systems. See Wang, "Vice Minister 
Wang Jirong's Speech at the National Environmental Inspection Work Summit." 5, and Xie, 
"Bawo Lishi Jiyu, Qianghua Zhifa Jiandu, Zhazha Shishi Zuohao Wuran Kongzhi Gongzuo 
(Grasp the Historical Opportunity, Strengthen the Supervision of Law Enforcement, and 
Thoroughly Carry out the Job of Controlling Pollution)." 4  
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bureau, makes final decisions for normal and major enforcement cases. 
Because there is a close relationship between the bureau leadership and the 
local government, local protectionism can therefore easily affect 
enforcement decision-making.  
Sanctions in Practice: Nature of Damages, Type of Violator, 
Complaints and Social-Economic Context 
So which cases receive what kind of enforcement? How does the nature of 
the violation and the violator affect the sanction issued? To what extent do 
enforcement agents and bureau leadership take local economic and social 
development into account?  Based on the explorative data collected, it seems 
that the economic and social context and agent-violator relationship play a 
dominant role in the enforcement decision practice. Other factors such as 
the severity of the damage, the type of violator or the number of complaints 
seem to have a less clear impact on sanction decisions. 
Severity of Damage has No Clear Influence on Sanction Decision 
Let us first look at the severity of the damage caused by the violation. In the 
cases studied, there is no clear correlation between the severity of the 
damage and the sanction height. In Part II we saw several cases in which the 
damage was considerable but enforcement action lax. Most of these cases 
were pollution violations. First, the Yunzhi’s pollution violations caused 
considerable damage to local farmers, industries and the Tanglang river 
ecological system. In all its years of severe pollution no enforcement action 
was taken, until the factory went bankrupt. The current pollution of the FSS 
companies is no less severe and located in the same area. The FSS pollution 
did not receive enforcement action until there was prolonged national media 
attention and national pressure to deal with this case. (See Chapter 14) 
Regular enforcement never dealt with this case and only campaign induced 
inspections brought forth sufficient evidence for enforcement action, which 
again was part of the campaign and not of regular enforcement practice. 
(Chapter 14) Another example of severe damages and weak enforcement is 
the Kunming Porcelain Enamel Factory, not yet discussed in part II. 
Recently this once profitable enterprise has been facing hard times. The 
popularity of plastic and other cheaper and unbreakable products has 
decreased demand for the expensive porcelain bowls this factory makes. The 
factory’s high costs, it supports 600 employees and another 3000 retirees 
from its former SOE days, have prevented the necessary investments in EP 
equipment. Consequently, the factory has been violating environmental 
standards continually the last years. Under the new APPCL133, the factory, 
                                                     
133 APPCL §19 
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with its outdated techniques, should have been closed, but until now it has 
continued to emit black smoke and cause serious environmental harm. So far, 
enforcement has been weak because the Kunming government has stopped 
the EPB from using strong enforcement action, and it has so far refused to 
close it down as it should and is authorized to do. EPB agents have confided 
that they understand local protectionism in this case, “This is as much an 
environmental as well as a social problem. If we would take stern action, or if 
the local government would decide to close the factory, social unrest would 
result. The workers have nowhere to go.”134 In these cases, there is no clear 
connection between the severity of pollution damages and the stringency of 
sanctions.135  
 For land cases, there are similar findings. All of Jiacun’s illegal land 
practices have led to considerable damage: most of the village arable land has 
been destroyed. Yet, this issue was not addressed in regular enforcement 
action. No houses or enterprises were ordered to be destroyed, and the 
whole issue remained unaddressed until a campaign started in 2004. (See 
Chapter 14) Meanwhile there have been cases of stricter punishment through 
regular enforcement. Some have been for minor damages. An example is 
that the Ningshi SLB together with the Ningshi government ordered the 
destruction of an illegally built second house in one of Ningshi’s villages. 
The owner of the house was a handicapped farmer who had used his last 
savings to erect a second house in order to rent out the first for profits. 
Ningshi officers issued the strictest sanction, only to protect a couple of 
square meters of arable land. Another similar case, was the forced demolition 
of a new hotel in Jiacun Township. This hotel was built with the support of 
the local village committee and the Township land authorities, right at the 
edge of Lake Dianchi in a protected area of the watershed. In this area all 
land is to be protected and nothing is allowed to be built upon it. When the 
DMB discovered the illegal construction, it immediately ordered its removal. 
Agents at the DMB have told me that all construction in the protected area 
right next to the lake is dealt with strictly. In another case, the DMB issued a 
strict fine to the Yunnan Electrical Power Company when they illegally tried 
to reclaim 12.000 m2 of land from the Northern-most, and smallest and 
most fragile part of the Dianchi Lake. The total fine for this big case was 
700.000 RMB. Strict punishment remains the exception though, and it can 
occur both for major cases, as well as for cases with less damages. Thus, in 
most cases, there is no clear connection between the severity of damage and 
the strictness of the sanctions. 
                                                     
134 Interview with KMEPB enforcement agents, 5 November 2004. 
135 Here are findings contradict Ma and Ortolano’s case studies from other parts of China in 
the early 1990s. Ma and Ortolano, Environmental Regulation in China. 120-1 
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Relation Agent-Violator Influences Sanction, Type of Violator not clearly Influential 
Prior research has emphasized that the relation between the enforcement 
bureau and the violator is crucial for understanding why enforcement 
sanctions have been weak. The explorative data in our research bring forth 
similar findings. 
First, in the cases studied there is not a clear connection between the 
type of violator and the severity of the sanctions. Both large and small 
enterprises, state-owned, privatized and collective firms have not received 
strict regular sanctions for their pollution violations. 136  The tiny privately 
owned FSS companies, who seemingly lack the power to make use of strong 
personal relationships with the far away district EPB, have been treated as 
lax as the strong well-connected larger firms such as the former SOEs Yunzhi 
Paper and Huafei. For land violations similarly, we see that in peri-urban 
Kunming the SLB does not issue strict sanctions against powerless 
households just as it has not done against larger enterprises or local 
governments.  
The exception seems to be that enforcement action against 
governmental bureaus was more difficult. 137 For land violations, for example, 
enforcement agents told me that punishing local governments for their illegal 
land practices is difficult.138 However, as our case studies demonstrate, such 
local governments have not received more lenient treatment than illegal 
construction by private enterprises or even poor rural households with 
whom the officials colluded in the violations. Moreover, although many 
agents have told me that it is difficult to issue strict sanctions against 
governmental violators, sometimes bureaus still punish governmental 
departments strictly. In one case, the DMB, had to deal with a violation 
committed by the Kunming municipal Hygiene Department. This 
department had illegally brought public toilet discharge to a normal water 
treatment center instead of the costlier special treatment center designated 
for dealing with such waste. After complaints, inspections followed and 
evidence was collected, upon which Hygiene Department staff admitted the 
department’s guilt and stated that the waste had been illegally dumped to cut 
costs. When the DMB enforcement agency started to prepare a sanction 
decision the local discharge regulations offered sanctions from a minimum 
                                                     
136 Previous research has demonstrated that enterprises in financial troubles are treated more 
leniently. See Liu, "Obstacles of the Environmental Law Enforcement System and their 
Countermeasures (Huanjing Zhifa Tizhi Zhuangai ji qi Xiaochu Duice).", Ma and Ortolano, 
Environmental Regulation in China. 
137  Compare with He, "Gengdi Baohu Ying Zuodao "Liu Ge Bixu" (The "Six Must Be 
Dones"of Arable Land Protection)." 41, See also Liu, "Obstacles of the Environmental Law 
Enforcement System and their Countermeasures (Huanjing Zhifa Tizhi Zhuangai ji qi 
Xiaochu Duice)." 1 
138 Based on interviews with SLB staff 2004, Kunming.  
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of 5000 RMB to a maximum of 50.000 RMB. “When the Hygiene 
Department heard that the minimum was 5000, they demanded that we issue 
that sanction,” a DMB agent explained. The Hygiene Department tried to 
exert all kinds of pressure, even through other departments to get the 
minimum fine.139 The DMB did not budge under their pressure, but instead 
fined the maximum. 
If the type of violator does not seem influential on enforcement 
decision making in the cases studied, the relationship with violators in 
general is. In Chapter 12, we saw that a cooperative enforcement style occurs 
when there are frequent agent-violator contacts and/or easily verifiable 
violations. Kunming’s natural resource enforcement has had neither, but is 
still cooperative. A closer analysis of the relationship between the regulated 
actors and the enforcement agents can help us unravel this puzzle. One 
explanation, offered by Ma and Ortolano, is that guanxi personal networks 
underlie all bureau-violator relationships. This means that even when there is 
infrequent contact between the two, both actors are locked together in a 
network in which they have to cooperate in order to prevent loss of face or 
break reciprocal structures.140 Here we find similarly that guanxi are important 
and that enforcement agents engage in cooperative enforcement because 
they have been afraid to upset relationships with regulated actors.141 We will 
call this “relational risk aversion”.   
Relational risk aversion characterizes enforcement decision-making 
in all three bureaus. Because natural resource protection has received little 
support in the past 142  and at present still often conflicts with powerful 
stakeholders when it harms economic growth or social stability, enforcement 
bureaus and their agents lack authority 143  and are careful not to upset 
powerful stakeholders.144 Regular enforcement practice at all three bureaus is 
                                                     
139 Liu’s research contains cases in which enterprises successfully forced the EPB to withdraw 
their enforcement decision or in which courts were forced to refrain from executing EPB 
sanction decisions. See Liu, "Obstacles of the Environmental Law Enforcement System and 
their Countermeasures (Huanjing Zhifa Tizhi Zhuangai ji qi Xiaochu Duice)." 1 
140 Ma and Ortolano, Environmental Regulation in China. 77-89 
141 Of course, risk aversion has to do with relationships and also with something one could 
call “loss of face”. We believe that the cultural approach Ma and Ortolano use obscures rather 
than clarifies matters.  
142 Jahiel, "The Organization of Environmental Protection in China." 
143 Compare with Lo and Leung, "Environmental Agency and Public Opinion in Guangzhou: 
The Limits of a Popular Approach to Environmental Governance." 677, Sinkule and 
Ortolano, Implementing Environmental Policy in China. 189, Ma and Ortolano, Environmental 
Regulation in China. 62 
144 Lo and Fryxell support our point here when they write that the Guangzhou EPB which 
has had less support than the Dalian EPB has relied more on cooperative enforcement 
strategies. See Lo and Fryxell, "Enforcement Styles Among Environmental Protection 
Officials in China."109 In another study both authors found that governmental support is 
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strongly influenced by such risk aversion, enforcement action should be 
strict enough that the bureau is not criticized for weak enforcement, but not 
too strong to upset the regulated actor and the local government. For 
sanction decision makers, whether agents or bureau leadership a psychology 
of risk aversion has led to bargained and explanatory cooperative 
enforcement. The director of one of the enforcement agencies explained to 
me that enforcement work is stressful. “This year I have punished 187 
violation cases; I have made at least 187 enemies. Sometimes I am so worried 
about their repercussions that I cannot sleep at night.” 145  He further 
explained how his agency deals with this problem: “Our motto now is, make 
friends from your enemies. We do so by explaining as much as possible why 
we have to issue sanctions and by offering our services for compliance.” In 
the DMB’s strict enforcement against the Public Hygiene Department case, 
this is exactly what the bureau did. Although it fined the department strictly, 
after execution of the fine, it immediately started a reconciliation process. In 
this process, the DMB enforcement agents invited hygiene officials to several 
dinners and tea sessions, during which they tried to explain their strict fines 
and limited options for leniency. The bureau agents have also offered their 
services to ensure future compliance.  
Another DMB agent has provided further information about how 
enforcement agents deal with the risk of making enemies out of punished 
violators. “I play white face, red face (bailian honglian), or ‘good cop, bad cop’, 
as your American movies would call it,” he told me just after I had seen him 
explain his enforcement decision to an employee of a violating firm. During 
this interview, I was fortunate enough to witness the whole conversation 
between agent and violator:  half an hour earlier a man wearing a red 
construction helmet and dust and dirt stained clothes walked into the agent’s 
office. He had an appointment to speak about the enforcement decision 
against his construction company that had violated the Kunming Urban 
Water Discharge Management Standards when building a large prestigious 
project in the center of town. The agent asked the man friendly to take a seat 
and explained why the bureau had decided to fine the violation. The first 
problem, the agent explained, was that the firm did not apply for the proper 
water discharge permit. The man immediately started his defense, “Our 
project is very important and the Kunming government wanted us to start as 
soon as possible, especially because many old houses were destroyed in 
preparation and the land must not lay barren. We had no time to apply for a 
                                                                                                                        
more influential than societal support for the perceived level of enforcement effectiveness. 
See Lo and Fryxell, "Governmental and Societal Support for Environmental Enforcement in 
China: An Empirical Study of in Guangzhou." 
145  Based on an interview with the Vice-director of the DMB Enforcement Agency, 15 
November 2004.  
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permit. We have just applied for one now though…” The agent did not let 
him continue and explained the second violation: destroying and replacing 
existing sewage pipes without following the proper procedures and standards. 
Again, the man started a defense, this time that another government 
department had demanded that these pipes be replaced. Remaining calm, the 
agent tried to control the man’s lengthy monologue, “You listen, I talk”. It 
had no effect; the violator’s representative kept on explaining how it was not 
their fault. The agent opened a file containing the evidence for this case and 
took out a document. “Here is your boss’s testimony stating that replacing 
the sewage was illegal and wrong. Look here is his red thumb print.” The 
agent continued that he understood the mitigating circumstances of the time 
pressure to complete the project. This dialogue of accusations and defenses 
went on several times, until the agent started to talk about the sanctions, 
“Construction without the proper discharge permit is punishable with a 
minimum of 1000 to a maximum of 10.000 RMB. The second problem, 
illegally replacing sewage pipes, is punishable with a fine of minimally 5000 
RMB and a maximum of 50.000.” Moreover, the agent explained, playing his 
trump card, “Your firm also committed a third violation installing sewage 
installations with a sub-standard capacity for absorbing sand, which can 
cause flooding. This is a serious offense, which we have punished in another 
case with a fine of 50.000.” Thus, ended his ‘bad cop’ routine, as the agent 
would later explain to me.  With a friendly smile, showing the ‘good cop’, the 
agents explained that because of the good cooperation so far, the first 
violation would be forgotten, especially because the firm had applied for a 
permit. “The third problem,” the agent explained, “I am also willing to let go 
this once, since your firm is acting directly on orders of the Kunming 
government.” The second violation, replacing sewage pipes remained though, 
and the agent explained that he had to fine this transgression because it 
could affect the whole sewage system. “However, I will not fine you at the 
maximum of 50.000 but only for 5.000 RMB,” the agent finally said. “Thus”, 
the agent clarified later to me, “I am able to make friends of enemies. First, 
they come here angry because we have fined them. Then I show them what 
we could have done and they leave feeling as if I have done them a favor.” 
This case illustrates how bargaining arises out of risk aversion and second 
how this leads to laxer enforcement in which violations for which there are 
minimum sanction requirements are acquitted without sanctions. The full 
reason why this happens is more complex than mere risk aversion though. 
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Economic and Social Circumstances are crucial 
Economic and social circumstances play a crucial role in the sanction 
decision- making process. 146 In most of the regular enforcement cases we 
studied, the decision not to enforce or enforce non-stringently concerned 
cases where compliance and strict sanctions might have a negative impact on 
local livelihoods and where violators were dominant employers.147  
The severest sanctions, closing an enterprise or ordering the 
destruction of a building, are rarely used in regular enforcement. The small 
FSS companies were never closed down in regular enforcement action, even 
though the problem had been clear for years (Chapter 10). The same applies 
to the Yunzhi paper factory, which needed a bankruptcy to end ongoing 
violations, while in fact a closure was warranted given the firm’s lack of 
resources to transform to cleaner production (Chapter 8). Similarly, the 
Kunming Porcelain company has remained in operation, even though its 
pollution has been in such violation of law that closure is the only remedy, 
especially now that fines have never been paid and have not stimulated any 
cleaner production. For all these cases, enforcement agents have explained to 
me that local economic and social concerns prevented stern action.148 For the 
FSS enterprises the fear is that their closure will ruin the whole phosphor 
production chain. (See Chapter 10) For the Yunzhi and Porcelain company 
the direct social consequences are large, both support a large number of 
workers and even pensioners, whose loss of income because of 
environmental protection would instigate much unrest. (See Chapter 10 and 
preceding sections)149  
Social concerns have also precluded the use of the strictest arable 
land protection sanction of forced demolitions. Except for the ordered 
                                                     
146 Wang and Wheeler have already demonstrated that there is a correlation between the level 
of economic development and sanctions, compare with Wang and Wheeler, "Endogenous 
Enforcement and Effectiveness of China's Pollution Levy System." 20 Ma and Ortolano have 
demonstrated that EPBs in the 1990s were less strict for enterprises with financial difficulties. 
Ma and Ortolano, Environmental Regulation in China. 119 Compare also with Swanson et al’s 
findings in rural Zhejiang in where enforcement was difficult due to economic constraints. See 
Swanson, Kuhn, and Xu, "Environmental Policy Implementation in Rural China: A Case 
Study of Yuhang, Zhejiang." 486 
147 Compare with Tang et al., "Institutional Constraints on Environmental Management in 
Urban China: Environmental Impact Assessment in Guangzhou and Shanghai." 869, who 
provide earlier examples from Guangzhou. See also Liu, "Obstacles of the Environmental 
Law Enforcement System and their Countermeasures (Huanjing Zhifa Tizhi Zhuangai ji qi 
Xiaochu Duice)." 1 
148 Based on interviews Kunming EPB staff, Autumn 2004, Kunming 
149 Here our analysis is in contrast with Ma and Ortolano’s explanation that EPBs do not issue 
such strict sanctions because of fear of upsetting harmonious relationships. We believe that 
such risk aversion is in these cases first rooted in fear of upsetting the local economy and thus 
relationships with all local actors. 
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destruction of the farmer’s house in Ningshi, the SLB never orders the 
forced demolition of illegal rural housing. “This would be too unreasonable,” 
an agent explained to me, “these poor farmers have put their life’s savings in 
these buildings and if we take that away from them unrest will erupt for 
sure.” 150  The SLB agent further explained that their work is about 
maintaining social stability, as much as it is about protecting arable land.151 
Thus a contextual goal influenced their primary goal of ensuring compliance. 
Fear of social instability has thus prevented SLBs to use their strongest 
instruments for punishing violations.  
Social and economic concerns also seem to have prevented the 
bureaus to issue strict fines. In general, fines issued are only a fraction of the 
maximum allowed, or they are the minimum (in case there is a minimum 
sanction standard), or in some cases even such minimum is ignored. The 
minimum sanction of 50.000 RMB for general EIA violations is a good 
example. Enforcement agents do not issue fines at this minimum. “EIA 
violations are quite common, mostly at small enterprises. If we would abide 
by this minimum sanction the economic and social consequences would be 
too great,” an agent told me. For restaurant violations, the same problem 
exists. According to the APPCL, restaurants without the proper smoke and 
smell installations should be fined with a minimum of 10.000 RMB. As we 
saw in Part II, Chapter 10, smaller restaurants, cannot afford the smoke 
installations, which cost 6000 RMB more than half of the initial investment 
of 10.000 RMB for the restaurant. However, they can also not afford to pay 
the APPCL fine minimum, which is about the same as the initial start-up 
capital. Agents know that if they follow the law’s letter, many of Kunming’s 
restaurants will face bankruptcy. Luckily, for this case, Kunming’s legislation 
has made local legislation with lower sanctions (see Part II and the preceding 
section), enabling Kunming EPBs to issue sanctions while not damaging the 
local economy or instigating social unrest from hungry Kunmingnese or 
angry restaurateurs. Another example of weak fining because of economic 
and social concerns is the DMB sewage case, described above, we saw that 
the bureau chose not to issue sanctions for two quite major violations, one 
of which had a minimum sanction requirement. The bureau agent explained 
that the violations were an unfortunate but necessary part of Kunming’s 
urbanization and should not be punished too strictly. 
Review Procedures  
Why have the bureaus been able to enforce leniently? Are there no 
consequences when the enforcement decision itself violates the law because 
                                                     
150 Based on an interview with Kunming SLB staff, Autumn 2004, Kunming 
151 Ibid. 
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violations detected are not met with the minimum sanctions the law 
demands? This brings us to the mechanisms for reviewing sanction decisions 
made. These review mechanisms have been too weak to control irregular 
enforcement decisions. 
The three bureaus have two broad types of review mechanisms: 
internal and external. The internal review mechanisms consist of the checks 
and balances the bureau has set up internally to verify sanctions made. This 
first consists of the reports inspection agents must make after inspections 
and after issuing sanctions under the simple procedures. As we saw above, 
agency leadership will interview agents upon return from the field. Because 
the agents’ work is difficult to verify, these post-enforcement interviews are 
not a strong method of knowing whether the law was properly applied. Even 
if, as sometimes does happen, the agency leadership finds that agents have 
not dealt strictly enough with the violation at hand, the ne bis in idem principle 
in the Law on Administrative Punishments, precludes issuing another stricter 
sanction decision for the same violation.152 In practice, bureau agents and 
their leaders know this rule, and I have not heard of instances where it has 
been broken. Apart from the internal checks for the simple procedure 
decisions, bureaus also check enforcement decisions of subordinate bureaus. 
This work is largely done by the legal affairs department, but may also be 
done by the Inspections and Processing Bureau (at the EPB) or the 
Enforcement Unit (at the SLB). Such vertical internal sanction review is as 
ineffective as that for simple sanctions. The first problem is that a real 
verification would mean that the superior bureau carries out new inspections, 
which is costly, especially because superior bureaus have less inspection staff 
than lower level bureaus. Second, the ne bis in idem rule here also prevents 
making a new stricter sanction decision for weak sanctions.  
External review mechanisms have not been much more effective 
though. In external review mechanisms regulated actors or third parties, 
other than the enforcement agents or their superiors, initiate procedures to 
review or verify sanctions. One can wonder whether external review would 
help to enhance weak enforcement. Procedures initiated by the regulated 
actor will obviously only concern sanctions that are considered too strict; 
only review initiated by third parties will question weak sanctions. In some of 
the cases studied at Lake Dianchi, where local communities condoned and 
even supported violations, local actors are unlikely to initiate such action. 
Non-local public interest groups, such as NGOs, do not have standing under 
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Chinese law to initiate administrative or legal review, unless their interests 
have been directly damaged by the decision in question.153 
There are two types of external review mechanisms: administrative 
review, and administrative litigation. 154  Administrative review is a legal 
procedure in which those affected by the enforcement decision can ask for a 
review of the original decision by the directly superior agency, either the 
bureau’s local government or the bureau’s vertical superior functional 
department at the next higher level of administration. 155  Administrative 
litigation is a concurrent option available to those that do not agree with 
sanction decisions. In this procedure, the applicant asks the court to review 
the case.156 In China and in Kunming’s local practice, enforcement agents 
have had little to fear from both these legal external review mechanisms.157  
 
China 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Review % 0,7 0,5 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,3 
Review Won % 55 58 44 66 67 66 
Litigation % 1,6 0,8 1,1 1,0 1,0 0,6 
Litigation Won % 93 95 95 98 96 95 
Yunnan 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Review % 1,5 6,1 0,7 10,7 0,9 0,9 
Review Won % 0 71 0 83 50 80 
Litigation % 0,5 0,9 1,6 6,8 1,3 0,9 
Litigation Won % 0 100 100 100 100 100 
Table 6, Administrative Review and Litigation EPB Enforcement Cases  
 1998-2003158 
                                                     
153  Law on Administrative Review § 2,  Law on Administrative Litigation § 2, Supreme 
People’s Court Interpretation of Certain Issues Regarding the Law on Administrative 
Litigation, 10 March 2000, § 23, 24 
154 There is also a third type, formal petitions, or shangfang in Chinese. We have not researched 
the impact of such petitions on enforcement. We do however acknowledge that citizens have 
been keen to write such petition letters when wrongly treated by their own government. See 
Chapter 9 and see also O'Brien, Kevin J., and Lianjiang Li. "The Politics of Lodging 
Complaints in Rural China."  
155 Law on Administrative Review § 2, 12, 13 
156 Law on Administrative Litigation § 2 
157 In contrast with our findings here, Tang’s study shows that if pollutions victims would 
make use of collective administrative litigation suits for the most severe cases, their action 
could have a large impact. See Y.Y. Tang, "When Peasants Sue En Masse: Large-Scale 
Collective A.L.L. Suits in Rural China," China: An International Journal 3, no. 1 (2005). 24 
158 Won cases indicate EPB victories. SEPA, Zhongguo Huanjing Tongji Nianbao 1998 (China 
Environmental Statistical Report 1998), SEPA, Zhongguo Huanjing Tongji Nianbao 1999 (China 
Environmental Statistical Report 1999), SEPA, Zhongguo Huanjing Tongji Nianbao 2000 (China 
Environment Statistical Report 2000), SEPA, Zhongguo Huanjing Tongji Nianbao 2001 (China 
Environment Statistical Report 2001), SEPA, Zhongguo Huanjing Tongji Nianbao 2002 (China 
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As historical data about pollution review cases in Table 6 
demonstrate, both types of cases have been rare. Second, of the cases that 
were reviewed the majority was won by the decision-making bureau, this is 
especially true for administrative litigation cases, of which nationally EPBs 
have won more than 90 percent and in Yunnan in all but one year 100 
percent.  
The data in table six would lead us to believe that the legal review 
procedures do not influence enforcement decision making. The chances that 
there will be a case or that such a case is lost are just too low, one could say. 
Furthermore, most if not all cases of legal review will be initiated by the 
violator who thinks he has been punished to strictly, so the bureau has little 
to fear if it punishes too lightly, which we saw it does.   
This analysis is partly in contrast with what we know about 
enforcement work. Although it is true that agents have at times issued 
irregular lenient fines, we also saw that the sanction decision-making process 
is carried out as much as possible according to the book. Agents in Yunnan, 
nowadays spend a lot of resources collecting the right evidence and the 
bureau makes sure that the sanction decisions made follow the law as close 
as possible. 
Risk aversion can explain these contrasting phenomena. The three 
bureaus, like most Chinese bureaucracies, are afraid to lose a review or 
litigation case.159 Even the slim chances of ending up with a case and losing it 
are sufficient to make bureaus emphasize legal procedures and evidence 
gathering. In the illegal sewer replacement case, the DMB agent kept on 
showing the evidence to the regulated actor, to show that starting review 
would not be beneficial. Apart from maintaining a working relation with the 
regulated actor, agents also worried about how to prevent review or 
administrative litigation. In the illegal public toilet discharge case, the 
violating Public Hygiene department did initiate administrative review against 
the DMB decision. After the Public Hygiene department lost this case, the 
DMB tried to explain their sanction decision over drinks and dinner, in order 
to prevent an administrative litigation procedure in court. When the DMB 
agents still feared the hygiene department would go to court, they threatened 
to make public that the department had been fined. The Hygiene 
                                                                                                                        
Environment Statistical Report 2002), SEPA, Zhongguo Huanjing Tongji Nianbao 2003 (China 
Environment Statistical Report 2003). 
159 Pei Minxin’s research has found similar findings and we have been influenced by his 
hypotheses. See M. Pei, "Citizens v. Mandarins: Administrative Litigation in China," The China 
Quarterly 152 (1997). 
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Department’s fear of having the whole city know of its violation made it 
drop the litigation case.160  
If bureaus are so afraid of legal action and have learned to 
communicate in legal language, why do they still make irregular sanction 
decisions? The explanation is that bureaus quit following the letter of the law, 
so it seems, if the expected negative results of stern formal action will 
provide a more direct threat because economic or social concerns are at 
stake. If this is the case, bureaus will let the more eminent risk of criticism 
about a damaged economy or social stability prevails over worries about 
possible review or litigation.  
Conclusion 
Regular enforcement of natural resource protection law in China is difficult. 
In line with most scholarship, local protectionism is the root cause for 
enforcement difficulty. However, this study has gone a step further by trying 
to understand what has caused such local protectionism. It found that the 
conflict of interests between the law’s formal goal of protecting natural 
resources and the locality’s concern for local livelihoods was an important 
cause for protectionist practices. It is this conflict of interests that has 
influenced local governments to use the relative autonomy they have had 
since reform to adapt local law enforcement to local concerns. Therefore, 
the present research emphasizes that there is a reason for local protectionism 
and that unless that reason is addressed local protectionism’s influence on 
weak enforcement will remain. Because the conflict of interests forms the 
heart of the problem, we do not believe that a mere recentralization of 
enforcement authority will solve it. Unfortunately, because the vertical 
management reform has only been initiated recently, we cannot yet support 
this hypothesis.  
 Local protectionism has adversely influenced enforcement. It has 
created weak institutions with conflicting goals, lacking resources and 
personnel structures with sufficient incentives for job conformity. This is 
                                                     
160  There is another explanation for understanding why bureaus work according to legal 
procedure even though there is a slim chance that they are ever held legally accountable. The 
constant emphasis on the establishment of a legal system and a system based on law, even 
though often no more than hollow propaganda, has started to influence bureaus and their 
agents so it seems. Legal language is used throughout the bureaus even though the content of 
the law is not often followed to the letter. However because of all the constant training 
seminars and study sessions on new legislation, the formal language of the law seems to have 
started to influence enforcement work in practice, even if it is only that enforcement agents 
try to legitimize their sub-optimum enforcement within the legal framework they have learned 
for communication. Compare with the literature on the communicative working of law 
discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
Punishing Violations       305 
 
 
especially so for the EPBs who put local interests above those of the law. 
The enforcement procedures have further exacerbated the local protectionist 
influences, as they have given local governments and the bureau leadership 
they directly appointed a strong role in the sanction decision-making process. 
The risk aversion that characterizes law enforcement agents has been 
another important catalyst for the local protectionist influence on weak 
enforcement. Agents, fearing problems with strong local actors, have opted 
to enforce in a less strict and formal way than they are supposed to. The 
large amount of discretion regular enforcement procedure leaves agents in 
the field has enabled agents to adopt such cooperative enforcement styles. 
 Part of the enforcement problem is practical. In practice, limiting 
agent discretion has been difficult because of the complexity of measuring 
enforcement results and verifying enforcement action made in the field. 
Furthermore, for some types of complex violations such as pollution 
violations, agents can only detect the violation by cooperating with the 
regulated actor, especially in remote areas where the local population does 
not actively report secret discharges. The result of all this is that regular 
natural resource protection law enforcement in Kunming has been 
cooperative, informal and non-stringent.  
 
    14. Movements of Law 
 Political Legal Campaigns to Enhance    
 Enforcement in Kunming and China 
Introduction 
The summer of 2004 witnessed changes in Kunming. In June 2004, we could 
no longer meet leadership in our three villages, as they were too busy in 
conferences with the district level government about the need to stop illegal 
land practices. What had been condoned and even actively promoted for 
years, now had to end. Before July 15, so the district government demanded, 
all illegal land practices had to be legalized. Even though village and 
township leadership saw that the legalization of illegal land practices would 
come at tremendous costs for local businesses and thus the local economy, 
this time they could not shirk their duties and allow violations to continue. In 
the following weeks village leaders were busy notifying illegal land users and 
persuading them to pay the costly legalization procedures. Around the same 
time, the Kunming EPB finally found evidence to fine the small FSS 
chemical factories that were discharging without installations and obstructing 
EPB inspections. Additionally, the EPB also found evidence of Huafei’s 
illegal nightly discharges1. Both violations were detected during extra nightly 
inspections the KEPB carried out in the summer of 2004.  
The sudden land legalization and the extra pollution inspections did 
not occur by accident but were part of national political campaigns, one to 
enhance arable land protection, and the other to combat pollution. For land 
this was the third time that such a campaign was organized, the first was in 
1997/1998 and the second in 2003. For environmental law, SEPA had tried 
over the last nine years or more to put campaign pressure on local 
governments and EPBs to enhance their enforcement.2. First in 1996 the 
State Council together with SEPA initiated a campaign known as the 
shiwuxiao (fifteen small), which was aimed at closing several types of severely 
polluting enterprises.  
This chapter will analyze the effect these campaigns have had on 
enforcement. It will study how and why enforcement changes during these 
campaigns and how this affects compliance. This research again draws on 
data collected during fieldwork in Kunming, national reports and national 
statistics. First, a section introduces the general use of political-legal 
                                                     
1 Based on interviews with Kunming EPB agents and enterprise managers. 
2 Other examples of such campaigns aimed at the legal system development are the “Strike 
Hard” campaigns, the anti-corruption campaigns and the legal education campaigns. For anti-
corruption campaigns see (Ye 2002). For strike hard campaigns see (Tanner 1999; Hu 2002). 
For legal education campaigns see (Exner 1995). On pre-reform mass campaigns see (Bennet 
1976). 
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campaigns in China. Subsequent sections detail land enforcement campaigns 
and pollution enforcement campaigns, followed by a conclusion. 
Political-Legal Campaigns in China 
Since the beginning of the post-Mao legal reform program, China’s 
leadership has made use of political pressure to enhance its legal system.  
These political campaigns overcame local resistance (See Chapter 13) 3 and 
achieved unusual success in implementing the law.  For instance, in 2001 the 
police of Sichuan,  China’s largest province with nearly one hundred million 
residents, solved 6706 crimes and apprehended 19,446 people, in just six 
days. 4   Furthermore, between 1986 and 1990, approximately 640 million 
people in China received education on its ten basic laws, including the 
constitution, criminal law, civil law, marriage law, and succession law.5  On 
August 13, 2003, forty-two million pirated CDs were destroyed throughout 
China.6  On June 26, 1996, the International Day against Drug Abuse and 
Illicit Trafficking designated by the United Nations General Assembly, it was 
reported that around 1.75 million people attended public rallies organized by 
the courts that convicted 1725 criminals for drug-related crimes.7   
There have been two types of campaigns.  The first one aims at 
enhancing law enforcement through command and control type methods.  
The most famous examples were the Strike Hard campaigns8 that imposed 
severe punishments upon criminals.  These campaigns attracted international 
attention because of the large number of death penalties they brought—
                                                     
3 See Van Rooij, "China's War on Graft: Politico-Legal Campaigns Against Corruption in 
China and Their Similarities to the Legal Reactions to Crisis in the U.S." Ho, "Who Owns 
China's Land? Policies, Property Rights and Deliberate Institutional Ambiguity." 394, Alford 
and Liebman, "Clean Air, Clean Processes? The Struggle over Air Pollution Law in the 
People's Republic of China." 109, Peerenboom, China's Long March toward the Rule of Law. 256-
7, 314-15, Keller, "Sources of Order in Chinese Law." 733, D.C. Clarke, "Power and Politics 
in the Chinese Court System: The Enforcement of Civil Judgments," Columbia Journal of Asian 
Law 10, no. 1 (1996). 41-9, Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China after Mao. 302-4 
4 Amnesty International, China: 'Striking harder' than ever before (ASA 17/022/2001) (6 July 2001 
[cited 26 August 2003]); available from 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGASA170222001. 
5 C. Cai, "Dui 'Guanyu Shenru Kaizhan Fazhi Xuanchuan Jiaoyu de Jueyi (Caoan)' de 
Shuoming (Explanation to the (Draft) Opinion on Deepening and Developing Legal System 
Propaganda and Education)," Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan Gongbao (Gazette of the PRC 
State Council) 645, no. April 13 (1991).195 
6W. Liu, "Huge Haul of Discs Destroyed," China Daily, 13 August 2003. 
7  Xinhua News Agency, "Over one million attend anti-drugs rallies," Summary of World 
Broadcasts Asia Pacific, 28 June 1996. 
8 For an overview of the earlier strike hard campaigns, see generally H.M. Tanner, Strike Hard! 
Anti-Crime Campaigns and Chinese Criminal Justice, 1979-1985 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 
1999). 
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especially the last one in 2001.9  So far there have been three large-scale 
Strike Hard campaigns—the first in 1983, the second in 1996, and the third 
in 2001.  These campaigns focused on harsh punishment of severe crimes.  
At the same time there have been many smaller Strike Hard campaigns 
against specific types of crimes, such as drug-related crimes in 1991, illegal 
border-crossing in 1993, and car theft in 1998.10   There have also been 
campaigns similar to the Strike Hard campaigns, but directed towards other 
violations of law, not falling under ordinary crimes.   For example, there 
were campaigns against the Falun Gong,11 copyright violation campaigns,12 
campaigns against illegal internet cafés (after the explosion of an internet bar 
in 2002),13 and, finally, campaigns against environmental law violations.14 
                                                     
9 Amnesty International, China: 'Striking harder' than ever before ([cited), Amnesty International, 
China: "Strike Hard" anti-crime campaign intensifies (23 July 2002 [cited 27 July 2003]); available 
from http:web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA170292002?open&of=ENG-CHN, 
Amnesty International, One Thousand Executed in "Strike Hard" Campaign Against Crime (1996 
[cited 27 July 2003]); available from http://www.amnesty.it/news/1996/31707196.htm, 
Amnesty International, People's Republic of China, Serious Human Rights Violations and the 
Crackdown on Dissent Continue (Amnesty International, 1 September 2002 [cited 27 July 2003]); 
available from http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGASA170472002. 
10 Supreme People's Court, "Zuigao Renminfayuan Guanyu Yange Zhixing [Quanguo Renmin 
Daibiao da Hui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Jindu de Jueding] Yanzheng Dupin Fanzui 
Fenzi de Tongzhi (Supreme People's Court Notice on Strictly Implementing [the SCNPC 
Decision on Banning Drugs] and Strictly Punishing Drug Related Criminals)," Gazette of the 
Supreme People's Court 25 (1991).10, Supreme People's Court, "Zuigao Renminfayuan Guanyu 
Yanlidaji Toudu Fanzui Huodong de Tongzhi (Supreme People's Court Notice on Striking 
Hard Against Illegal Border Crossing)," Gazette of the Supreme People's Court 36 (1993).147, 
Supreme People's Court et al., "Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Zuigao Jianchayuan Gonganbu 
Guojia Gongshang Xingzheng Guanliju Guanyu Yinfa [Guanyu Yifazhiguo Chachu Daoqie 
Qiangjie Jidongche Anjian de Guiding] de Tongzhi (SPC, SPP, PSB and SBIC notice on the 
issuing of [the Regulation on the Robbery and Theft of Moter-driven Vehicles])," Gazette of the 
Supreme People's Court 55 (1998). 
11  Human Rights Watch, Dangerous Mediation, China's Campaign Against Falungong. 21, 27-28, 34, 
36, 40. 
12 Y. Wang, "Capital Succeeds in Crackdown on Crimes," China Daily, 1 December 2001, 
Xinhua News Agency, "Anti-pornography, anti-piracy campaign "fruitful"," Summary of World 
Broadcasts Asia Pacific, 31 May 1996, Xinhua News Agency, "Authorities taking "stern action" 
against copyright pirates," Summary of World Broadcasts Asia Pacific, 13 May 1996, Xinhua News 
Agency, "Beijing Police make "largest-ever" illegal CD seizure," Summary of World Broadcasts 
Asia Pacific, 13 May 1996, Xinhua News Agency, "Police Ordered to Crack Down on Piracy of 
Copyrights," Summary of World Broadcasts Asia Pacific, 25 May 1996, Xinhua News Agency, 
"USA, China avert trade war over copyright," Summary of World Broadcasts Asia Pacific, 18 June 
1996, J. Zhou, "Anti-counterfeit move threatens Silk Alley," South China Morning Post, 11 May 
2001. 
13 L. Tsui, "The Panopticon as the Antithesis of a Space of Freedom, Control and Regulation 
of the Internet in China," China Information 17, no. 2 (2003). 65, 71. 
14 Van Rooij, "Implementing Chinese Environmental Law through Enforcement, the Shiwu 
Xiao  and Shuangge Dabiao Campaigns." 169-177; B. Van Rooij, "Implementation of Chinese 
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The second type of politico-legal campaigns are campaigns directed 
towards either enhancing the legal system as a whole, or just the 
implementation of a single law through dissemination of legal knowledge 
and raising people’s awareness.  The most important campaign of this sort is 
the Pufa (legal dissemination) campaign, which aims to educate the Chinese 
public about various laws.  This five-year campaign has been organized four 
times since 1986.15  It provides basic legal education to most Chinese.  As 
early as 1989, one author noted that “[j]ust about every Chinese citizen has 
been involved with or exposed to this campaign.”16  A special type of legal 
education and awareness campaign, the Pufa campaign implemented the 
1987 Organic Law on Village Committees (OLVC, amended in 1998).  
During several campaign rounds, the Ministry of Civil Affairs publicized this 
law and raised public pressure to overcome the local cadres’ resistance to its 
implementation.17 
China’s politico-legal campaigns share common characteristics.  First, 
during campaigns top level leaders start to support the law.18  Whereas in 
                                                                                                                        
Environmental Law: Regular Enforcement and Political Campaigns," Development and Change 
37, no. 1 (2006). 7-9. 
15 For an overview of the earlier campaigns, see R.J. Troyer, "Publicizing New Laws: The 
Public Legal Education Campaign," in Social Control in The People's Republic of China, ed. R J 
Troyer, J P Clark, and D G Royek (New York: Praeger, 1989).70-83; M. Exner, "Convergence 
of ideology and the law: the functions of the legal education campaign in building a Chinese 
legal system," Issues and Studies, no. August (1995). 68-102. 
16 Troyer, "Publicizing New Laws: The Public Legal Education Campaign." 70. 
17 J. Gu, "Yifa Zuohao Cunweihui Huanjie Xuanju (Tanyuan yu Sikao) (Implementing the 
Next Round of Village Committee Elections Based on Law (Causes and Ideas)," People's Daily, 
10 April 2002, Ministry of Civil Affairs, Xinban "Zhonghuarenmin Gongheguo Cunmin Weiyuanhui 
Xuanju Guizhang" Jinri Chuban (Today We Publish a  New edition of the "PRC Measures on Village 
Committee Elections") (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 29 November 2001 [cited 16 September 2003]); 
available from http://www.mca.gov.cn/news/news2001112901.html. For an overview of the 
literature on earlier campaigns and elections, see Liu, "Consequences of Villager Committee 
Elections in China, Better Local Governance or Consolidation of State Power.", Manion, 
"The Electoral Connection in the Chinese Countryside.", O'Brien, "Villagers' Committees, 
Implementing Political Reform in China's Villages.", O'Brien and Li, "Accomodating 
"Democracy" in a One-Party State: Introducing Village Elections in China.", C. Shi, Collective 
Democracy: Political and Legal Reform in China (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1999), Xu, 
"Mutual Empowerment of State and Peasantry: Grassroots Democracy in Rural China." 
18  X. Deng, Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan Disan Juan (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume 3) 
(Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1993). 33, Y. Meng, "Criminal Gangs Targeted in Strikes," China 
Daily, 24 November 2001, O'Brien and Li, "Accomodating "Democracy" in a One-Party State: 
Introducing Village Elections in China.", Wen Wei Po newspaper, "Public Security Minister 
urges learning from Guangdong on serious crime cases," Summary of World Broadcasts Asia 
Pacific, 30 May 1996. Xinhua News Agency, "Luo Urges Continuation of "Strike Hard" 
Campaign," China Daily, 20 July 2003, Xinhua News Agency, President Hu Calls for Efforts in 
"Strike Hard" Campaign (Xinhua Wang online) (2003 [cited 28 July 2003]); available from 
http:test.china.org.cn/english/China/68372.htm. Gu, "Yifa Zuohao Cunweihui Huanjie 
Xuanju (Tanyuan yu Sikao) (Implementing the Next Round of Village Committee Elections 
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certain cases bureaucratic or local resistance would normally make 
implementation of the law impossible, the political pressure of the campaign 
ensures results, at least temporarily.19  Leadership and civil servant evaluation 
systems (kaohe) have been key to the campaigns’ successes in implementation.  
The aims of the campaign (such as implementation of certain laws and 
regulations) become part of the policy priorities that form the basis on which 
bureaucratic leadership gets evaluated, rewarded and disciplined through the 
cadre responsibility and the civil service systems.20  
Second, in some cases, political power holders start the campaign by 
changing the existing legislation to allow for stricter enforcement.21  For 
example, during the first Strike Hard campaign in 1983, the Criminal Code 
was amended to allow for more “severe punishments, including the death 
sentence, on offenders who cause grave harm to public order.”22 Another 
1983 Strike Hard amendment was the suspension of the right to appeal a 
death sentence to the Supreme People’s Court.23   We can see that such 
campaigns thus bear a linkage with the ad-hoc-type lawmaking analyzed in 
Part II, Chapter 5.  
Third, national policymakers choose which laws and which aspects 
of the laws are to be the focus of the campaign.24  Campaigns thus provide 
                                                                                                                        
Based on Law (Causes and Ideas).", State Council, "State Council Decision on Several 
Problems concerning Environmental Protection (Guowuyuan guanyu Huanjing Baohu ruogan  
Wenti de Jueding)." Xinhua News Agency, "Police Ordered to Crack Down on Piracy of 
Copyrights.", Xinhua News Agency, "Politburo member Hu Jintao calls for broad 
participation in crime crackdown," Summary of World Broadcasts Asia Pacific, 6 May 1996. Van 
Rooij, "Implementing Chinese Environmental Law through Enforcement, the Shiwu Xiao  and 
Shuangge Dabiao Campaigns.", Wang, "Capital Succeeds in Crackdown on Crimes."170Van 
Rooij, "Implementation of Chinese Environmental Law: Regular Enforcement and Political 
Campaigns." 7, Troyer, "Publicizing New Laws: The Public Legal Education Campaign." 73. 
19  For the clearest example, see Van Rooij, "Implementing Chinese Environmental Law 
through Enforcement, the Shiwu Xiao  and Shuangge Dabiao Campaigns."170Van Rooij, 
"Implementation of Chinese Environmental Law: Regular Enforcement and Political 
Campaigns." 7 
20 This assumption is based on the author’s interviews with environmental enforcement agents 
conducted in Kunming in 2004.  See also Edin, "State Capacity and Local Agent Control in 
China: CCP Cadre Management from a Township Perspective." 35, 52. 
21 Z. An, "On Capital Punishment," Beijing Review 45, no. 7 (1983). 4, quoted in Beijing Review 
Article Explains Capital Punishment, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: Asia-Pacific, Nov. 15, 
1983, at K1; B.L. McCormick, Political Reform in Post-Mao China, Democracy and Bureaucracy in a 
Leninist State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). 108-109, Potter, "Belief in 
Control: Regulation of Religion in China."317, 331. 
22 An, "On Capital Punishment." 4. 
23 McCormick, Political Reform in Post-Mao China, Democracy and Bureaucracy in a Leninist State. 
108-109. 
24  Meng, "Criminal Gangs Targeted in Strikes.", Supreme People's Court, "Zuigao 
Renminfayuan Bangongting Zhuanfa Guojia Shangjianju Gonganbu [Guanyu Yanli Daji 
Bufafenzi Weizao Bianzao Maimai Shangjian Danzheng Xingwei de Tongzhi] de Tongzhi 
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political choices on how to allocate the limited implementation resources.  
After making these choices, the central political leadership communicates it 
and orders uniform implementation throughout the campaign’s target area.   
The fourth aspect is that the campaigns provide a standard working 
procedure.  Most campaigns begin by selecting their participants and 
preparing the main policy documents. 25   At the beginning of some 
campaigns, local officials evaluate the relevant local issues, and central level 
policymakers turn the issues into solution proposals on the basis of these 
evaluations.26  Governmental officials involved in the campaign then initiate 
implementation throughout China.  Finally, at every level of implementation, 
officials have to evaluate the progress and report to the higher level, and are 
sometimes inspected.27  Some campaigns focus on learning from the best 
local practices.28  They can be either major violation cases in enforcement 
                                                                                                                        
(Supreme People's Court Office Notice Transmitting the State Commodities Bureau and 
Public Security Bureau [Notice on Striking Hard Against Illegal Forging, Alteration or Sale of 
Commodity Documents])," Gazette of the Supreme People's Court 14 (1988), Van Rooij, 
"Implementing Chinese Environmental Law through Enforcement, the Shiwu Xiao  and 
Shuangge Dabiao Campaigns."170-7, Van Rooij, "Implementation of Chinese Environmental 
Law: Regular Enforcement and Political Campaigns."7-9 
25 McCormick, Political Reform in Post-Mao China, Democracy and Bureaucracy in a Leninist State. 106, 
CCP CC Bureau and State Council Bureau, Zhonggong Zhongyang Bangongting Guowuyuan 
Bangongting Fazhu Tongzhi Jin Yibu Zuohao Cunmin Weiyuanhui Huanjie Xuanju Gongzuo (The CCP 
Central Committee Bureau and State Council Bureau issue a Notice on Strengthening the Implementation of 
the Upcoming Round of Village Committee Elections) (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 19 August 2002 
[cited 16 September 2003]); available from 
http:www.mca.gov.cn/news/news2002081901.html, Gu, "Yifa Zuohao Cunweihui Huanjie 
Xuanju (Tanyuan yu Sikao) (Implementing the Next Round of Village Committee Elections 
Based on Law (Causes and Ideas)." Van Rooij, "Implementation of Chinese Environmental 
Law: Regular Enforcement and Political Campaigns." 709, H. Shi, "Quanguo "Er Wu" Pufa 
Jingyan Jiaoliu Huiyi (Conference to Exchange Experiences With regard to the National 
Second Five Year Legal Dissemination Campaign)," Falünianjian 1994 (1994).. 
26 See, e.g., Van Rooij, "Implementation of Chinese Environmental Law: Regular Enforcement 
and Political Campaigns." 7-9. 
27 Van Rooij, "Implementing Chinese Environmental Law through Enforcement, the Shiwu 
Xiao  and Shuangge Dabiao Campaigns.", Wang, "Capital Succeeds in Crackdown on Crimes." 
175, Van Rooij, "Implementation of Chinese Environmental Law: Regular Enforcement and 
Political Campaigns." 7-9, Ministry of Civil Affairs, Guanyu Choubei Zhaokai Quanguo Cunweihui 
Xuanju Qingkuang de Tongzhi (Decision on Preparing for Convening a Meeting on the Circumstances of 
Village Committee Elections) (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2002 [cited 16 September 2003]); available 
from http://www.mca.gov.cn/news/news2002091102.html.,F. Yang, "Destroying 800,000 
Illegal CDs," Huaxi Dushi Bao, 3 December 2001, Z. Yao, "Quanguo Renda Changweihui 
Jiancha "Er Wu" Pufa Jueyi ZHixing Qingkuang (SCNPC Inspects the Implementation of 
Opinion on the Second Five Year Legal Dissemination)," Falünianjian 1996 (1996). 181 
28 O'Brien, "Villagers' Committees, Implementing Political Reform in China's Villages." 41, 
Wen Wei Po newspaper, "Public Security Minister urges learning from Guangdong on serious 
crime cases." 74, Y. Zou, "Guanyu 1986 Nian Guanche Shishi Quanguo Renda Changweihui 
[Zai Gongminzhong Jiben Puji Falü Changshi de Jueyi] Qingkuang de Baogao (Report on the 
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type campaigns, or exemplary cases in education and propaganda campaigns.  
An additional issue is public involvement.  Most campaigns make use of the 
mass population to enhance their effectiveness.29  They do this either directly 
through education or indirectly through telephone hotlines, which allow 
citizens to voice complaints about violations, as well as through the reports 
on campaign progress and publication of model cases. 
Land Campaigns 
Until 2004, Jiacun village had thrived from developing its land. Farmers built 
second houses, while earning income from leasing their old one. Enterprises 
leased collective land, while the collective benefited from job opportunities 
and land leases. All of this, as we saw in Chapter 9, was in violation of the 
LMA. In the past these violations were condoned; even encouraged and 
regular enforcement did nothing to stop them. As we saw in Chapter 13, this 
was the result of local concerns for economic and social stability, combined 
with local autonomy and risk aversion of the enforcement agents and agency. 
On July 15, 2004, Jiacun’s illegal land practices were about to change. Local 
governments including Yunnan’s provincial level, Kunming’s municipal level, 
Diandong’s district level, Jiacun’s township level, Jiacun’s village level and 
even Jiacun’s seven sub-village levels became involved in a nationwide 
campaign to stop illegal land practices. What had been impossible in the past 
because of local resistance would now be done, so it seemed on July 15. Not 
just in Jiacun village, but also in Licun and Baocun where fewer, but similar 
violations of the LMA had been taking place. In fact, all of China’s villages 
became involved in the national 2004 illegal land use campaign.  
                                                                                                                        
Circumstances of Implementation in 1986 of the SCNPC [Opinion on the Basic 
Dissemination of Legal Knowledge among the People])," Falünianjian 1988 (1987). 675.  For 
environmental enforcement campaigns, a local practice from Zhejiang province to involve 
local farmers as inspection agents was propagated as a preferred method in the 2002 campaign.  
Based on the author’s personal correspondence with an anonymous official at the State 
Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA), Beijing, 2002.  
29O'Brien and Li, "The Politics of Lodging Complaints in Rural China." 482-483, BBC, China 
'outstrips world' on executions (Asia Pacific) (BBC News, 6 July 2001 [cited 28 July 2003]); 
available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1425570.stm. China Daily, 
"150 Heroic Citizens Rewarded," China Daily, 27 October 2001, Van Rooij, "Implementation 
of Chinese Environmental Law: Regular Enforcement and Political Campaigns." 8, CCP CC 
Bureau and State Council Bureau, Zhonggong Zhongyang Bangongting Guowuyuan Bangongting Fazhu 
Tongzhi Jin Yibu Zuohao Cunmin Weiyuanhui Huanjie Xuanju Gongzuo (The CCP Central Committee 
Bureau and State Council Bureau issue a Notice on Strengthening the Implementation of the Upcoming 
Round of Village Committee Elections) ([cited). H. Shi, Siwu Pufa Yinianjian (The Fourth Five Year 
Legal Dissemination Campaign's First Year) (Zhongguo Pufa Wang, 2002 [cited 8 September 
2003]); available from http://www.legalinfo.gov.cn/joa/shifadongtai/sfdt2002050901.htm. 
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1997 and 1998 Campaigns in Preparation of the LMA  
The 2004 land campaign was a continuation of earlier political efforts to 
strengthen arable land protection law. One of the earlier examples occurred 
in 1997 when a round of political pressure to enhance arable land protection 
started. At the time, China’s leadership felt a sense of urgency about the 
looming crisis about arable land loss and food shortages.30 The crisis not 
only led to stronger legislation to protect such arable land (see Chapter 3), 
but it also caused two rounds of campaigning to protect land while the new 
law was being drafted. The campaigns, organized in 1997 and 1998, 
introduced strict arable protection norms through extra-legal policy 
documents to be implemented in a campaign type fashion.  
 On April 15, 1997, China’s highest political and administrative 
institutions, the CCP Central Committee (CCP-CC) and the State Council 
issued a joint notice in order to strengthen arable land protection.31 In this 
notice, these powerful institutions recognized the importance of dealing with 
China’s ongoing land loss:  
 
“Land is a most valuable resource and capital. China is a country 
with a low per capita amount of arable land, which in general is of 
an inferior quality…Protecting arable land therefore means 
protecting our life support line. 32  However, the last years, some 
localities have converted land at random, illegally approved land 
usage and wasted land resources…Consequently, the total amount 
of arable land has sharply declined. The loss of arable land not only 
affects food production and agricultural development, but also 
influences the whole national economic development and social 
stability.”33 
 
                                                     
30 See Chapter 3 
31 CCP Central Committee and State Council, "Zhonggong Zhongyang, Guowuyuan Guanyu 
Jinyibu Jiaqiang Tudi Guanli Qieshi Baohu Gengdi de Tongzhi (CCP Central Committee and 
State Council Notice on Further Strengthening Land Management in order to Realize the 
Protection of Arable Land)," no. 11, 15 April 1997. 
32 Here the notice quotes a well known saying the then CCP secretary and president Jiang 
Zemin has been using since the mid-nineties to express his concern for arable land loss and to 
emphasize the need for arable land protection. See for example Z. Lin, Wai Zou Madai: Kaushiji 
de Weiken zhi Meng (Going into Madai, A Dream of Land Reclamation in the New Century) (16 August 
2004 [cited 15 September 2005]); available from http://www.fj.xinhua.org/news/2004-
08/16/content_2693392.htm. 
33 CCP Central Committee and State Council, "Zhonggong Zhongyang, Guowuyuan Guanyu 
Jinyibu Jiaqiang Tudi Guanli Qieshi Baohu Gengdi de Tongzhi (CCP Central Committee and 
State Council Notice on Further Strengthening Land Management in order to Realize the 
Protection of Arable Land)." 
314       Enforcement and Political Campaigns 
 
 
The first campaign concern was to strengthen macro-level land 
management. The joint notice introduced several new norms, which later 
would become part of the new Land Management Act (See Chapter 3)34. 
First, the total amount of arable land may only increase, and not decrease, 
while the quality of land must be improved. Second, all governments must 
strive to enhance land use effectiveness, introducing a land balancing system 
in which the amount of land to be used for construction must be replaced by 
newly developed arable land. According to the 1997 notice, all existing land 
plans must be changed in order to adopt these new principles.35 
The joint notice further issued a so-called “freeze” (dongjie) for all 
non-agricultural construction projects using arable land. The freeze was to 
start on 15 April 1997 and to continue for one year. The joint notice of 1997 
allowed only two exceptions. First, important projects that still needed to use 
arable land should apply for permission from the State Council.  Second, 
construction housing for middle and lower level income families and other 
already approved important national construction projects could still be 
carried out under the existing approval framework of the pre-1998 LMA.36. 
One can only imagine the impact this strict construction freeze could have 
had in a country as rapidly growing as China if it had been fully implemented.  
Another measure adopted in the CCP-CC and State Council notice 
concerned village construction. The notice emphasized strict adherence to 
village land planning, which should be based on using as little arable land for 
construction as possible and if arable land is used, the worst quality land 
should be used first. Furthermore, the 1997 land campaign introduced 
another new norm: rural households may only build one house. Here, the 
campaign again introduced a norm that would only become officially legal 
after the 1998 LMA amendment.37 The notice also stated that Township and 
Village enterprises should not use arable land, or use it as little as possible. 
Furthermore, it stated, as later regulated in the new LMA38, that collective 
                                                     
34 Land Management Act §18, 19, 31, 33 
35 CCP Central Committee and State Council, "Zhonggong Zhongyang, Guowuyuan Guanyu 
Jinyibu Jiaqiang Tudi Guanli Qieshi Baohu Gengdi de Tongzhi (CCP Central Committee and 
State Council Notice on Further Strengthening Land Management in order to Realize the 
Protection of Arable Land)." 
36 Ibid. 
37 LMA § 62.1 
38 LMA § 63 
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land may not be rented out for non-agricultural activities. 39  Thus, the 
campaign further pre-introduced new norms.40 
Except for these new policy norms, the joint notice also introduced 
a work plan to enhance current law enforcement. Similar to other political-
legal campaigns the 1997 land campaign aimed to improve enforcement by 
setting up a joint enforcement investigations group, consisting of the State 
Land Management Bureau (the predecessor of the Ministry of National Land 
Resources), the Ministry of Construction and the Supervision Ministry. This 
group was to supervise the enforcement campaign and deal strictly with any 
irregularities found during their supervision.41 The enforcement work itself 
consisted of an overall inspection of all construction projects since 1991, 
including rural housing. This inspection work had to have been finished 
before October 1997, so in just under six months, quite a task considering 
the amount of construction during the early 1990s in China. The ministries 
in charge had to report the results to the CCP-CC and the State Council, and 
all violations found had to be dealt with strictly, so the notice regulated.  
In order to make the overall inspection and sanction work feasible, 
the 1997 enforcement work was focused on several issues. First inspections 
were to look at development zones (kaifaqu), which have since the 1990s 
been responsible for a large amount of arable land loss. Second, the 
campaign focused on commercial housing and commercial projects such as 
golf courses. Third, illegal land transfers and leases, and other land 
transactions were priorities. Finally, the campaign focused on collective 
construction on arable land. 
This first campaign to protect arable land ran for a year, with a half a 
year period solely focused on enhancing enforcement. The campaign set-up 
was quite broad. It mostly consisted of symbolic statements that the norms 
should be implemented stricter and that stricter norms should be introduced. 
Remarkably, the joint notice held little detail about how the central level 
ministries are to deal with local resistance, other than that local governments 
should be educated and that study sessions should be organized for relevant 
cadre.42  
Because it occurred long before 2004, we have no specific data from 
our villages about this campaign. It seems though that it had little lasting 
impact, because the land violations witnessed in 2004 had originated already 
                                                     
39 CCP Central Committee and State Council, "Zhonggong Zhongyang, Guowuyuan Guanyu 
Jinyibu Jiaqiang Tudi Guanli Qieshi Baohu Gengdi de Tongzhi (CCP Central Committee and 
State Council Notice on Further Strengthening Land Management in order to Realize the 
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in the middle of the 1990s. The fact that China embarked on a new 
campaign in 1998 shows that national leadership believed a continued effort 
was necessary. 
In 1998, the CCP CC and the State Council issued another joint 
declaration, “the notice on continuing the freeze of non-agricultural 
construction on arable land.”43 The 1998 joint notice stated that although the 
1997 campaign had caused positive changes, illegal land practices remained 
and arable land was still threatened: 
 
“Since the 1997 notice…all localities have done their utmost to 
implement the one year freeze on non-agricultural construction 
projects using arable land… Since the 1997 national inspection, 
however, we know that lax and idle land use are still serious and that 
the control of non-arable use construction on arable land has been 
very difficult.”44 
 
To deal with these problems, the 1998 joint notice started another 
period during which all projects involving non-arable construction on arable 
land had to be halted. This was done in preparation of the new Land 
Management Act, and thus the period of the 1998 land freeze was to be 
from March 29 1998, until January 1 1999, the first day that the LMA would 
become effective.  
2003 Controlling and Overhauling the Land Market Campaign 
Since 1999, China has organized yearly campaigns to deal with recurring land 
loss violations.45 After 2002, the campaigns gained momentum as national 
leadership was shocked by a nationwide survey about arable land protection. 
The survey found that illegal land practices continued and were responsible 
for an ongoing reduction of arable land. It found that in 2002 there had been 
140.254 cases of illegal land use involving a total of 14.872 hectares of arable 
land.46 The amount of illegally used arable land had increased 50% compared 
                                                     
43 CCP Central Committee and State Council, "Zhonggong Zhongyang, Guowuyuan Guanyu 
Jixu Dongjie Feinongye Jianshe Xiangmu Zhanyong Gengdi de Tongzhi (CCP Central 
Committee and State Council Notice on Continuiing to Freeze Non-Agricultural 
Construction Projects using Arable Land)," no. 2, 29 March 1998. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Editorial, "2003-Tudi Zhengdun Fengbao (2003-A Land Overhaul Storm)," Nanfang Zhoumo, 
8 January 2004. 
46 Editorial, "Quanguo Tudi Zhengdun Dapandian: Kaifaqu Quandi 3 Wanpingfang Gongli, 
Fang Guotuziyuanbu Tudi Liyong Guanlisi Fusizhang Shu Keyin (An inventory of the 
National Land Overhaul, 30.000 Square Kilometers of Development Zones, an interview with 
Shu Keyin, vice director of the Ministry of National Land Resources Department of Land Use 
Management)," 21 Shiji, 18 November 2003.  
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to 2001.47  Although illegal land use consisted largely of farmers building 
illegal housing, 48  most attention went to the illegal construction of 
development zones. Such zones were set up throughout peri-urban China in 
order to promote trade and technological development. In general, zones 
take a large amount of arable land located on the outskirts of cities and 
towns.  According to a 2003 survey, China had erected over 5000 such 
commercial development projects occupying a total of about 3000 hectares.49 
The fact that land violations had continued despite the earlier campaigns and 
the introduction of the new law made China’s top leadership called for 
immediate action.50  
 On 20 February 2003, supported by prime-minister Wen Jiabao51, 
the CCP CC and the State Council 52 , the Ministry of National Land 
Resources (MNLR) organized a video conference to discuss the ongoing 
land violations and arable land loss. During this conference, MNLR 
announced it would start another round of campaigning to curb ongoing 
violations and arable land loss.53 This new round called “Jinyibu Zhili Zhengdun 
Tudi Shichang Zixu” (Further Controlling and Overhauling the Land Market 
System) was set for half a year from February until July 2003.54  On 22 
February, MNLR issued a working plan detailing how the campaign was to 
be conducted.55  
                                                     
47 Ibid. 
48 Between 2000 until 2002 there have been 400.000 illegal land cases 320.000 of which were 
housing. See W. Wang and L. Zhou, "Quanguo Tudi Weifa Shijian Pinchu, Quandi Re Heyi 
Lu Jinbuzhi? Guanyu Difang Zhengfu Tudi Weifa Anjian de Diaocha yu Sikao (Throughout 
the Nation Land Violations Frequently Occur, Why has the Trend of Occupying Land been 
So Difficult to Stop? Research and Reflection about Local Government Land Violation 
Cases)," Renmin Ribao, 24 April 2004. 
49 Editorial, "Quanguo Tudi Zhengdun Dapandian: Kaifaqu Quandi 3 Wanpingfang Gongli, 
Fang Guotuziyuanbu Tudi Liyong Guanlisi Fusizhang Shu Keyin (An inventory of the 
National Land Overhaul, 30.000 Square Kilometers of Development Zones, an interview with 




52  Ministry of National Land Resources, "Guotuziyuanbu Guanyu Yinfa "Jinyibu 
Zhilizhengdun Tudi Shichang Zixu Gongzuo Fang an" de Tongzhi (Ministry of Land 
Resources Notice on Initiating "The Work Plan for Further Control and Overhaul of the 
Land Market System")," no. 49, 21 February 2003. 
53 Editorial, "2003-Tudi Zhengdun Fengbao (2003-A Land Overhaul Storm)." 
54  Ministry of National Land Resources, "Guotuziyuanbu Guanyu Yinfa "Jinyibu 
Zhilizhengdun Tudi Shichang Zixu Gongzuo Fang an" de Tongzhi (Ministry of Land 
Resources Notice on Initiating "The Work Plan for Further Control and Overhaul of the 
Land Market System")." 
55 Ibid. 
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 The working plan outlined four campaign principles. First, zicha 
weizu, which means that self-reporting is central. The document explains that 
in the 2003 campaign the work by lower level governments and land bureaus 
is essential. These bureaus are to make reports about their own work 
detailing the current situation and problems relating to land violations and 
their control. Higher-level departments are to verify these lower level 
reports. 56  The second campaign principle is called tuchu zhongdian, which 
loosely translated means focusing on priorities. For education work the 
priority is educating leadership and management institutions in the 
importance of protecting arable land. For inspection and enforcement work 
the campaign lists several priorities, which we will look at in more detail 
below.57 The third campaign principle was zhong zai zhenggai or in English 
“emphasizing complete reform”. This means that in the campaign problems 
should be addressed by their roots and as much as possible structural 
reforms should be made to solve the underlying causes. 58  The fourth 
principle in the 2003 land campaign was the differential approach or qubie 
duidai in Chinese. This means that arable land loss problems that originate 
before the LMA was amended in 1999 should be dealt with more leniently 
than those that have occurred thereafter in violation of the new law. The 
working plan calls such pre-1999 issues “historical problems”, whose 
historical causes should be understood and respected in the campaign. 
Problems that keep on recurring despite enforcement and campaign efforts 
should be dealt with strictly, the working plan states. For such recurring 
cases the responsible leadership should be addressed and if necessary 
punished. Furthermore, in cases, which can be prosecuted criminally, the 
procurate and the police should be notified.59  
 As we just saw, the 2003 Campaign prioritizes inspection and 
enforcement work. As all political legal campaigns, the 2003 Campaign uses 
prioritization in order to enhance enforcement efficiency. During the 
campaign, enforcement agents are to focus on several types of violations, 
which must receive extra attention. In this manner enforcement, which 
normally is informal, becomes more formalized. (Compare with Chapter 12) 
The first enforcement priority in 2003 was for development zones and other 
large construction projects such as universities and golf courses.60 The choice 
for curbing development zones’ use of arable land is not surprising with all 
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the media attention there has been for such zones since early 2003.61 Shu 
Keyin, vice-director of the MNLR Department of Land Use Management, 
stated in a published interview that development zones are a priority first 
because they severely waste land resources, but also because such projects 
cause social tensions between local governments and land developers on the 
one hand and under-compensated landless farmers on the other. 62  The 
second 2003 campaign priority concerned non-agricultural construction on 
collective land, without carrying out the full land conversion procedures.63 
Again, this is not a surprising choice, as national data and our own case 
studies from Kunming demonstrate such violations are widespread and have 
had a major impact on the decrease of arable land. 64  The third priority 
concerned illegal land transactions, mainly for commercial property in cities, 
which is transferred obscurely without proper advertisement in the market.65 
The fourth and last campaign priority in 2003 was law enforcement itself. 
Lax law enforcement was to be addressed and strictly punished.66 
 The work-plan of the first 2003 land campaign outlined four periods. 
During the first period, from 20 February to 10 March, the work-plan itself 
had to be distributed through video conferences to all land bureaus at district 
level or higher. MNLR also stated that it would send such land bureaus the 
relevant study materials. At the same time, CCP leadership in all bureaus had 
                                                     
61 Editorial, "Quanguo Tudi Zhengdun Dapandian: Kaifaqu Quandi 3 Wanpingfang Gongli, 
Fang Guotuziyuanbu Tudi Liyong Guanlisi Fusizhang Shu Keyin (An inventory of the 
National Land Overhaul, 30.000 Square Kilometers of Development Zones, an interview with 
Shu Keyin, vice director of the Ministry of National Land Resources Department of Land Use 
Management)." For a later example of national media attention for development zones see the 
following article in the highly influential Nanfang Zhoumo: Editorial, ""Bie Duozou Wo de 
Maitian" ("Do not Deprive me of my Wheat Fields")," Nanfang Zhoumo, 8 January 2004.  
62 Editorial, "Quanguo Tudi Zhengdun Dapandian: Kaifaqu Quandi 3 Wanpingfang Gongli, 
Fang Guotuziyuanbu Tudi Liyong Guanlisi Fusizhang Shu Keyin (An inventory of the 
National Land Overhaul, 30.000 Square Kilometers of Development Zones, an interview with 
Shu Keyin, vice director of the Ministry of National Land Resources Department of Land Use 
Management)." 
63  Ministry of National Land Resources, "Guotuziyuanbu Guanyu Yinfa "Jinyibu 
Zhilizhengdun Tudi Shichang Zixu Gongzuo Fang an" de Tongzhi (Ministry of Land 
Resources Notice on Initiating "The Work Plan for Further Control and Overhaul of the 
Land Market System")." 
64 See Chapter 9 and Wang and Zhou, "Quanguo Tudi Weifa Shijian Pinchu, Quandi Re Heyi 
Lu Jinbuzhi? Guanyu Difang Zhengfu Tudi Weifa Anjian de Diaocha yu Sikao (Throughout 
the Nation Land Violations Frequently Occur, Why has the Trend of Occupying Land been 
So Difficult to Stop? Research and Reflection about Local Government Land Violation 
Cases)." 
65  Ministry of National Land Resources, "Guotuziyuanbu Guanyu Yinfa "Jinyibu 
Zhilizhengdun Tudi Shichang Zixu Gongzuo Fang an" de Tongzhi (Ministry of Land 
Resources Notice on Initiating "The Work Plan for Further Control and Overhaul of the 
Land Market System")." 
66 Ibid. 
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to erect special campaign working groups, which should include bureau 
leadership and be located at the bureau’s enforcement division. Finally 
during this first period all local departments had to make their own work-
plan, which should be given to higher level departments.67 
 During the second phase, from 11 March until 10 April, all land 
department personnel had to study the relevant campaign documents issued 
during the first phase. For this, study sessions had to be organized. During 
such sessions personnel were also to study the relevant existing legal and 
policy frameworks in order to understand the importance of protecting 
arable land and to know in detail what the existing norms are. 
 In the third phase, from 11 April to June 10, the actual enforcement 
work started. In these months, all departments had to start inspections to 
detect existing violations. For violations found, strict sanctions should be 
issued and measures to solve the issues through reforms should be adopted. 
As the working plan stated rather cryptically: 
 
“For problems discovered during the control and overhaul 
(campaign), those that need to be put straight should be firmly 
straightened out, those that need correction should be actively 
corrected, those that should be punished should be punished, those 
that need to be exposed should be exposed publicly.”68  
  
The principal enforcement work was to be done by municipal and 
city land bureaus, while provincial level bureaus strictly verified their 
activities. This worked through a bottom-up vertical reporting system, during 
which all bureaus were to report their work to higher level authorities. In 
case provincial level departments found that enforcement was too lax they 
should intervene. At the same time, the 2003 Campaign work-plan 
demanded that each province should choose one large violation case to be 
strictly punished and exposed publicly.69 
In the fourth and last phase, from 11 June until 30 July, all bureaus 
had to summarize their work and provincial level bureaus had to verify the 
work lower level bureau self-reported to have carried out. The work-plan 
stipulated that provincial level land bureaus should at least verify five per 
cent of all lower level cases. Before 10 July all provinces were supposed to 
hand in their final reports to MNLR. In this final phase reporting campaign 
results was the main goal. According to the work-plan all such reports should 
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honestly address what problems still exist and to what extent they are related 
to internal issues and how such issues can be solved.70 
Because of China’s SARS crisis71, the original working plan could 
not be carried out.72 In order to continue the arable land protection, the State 
Council organized another video conference on 31 July 2003, during which 
prime-minister Wen Jiabao emphasized that “Tudi shi Minsheng zhi Ben” (Land 
is the root for the people’s livelihood).73 The videoconference formed the 
start of a series of campaigns continuing the original 2003 Campaign, 
organized between June and December.74 First, a special campaign against 
development zones was launched in June.75 Then in October MNLR issued a 
notice about the continuation of the original general land market campaign76, 
which in November was followed by an urgent State Council notice calling 
for a stronger land campaign effort.77  
To what extent have the 2003 campaigns been able to enhance 
arable land protection law compliance? Were they successful in decreasing 
illegal land use and arable land loss? Nationwide data reported just after the 
campaigns late 2003 and early 2004 are positive. According to these reports, 
the campaign detected more than 170.000 illegal land use cases, of which 
128.00 were punished. 78  Furthermore, during the campaign 732 
                                                     
70 Ibid. 
71 Editorial, "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation (April-June 2003)," China Quarterly, no. 
175 (2003). 862-867 
72 Editorial, "Quanguo Tudi Zhengdun Dapandian: Kaifaqu Quandi 3 Wanpingfang Gongli, 
Fang Guotuziyuanbu Tudi Liyong Guanlisi Fusizhang Shu Keyin (An inventory of the 
National Land Overhaul, 30.000 Square Kilometers of Development Zones, an interview with 
Shu Keyin, vice director of the Ministry of National Land Resources Department of Land Use 
Management)." 
73 Editorial, "2003-Tudi Zhengdun Fengbao (2003-A Land Overhaul Storm)." 
74 For an overview see Editorial, "Quanguo Tudi Zhengdun Dapandian: Kaifaqu Quandi 3 
Wanpingfang Gongli, Fang Guotuziyuanbu Tudi Liyong Guanlisi Fusizhang Shu Keyin (An 
inventory of the National Land Overhaul, 30.000 Square Kilometers of Development Zones, 
an interview with Shu Keyin, vice director of the Ministry of National Land Resources 
Department of Land Use Management)." Editorial, "2003-Tudi Zhengdun Fengbao (2003-A 
Land Overhaul Storm)." 
75 State Council Bureau, "Guowu Yuan Bangongting Guanyu Qingli Zhengdun Gelei Kaifaqu 
Jiaqiang Jianshe Yongdi Guanli de Tongzhi (State Council Bureau Notice on Regulating and 
Overhauling the All Development Zones in order to Strengthen the Management of Land 
Used for Construction)," 30 June 2003. 
76 Ministry of National Land Resources, "Jinyibu Zhili Zhengdun Tudi Shichang Zixu Jiancha 
Yanshou Fangan (Plan on Continuing the Inspection and Verification of the Control and 
Overhaul of the Land Market System (Campaign))," 13 October 2003. 
77 State Council, "Guanyu Jiaqiang Gongzuo Lidu Jianyibu Zhili Zhengdun Tudi Shichang 
Zixu de Jinji Tongzhi (Urgent Notice on Strengthening the Continued Control and Overhaul 
of the Land Market System)," Guofa Mingdian, No. 7, 3 November 2003. 
78 Editorial, "Gedi Jiajin Chachu Tudi Weifa Anjian Chachu Lidu Jiada (Throughout China 
Land Violations are More Urgently Punished with Greater Force)," Renminrinbao Haiwaiban, 25 
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governmental officials received internal disciplinary sanctions (chufen) for 
their involvement in these cases and 134 individuals were prosecuted under 
criminal law. Similarly national reports proudly announced that the campaign 
had been successful in curbing the illegal land use by development zones. Of 
the 5658 development zones, 2046 had been disbanded during the 2003 
campaigns, over 35 per cent.79 Furthermore, MNLR published nine model 
violation cases, five in November and four in December, it had detected and 
severely punished, just as the campaign had planned.80 
These national data are not the full story though. The validity of the 
data presented in the reports is as any data in China doubtful.81 An indication 
of this is found in our fieldwork. When we first started our research in 
Kunming in January 2004, the 2003 campaign had just ended. By that time, 
the 2003 campaign had not affected Jiacun, Licun and Baocun as the national 
reports would lead us to believe. All of the violations discussed in Chapter 9 
were ongoing still in early 2004 and the 2003 campaigns had not stopped 
them or even addressed them in any way. Kouxiang Township’s 
development zone provides a good example. Even though the 2003 
campaign aimed to curb all further development of such zones, especially by 
township governments, the Kouxiang government proudly explained their 
development zone work in May 2004.  
General Set-up of the 2004 Controlling and Overhauling the Land 
Market Campaign 
In June 2004, I learned things had begun to change in Kunming. This change 
became clear when the director of the Kouxiang development zone was 
suddenly relieved of his tasks and made responsible solely of local enterprise 
development instead of the development zone itself. The zone itself had 
been dismantled and further development forbidden.82 The termination of 
Kouxiang’s development zone marked the start of the 2004 land campaign, 
the first one that would directly influence our fieldwork area in peri-urban 
Kunming. 
                                                                                                                        
March 2004. For older reports see Editorial, Guanyu Tudi Shichang Zixu Zhili Chengdun youguan 
Qingkuang de Tongzhi (Notice on the Circumstances of the Land Market System Control and Overhaul 
(Campaign)) (4 December 2003 [cited 20 September 2005]); available from 
http://www.landchina.com/query/content.ASP?Article_ID=475&TitleImage=subject.gif. 
79 Editorial, "Zhengdun Tudishichangzixu Feifa "Quandi"738 Ren Bei Chanchu (Overhaul of 
the Land Market, 738 People have bEen Punished for Illegal Land Occupation)," Beijing 
Chenbao, 12 February 2003. 
80 Editorial, "2003-Tudi Zhengdun Fengbao (2003-A Land Overhaul Storm)." 
81  The problem of positive bottom-up reporting is well known in China. A lack of 
accountability and transparency makes it difficult for higher levels to get trustworthy 
information from subordinate departments.  
82 Based on an interview with Kunming SLB enforcement agents, 8 December 2004. 
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Late 2003, despite the positive reports, China’s national leadership 
recognized that arable land violations remained problematic. At the time, 
Sun Wensheng, minister of MNLR stated: 
 
“There are many obstructing factors influencing the protection of 
national land resources and rational land use. Law enforcement 
supervision problems are still apparent…Some local land authorities 
have been lax and not enforced strictly. Some cadre have engaged in 
humanism, popularism or laxness and this has opened the door for 
illegal elements.”83  
 
During the same meeting minister Sun announced a continuation of 
the national land campaign in 2004, “The public can expect to see more 
officials with their land allocations deeds exposed.”84 National leadership’s 
support for continued land campaigns was probably further fueled in January 
2004 when China’s most influential newspaper, the Nanfang Zhoumo, 
published a special report on a large illegal land use case involving a golf 
course in Shandong province. 85  In his speech on 5 April, minister Sun 
Wensheng repeated his concern for arable land loss and the necessity for a 
continued effort to enhance enforcement.86  
All of this finally culminated in the State Council’s urgent notice 
calling for a further “deepening” of the 2003 land campaign.87 The notice 
announced a six month nationwide effort to enhance the implementation of 
the LMA in order to protect arable land and control disorderly land use 
practices.88 Similar to previous campaigns, the 2004 notice prioritized work. 
First, it urged regulating illegal land practices in which arable land was used 
without proper permission, speculation cases where arable land had been 
converted for construction but the land was not used, and in general cases in 
which land use was changed illegally. Second the notice called for dealing 
with land authorities and local governments granting permission for land use 
                                                     
83 Editorial, "2003-Tudi Zhengdun Fengbao (2003-A Land Overhaul Storm)." 
84 M. Tang, "Land Allocation Abuses Probed," China Daily, 29 December 2003. 
85 Editorial, ""Bie Duozou Wo de Maitian" ("Do not Deprive me of my Wheat Fields")." 
86 W. Sun, Renzhen Guanche Luoshi Dangzhongyang Guoquyuan Bushu Jianjue Jiuzheng Zhengdizhong 
Qinhai Nongmin Liyi Wenti (We Must Sincerely Implement the CCP Central Committee and State 
Council's Strong Commitement to Correct the Problem that Farmer's Interests are Harmed in Land 
Requisitioning) (8 April 2004 [cited 15 September 2005]); available from 
http://www.clr.cn/front/chinaResource/read/news-info2.asp?ID=40864. 
87 State Council Bureau, "Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Shenru Kaizhan Tudi Shichang 
Zhili Zhengdun Yange Tudi Guanli de Jinji Tongzhi (State Council Bureau Notice on the 
Urgency of Deepeing the Overhaul of the Land Market towards Stricter Land Management)," 
no. 20, 29 April 2004. 
88 Ibid. 
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in violation of existing land use planning. Third, the notice addressed the 
issue of misuse or disabuse of land compensation fees. (For an example see 
the case of Xiaocun in Chapter 9) Furthermore it called for amending farmer 
compensation problems in general, addressing the issue of farmers receiving 
too little compensation for land lost. 89  This priority is logical as 
compensation issued had started to instigate rural unrest throughout China. 
In Kunming as we saw in Chapter 9, farmers started to engage in violent 
confrontations with township and village governments when they felt they 
had been unduly compensated. Last, protecting basic arable land formed a 
special priority in the campaign, calling for nationwide inspections on basic 
farmland use and strict punishment for violations found.90 
The campaign also introduced a new norm, not found in the LMA 
or other legislation: it called for another land conversion freeze, echoing the 
1997 and 1998 campaigns. This time, for the duration of the campaign, i.e. 
six months, in all of China arable land could not be converted to non-arable 
usage. Furthermore, in localities in which the campaign brought forward 
serious irregularities, the temporary land freeze could be continued until such 
problems had been solved, so the notice decreed.91 Thus, once again the land 
campaigns introduced extra-legal norms, not just any norm, but a very strict 
one.92 Finally the campaign aimed at aiding the introduction of the vertical 
management system for local land bureaus (see Chapter 13), which was 
introduced in a separate State Council notice just two months prior.93 
The State Council 2004 campaign notice offered little detail about 
how the work was to be carried out exactly. It only stated that the 
responsibility for the campaign work would be delegated to provincial level 
governments.94 On May 15 2004, MNLR issued a working plan, detailing 
how various governments and land bureaus were to implement the 
campaign.95 This working plan first introduced five main principles on the 
basis of which the work was to be done. Some of these were copied from the 




92  One can wonder about the legal status of such norm. Compare with the Law on 
Lawmaking.  
93 S. Council, "Guowuyuan Guanyu Zuohao Shengji Yixia Guotu Ziyuan Guanlitizhi Gaige 
Youguan Wenti de Tongzhi (State Council Notice on Problems of Reforming the Sub-
provincial Land Resource Management System)," No. 12, OPZOEKEN 2004. 
94 State Council Bureau, "Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Shenru Kaizhan Tudi Shichang 
Zhili Zhengdun Yange Tudi Guanli de Jinji Tongzhi (State Council Bureau Notice on the 
Urgency of Deepeing the Overhaul of the Land Market towards Stricter Land Management)." 
95 Ministry of National Land Resources, "Guotu Ziyuanbu Guanyu Yinfa <Shenru Kaizhan 
Tudi Shichang Zhili Zhengdun Gongzuo Shishi Fangan> de Han (Ministry of National Land 
Resources Document on Distributing the Realization Plan on the Deepening of the Control 
and Overhaul of the Land Market (Campaign))," No. 154, 15 May 2004. 
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2003 campaign:  zicha weizu (self-reporting is central), meaning that each level 
of administration must self report problems and solutions related to the 
campaign96 , tuchu zhongdian (focusing on priorities) 97 , which is the list of 
priorities mentioned in the State Council’s urgent notice.98 Others were new: 
mingque zeren (clear responsibilities), which meant that provincial level 
governments were made responsible, while specific tasks were delegated to 
different local departments (see below) 99 , gaohao jiehe (accomplish 
integration)100, indicating that this large general land campaign should be 
integrated with special smaller ongoing campaigns on for example 
development zones and arable land protection101, jiaqiang ducha (strengthening 
supervision), which the document explains means that all localities must 
make their own workplans to carry out the tasks of the campaign and to 
organize working groups with delegated campaign responsibilities related to 
inspecting and verifying work done.102 
The MNLR 2004 campaign document further detailed what 
departments should cooperate in which tasks. The 2004 campaign had 
sufficient support from powerful leaders in the CCP CC and the State 
Council, to enable a coordinated effort involving departments with much 
more resources and power than just the MNLR alone. For instance, for 
enforcement work against arable land use abuses, the first campaign 
priority103, land bureaus cooperated with the all powerful Development and 
Reform Departments.104 This cooperation guaranteed that extra force was 
allocated to enhance weak regular law enforcement. It shows that during the 
                                                     
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
98 State Council Bureau, "Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Shenru Kaizhan Tudi Shichang 
Zhili Zhengdun Yange Tudi Guanli de Jinji Tongzhi (State Council Bureau Notice on the 
Urgency of Deepeing the Overhaul of the Land Market towards Stricter Land Management)." 
99 Ministry of National Land Resources, "Guotu Ziyuanbu Guanyu Yinfa <Shenru Kaizhan 
Tudi Shichang Zhili Zhengdun Gongzuo Shishi Fangan> de Han (Ministry of National Land 
Resources Document on Distributing the Realization Plan on the Deepening of the Control 
and Overhaul of the Land Market (Campaign))." 
100 Ibid. 
101 REF 
102 Ministry of National Land Resources, "Guotu Ziyuanbu Guanyu Yinfa <Shenru Kaizhan 
Tudi Shichang Zhili Zhengdun Gongzuo Shishi Fangan> de Han (Ministry of National Land 
Resources Document on Distributing the Realization Plan on the Deepening of the Control 
and Overhaul of the Land Market (Campaign))." 
103 State Council Bureau, "Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Shenru Kaizhan Tudi Shichang 
Zhili Zhengdun Yange Tudi Guanli de Jinji Tongzhi (State Council Bureau Notice on the 
Urgency of Deepeing the Overhaul of the Land Market towards Stricter Land Management)." 
104 Ministry of National Land Resources, "Guotu Ziyuanbu Guanyu Yinfa <Shenru Kaizhan 
Tudi Shichang Zhili Zhengdun Gongzuo Shishi Fangan> de Han (Ministry of National Land 
Resources Document on Distributing the Realization Plan on the Deepening of the Control 
and Overhaul of the Land Market (Campaign))." 
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campaign the highest levels of power and even departments normally not 
concerned with arable land protection were involved in stopping ongoing 
violations. Letting non-land departments cooperate in the campaign was also 
practical. For illegal use of compensation fees, the land bureau lacked 
knowledge and access to information. Therefore, the campaign document 
provided that for this type of priority the land bureaus should cooperate with 
Finance Departments and Accounting Departments.105 
Similar to the 2003 campaign, work was divided in self-reporting 
and verification of such reports. Provincial level governments organized the 
self reporting of the existing problems and the solutions found. After that, 
national level departments including MNLR, the Development and Reform 
Commission, the Ministry of Construction, the Ministry of Finance, the 
Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Accounting and the Ministry of 
Supervision (Jiancha Bu) examined and verified these self-made reports 
through inspection visits and hearings.106  
Apart from the above, the 2004 MNLR document provided little 
more detail about how work is to be carried out exactly. It only stated that in 
case violations are found a limit time should be given to address the 
problems, which if then still not solved should be punished strictly. 107 
Furthermore the document stated that local governments should deal with 
problems within their jurisdiction. If governments failed to address their own 
land problems those in charge should be held responsible.108 Finally, like 
before the campaign emphasized openness of enforcement: “public 
inspections, public punishment, public prosecution, public disclosure.” 109 
Again emphasizing that large violation cases should be punished swiftly 
under as much media attention as possible. 
For more detail about how the 2004 campaign was set up, we are 
lucky that we have a district level internal document. In this Kunming, 
Diandong District document the Diandong District Government provided 
detail about how to implement the national campaign. 110  In Diandong 
District the main focus was on one of the national campaign’s priorities, the 
existing illegal land practices in which land had been used without following 
the proper procedures. It demanded that before July 15 all existing illegal 
land practices should be rectified through renewed land application 
procedures with the township level governments. All cases in which land had 






110 Diandong District Government, "Guanyu Zhengdun Tudi Shichang Zixu Wanshan Jianshe 
Yongdi Shouxu de Tonggao (Notice on Enhancing the Land Use Procedures for the 
Overhaul of the Land Market System (Campaign))," 22 June 2004. 
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been used without full land reclamation or land use conversion procedures, 
such procedures had to be carried out once again. In our fieldwork villages 
this mainly meant that enterprises which had illegally leased collectively 
owned land would have to apply for the full land reclamation and land use 
conversion and compensation procedures the LMA provides for.  
The Diandong notice distinguished different circumstances. 
Recognizing that the problem had historical roots, years of weak 
enforcement and condoning illegal practices needed for local development, 
older violations were dealt with more leniently than recent transgressions. 
Illegal land practices that had existed from before the 1997 first land 
campaign, so the notice stated, only needed to reapply for the relevant 
procedures and pay all fees and compensations needed, while they could 
continue to use the land as they had done in the past. For violations that had 
originated during the 1997 and 1998 campaigns, Diandong was stricter. 
Illegal land users had to pay a fine and taxes on top of the land procedure 
and compensation fees before their land use was legalized. A third category 
of violations, those between 1 January 1999 and 30 November 2003, had to 
carry out applications again, pay fines and taxes and had to balance the arable 
land used with newly developed arable land according to the law. For 
violations since 30 November 2003, violators had to be punished strictly.111 
For those violations that did not meet the criteria of the Kunming Overall 
Land Use Plan or the Dianchi Management Regulations (see Chapter 4), land 
users should destroy the constructions made on the land and restore it to its 
original use, especially if it concerns basic arable land. 
Campaign work, so the Diandong notice decreed should be carried 
out by Township level governments. They were responsible for preparing 
the legalization process, which meant they had to investigate existing land 
violations, initiate applications for reparation procedures for those violations 
that should be legalized and make overall reports about the current situation. 
The reports and applications had to be given to the Diandong district 
National Land Resource Bureau for verification and approval. All of this 
should have had to be finalized before July 15 the Diandong notice stated. 
After this date illegal land users could no longer apply for reparative 
procedures in order to legalize their current land practices.112 Such practices 
would remain illegal and in the future be punished harshly, the decree 
stated. 113  For this it introduced new enforcement measures including an 
enforcement information network and a system of regular on site 
inspections.114 
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The Diandong notice on the 2004 campaign finally introduced 
mechanisms to ensure that local governments at the Township level 
cooperate fully in the campaign instead of resisting national law and policy as 
they had done in the past. The document does so by incorporating results 
made in the campaign in the general cadre evaluation system (kaohe) (See 
Chapter 13). If governments failed to do their best to carry out the campaign 
and let land violations continue the decree stated leadership will be held 
responsible. 
What was the effect of all these paper documents? Did they change 
ongoing land practices in China and in peri-urban Kunming in particular? 
And if they had an impact why was that? What changed and what did not, 
and again why? 
Results of the 2004 Land Campaign in Kunming 
There is only one way of answering the questions posed in the preceding 
section: by looking at what has happened in practice. As we saw, one source 
of information are governmental reports about campaign achievements, 
Unfortunately, such reports present only part of what actually happens. We 
are fortunate that for the 2004 land campaigns we were able to witness 
ongoing changes in the three villages we worked in.  
If all earlier campaigns failed to affect local practice in peri-urban 
Kunming, the 2004 campaign did bring changes. Soon after the national 
campaign documents had been issued, provincial, municipal, district and 
township level governments convened a meeting in which the higher level 
government plans were translated into local policy and plans of action, 
similar to the Diandong notice just described above. Soon, in late June even 
the VC and xiaozu (sub-village leadership) convened in order to discuss the 
changes at hand. At all levels the new land campaign was discussed by 
leaders far beyond those merely working on land issues. 
In Kunming’s peri-urban land practice there was one main issue this 
campaign tried to address. This was the illegal land leases to non-collectively 
owned enterprises. As we saw, the LMA forbids leasing collectively owned 
land for non-arable use practices such as privately owned enterprises. In all 
three villages, but in Jiacun in particular, such illegal lease cases are the norm, 
not the exception (See Chapter 9). The 2004 campaign wanted to legalize 
such land practices by forcing illegal land users to apply for reparative land 
use procedures. In the first meetings on how to implement the campaign in 
Kunming it was proposed to do so strictly: converting both the land 
ownership to the state and the land use right to the enterprise. 115  The 
enterprise would then have to pay for all fees and land use costs. In 
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Diandong this led to protest by VCs fearing that they and their farmers 
would lose all land related income which would in this plan only be paid to 
the state. In this district the plans were amended in reaction to the village 
level concerns.116 Now, the land ownership would be converted to the state, 
but the land use right would remain with the sub-village, which could then 
continue to receive land lease income. Meanwhile in Dianxi district’s 
Kouxiang township, in Baocun and Licun the campaign also started. In 
Baocun the campaign would affect about ten companies and about 100 Mu 
of land. 117  In the discussions the Baocun VC had with their Township 
authorities, a similar approach as that in Jiacun was adopted: converting the 
land ownership to the state, while letting the sub-village exercise the land use 
right by leasing it to the enterprises.118 In Licun, finally the campaign would 
affect about 20 Mu of land, the land the VC had rented from farmers and 
rented out to enterprises with a considerable profit. 119  The approach for 
implementing the campaign in Licun was different from Baocun and Jiacun, 
because Licun’s land had been leased for one lump sum instead of annual 
leases (See Chapter 9). Because of this, Licun village did not mind losing its 
land use right; the village could not lose land income because the enterprises 
had already paid. Thus, in Licun the original model was followed: converting 
the ownership to the state and the land use right to the enterprise.120 
In all three villages, at first, campaign work proceeded smoothly. All 
villages were able to meet the original deadline of July 15th, before which 
they had to report the existing problems and present plans for legalization. 
Work became more troublesome when the issue of legalization costs came 
up. These first included fees due for ownership conversion, from state to 
collective land. This so-called land conversion fee (zhengyong fei) was not set at 
the start of the campaign. At first, different fee standards were rumored to 
be used ranging from 20.000 RMB/Mu for land practices existing since 
before 1999 in the remote Kouxiang township area 121  to up to 80.000 
RMB/Mu for recent land use practices in Jiacun township, near to 
Kunming.122 What was clear from the start was who was going to pay for it. 
Formally the VC or the sub-village would have to pay for land use 
conversion because they were the ones retaining the land use right (at least in 
Jiacun and Baocun). However, village leadership soon decided to let the final 
land users, the enterprises pay for such costs. The rationale was that the 
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117 Based on an Interview with Baocun village leadership 15 July 2004 
118 Ibid. 
119 Based on an Interview with Licun village leadership 10 August 2004 
120 Ibid. 
121 Based on an Interview with Baocun leadership 15 July 2004 
122 Based on an Interview with Jiacun village leadership 16 August 2004 
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village should not have to pay for the extra security the enterprise would get, 
so it seems. Or otherwise, sub-villages knew they would not be able to pay 
and instead of instigating social unrest with villagers decided to shift the 
burden to the enterprises. The issue of land fees remained unclear for 
months. Thus, the existing legal land practices were reported and registered 
and the enterprises were notified of the changes at hand. However, because 
the exact fees were not yet set, the actual legalization could not proceed. 
Meanwhile, many feared that if the campaign would be implemented 
according to plan the local effects would be disastrous. First of all, 
enterprises complained that this sudden change of policy was unfair. One 
enterprise manager in Baocun told me that if this legalization had been 
announced a year in advance he might have been able to save to pay for it. 
Now, he told me, the 60 Mu of land he had illegally used might force him 
into bankruptcy. In Jiacun, VC leadership was also concerned. The village 
vice-CCP secretary, in charge of enterprise development, told me that many 
of the village’s enterprises would not be able to pay the fees so far discussed 
due for the land legalization. Similarly, Jiacun’s village head and secretary told 
me that the current campaign heavily suppressed the village’s development 
potential. First, it would affect current enterprises, but second because of the 
enhanced enforcement of these unfavorable rules the village would have 
difficulty attracting new enterprises and developing its current area of unused 
land. Licun’s leadership agreed and as their secretary said: “The policy is 
good but because of it we will no longer be able to develop our land in the 
future.”123 
The campaign also affected housing practices, mainly in Jiacun 
village. As we saw in Chapter 9, many farmers had illegally built a new house 
while renting out their old one. As of June 2004, sub-village councils stopped 
approving construction of new houses other than those constructed on land 
where the old house used to stand. For villagers who had so far not 
benefited from building a second house, the sudden change in policy was 
very unfair.  The sub-village council chairman of Jiacun sub-village number 2 
showed me an application for a second house filed just weeks after the 
campaign had started: “This villager was angry when I told that with the 
campaign building a second house is no longer allowed. He said: ‘Why 
should I not be able to get the 2000 yuan my neighbor gets from renting his 
second house?’” 
Late November 2004 the legalization fees were finally set. The worst 
rumors were confirmed as the fees and land rents were high. First enterprises 
would have to pay a land conversion procedure fee (banzhengfei) of 80.000 per 
mu, to be paid to the land bureau. Second, enterprises had to pay a lump 
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sum for renting the land use right from the sub-village, which is set at 
200.000 for a 50 years period.124 In Jiacun village, which is in many aspects 
the richest of the three villages studied, more than two thirds of the 
enterprises were reported not to be able to pay these new fees and rents. By 
the end of this research in December 2004, it seemed unlikely therefore that 
the campaign would actually be implemented according to the letter. As one 
of the village leaders told me two months earlier: “If we want to maintain 
our current level of development and continue to develop in the future, we 
must and will find a way around the campaign.”125 
The 2004 land campaign was a mixed success. On the positive side, 
one could argue that the campaign did affect local resistance to the 
implementation of the LMA. Local governments down to the lowest 
grassroots sub-village council participated actively in the campaign. Existing 
illegal land practices that had been condoned for years, and that weeks prior 
to the campaign leadership had told us were legal, were now recognized as 
violations and reported as such. Furthermore, during the campaign new land 
practices in violation of the law were temporary halted, such as for example 
the ban on building second houses in Jiacun.  
The success is probably due to the fact that the campaign results 
were weighed in the kaohe cadre management system. Informants working at 
the Jiacun Township land bureau confirmed the importance of incorporating 
the campaign into this internal evaluation system.126  
On the negative side, first the campaign brought a sudden change 
with unfair consequences for many. Enterprises suddenly had to pay 
enormous fees for land practices that had been condoned for years. Similarly, 
unlucky farmers who in the past had not been able to benefit from building a 
second house found out that as of June this option was no longer available 
to them. Another negative consequence of the campaign was its possible 
impact on local development. If implemented to its letter many enterprises 
will have to close, while because of the higher costs of start-up attracting 
new enterprises in the future will be difficult. In addition, the campaign as 
set-up and executed in Kunming did not pay sufficient attention to local 
circumstances and failed to achieve its original goal of land protection. In 
order to keep control over outcomes the campaign set targets with deadlines. 
Unfortunately, the targets set did not lead to arable land protection but only 
to legalizing existing illegal practices. Because of the rigid formal adherence 
to the targets, local governments were not allowed to adapt the campaign to 
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their local circumstances with possible disastrous consequences. Finally, 
because of these problems, it is highly unlikely that the campaign, which fails 
to solve the underlying conflict of interests between arable land protection 
and local livelihoods, is able to achieve its legalization plans. As we saw, 
village leadership is confident that in the end they will find a way around the 
proposed measures, they must in order to save their local development. So 
while on paper progress will be reported for the short term, as it has been in 
the past, in the longer term the results made will evaporate as violations are 
likely to continue. 
Pollution Campaigns 
Since the mid-1990s China has also organized campaigns against 
environmental pollution violations. These campaigns focused and formalized 
environmental enforcement work. Through prioritized targets and short-
term deadlines, the pollution campaigns were able to overcome local 
resistance and achieve unprecedented results. That is, if we believe the 
reports that have been issued after each campaign. Similar to the land 
campaigns, the results reported have not been sustained and relapses in 
violations have been common. As a result, environmental campaigns have 
become a recurring event, organized each spring and summer, each year with 
different targets and focuses. 
 This section looks at the pollution campaigns of 1996, 2000, 2001, 
2002, 2003 and finally 2004 campaign. For the first five it mainly discusses 
how the campaigns were organized throughout China, while for the 2004 
campaign it looks in more detail how the campaign affected local law 
enforcement and compliance in Kunming. 
1996-2000 Small Polluting Enterprises and Large Polluter Campaigns 
In 1996 China suddenly closed over 60,000 enterprises because of their 
pollution problems.127 In December 2000 China’s national media reported 
that nearly 100 per cent of the larger major polluting enterprises now met 
pollution standards. 128  These changes were not the result of changes in 
regular enforcement, but rather of a new State Council policy. Just months 
after the 4th conference on EP law129 and in line with the 9th five year plan 
                                                     
127  China Environment Yearbook 1997 (Zhongguo Huanjing Nianjian 1997),  (Beijing: China 
Environment Yearbook Press, 1998). 510 
128 See China Environmental Newspaper (Internet Edition), December 30, 2000. 
129 Documents of this conference have been published in NEPA (ed), Compilation of Documents 
of the Fourth National Conference on Environmental Protection  (Beijing: China Environmental 
Sciences Press, 1996). 
Movements of Law       333 
 
 
and China’s long-term 2010 plan for EP, 130  the State Council issued a 
decision on strengthening the implementation of EP. 131  This decision 
brought a landmark change in the enforcement of EP law in China, in 
particular, the promotion of the severest administrative sanction to counter 
industrial pollution: abatement deadlines, to be followed by the forced 
closure of polluting industries. 
In its Decision, issued on August 3, 1996 the State Council stated 
that by 2000 all of China’s pollution discharged from industrial pollution 
sources should meet State and local standards. 132  The responsibility for 
achieving this goal was imposed on local governments.133 The State Council 
also explained how this goal was to be met. The Notice stated that any 
polluting unit whose discharges exceeded the standards, should be given an 
abatement deadline by the local government at county level or higher.134 
Units that failed to meet this deadline should be ordered by the local 
government at county level or above to be closed, to halt production or to 
move their operation.135 The Decision further ordered the direct closure of 
several types of small polluting enterprises before 30 September 1996. The 
latter policy is usually referred to as ‘The 15 Small’ (‘Shiwu Xiao’) (here called 
“Small Enterprises”) and the former policy of first setting abatement 
deadlines and then closing units that fail to meet them is part of the policy 
usually referred to as ‘Twice Reaching the Standards’ (‘Shuang Dabiao’) (here 
called “Large Polluter”). Under the policy of the Shiwu Xiao all 15 types of 
small polluting enterprises were to be closed before September 30, 1996.136 
The 1996 Notice named the following types of enterprises: paper factories 
producing less than 5,000 tons a year, tanneries treating less than 30,000 
hides a year, dye factories producing less than 500 tons a year; coking 
enterprises and sulfur smelting enterprises using obsolete technologies. All 
these were to be banned by local governments at district level and above. 
Enterprises using indigenous methods to smelt arsenic, mercury, lead-zinc or 
to refine oil and extract gold, enterprises using pesticides, bleach and dye, 
electroplating, and enterprises producing radioactive and asbestos products, 
                                                     
130 NEPA, ‘The National Ninth Five-Year State Plan for Environmental Protection and the 
Long-Term Targets for the Year 2010 ‘, (1996) (10) Environmental Work News Report (Huanjing 
Gongzuo Tongxun), 3-26. 
131 State Council, ‘State Council Decision on Several Problems concerning Environmental 
Protection’, (1996) (8) Environmental Work News Report (Huanjing Gongzuo Tongxun), 10 
132 Ibid. 
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were all to be ordered to be closed and to stop production by the local 
governments at county level or above.137 
The second part of the 1996 State Council Decision concerned the 
Shuang Dabiao aimed at achieving that all of China’s industrial enterprises 
meet the national and regional standards by 31 December 2000.138 Unlike the 
Small Enterprises campaign, this one was directed at China’s larger industrial 
enterprises. Many of these were still state owned, and prior to the campaign, 
these had not been targeted much by enforcement action.139 
The methods used to achieve this goal were twofold. First, the 
enterprises that failed to meet the standards were to be given an abatement 
deadline during which they were to control their pollution sources so that 
they would meet the standards.140 Second, enterprises that still failed to meet 
the standards were to be closed down.141 The campaign gained momentum 
in 1999 after SEPA produced a detailed work schedule 142  and when it 
became a focus of EP work in China. Even president Jiang Zemin called 
1999 a crucial year for implementing this campaign.143 
                                                     
137 Ibid., 12. 
138 State Council, "State Council Decision on Several Problems concerning Environmental 
Protection (Guowuyuan guanyu Huanjing Baohu ruogan  Wenti de Jueding)." The State 
Council policy has been further elaborated concerning the Shuang Dabiao in SEPA, "Guojia 
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no. 1 (1999).. 
139Sun, "Controlling the Environmental Consequences of Power Development in the PRC." 
1027 
140 State Council, "State Council Decision on Several Problems concerning Environmental 
Protection (Guowuyuan guanyu Huanjing Baohu ruogan  Wenti de Jueding)." 11-12. 
141 SEPA, "Guojia Huanbao Zongju guanyu Quanguo 2000 nian Gongye Wuranyuan Dabiao 
Paifang he Huanjing Baohu Zhongdian Chengshi Huanjing Gongnengqu Dabiao Gongzuo 
Fangan (SEPA Work Schedule so that All China's Industrial Pollution Sources Meet the 
Standards when Discharging and that the Environmental Protection Key Cities Meet the 
Standards in their Environmental Function Areas)." 19. At the start of the campaign all 
industrial pollution sources had to register with the local EP authorities. Then the provincial 
EP authorities should have decided which of the registered pollution sources were key-
polluting enterprises. EP authorities should have carried out regular inspections at these key-
polluting enterprises, at other enterprises inspections could be selective. Special Shuang Dabiao 
leading groups should have been set up at central and local level. Furthermore, local 
governments should have incorporated the targets of the Shuang Dabiao in their socio-
economic planning. See for all this Ibid.,  19-20. 
142 Ibid. 
143  SEPA, "Guojia Huanbao Zongju guanyu 1999 nian Gongye Wuranyuan Dabiao Paifang 
Gongzuo Fangan de Tongzhi (SEPA Notice on the 1999 Work Schedule so Industrial 
Pollution Sources Meet the Standards when Discharging)," Huanjing Gongzuo Tongxun 
(Environmental Work Report), no. 5 (1999). 17 
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Both campaigns were reported as highly successful. For the Small 
Enterprises campaign within months after the decision was issued, some 
60,000 small polluting enterprises were said to have been closed.144 Wang 
Bingqian, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress put it this way: 
 
It is rare in the history of the whole world that such a large number 
of businesses has been shut down in such a short period of time. 
Thanks to the adoption of such powerful measures against 
environmental pollution, conditions in the natural environment have 
not greatly deteriorated together with the rapid development and fast 
population growth.145  
 
For the 1996-2000 campaign to clean up large polluting enterprises, the 
media reports were equally positive. The final deadline for was December 31 
2000.146 From the reports in the newspapers it seems that most provinces 
met the deadline and that most of the industrial enterprises either cleaned up 
or were closed down.147 
The reported results are questionable though. First, during the 
campaigns, especially the 1996 Small Enterprises campaign, legal procedure 
was discarded to enhance the campaign’s effectiveness. Similar to what we 
saw in the land campaigns, the campaign against small polluters brought 
sudden changes to illegal situations that had been condoned for years. 
Furthermore, enterprises were not given sufficient time and opportunity to 
exercise their legal remedies against such decisions.148 During the campaign , 
legal procedures such as notifying the polluter of his remedies149 were not 
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Yaodian (Important Points from General Secretary Jiang Zemin's Speech on the Work 
Conference of the Central Committee Birth Planning and Environmental Protection)," 
Environmental Work News Report (Huanjing Gongzuo Tongxun), no. 6 (1997). 3. 
146  Ibid. and SEPA, "Guojia Huanbao Zongju guanyu Quanguo 2000 nian Gongye 
Wuranyuan Dabiao Paifang he Huanjing Baohu Zhongdian Chengshi Huanjing Gongnengqu 
Dabiao Gongzuo Fangan (SEPA Work Schedule so that All China's Industrial Pollution 
Sources Meet the Standards when Discharging and that the Environmental Protection Key 
Cities Meet the Standards in their Environmental Function Areas)."19 
147 See China Environmental Newspaper (Internet Edition), December 30, 2000. 
148 For a more detailed analysis of this and an illustration of what happened see Van Rooij, 
"Implementing Chinese Environmental Law through Enforcement, the Shiwu Xiao  and 
Shuangge Dabiao Campaigns." For the illustrative case 
149  See Art 20 (5) of the (old) 1992 Measures on Administrative Sanctions for Environmental Protection. 
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duly followed. 150  Because the small enterprises involved in the 1996 
Campaign were often just regional TVEs they had little way of knowing their 
remedies, certainly if they had not been informed of them. This might 
explain why the campaign was so successful in swiftly closing down so many 
enterprises. Success in terms of closed enterprises may have affected failure 
in promoting a rule of law based on legal procedure.  
Second, we can question the validity of such data. As stated before, all 
official data reported in China are questionable. This applies especially to 
data gathered under top-down pressure. During the campaigns, the local 
governments and their EPBs were in charge of implementing the policies 
and reporting on successes made. Because the local governments controlled 
the local information about campaign results, they had the opportunity to 
report overly positive.151 For the 1996-2000 large polluters campaign, the 
data are also questionable because they are based on snapshots of 
compliance during irregular inspections. As we saw in Chapter 13, 
enterprises have been very skillful in letting EPBs believe that they are in 
compliance during daily inspections, while illegally discharging at night. 
Hence, for both campaigns, the superior authorities had difficulty verifying 
the local reports made. SEPA has therefore initiated supervisory inspections 
to verify the reported results. During their inspections, SEPA did come 
across some irregularities. 152   Furthermore, SEPA has encountered 
considerable local obstruction to their verification work. Not being able to 
trust the local EPBs and governments, SEPA has had to use public hearings 
and telephone hotlines to get non-official information about the actual 
practices ongoing. 153  
The reason why local governments have obstructed such inspections or 
have reported false results is crucial for understanding the true problem of 
the campaign. Local governments, as we saw in Chapter 13, have engaged in 
local protectionism to protect their local economy and social stability. 
However, during the campaign the local government and their EPBs come 
under a double pressure, first the local development and social stability, but 
second the pressure from the campaign, that as we saw in the land campaign 
is strong because it is part of the evaluation system. In order to deal with 
both pressures the local governments shirk their duties and once the 
campaign is over illegal practices important for local livelihoods and income 
return. Right after the Small Enterprises campaign ended, many closed 
                                                     
150 Van Rooij, "Implementing Chinese Environmental Law through Enforcement, the Shiwu 
Xiao  and Shuangge Dabiao Campaigns." 
151 For more detail about how this worked see Ibid. 
152 Interview with SEPA official 17 December 2000, Beijing 
153 Interview with SEPA official 17 December 2000, Beijing 
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enterprises suddenly came back, or had moved to a different location. 154 In 
one case, a reporter found that a closed small paper factory had resumed 
operation right across from the main entrance of the local police station.155 
Similarly, in the months after the Large Enterprise campaign had ended 
national newspapers reported fantan  (lit. returning bullets, meaning relapse) 
problems in which enterprises that had met the standards started sub-
standard production again. The main problem has been that the 1996-2000 
campaigns failed to address the underlying conflict of interests.  
The campaigns were target oriented. By setting clear targets, it was 
hoped that the underlying goal of less pollution and more compliance would 
be achieved. In fact, this did led to a more rigid formalized form of 
enforcement, in which agents had to achieve the strict campaign targets 
without being able to adapt enforcement to local practice. Instead of 
recognizing this issue, China tried to deal with the relapse problems by 
issuing further rounds of campaigns between 2001-2004. 
The 2001-2004 Strict Inspections and Sanctions Campaigns Set-up 
From 2001 to 2004, China organized subsequent nationwide pollution 
campaigns. In 2001 and 2002 campaigns were called “Strict Inspections and 
Sanctions” (SIS) 156  and in 2003 and 2004 “Guaranteeing Public Health” 
(GPH)157. As before, the campaigns were enforcement strategies, involving 
work prioritization, backed by political power.  
                                                     
154 NEPA, "The National Ninth Five-Year State Plan for Environmental Protection and the 
Long-Term Targets for the Year 2010 (Guojia Huanjing Baohu "Jiu Wu" Jihua he 2010 nian 
Yuanjing Mubiao)," Environmental Work News Report, no. 10 (1996). 11, J. Song, "Guowuweiyuan 
Songjian zai di erci Quanguo Huanjingfazhi Gongzuo uiyi shang de Jianghua (State Council Member 
Song Jian's Speech during the Second National Work Conference on Environmental Law)," 
Environmental Work News Report (Huanjing Gongzuo Tongxun), no. 12 (1997). 4, Xie, "Bawo Lishi 
Jiyu, Qianghua Zhifa Jiandu, Zhazha Shishi Zuohao Wuran Kongzhi Gongzuo (Grasp the 
Historical Opportunity, Strengthen the Supervision of Law Enforcement, and Thoroughly 
Carry out the Job of Controlling Pollution)." 4 
155 China Environment Newspaper (Internet edition), 12 January 2001. 
156  Editorial, "Xie Zhenhua Juzhang zai Quanguo Kaizhan Yansuchachu Huanjing Weifa Xingwei 
Zhuanxiang Xingdong Dianshidianhua Huiyishang de Jianghua (Speech by Minister Xie Zhenhua at the 
Televised Conference of China's Strict Inspections and Sanctions Campaign againgst Environmental 
Violations)," Huanjing Gongzuo Tongxun (Environmental Work Report), no. 283 (2001a), Editorial, 
"Yancha Huanjing Weifa Xingwei Weihu Shehui Daju Wending Guojia Huanbaozongju Bushu Xin yi 
Lun Yancha Xing Dong (Strict Inspections of Environmental Violations protect the overal 
Social Stability, SEPA deploys a new round of Strict Inspection Campaigns)," China 
Environmental News (Internet Edition), May 29 2002a.  
157 SEPA et al., "Notice on Starting An Environmental Protection Campaign to Clean Up 
Illegally Polluting  Enterprises in order to Guarantee Public Health (Guanyu Kaizhan Qingli 
Zhengdun Bufa Paiwu Qiye Baozhang Qunzhong Jiankang Huanbao Xingdong de Tongzhi)," 
Huanjing Gongzuo Tongxun (Environmental Work Report) 308, no. 9 (2003), SEPA et al., "Notice 
on Starting An Environmental Protection Campaign to Punish Illegally Polluting  Enterprises 
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 As before, and similar to other political-legal campaigns, the 2001-
2004 pollution campaigns started by political speeches emphasizing the 
urgency of stricter enforcement in order to combat the worsening pollution 
problem and stop ongoing and recurring violations of the new stricter laws 
made. For instance in May 2001 SEPA’s minister mister Xie Zhenhua 
initiated the 2001 campaign through a talk for a televised meeting of all 
higher level EPBs. He said: 
 
(…)Environmental violations are still an acute problem. If acute 
measures are not taken this may actually mean that the results of the 
ninth five year plan will be endangered, as well as even the social 
stability and modernization as a whole(…)158 
  
 A year later, on 28 May 2002, minister Xie held another speech 
during a televised meeting with the country’s provincial and large municipal 
governments and EPBs. This time the campaign was linked directly to 
criticism by the State Council about China’s weak environmental law 
enforcement 159: 
 
“(…)After last year’s Strict Inspections and Sanctions special 
Campaign, which was conducted throughout the country between 
May and August, environmental violations were to a certain extent 
controlled. However, since this year the problem of environmental 
pollution created by the illegal emissions of certain industrial and 
mining enterprises is getting worse. This has left the masses 
extremely dissatisfied and in certain cases has had an influence on 
social stability (…) this time the emphasis of the campaign should be 
on inspections and sanctions for those environmental problems 
                                                                                                                        
in order to Guarantee Public Health (Guanyu Kaizhan Zhengzhi Weifa Paiwu Qiye Baozhang 
Qunzhong Jiankang Huanbao Xingdong de Tongzhi)," Huanbao Gongzuo Ziliao Xuan (Selected 
Materials on Environmental Protection Work) 6, no. 6 (2004). 
158  Editorial, "Xie Zhenhua Juzhang zai Quanguo Kaizhan Yansuchachu Huanjing Weifa Xingwei 
Zhuanxiang Xingdong Dianshidianhua Huiyishang de Jianghua (Speech by Minister Xie Zhenhua at the 
Televised Conference of China's Strict Inspections and Sanctions Campaign againgst Environmental 
Violations).", Editorial, "Yancha Huanjing Weifa Xingwei Weihu Shehui Daju Wending Guojia 
Huanbaozongju Bushu Xin yi Lun Yancha Xing Dong (Strict Inspections of Environmental 
Violations protect the overal Social Stability, SEPA deploys a new round of Strict Inspection 
Campaigns)."  
159 A SEPA informant stated that several provincial leaders were publicly criticized on national 
television early 2002 about these issues by premier Zhu Rongji. Interview SEPA informant,  
31 May 2002. 
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about which the masses have strongly complained and which have 
an impact on social stability (…)”160 
 
The 2001-2004 campaigns ran each year from April to September. 
During this period several related departments, including EPBs, local 
governments, Supervision Departments and later also Justice Departments, 
cooperated to achieve the goals set in the campaign work schedule. At first, 
mainly in the 2001 SIS, the campaign was aimed to maintain prior results  
and to control the relapse in violations that became apparent several months 
after the original campaigns had ended in 1997 and early 2001 161 . For 
example, 30 per cent of the small enterprises closed during the 1996 
campaign reopened and about 15 per cent of the lager enterprises supposed 
to operate according to standards, stopped using their EP installations after 
the campaign had ended in 2001.162  
The campaigns also maintained a regional focus on several severely 
polluted rivers and lakes, including Lake Dianchi in Kunming.163 From 2002 
onwards 164  and especially in the 2003 and 2004 GPH campaigns, 165  the 
emphasis shifted increasingly to violations the public complained most 
loudly about. Then, the 2003 SARS disaster narrowed the focus to public 
health and drinking-water safety. While the campaigns were originally set up 
top-down and unified for the whole country irrespective of regional 
differences, the last two years has changed somewhat. First, the 2003 
campaign prescribed several regional priority issues that local governments 
                                                     
160 Editorial, "Yancha Huanjing Weifa Xingwei Weihu Shehui Daju Wending Guojia Huanbaozongju 
Bushu Xin yi Lun Yancha Xing Dong (Strict Inspections of Environmental Violations protect the 
overal Social Stability, SEPA deploys a new round of Strict Inspection Campaigns)." 
161  Editorial, "Xie Zhenhua Juzhang zai Quanguo Kaizhan Yansuchachu Huanjing Weifa Xingwei 
Zhuanxiang Xingdong Dianshidianhua Huiyishang de Jianghua (Speech by Minister Xie Zhenhua at the 
Televised Conference of China's Strict Inspections and Sanctions Campaign againgst Environmental 
Violations)." 2 
162 Ibid. 
163  Ibid. 2, SEPA et al., "Notice on Starting An Environmental Protection Campaign to 
Punish Illegally Polluting  Enterprises in order to Guarantee Public Health (Guanyu Kaizhan 
Zhengzhi Weifa Paiwu Qiye Baozhang Qunzhong Jiankang Huanbao Xingdong de Tongzhi)." 
13 
164 Editorial, "Yancha Huanjing Weifa Xingwei Weihu Shehui Daju Wending Guojia Huanbaozongju 
Bushu Xin yi Lun Yancha Xing Dong (Strict Inspections of Environmental Violations protect the 
overal Social Stability, SEPA deploys a new round of Strict Inspection Campaigns)." 
165 SEPA et al., "Notice on Starting An Environmental Protection Campaign to Clean Up 
Illegally Polluting  Enterprises in order to Guarantee Public Health (Guanyu Kaizhan Qingli 
Zhengdun Bufa Paiwu Qiye Baozhang Qunzhong Jiankang Huanbao Xingdong de Tongzhi).", 
SEPA et al., "Notice on Starting An Environmental Protection Campaign to Punish Illegally 
Polluting  Enterprises in order to Guarantee Public Health (Guanyu Kaizhan Zhengzhi Weifa 
Paiwu Qiye Baozhang Qunzhong Jiankang Huanbao Xingdong de Tongzhi)." 
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were to solve.166 In this manner, the campaign allowed for regional variation, 
although in a top-down prescribed way.  
In 2004, local variation was allowed again and local departments 
were to summarize local problems and make them part of the campaign.167 
In Kunming the result was that the FSS production related pollution 
problem became one of the campaign’s focal points. 168  With significant 
national media attention, the Kunming government, although it knew local 
interests were at stake, had to show that it was trying to solve the problem. 
Campaign methods did not change drastically between 2001 and 
2004. First, EPBs were to summarize the local issues related to ongoing 
national campaign targets. Then they were to establish work plans on how to 
deal with the issues at hand, mainly by setting out schemes of inspections at 
different kinds of violators.169  
Work also included participatory methods such as setting up a 
hotline to allow citizens to voice complaints or report violations.170 This was 
especially emphasized since the 2002 campaign, when SEPA further 
propagated the use of mass media and participatory mechanisms to enhance 
                                                     
166 SEPA et al., "Notice on Starting An Environmental Protection Campaign to Clean Up 
Illegally Polluting  Enterprises in order to Guarantee Public Health (Guanyu Kaizhan Qingli 
Zhengdun Bufa Paiwu Qiye Baozhang Qunzhong Jiankang Huanbao Xingdong de Tongzhi)." 
167  SEPA et al., "Notice on Starting An Environmental Protection Campaign to Punish 
Illegally Polluting  Enterprises in order to Guarantee Public Health (Guanyu Kaizhan 
Zhengzhi Weifa Paiwu Qiye Baozhang Qunzhong Jiankang Huanbao Xingdong de Tongzhi)." 
168 Based on interviews with Kunming and Ningshi EPB personnel, Autumn 2004. For more 
see Anning EPB, "Anningshi "Zhengzhi Weifa Paiwu Qiye Baozhang Qunzhong Jiankang" 
Huanbao Zhuanxiang Xingdong Gongzuo Zongjie (Summary of Anning City Work on the 
"Complete Control of Illegally Discharging enterprises in order to Safeguard Public Health" 
Environmental Campaign," Internal Document  (2004). 
169  Editorial, "Xie Zhenhua Juzhang zai Quanguo Kaizhan Yansuchachu Huanjing Weifa Xingwei 
Zhuanxiang Xingdong Dianshidianhua Huiyishang de Jianghua (Speech by Minister Xie Zhenhua at the 
Televised Conference of China's Strict Inspections and Sanctions Campaign againgst Environmental 
Violations).", Editorial, "Yancha Huanjing Weifa Xingwei Weihu Shehui Daju Wending Guojia 
Huanbaozongju Bushu Xin yi Lun Yancha Xing Dong (Strict Inspections of Environmental 
Violations protect the overal Social Stability, SEPA deploys a new round of Strict Inspection 
Campaigns).", SEPA et al., "Notice on Starting An Environmental Protection Campaign to 
Clean Up Illegally Polluting  Enterprises in order to Guarantee Public Health (Guanyu 
Kaizhan Qingli Zhengdun Bufa Paiwu Qiye Baozhang Qunzhong Jiankang Huanbao 
Xingdong de Tongzhi).", SEPA et al., "Notice on Starting An Environmental Protection 
Campaign to Punish Illegally Polluting  Enterprises in order to Guarantee Public Health 
(Guanyu Kaizhan Zhengzhi Weifa Paiwu Qiye Baozhang Qunzhong Jiankang Huanbao 
Xingdong de Tongzhi)." 
170  Editorial, "Xie Zhenhua Juzhang zai Quanguo Kaizhan Yansuchachu Huanjing Weifa Xingwei 
Zhuanxiang Xingdong Dianshidianhua Huiyishang de Jianghua (Speech by Minister Xie Zhenhua at the 
Televised Conference of China's Strict Inspections and Sanctions Campaign againgst Environmental 
Violations)." 3 
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inspections and enforcement efforts.171 In the east of China, especially in 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai there have been experiments to use the 
citizens to detect violations of environmental law. The local EPBs there have 
offered rewards of up to 5000 RMB for true complaints about violations. 
The effect has been that an EPB with only limited inspection personnel can 
make use of a large number of local amateur inspection agents. In some 
cases, local people have driven on motor cycles around factories at night in 
the hope that they would find violations and could get the reward172. Since 
the 2002 SIS campaign, SEPA has made an emphasis on the use of such new 
techniques of participatory engagement in enforcement work.  
The most important work consisted of enforcement itself. During 
the campaigns EPBs were to carry out inspections at priority sites as 
indicated by the ongoing campaign and to punish found violations strictly. 
They were also to close obsolete industries or factories with recurring 
violations. Finally in the last phase of the campaign results were to be 
summarized and reported to higher level EPBs173 and since 2002 also be 
made public to the press. 174  The campaigns were not only directed at 
violators, but also aimed at the EPBs themselves. This has been so since the 
2001 campaign when SEPA minister Xie emphasized that EPBs that fail in 
strongly enforcing environmental law should be held responsible. He 
clarified that in serious cases they should be punished using internal 
administrative sanctions (chufen) and in extreme cases should be prosecuted 
under criminal law175. The campaign was also directed against corrupt EPB 
                                                     
171 Editorial, "Yancha Huanjing Weifa Xingwei Weihu Shehui Daju Wending Guojia Huanbaozongju 
Bushu Xin yi Lun Yancha Xing Dong (Strict Inspections of Environmental Violations protect the 
overal Social Stability, SEPA deploys a new round of Strict Inspection Campaigns)." 
172 Interview with SEPA official, Beijing 30 5 2002 
173  Editorial, "Xie Zhenhua Juzhang zai Quanguo Kaizhan Yansuchachu Huanjing Weifa Xingwei 
Zhuanxiang Xingdong Dianshidianhua Huiyishang de Jianghua (Speech by Minister Xie Zhenhua at the 
Televised Conference of China's Strict Inspections and Sanctions Campaign againgst Environmental 
Violations).", Editorial, "Yancha Huanjing Weifa Xingwei Weihu Shehui Daju Wending Guojia 
Huanbaozongju Bushu Xin yi Lun Yancha Xing Dong (Strict Inspections of Environmental 
Violations protect the overal Social Stability, SEPA deploys a new round of Strict Inspection 
Campaigns).", SEPA et al., "Notice on Starting An Environmental Protection Campaign to 
Clean Up Illegally Polluting  Enterprises in order to Guarantee Public Health (Guanyu 
Kaizhan Qingli Zhengdun Bufa Paiwu Qiye Baozhang Qunzhong Jiankang Huanbao 
Xingdong de Tongzhi).", SEPA et al., "Notice on Starting An Environmental Protection 
Campaign to Punish Illegally Polluting  Enterprises in order to Guarantee Public Health 
(Guanyu Kaizhan Zhengzhi Weifa Paiwu Qiye Baozhang Qunzhong Jiankang Huanbao 
Xingdong de Tongzhi)." 
174 Editorial, "Yancha Huanjing Weifa Xingwei Weihu Shehui Daju Wending Guojia Huanbaozongju 
Bushu Xin yi Lun Yancha Xing Dong (Strict Inspections of Environmental Violations protect the 
overal Social Stability, SEPA deploys a new round of Strict Inspection Campaigns)." 4 
175 Chinese criminal law has one article, art 408 of the 1997 Criminal Code, which is dedicated 
to this crime. Editorial, "Xie Zhenhua Juzhang zai Quanguo Kaizhan Yansuchachu Huanjing Weifa 
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officials. Xie stated that corrupt officials must be cleaned out of the work 
force.176 
Campaign Results Nationwide: 2001-2004 
If we believe the official reports, the 2001-2004 Campaigns have been quite 
successful in combating China’s pollution problems. During the campaigns, 
extra inspections were carried out and stricter punishments were given to 
violations found.  
For instance, SEPA reported in September 2001 that the 2001 SIS 
campaign had had the following results: 142.121 enterprises were 
inspected. 177  In 18.084 cases investigations for sanction decisions were 
initiated and 8.745 of these cases have been handled thus far. Of these cases 
handled, 2435 Fifteen Small Enterprises who had been closed but reappeared 
were shut down once again. 1283 (ordinary) enterprises were ordered to halt 
production and 4937 enterprises were fined for their violations. The 
campaign also created results in punishing officials who did not fulfill their 
EP enforcement obligations. 54 officials received some sort of sanction: 5 
district level government leaders, 39 leaders of local departments such as 
EPBs, Economic and Trade Departments and 10 leaders of Township and 
Village level administration.  
A second example is SEPA’s report that during the 2002 SIS 
campaign 316.000 enterprises were inspected. In 16.000 cases, sanction 
procedure was initiated. During this campaign 428 persons were found to be 
individually responsible for violations.178 Of these 15 were employed in sub-
national governments and 35 in sub-national government departments179.  
Another example is that the Environmental News reports in 
December 2004 that the 2004 GPH campaign inspected 470.000 enterprises, 
issuing sanctions for 23.000 cases, of which 5031 were closed.180  
                                                                                                                        
Xingwei Zhuanxiang Xingdong Dianshidianhua Huiyishang de Jianghua (Speech by Minister Xie Zhenhua 
at the Televised Conference of China's Strict Inspections and Sanctions Campaign againgst Environmental 
Violations)." 3 
176 Ibid. 3 
177 Editorial, "Zhuanxiang Chanchu Xingdong Chengxiao Xianzhu (The Special Inspections and 
Sanctions Campaign Achieves Remarkable Success)," China Environmental News (Internet Edition), 
26-9 2001b. 
178 Editorial, "Guojia Huanbaozongju Tongbao "Yancha" Shige Dianxing (SEPA Reports 10 Typical 
Cases of the Strict Inspections Campaign)," China Environmental News (Internet Edition), 27-9 
2002b. 
179 These data are based on an earlier report in China Environmental News, August 21 2002 
(Internet Edition) in which the total of individuals held responsible was 417, so the number of 
officials held responsible may have been higher in September when the total number is 428. 
180 Editorial, "Zhengzhi Weifa Paifang Qiye Baozhang Qunzhongjiankang (Punish Enterprises 
that are Illegally Discharging in order to Safeguard Public Health)," Environmental News, 3 
December 2004. 
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Finally, during prior fieldwork in Sichuan province we found that 
during campaigns punishment for violations found is much stricter: in most 
cases local EPBs suddenly start to issue the maximum fines, whereas 
normally they punish at only 30-40 per cent.181 
Hence, it seems that the campaigns increased inspections and 
punishment of violations found.182 Below in Table 1 is an outline of the data 
published on the 2001-2003183 campaigns. 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Sanctions 18.084 16.000 21.000 23.000 
Inspections 142.121 316.000 496.000 470.000 
Ratio 0,13 0,05 0,04 0,05 
 
Table 1, Differences in campaign results 2001, 2002 and 2003. Number of Sanction 
Decisions Initiated made, number of Inspections carried out, Sanction/Inspection 
Ratio.184  
 
The data in Table 1 show that the campaigns were more successful in 
producing extra inspections than in generating extra punishments. While in 
2001 in 13 per cent of the cases an inspection would lead to a sanction 
preparation, in 2004, this was only 5 per cent.  
 There can be two explanations. The first is that the ongoing 
campaigns have led to fewer violations and therefore inspections lead to less 
punishment. Another explanation seems more plausible though, given the 
ongoing reports of recurring violations and the fact that new campaigns 
continue to be organized. EPBs find it much easier to organize extra 
inspections that issuing extra punishments. The campaign pressure forced 
local governments to take action even though they did not always want to 
because of local interests. The easiest action they could take was to organize 
extra inspections. Only if they issued more sanctions would local interests 
come at stake. Furthermore, we also saw in Chapter 13 that inspections 
especially if carried out in the day-time in remoter areas are not always 
                                                     
181 Based on interviews with Sichuan EPB personnel, July-August 2002 
182 As this is Chinese governmental information it is to be used with the greatest caution. We 
use it here as there is no other data available. 
183 For 2004 there is only partial data which shows that by July there had been 310.000 
Inspections and 8000 cases, which would make a ratio of  0,03 cases for each inspection. 
184 Editorial, "Guojia Huanbaozongju Tongbao "Yancha" Shige Dianxing (SEPA Reports 10 Typical 
Cases of the Strict Inspections Campaign).", Editorial, "Zhengzhi Weifa Paifang Qiye 
Baozhang Qunzhongjiankang (Punish Enterprises that are Illegally Discharging in order to 
Safeguard Public Health).", Editorial, "Zhuanxiang Chanchu Xingdong Chengxiao Xianzhu (The 
Special Inspections and Sanctions Campaign Achieves Remarkable Success).", Wang, "Vice 
Minister Wang Jirong's Speech at the National Environmental Inspection Work Summit." 
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effective in detecting violations or finding sufficient evidence to issue 
sanctions. 
 Similar to our findings about regional variation in environmental 
enforcement in Chapter 13, an analysis of regional variation in campaign 
outcomes also demonstrates that in less developed areas enforcement is 
more difficult. We have made such an analysis for the 2001 Campaign about 
which so far the most data have been reported. Table 2 portrays data from 
various provinces and cities. Although far from sufficient to make a valid 
and representative analysis185, the data confirm a trend noticed earlier in 
Chapter 13.  
 
China Sichuan Ningxia Anhui Chongqing Guangzhou Xi'an Shanxi Liaoning Jiangsu Dalian Nanjing
Inspections 142121 22498 1500 715 2000 5029 200 1200 7903 4000 2100 2449
Sanctions 18084 158 100 15 240 290 18 400 2306 800 333 350
Ratio 0,13 0,01 0,07 0,02 0,12 0,06 0,09 0,33 0,29 0,20 0,16 0,14
Table 2, 2001 SIS Results: Number of Inspections carried out, number of Sanction 
Decisions initiated, and Inspection/Sanction Ratio.186  
 
 
If we look at the ratio between the number of inspections carried out and the 
number of sanctions issued, we find that on average in the country for every 
100 inspected enterprises 13 sanctions are prepared. On the one extreme we 
find Sichuan where less than 1 per cent of the inspections lead to sanctions187. 
Except for Sichuan we also find that provinces such as Ningxia (7 per 
cent)188, Anhui (2 per cent),189 Chongqing (12 per cent)190 and municipalities 
such as Guangzhou (6 per cent)191 and Xi’an (9 per cent) are below country 
average. On the other hand, we find the extreme of Shanxi where for every 
three inspections one sanction was prepared192. Other regions above country 
average (for which we have data) are: the provinces Liaoning (29 per cent)193, 
                                                     
185 This comparison can in no sense be taken as a representative or valid analysis of regional 
variation. Firstly the reports miss essential data for that. The reports mostly only mention the 
number of inspections carried out and the number of sanctions prepared. For a real analysis 
of the situation we would also need to know the number of violations detected upon 
inspections. A second problem with the data is that it comes from different reports from 
different times in the campaign. The analysis presented here is to give some sketch and 
explanation of how the campaign was carried out throughout the country.   
186 Sources: Reports in China Environmental News (Internet Edition) July 15, 27, August 10, 
24, September 4, October 10 2001. 
187 based on a report in China Environmental News, August 10 2001 (Internet Edition) 
188 based on a report in China Environmental News, August 24 2001 (Internet Edition) 
189 based on a report in China Environmental News, July 15 2001 (Internet Edition) 
190 based on a report in China Environmental News, July 27 2001 (Internet Edition) 
191 based on a report in China Environmental News, August 10 2001 (Internet Edition) 
192 based on a report in China Environmental News, September 4 2001 (Internet Edition) 
193 based on a report in China Environmental News, July 15 2001 (Internet Edition) 
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Jiangsu (20 per cent)194, and the municipalities Dalian (16 per cent)195 and 
Nanjing (14 per cent)196.  
There seems to be some relation between the inspection/sanction 
ratio results and the relative level of development of the provinces described 
here. With the exception of Guangzhou—this is in the well-developed 
Guangdong province—all regions, whose ratio are below average, are in less 
developed areas of China197. We may therefore cautiously conclude that in 
less developed regions the campaign has been more effective in promoting 
inspections but less effective in promoting sanctions.198 An extra indication 
supporting this point was found during field research in Sichuan in the 
summer of 2002. Two vice-directors of two municipal EPBs of less 
developed areas of Sichuan indicated that strictly implementing the campaign 
was not always possible due to local underdevelopment. We already saw that 
with the 1996-2000 campaigns results were not sustained in areas where the 
industry closed down came back because of local protectionism. We will 
look closer at this point when discussing the campaign results of the 2004 
campaign in Kunming in the next section.  
Apart from results in terms of inspections and sanctions, the 
campaigns initiated other changes. The news reports about this campaign 
indicate that the campaign made use of public participation methods to 
enhance enforcement. Most reports contain some reference to the use of 
public complaints or hotline telephone numbers to help the inspections199. 
For example in Jiangsu province, several journalists received a reward from 
the EPB for their research, which enhanced inspections and helped gather 
evidence.200 Another example is the publication of a list of enterprises that 
have severely violated EP law201. 
                                                     
194 based on a report in China Environmental News, July 15 2001 (Internet Edition) 
195 based on a report in China Environmental News, July 15 2001 (Internet Edition) 
196 based on a report in China Environmental News, October 10 2001 (Internet Edition) 
197 In 1999 Sichuan’s per capita GDP was 4452 RMB, Ningxia’s per capita GDP was 4473 
RMB, Anhui’s per capita GDP was 4707 RMB, Chongqing’s per capita GDP was 4826 RMB 
and Shaanxi province of which Xian is the capital had a per capita GDP of 4101 RMB. All 
these provicnes had a per capita that was lower than China’s per capita GDP as a whole which 
was 65534 RMB. On the other had all regions whose inspection sanctions ratio was lower 
than country average all (with the exception of Shanxi) had a per capita GDP higher than 
China’s total per capita GDP: Liaoning (which includes Dalian) (10086 RMB) and Jiangsu 
(which includes Nanjing) (10665 RMB).  
198 Taking in mind the nature of the data, the lack of data and the exceptions found.  
199 See for example reports in China Environmental News, on June 22 (about Jilin),  June 26 
(about Liuzhou), July 5 (about Jiangsu), August 13 (about Qingdao), September 28 (about 
Shanxi) 2002 (Internet Edition) 
200 See report in China Environmental News, July 5 2002 (Internet Edition) 
201 See report in China Environmental News, July 12 2002 (Internet Edition) 
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While campaigns have initiated temporary changes and caused more 
inspections, and perhaps may also initiate a changed mind set due to the 
involvement of the public, the simple fact that campaigns have become a 
recurrent event indicates their failure to produce sustained long-term 
compliance. After campaign pressure ends in many instances pollution 
violations have come back. As stated above this is because the campaign fails 
to solve the basic contradiction in such cases between local livelihoods and 
environmental protection. In the next section we will look closer at 
campaign results this time those of the 2004 campaign in our area of 
fieldwork: peri-urban Kunming. 
Campaign Results in Kunming 
In 1996, Kunming participated in the Small Enterprise campaign and made a 
list of 114 small polluting enterprises to target enforcement. 202  The list 
included paper factories, coking plants, and tanneries. For the coking plants 
the KMEPB was able to convince SEPA and the State Council that a 
temporary exception should be made because of their importance in the 
local economy203, which was granted because of Yunnan’s overall economic 
situation.204 KMEPB informants told me that at first the Small Enterprises 
campaign was influential because national leadership participated and the 
pressure from Beijing was substantial. As a result, 10 per cent of the 
enterprises placed on the list were closed, while the others invested in better 
EP equipment so that they could resume production. Right after the 
campaign, the problem of recurring violations was severe. Many of the 
enterprises that had invested in installing new EP equipment failed to use it 
due to the high costs involved. (See Chapter 10 for this problem) 
Consequently, secret nightly discharges (toupai) problems became common 
once the campaign had ended and could not be properly addressed through 
regular enforcement.205 (See Chapter 13)  
The second campaign—Shuang Dabiao targeting large enterprises 
(1996-2000)—was also difficult to implement in Kunming. Nevertheless, 
Kunming was ambitious to complete the campaign a year ahead of schedule. 
This was because of Kunming’s 1999 World Flower Expo (shibohui), which 
led to a rapid modernization of Kunming’s city center. Kunming’s leadership 
must have believed that cleaning existing sources of pollution should be part 
of the city’s new floral image. In order to implement the Large Enterprises 
campaign before the end of 1999, Kunming organized lingdian xingdong, 
“ Zero Clean Up” campaigns all around the Dianchi Lake catchment area. A 
                                                     
202 Based on an Interview with KMEPB staff, Kunming 22 October 2004 
203 Ibid. 
204 Based on an interview with a SEPA official, Beijing 20 December 2000 
205 Based on an Interview with KMEPB staff, Kunming 22 October 2004 
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final deadline for compliance was set for May first 1999. Before that date the 
YNEPB and the KMEPB coordinated a campaign enforcement effort 
against a list of 253 major polluters in the area. During the Zero Clean up all 
enterprises were inspected eight times. 206  The campaign was an 
unprecedented environmental enforcement effort in the area. By the end of 
the campaign, 249 of the enterprises were reported to have met the 
standards, while four enterprises did not and had to be closed.207 Although 
first reported as a success, the campaign’s effects did not last. Ever since the 
campaign, secret discharges have been common.  
Since the 1999 Zero Clean Up, the YNEPB and KMEPB have 
continued to prioritize their enforcement on the enterprises originally 
targeted in this first campaign. The EPBs publish a list of major enterprises 
with details about enterprises’ compliance behavior.208 For those in violation 
the list also shows what pollutant is sub-standard and how long the 
enterprise has for improvement. With the weak regular inspections, the list 
made is not accurate. Huafei enterprise for example (see Chapter 10) has been 
listed as in compliance, even though they had been secretly discharging. The 
problem is that the EPBs have difficulty detecting such violations through 
regular inspections. EPB informants are honest about these problems. In 
their analysis the problem is not merely a lack in inspection capability, but 
also the difficulty of addressing dominant employers. They have seen how 
much the Zero Clean Up affected the local economy in areas where 
enterprises were closed or strictly punished because of it.209  
Until 2004, the direct results of these campaigns on the cases studied 
here were limited. In only one case, the FPC, did campaign enforcement 
directly lead to compliance (Chapter 8). Meanwhile in several other cases, 
pollution violations continued while campaigns were organized. Examples 
are the Kunming Porcelain company, Yunzhi, the FSS companies and Huafei, 
who continued violating pollution law while China organized campaigns 
from 1996-2004. It was not until the last campaign in 2004 that some of the 
cases studied were addressed, most notably the FSS companies and Huafei.  
The 2004 GBH campaign in Kunming was similar to earlier efforts. 
In the campaign, priority offenses were targeted with strict sanctions, 
abatement deadlines and enforcement methods were widened to include 
public participation through complaint hotlines. The Tanglang River and the 
                                                     
206 X. Yang, "Yunnan Jiang Zhengqu Jinnian Shixian Dianchi Wuran Zhili (Yunnan Strives to 
Control Dianchi's Pollution this Year)," Yunnan Ribao, 28 February 2000. 
207 Ibid. 
208 REF 
209 Based on an Interview with KMEPB staff, Kunming 22 October 2004 
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phosphor industry there became one of the campaign’s priorities.210 During 
the campaign, the EPBs cooperated with other governments departments in 
one coordinated effort against ongoing pollution problems. During the 
campaign at each level administration a special working group was erected 
which included top governmental leaders and leadership from all major 
departments including the EPB, the Development and Planning Bureau, the 
Supervision Bureau, the Industry and Trade Department, and the TVE 
Bureau, the Forestry Department. 211  These working groups convened 
meetings to disseminate the upcoming campaign and study the relevant 
campaign documents and targets. In addition, these groups specified local 
targets, such as for example the Tanglang River pollution. During the 
campaign the EPBs organized extra inspections, especially during the night. 
In Ningshi, this is located in the Northern part of Kunming’s Tanglang River 
catchment, 625 enforcement agents carried out inspections at 325 
enterprises. 212  Similar to other campaigns, in the 2004 GBH Kunming’s 
EPBs also published model cases and a list of major polluters. 213 The 
Kunming local implementation of the national 2004 GBH campaign was in 
many aspects similar to earlier campaigns and to China’s political-legal 
campaigns in general. 
What effect did the 2004 campaign have on compliance behavior at 
Lake Dianchi? While in part of the cases studied, such as Kunming Porcelain, 
small EIA violations and restaurants, this last campaign brought little change, 
the 2004 campaign did seem to have an effect on Huafei and the FSS 
companies, both located at the Tanglang River. Before the 2004 campaign, 
even a year of increased national media attention had not made the FSS 
companies comply with the law. As noted in chapter 10 and 13, their 
importance for the local phosphor chain and their ability to discharge 
undetected at night had so far prevented strict enforcement action. The 
campaign lifted some of the existing local protectionism, as the relevant local 
Township and District governments were forced through cadre 
responsibility systems to partake in the work and were to be judged on the 
campaign results made214. Furthermore, the municipal EPB initiated its own 
                                                     
210 Anning EPB, "Anningshi "Zhengzhi Weifa Paiwu Qiye Baozhang Qunzhong Jiankang" 
Huanbao Zhuanxiang Xingdong Gongzuo Zongjie (Summary of Anning City Work on the 




213 See for example Ibid. where the Ningshi EPB published a list of eight major cases they 
strictly punished. 
214 Based on interviews with Township leaders and EPB personnel. The idea to ask about the 
relation between cadre management and campaign success came from Edin, "State Capacity 
and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a Township Perspective." 
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inspections in order to verify the Dianxi district level EPB’s work and 
prevent it shirking its duties. Cars regularly set out from Kunming to the 
mountains where the factories were located. With the summer rain, the roads 
were bad and inspections could only be carried out during the day, while 
production and illegal discharge took place at night. For the small FSS 
companies, in which violation of law was known, and even filmed by the 
national media,215 it still took nearly three months of inspections before, at 
night, enough evidence to make a case was found. After the EPB had 
collected the evidence, it fined the violating factories and ordered them to 
halt production216.  
Similarly, one of the campaign inspections in September 2004 
discovered Huafei’s illegal nightly discharges. The EPB issued a 50.000 RMB 
fine and told the company that it would publicize the violation and the 
sanction. Huafei management was upset as it feared losing its good name and 
perhaps even investments from their American partners, once word of their 
violations would get out. The EPB used the factory’s anxiety to strike a deal. 
The EPB would not publicize the violation and sanction, in return for which 
the enterprise would set up its own FSS production and quit supporting the 
highly polluting, cheap, small-scale production.  
The campaigns thus did have an effect on Huafei and the FSS 
companies. First violations that had so far gone undetected were discovered 
and evidence was found. Second, the violators were fined, some even 
ordered to halt production, while others had promised to change their 
production process.  
However, it seems that even in these two cases the campaign effects 
could not be sustained. First of all, nearly two months later, weeks after the 
campaign had ended, the FSS factories resumed production, even in broad 
daylight217. This is a clear indication not only that the FSS companies could 
continue business as usual once the campaign had ended, but also that 
Huafei’s promise to start its own FSS production had not affected these 
companies. A second indication of the campaign’s failure to maintain success 
was that Huafei did not seem to live up to its promise of cleaning up its 
                                                                                                                        
Another reason why local protectionism is overcome is that campaigns started to punish and 
sometimes even prosecute lax enforcement officials and thus brought extra pressure on local 
agents to carry out work according to plan Editorial, "Guojia Huanbaozongju Tongbao "Yancha" 
Shige Dianxing (SEPA Reports 10 Typical Cases of the Strict Inspections Campaign).", 
Editorial, "Zhuanxiang Chanchu Xingdong Chengxiao Xianzhu (The Special Inspections and 
Sanctions Campaign Achieves Remarkable Success).", D. Huang, "Environmental Inspection 
Breach of Duty, EPB Director to Jail (Huanjing Jianguan Shizhi, Huanbaojuzhang Jin 
Jianyu)," Huanjing Gongzuo Tongxun (Environmental Work Report) 298, no. 11 (2002). 19-21 
215 CCTV, "Jinri Shuofa" Fushi de Beihou ("Talking of Law Today" Corrosion's Background) ([cited). 
216 Based on interviews with Kunming EPB personnel. 
217 Based on personal observation, several times in November 2004 
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production process. Quite the contrary, the company initiated an expansion 
of its Phosphor Ammonium installations, enlarging production by 1.2 
million tons a year. A SEPA investigation of projects with a possible effect 
on the environment, named Huafei’s expansion as one of China’s twenty 
worst new environmental hazards, stating that the company contained 
“hidden problems.”218  
While we lack data to fully verify whether the campaigns have had a 
longer term result in Kunming, for the cases researched the results seem to 
be limited. Even when extra inspections led to more sanctions, this did not 
lead to sustained compliance. The problem seems to be that the pollution 
campaigns have not been able to find a sustained solution to the obstacles 
that hamper regular enforcement, and because of this, once the campaign 
ends such problems come back with all related consequences. Campaigns 
have been unable to address the causes for local protectionism, and neither 
have they been able to address the practical difficulties of pollution law 
enforcement, when lacking resources, support from local communities and 
facing uncooperative regulated actors that will do their best to exploit this 
situation. The failure to address the causes of local protectionism is especially 
important. As noted, many of the regulated companies are important sources 
of local income, and for this reason, local governments, regulators, and also 
some of the affected local communities have condoned their violations. 
Campaigns may be a temporary measure to overcome such local 
protectionism, but unless alternative sources of income are developed, it 
seems that once the campaigns end, violating sources of local income are 
bound to return.  
On a positive note, more generally, the campaigns’ use of public 
participation enhances public awareness for environmental protection. The 
involvement of the public, since the 2002 campaigns, may have created large 
expectations for change and thus a pressure on governments to deal with the 
problems citizens most care for. Even though in areas in which livelihoods 
are dependent on violation related sources, such as those in Western 
Kunming, this will have little impact, in many others it may.219 
Conclusion 
Natural resource enforcement in China has been greatly influenced by 
national politics. National leadership has organized political legal campaigns 
in order to address the weak regular law enforcement of natural resource 
                                                     
218 Based on a newspaper report, published April 6 2006. For guaranteeing Huafei’s anonymity, 
the source is not mentioned here.  
219 Lo and Leung, "Environmental Agency and Public Opinion in Guangzhou: The Limits of 
a Popular Approach to Environmental Governance." Lo, Yip, and Cheung, "The Regulatory 
Style of Environmental Governance in China: The Case of EIA in Shanghai." 
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protection law. The natural resource campaigns are part of a wider 
phenomenon, political-legal campaigns, which China has organized for 
various fields of law since reform. The natural resource law enforcement 
campaigns share characteristics with the general political-legal campaigns: 
initiated after central political pressure, prioritizing certain violations, creating 
strict goals and mechanisms to verify and reward goal attainment, enhancing 
vertical top-down pressure to realize the campaign goals, involving the media 
and the public at large, all of this in order to overcome local resistance.  
 As a result of the campaigns, law enforcement has become more 
formalized and more stringent. Enforcement agents and agencies once they 
participate in the campaign have to meet simple campaign targets such as a 
number of inspections, sanctions and model cases. If they meet such targets, 
the campaign is a success. Thus, the formalization of campaign law 
enforcement makes enforcement effectiveness measurable and therefore it is 
easier to reduce agent discretion. If this goal-oriented type of measurement is 
used as a yardstick and if published data are to be believed, both types of 
campaigns were successful, they achieved their primary objectives, carrying 
out inspections, describing the present illegal situations and issuing strict 
sanctions. However, when one evaluates the campaigns based on whether 
they have caused sustained compliance with the law in question, the result is 
less positive.  The campaigns were not able to create such compliance, 
mainly because the structural problems of law enforcement and most 
importantly the causes for local protectionism by the underlying conflict of 
interests between local economic and social development and the law’s goal 
of protecting natural resources could not be solved in the rigid enforcement 
campaign.  
 
       15. Ad Hoc Law Enforcement 
 Insights about Regulatory Law Enforcement    
 Strategies and the Influence of Political Power  
 
 
The face of China’s natural resource law enforcement changes as rapidly as 
bialian (lit. “face changing”) actors in Sichuan opera change masks. First, 
there is the face of regular law enforcement, which is characterized by risk 
aversion, weak punishment and cooperation with violators during informal 
enforcement procedures. Then from one day to the next, all of this changes 
when the face of campaign driven enforcement, which is formal, with limited 
discretion, with stringent sanctions and adversarial, comes on stage. These 
two faces of China’s resource law enforcement are illustrative of the two 
styles of regulatory law enforcement recognized in the various international 
studies thereof (summarized in Chapter 12). First is cooperative-type law 
enforcement, characterized ideal-typically by large discretion for agents, 
informal relationships between agent and violator resulting in mutual 
understanding and negotiation towards compliance, but in its extreme weak 
enforcement and ongoing violations of law. Second is deterrence-type law 
enforcement, ideal-typically characterized by  formal enforcement 
procedures limiting agent discretion, a strategy of severe punishments and 
little agent violator contacts, which in its most extreme form can lead to 
making punishment more important than compliance with continued 
violation and unreasonable enforcement, with great social and economic 
consequences as a possible result. The literature recognizes that both 
enforcement types are hyperboles that in their extreme forms do not work. 
The literature therefore argues for a balance between the two. Yet, at least in 
Chinese practice, we see that such a balance is not sought but instead 
enforcement fluctuates between the two types when it alternates between 
regular and campaign-type enforcement. 
 This part of the book has sought to understand how natural 
resource protection law enforcement is organized in China and at Lake 
Dianchi and to what extent and why it has contributed to achieving 
compliance. This concluding section will summarize the findings of this 
study, first about regular enforcement and then about campaign type 
enforcement. In addition, it will compare these findings from Lake Dianchi 
and China with studies about regulatory enforcement from Western and 
other non-Western countries. 
 Regular enforcement was difficult at Lake Dianchi. In none of the 
compliance cases studied in part II and introduced in Chapter 13, was regular 
enforcement an important factor influencing the regulated actor to comply 
with the law. In most of the violation cases studied, regular enforcement was 
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weak. Regular inspections had trouble detecting violations that had been 
ongoing for a long time, while for the violations detected, in none of the 
cases studied, were sanctions issued during regular enforcement. 
 A set of variables can help to explain why regular enforcement was 
so problematic at Lake Dianchi. First are variables related to the 
enforcement agency itself. The bureaus studied, lacked resources, or their 
resources came from sources related to the violating activity. Bureaus also 
lacked enforcement staff, as well as the right type of staff with technical 
training. Internal bureau personnel procedures offered weak incentives and 
controls for job conformity. Stimulating and controlling agents was thus 
difficult, especially since bureau management could not verify what 
happened during inspections, and the fact that the outcome of enforcement 
work was difficult to measure. Enforcement procedures in practice, finally 
offered agents and bureau leaders considerable freedom when deciding on 
sanctions. As a result of the weak personnel procedures and the enforcement 
procedures those deciding on sanctions had a large amount of discretion. 
When using this discretion agents seemed to be risk averse, trying to do their 
work in such a manner that they would not upset any of the relationships 
with their management, the regulated actor, local politicians, and higher level 
agencies.  
 A second set of variables hampering regular enforcement work are 
those related to the external context of the enforcement agency. The agency 
first of all was influenced by the regulated actor, who in several cases directly 
obstructed enforcement work. Even though in some of the cases there was a 
low level of trust between the agency and the regulated actor, risk averse 
enforcement agents still tried their best to maintain a good working relation 
with regulated actors. Second was the local social context. In many of the 
cases where regular enforcement was difficult, local communities depended 
largely on the violating activities, as major sources of income, or on some of 
the violators who had considerable power. For land, local communities 
supported and even engaged in violations, while for pollution some localities 
although suffering from pollution still failed to report it. The fact that the 
social context depended on violating activities had several consequences. 
First, there were fewer complaints about violations, making detection more 
difficult. Second, violation of law formed a source of local income, making it 
more difficult to deal with such violations stringently. Third is the local 
political context. Local governments were able to control natural resource 
law enforcement through their influence on agency budgets and the 
appointment of bureau leadership. Enforcement agents paid attention to 
local government concerns about economic growth and social stability in 
their regular sanction decisions. 
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 As a result of these variables regular law enforcement had difficulty 
detecting violations, and once violations were discovered, issued non-
stringent sanctions, while paying attention to the social and economic 
consequences of such sanctions. The result of this was that some violations 
could go on for years. Examples are the pollution violations at Huafei, Yunzhi, 
Kunming Porcelain, and the FSS companies, and the land violations at 
Jiacun, Baocun and Licun.  
 The study’s findings are in many aspects similar to existing research 
about other parts of China. 1  Such studies have especially blamed “local 
protectionism”, local governments protecting their own interests instead of 
enforcing national legislation. This study also found that local protectionism 
influenced regular law enforcement. Instead of just seeing this as an abject 
and corruptive phenomenon, the present study has sought to understand the 
causes of local institutions engaging in this practice. First, it finds that local 
protectionism was more widespread than existing studies lead to believe. It 
concerned more than just corrupt, self-interested local politicians. In some of 
the cases studied, strict law enforcement was not supported by a wide range 
of local actors, including local citizens, whose livelihoods depended directly 
or indirectly on ongoing violations. Second, it thus finds that local 
protectionism may have legitimate causes. Such protectionism has in some of 
the cases studied maintained local livelihoods and necessary local products, 
which if the law had been fully enforced would have come under pressure. 
The best examples are the violations of the LMA’s prohibitions on housing 
and enterprise construction on collective arable land. Other examples are the 
protection of Kunming Porcelain, the FSS companies and local restaurants. 
Third, this study finds that local protectionism was at times a coping 
mechanism for risk averse law enforcement officials when lacking resources, 
having to enforce legislation with a wide scope of application, which was 
widely violated, and in addition facing powerful regulated actors opposed to 
the law, and receiving limited support from local communities and local 
governments.  
 As current scholarship holds, local protectionism is first caused by 
the high level of autonomy of local governments and their enforcement 
agents. This study however further finds that another important cause for 
local protectionism is the law’s lack of local feasibility, both for regulated 
actors, local communities, local governments and enforcement officials. In 
the existing studies from other parts of China, few scholars have addressed 
this cause or recognized the possible legitimacy of local protectionism.  
 Meanwhile, regular enforcement has been weak, and the law’s 
equally legitimate goals of protecting arable land and preventing and 
                                                     
1 See Chapter 13 
Ad Hoc Law Enforcement       355 
 
 
controlling pollution proved difficult to achieve. Thus, while local 
protectionism may at times be an understandable phenomenon helping to 
adapt the law to local circumstances, it has also undermined the law and 
obstructed natural resource protection.  
 Since 1996 Chinese leadership has recognized the danger of weak 
natural resource protection law enforcement. To deal with the existing weak 
enforcement, campaigns were organized. The campaigns were organized 
through political pressure from the center, using cadre evaluation systems to 
overcome local protectionism, making campaign targets into priority policy 
on the basis of which local leaders were to be evaluated. The campaigns 
made enforcement measurable, setting formalistic targets of numbers of 
inspections, strict sanctions and model cases. During the campaigns, local 
actors were thus less allowed and able to take local concerns into account.  
 Until 2004, the campaigns had little effect on ongoing violations 
studied at Lake Dianchi. Only in the case of FPC did a campaign directly end 
violations. Even in 2004, when land and pollution campaigns seemed to 
initiate a change in violation cases in Jiacun, Licun, Baocun, Huafei, and the 
FSS companies, the findings seem to indicate that these changes were to be 
short lived. 
 The reason why campaigns had difficulty causing sustainable 
compliance at Lake Dianchi was that they were not able to provide a 
structural solution to the obstacles of regular law enforcement. Once a 
campaign ended, the law’s unfeasibility remained, as the bureaus lacked 
resources or support, local communities depended still on violating sources 
of income, violators were still powerful as dominant employers, and local 
governments still cared about maintaining economic growth and social 
stability, which some of the law’s norms if fully enforced or complied with 
would endanger. 
 There are different ways to evaluate these campaigns. From a direct 
compliance perspective, as adopted mostly in this book, the campaigns were 
largely unsuccessful. While the campaigns mark a tougher stance on natural 
resource violations, the temporary toughness does not overcome structural 
problems as we saw and is unable to create compliance.  
 From a pragmatic perspective, the campaigns are the only way to 
deal with the existing violations, given China’s present central-local 
relationships and the structural conflict of interests between short-term local 
livelihoods and long-term natural resource protection. Using campaigns 
offers an incremental tool to address the worst violations that the regular 
enforcement system fails to address.  
 From a symbolic perspective, the campaigns may be more successful 
than they seem at first blush. The campaigns may actually be a symbol of 
change, demonstrating that what was condoned for years must end. The 
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symbolic function of campaigns may be enhanced because of their increasing 
use of public participation mechanisms creating awareness for law 
enforcement and natural resource protection.2  
 From a rule of law perspective3, one could argue that the campaigns 
are dangerous as they may set a bad example instead of a positive symbol. 
The constant conjuncture of weak enforcement followed by strong campaign 
enforcement makes the legal system as a whole less consistent. During 
campaigns, campaign objectives are more important than legal procedure.  In 
addition, the campaigns are law based on politics, instead of China’s recent 
adoption of Yifa Zhiguo, governance based on law. Using campaigns to 
enforce normally non-enforced law may endanger the legal system as a whole 
and the beginning rule of law doctrine in China.4  
 A final perspective on the use of campaigns, is a political perspective. 
One can wonder why, although China is really losing land and pollution is 
damaging many interests, these problems have suddenly received so much 
attention. Perhaps the answer is that politicians truly wished to solve these 
problems and used the incidents to trigger changes not possible before. 
Moreover, more cynically and following Edelman5, stakeholders may have 
used the growing urgency about pollution and arable land loss to attain goals 
not directly related to them. For the cases described here and for all of 
China’s political legal campaigns, this line of argumentation holds attraction, 
as most campaigns have been about enhancing the state’s vertical reach into 
the local bureaucracy. Boosting the legal system through campaigns serves 
this purpose, and social problems such as pollution, food security, 
corruption, crime, religious practices, copyright piracy, and disabuse of 
village power, may all serve as fora for enhancing the center’s vertical reach.   
 When comparing natural resource law enforcement at Lake Dianchi 
with studies of regulatory enforcement from other countries, both Western 
and non-Western, there are several findings.  
                                                     
2 This perspective is influenced by the Dutch literature on symbolic or communicative effects 
of legislation. See Chapter 2. 
3  With rule of law we here mean both in general the law’s meaningful restraints on 
government action, as well as the thin formal rational rule of law conceptions which require 
that the law should provide clear unambiguous procedures, that should be applied in a 
consistent manner. Compare with Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law History, Politics, Theory. 
Peerenboom, China's Long March toward the Rule of Law. R. Kleinfeld, "Competing Definitions 
of the Rule of Law," in Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad, In Search of Knowledge, ed. T Carothers 
(Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006). 
4 For debates on the development of a rule of law in China see Keith, China's Struggle for the 
Rule of Law (Basingstoke, Hamshire: Macmillan Press LTD, 1994). Keith and Lin, Law and 
Justice in China's New Marketplace, Peerenboom, China's Long March toward the Rule of Law. 
5 Edelman, "The Construction and Uses of Social Problems." Edelman, Constructing the Political 
Spectacle. 
Ad Hoc Law Enforcement       357 
 
 
 First, the present study finds in the cases studied that extreme styles 
of law enforcement, either strongly cooperative and strongly deterrent did 
not cause sustainable compliance. This finding is supported largely in recent 
studies of regulatory enforcement in Western countries.6 These studies now 
advocate mixed styles in which elements of both are incorporated7; such 
mixture of styles has unfortunately not been used in China yet. Such mixed 
styles has not been recognized in studies about enforcement in China or 
other non-Western countries, of which some have advocated a deterrent 
style when facing corruption and weak institutions, while others have argued 
for a more cooperative style as deterrence is too costly in a weak bureaucracy. 
Based on Western studies and the explorative findings from China presented 
here, it seems a mixed enforcement style would be beneficial for non-
Western context. Exactly what such a style means and how it is to be 
established in these contexts, where institutions may be weak and corruptive 
practices influential, is a question for further research.  
 Second, the study finds that at Lake Dianchi a combination of 
variables, both internal and external to the enforcement agency and the agent 
were responsible for how enforcement was carried out. The findings here are 
similar to existing studies. There are two noteworthy differences between 
Lake Dianchi and existing studies. First, law enforcement agents at Lake 
Dianchi, while lacking resources compared to their enforcement tasks, have 
still been relatively well off, in terms of personnel, education and equipment 
compared to other non-Western natural resource protection agencies, so it 
seems. Second, while in Western studies of law enforcement a lack of 
resources and a lack of trust with the regulated actor has led to more 
deterrent enforcement styles, in Lake Dianchi with limited resources and 
limited trust regular enforcement remained cooperative. It seems that the 
difference can be partly explained by the fact that Chinese agents have 
insisted that they wished to maintain a proper relationship with the regulated 
actor. In this sense Lake Dianchi may show similarities to other contexts 
where values of favoritism and informal networks are important, such as the 
Philippines.8 
Third, in the Western literature, the relation between the type of law 
enforcement and the reasons for violation has been important for ensuring 
compliance. Kagan and Scholz have argued that different motivations of 
violation (ranging from rational choice, moral, or competence)9, enforcement 
should adopt a different strategy (ranging from deterrent, convincing, or 
                                                     
6 See Chapter 12 
7 Ibid. 
8 Compare with Oposa, A Socio-Cultural Approach to Environmental Law Compliance: A Philippine 
Scenario ([cited). 
9 See Chapter 6 
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teaching).10 Following their approach, which has received wide recognition in 
the literature 11 , enforcement needs to be adapted to the reasons for 
compliance. The case of Lake Dianchi has demonstrated how difficult it is to 
understand the reasons for compliance (see Chapter 11). Adapting to such 
complexity is thus not easy. Even when the full complexity of norm-
conform behavior is understood, it is not easy to make an enforcement 
policy that is well adapted to it. First, in order to adapt themselves to such 
complexity enforcement agents should be given a significant amount of 
discretion, perhaps so much that they are no longer controllable to enforce 
the law in a manner conducive to attaining the law’s goals. Limiting agent 
discretion can however have the opposite effect, as demonstrated to some 
extent, in China’s law enforcement campaigns, that enforcement action is 
not adapted to local circumstances and does not lead to sustained 
compliance. Second, if there is a wide gap between the goals of the law and 
local interests, as there was at Lake Dianchi, adapting law enforcement to 
both such goals and interests at the same time is difficult, leading easily to 
enforcement that is too stringent and unreasonable, and possibly with less 
compliance, or not stringent enough, also with limited compliance. It thus 
seems that law enforcement when faced with complex behavior and norms 
that are opposed to existing practices, similar to lawmaking has trouble 
balancing certainty (formality) and adaptability (informality), and balancing 
adequacy (stringency) and feasibility (non-stringency).  
Fourth, China’s law enforcement campaigns are an example of how 
regulatory law enforcement can become temporarily influenced by shifts in 
power in the external context of the regulatory agency. While the temporary 
political effects on the legal system seem to be a Chinese phenomenon, used 
in political-legal campaigns and based on a past where the main normative 
system was not legal but political, studies from other countries also 
demonstrate similar phenomena. As noted in Chapter 12, political and social 
contexts have asserted temporary pressure on regulatory law enforcement in 
other countries, following disasters, electoral change, economic opportunities, 
financial crises, or regulatory scandals. There have been many examples of 
how regulatory law enforcement suddenly changed as a result of a shift in 
power following an incident, especially if widely reported.12 We believe that 
this phenomenon, which we will call “ad hoc enforcement” deserves further 
scholarly attention. Ad hoc enforcement seems to have the following 
characteristics: first, following an incident and/or shifts of power in the 
political or social context,  law enforcement is changed quickly, breaking 
                                                     
10 Kagan and Scholz, "The "Criminology of the Corporation" and Regulatory Enforcement 
Strategies." 
11 See Chapter 6 
12 See Chapter 12 
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radically with existing practices; second, such changes are based on a political 
rationale of demonstrating change rather than a full analysis of what 
enforcement action is needed for achieving compliance; third, changes are 
temporal in nature; fourth, as a result of changing external pressures or 
periods of weak and strong pressure there may be conjunctures of 
enforcement changes; fifth, the reactive nature of ad hoc enforcement and 
the political rationale may make that it especially enhances extreme forms of 
cooperative or deterrent styles of enforcement, instead of the mixed style 
favored by scholars. As thus stated these characteristics apply to regulatory 
enforcement practices in cases such as the Chinese political legal campaigns, 
but also the Dutch reaction to disasters, or the US regulatory enforcement 
shifts when Reagan followed Carter, or regulatory changes in Mexico or 
Brazil following social pressures and electoral change.13  
                                                     
13 See Chapter 12 
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Introduction 
In November 2005, a major toxic spill at a Petro-China chemical plant in the 
north-east of China severely polluted the Songhua River. As a result, Harbin 
city’s 3.4 million residents were cut off from water supplies for five days. 
Local governments tried to cover up this disaster and SEPA’s minister Mr. 
Xie Zhenhua had to leave office in the aftermath of the scandal that 
followed.1 A month later, in Guangdong province, at least three people were 
killed in a violent clash when police opened fire at a mob of ten thousand 
angry villagers protesting against the construction of a wind power plant on 
their land without sufficient compensation.2 These two recent cases have 
attracted worldwide attention to the fact that China’s regulation of pollution 
and arable land remains a volatile challenge.  
 China has since the mid-1990s tried to ameliorate its natural 
resource protection legislation and enforcement. This book has tried to 
assess what effects these efforts to enhance the regulation of pollution and 
arable land had in local practice. It has looked at changes in legislation as well 
as changes in law enforcement, and how they have affected compliance and 
violation at Lake Dianchi. This conclusion starts with a short outline of the 
main findings of the three main parts of this book, before discussing what 
the combined findings are and how these bring forth new insights when 
compared with studies about such regulation in other parts of China and 
other countries.  
 The implementability of changes in legislation was discussed in Part 
I. As Chapter 5 summarized, the research found that the changes made were 
not expected to enhance the laws’ implementability. Especially the feasibility 
and adaptability of some of the new stricter and more specific norms 
adopted were questionable. During deliberations on draft laws, opposed 
stakeholders had voiced concern about the fact that some of these norms did 
not fit local circumstances and would be difficult to implement. Largely, such 
concerns were ignored by the NPC Legal Committee that played a dominant 
role in the enactment of the final draft into law.  
                                                     
1 Editorial, China Plans huge river clean up (30 March 2006 [cited 12 September 2006]); available 
from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4860134.stm. 
2 A. Ang, Chinese Village Surrounded After Shootings (Associated Press, December 9 2005 [cited 
20 February 2006]); available from 
 http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2005/12/09/international/i092407S20.DTL. 
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 Part II looked at why regulated actors at Lake Dianchi complied or 
violated land and pollution regulation. As summed up in Chapter 11, it 
found that variables, both external and internal to the regulated actor 
explained violation or compliance. The research found that regulated 
behavior was case based, and often the result of interactions between one or 
more regulated actors with their social, political, economic, and regulatory 
contexts. Among these contexts, especially the economic context was 
important as it affected how both regulated actors, as well as local 
communities, governments and enforcement agents looked at the law’s 
norms and at compliance and violation. 
 Enforcement, both regular and campaign induced, was studied in 
Part III. As detailed in Chapter 15, it found that regular enforcement was 
problematic. Several factors, both related to the enforcement agency and 
agents themselves, as well as those regarding their relationship with the 
regulated actor, local communities and local governments and local social 
and economic circumstances. It found that local protectionism—local 
governments, their enforcement agents and also local communities letting 
local social and economic interests prevail over the goals of natural resource 
protection legislation—had a dominant negative impact on regular 
enforcement. It found that such local protectionism existed first, because of 
the conflict between some of the laws’ norms and local social and economic 
interests and second, because of the relative autonomy local governments 
had when managing local law enforcement. Campaigns, which have been 
organized since 1996 to enhance natural resource protection law 
enforcement, were largely unsuccessful. While they may have been able to 
overcome local protectionism for a short period of time, they were unable to 
overcome the structural problems of regular law enforcement, which 
returned once campaigns ended.  
The Effects of Changes in Legislation and Enforcement on 
Compliance at Lake Dianchi 
Based on the findings presented in this book, it can be argued that the 
changes in legislation and enforcement have had a limited impact on 
compliance behavior at Lake Dianchi. This can be deduced from the data 
presented by asking what would have happened had the law not been 
changed and had enforcement campaigns not been organized. 
 For lawmaking, the answer to this question would be that a large 
part of the behavior observed would have been the same. There were many 
compliance cases in which violation was not profitable or possible, either 
because there was no demand for illegal products or because a bankruptcy 
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had ended the regulated actor’s activities.3 Had the new norms not been 
introduced the results in these compliance cases would have been the same. 
It should be noted, however, that in some cases the new norms may have 
attributed to compliance. These were cases where compliance was the result 
of external pressure from local communities, the media, and in one case 
enforcement agents, who may have been able to use the law’s stricter norms 
to assert stronger pressure.4 
 For violation cases, had the norms not been changed, behavior 
witnessed would have occurred just the same. In violation cases, the (illegal) 
behavior was profitable, while the costs associated with such behavior were 
low, as even with the law’s new norms in place, local communities, local 
governments and enforcement agents condoned and sometimes even 
supported violations, largely because of the importance of the regulated actor 
or its illegal products for local livelihoods.5 
 Had law enforcement campaigns not been organized would 
behavior in the cases studied have been different? Only in one case, FPC’s 
compliance6, the answer is clearly, yes. For all other cases, behavior would 
have remained largely the same, as campaigns had little lasting effect.7 Until 
2004, in none of the other cases campaigns had any direct effect. For 
ongoing land violations in Jiacun, Baocun and Licun, campaigns in 2004 
seemed to start to make a change, but as related in Chapter 14, it is very 
doubtful whether this change has been effected or sustained. Similarly, 
pollution violations at the FSS companies and Huafei were targeted in the 
2004 campaign, but there are strong indications that by the end of 2004 
existing violations continued. The direct long-term effect of the campaigns 
has thus been limited, mainly because the campaigns failed to solve structural 
regular law enforcement problems. It should be noted however, that 
campaigns may have influenced behavior indirectly, being symbols of change 
and by enhancing public awareness and participation.8 
 The conflict between the law’s norms and local interests is a 
fundamental problem that existed at Lake Dianchi when long-term macro 
concerns for natural resource protection clashed with short-term micro 
concerns for income. Lawmaking and enforcement failed to find a balance 
between the goals of the law and law enforcement on the one hand, and the 
dominant local interests and circumstances of the cases of behavior such 
laws and enforcement were aiming to change, which were largely constituted 
                                                     
3 See Chapter 7, 8, 11 
4 See Chapter 7, 8 and 11 
5 See Chapter 9, 10, and 11 
6 See Chapter 8 
7 See Chapter 14 and 15 
8 See Chapter 14, 15 
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by the local economic context, on the other. Legal efforts through changing 
legislation and enforcement were thus disappointing. The manner in which 
the law was changed and the law enforcement campaigns were organized 
seems to have exacerbated the contradiction; both were largely top-down 
processes in which there was little room for local concerns. Before the 
changes discussed here, lawmaking and enforcement were too 
accommodative to such dominant local circumstances and failed to initiate a 
change. Once changes had been made, lawmaking and enforcement largely 
failed to consider local circumstances, leading to unfeasible and inflexible 
norms and enforcement whose compliance could not be sustained.  
Lake Dianchi’s Conclusions about Lawmaking, Compliance 
and Enforcement in China 
The findings presented in this book hold relevance beyond Lake Dianchi, 
even though the data collected are not representative for China. When 
comparing these data with studies about land and pollution regulation from 
other parts of the country, they suggest important trends and raise vital 
questions. 
 First are findings about lawmaking. The cases studied here indicate 
that China’s legislator moves away from the piece meal approach to law9, 
making laws that are stricter and more specific, more focused on one interest 
instead of trying to accommodate many, less oriented at the adaptability to 
varied and changing circumstances and more at ensuring certainty. If this 
trend is true it may be beneficial for enhancing the law’s certainty and 
adequacy, however if local variation and a wide array of interests are not 
incorporated, Chinese regulatory law may become difficult to implement. 
Here, China’s top down legal and political system, which has few 
mechanisms for the bottom up formation of norms, such as a case law 
system, further exacerbates this danger.  
 The findings about why compliance and violation occurred at Lake 
Dianchi are largely similar to earlier studies about arable land loss and 
pollution. 10  There were some noteworthy differences and new insights, 
however. First is the fact that existing studies about pollution violations have 
not looked at how important sources of local income have received less 
external pressure to comply with the law. They have not looked at the 
position of dominant employers, regulated actors who directly and indirectly 
provide a significant amount of income for people in a given locality. 11 
Second, existing studies have generally not looked at how local power 
                                                     
9 Chen, Chinese Law, Towards an Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and Development. See 
further Chapter 2 and 5. 
10 See Chapter 5 and 11 
11 See Chapter 6 
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configurations affect compliance and violation of law. Neither has there been 
attention to how village democratization has influenced arable land and 
pollution cases. Third, while this study, similar to other studies, found that 
small regulated actors were more likely to violate pollution law, such studies 
did not address how large enterprises have been able to use their economic 
power to violate the law with little risk. Fourth, a new finding about 
compliance behavior is that in some case studies compliance could partly be 
explained by the fact that the company in question had to support 
pensioners. 
 For the enforcement of natural resource protection law the present 
study confirmed many findings from existing studies emphasizing that weak 
enforcement arises out of local protectionism, a lack of resources and close 
relationships between the enforcement agents and the regulated actors. 12 
There are two main differences however between existing studies and the 
present findings. First, this study has sought to understand why local 
protectionism exists, finding that it occurs because local governments, 
enforcement agents, but also local communities have condoned the violation 
of norms that if complied with could affect dominant sources of local 
income. Second, this study has looked at the effect of political campaigns, a 
phenomenon not yet studied for natural resource protection law 
enforcement. Campaigns studied here are examples of Chinese political-legal 
campaigns. These campaigns have been used to enhance the implementation 
of law in China. Given the weak regular enforcement that exists in certain 
areas of law, such campaigns may be necessary to overcome local resistance. 
However, their effect may be limited as long as structural problems and 
power relations are not addressed. In addition, their political and ad hoc 
character stands opposed to a long-term process of rule of law formation.   
Comparing China and other Countries 
The lack of specific analytical frameworks developed for contexts such as 
those at Lake Dianchi forced us to resort to literature and theories derived 
from other countries, both Western and non-Western. Having used these 
analytical frameworks to study regulation at Lake Dianchi, new insights may 
be drawn by comparing the findings of this research with findings from 
Western and other non-Western studies. Such comparison, which is made in 
explicit recognition of similarities as well as differences, may help to broaden 
the existing Western theories to be adapted to non-Western contexts, as well 
as to see to which extent the findings here are unique for China and to which 
extent they can be found in other countries as well. Before we can discuss a 
comparison of our case of Lake Dianchi and the existing Western and non-
                                                     
12 See Chapter 15 
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Western studies, we need to clarify some of the differences between China 
and other countries.13  
 A first difference between China and the West is that in China the 
conflict of goals between protecting natural resources and ensuring 
livelihoods is much broader, deeper and more acute than in the West. 
China’s economic circumstances are much different from Western, 
developed countries. A first fact is that the Chinese per capita GNI is much 
lower than that of for example the US, the UK, Australia or the 
Netherlands.14 In addition China still has a significant poverty problem with 
16.6% of the population living from less than one US$ a day in 2002 and 10 
percent of children under 5 suffering from malnutrition.15  Second, rapid 
economic growth, which was much larger than that in said Western 
countries16, has since reform significantly helped to enhance China’s low 
standards of living.17 Third, with this economic growth China has had a 
much faster rate of industrialization 18  and urbanization 19  than the West. 
Because of such industrialization and urbanization, China’s already much 
pressured national resources have come under severe pressure from 
pollution and construction. 20  In China, there are thus strong linkages 
between poverty reduction, economic growth, industrialization and 
urbanization and natural resource pressure. Because many Chinese still 
remain poor and many that have left poverty are largely dependent on 
                                                     
13 The list of differences presented below is by no way exclusive and just contains some of the 
differences that are relevant for the present analysis and help to enable comparison.  
14 In 2004 China had a per capita Gross National Income (GNI) of US$ 1,290, while Australia 
had US$ 26,900, the Netherlands had US$ 31,700, the UK had US$ 33,940, and the US had 
US$ 41,400. World Bank, Equity and Development, World Development Report 2006 (Washington: 
World Bank, 2006). 292-3 
15 Ibid. 294 
16 China had a GDP growth of 8.8% in 2003-4, while growth in the four above mentioned 
Western countries ranged from 1.2% in the Netherlands to 3.4% in the US. Ibid. 292-3 
17 An indicator of this is that the percentage of children under five suffering from malnutrition 
has dropped from 17.4% to 10% between 1989-94 and the 2000-3 periods. Ibid. 294  
18 China’s Industry Value Added Growth grew from 11.1% in the 1980-1990 period to 14.1% 
in the 1990-1999 period. While in the same periods growth on the four Western countries 
mentioned above ranged from 2.5 to 3.7%. See World Bank, Attacking Poverty, World 
Development Report, 2000-2001 (Washington: World Bank, 2001). 294-5 
19 While until reform urbanization had been low, with about 18% of the population living in 
cities in 1960, in 1980 this number was still only 20%. By 1999, 31% of the Chinese lived in 
cities, or more than a 50% increase in twenty years, or a 2.5 % annual increase. Meanwhile in 
Western countries urbanization levels were already high and stable, ranging from 74% in 1980 
to 77% in 1999 in the US to 88% in 1980 to 89% in 1999 in the Netherlands. See World Bank, 
World Development Report 1983 (Washington: World Bank, 1983). and World Bank, Attacking 
Poverty, World Development Report, 2000-2001. 276-7 
20 See Chapter 3 and 4 
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ongoing economic growth related to destruction of natural resources 21 , 
measures to control natural resource destruction, which affect such growth22, 
will have a much stronger effect on the incomes of the people. In other 
words, the context of relative poverty, combined with a dependence on 
natural resource destroying sources of income, makes it difficult to control 
such resource losses without affecting local livelihoods in a much stronger 
way than in the West. These differences make that strict control of pollution 
and land use is stronger opposed to China’s local economic and social 
circumstances than to Western countries where most theories on regulation 
were developed for.  
 In terms of poverty and low per-capita, China is similar to other 
non-Western countries23. However, this does not mean that all non-Western 
countries suffer from the same conflict of interests as China.  Compared to 
some non-Western, developing countries China has a high degree of 
industrialization and urbanization. 24  In addition, it has a high level of 
economic growth. 25  Non-Western countries without much growth or 
industrialization will have less difficulty balancing economy and environment, 
because such interests are less opposed. Here it seems that China is at a 
difficult point, as it has both growth based on natural resource exploitation 
and poverty.  
 A second difference is the limited amount of public participation 
allowed in China’s political and legal system, which has only exacerbated the 
existing conflicts of interests. Whereas most Western countries have political 
systems, which allow for a great deal of participation from various interest 
groups and the population at large, China is a one party state where public 
participation is limited.26 In this aspect, China is comparable to some, but not 
                                                     
21 At Lake Dianchi this is most clearly the case for construction on arable land and for income 
depended on small polluting enterprises, or older polluting enterprises without funds for 
proper environmental installations.  
22 For construction on arable land the linkage is clear as there is no alternative when rural 
development, rural industrialization, or rural urbanization is concerned, this always costs 
arable land. Restricting such land use will restrict economic growth. For pollution the case is 
more complex. For some polluting companies pollution control can actually lead to more cost 
efficient production. As such, firms can seek “win-win” situations in which stricter 
environmental protection is profitable. While this has been noted in the West at for example 
pulp mills, in China the number of small heavily polluting factories, like the FSS plants, or the 
number of old heavily polluting factories like Yunfeng is substantial and for these types of 
plants abatement will bring considerable costs and in many cases mean closure. For a 
discussion on pulp plants in the West see Gunningham, Kagan, and Thornton, Shades of Green, 
Business Regulation and Environment. 60-72 
23 World Bank, Equity and Development, World Development Report 2006. 292-3 
24 Ibid. 294 
25 World Bank, Attacking Poverty, World Development Report, 2000-2001. 276-7 
26 Saich, Governance and Politics of China. Zheng, Party vs. State in Post-1949 China, The Institutional 
Dilemma. 
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all, non-Western countries.27 Especially in a unitary state as large as China, 
with all its regional differences and its rapid changes, this complicates making 
policy that fits different interests and contexts in society. Here it is especially 
noteworthy that China’s legal system is largely top-down and does not see 
local court decisions as a source of law, which could in theory have helped to 
make the unitary legal system more adaptable to local circumstances and 
changes.28 In this aspect China is similar to some non-Western countries, 
mainly those with a continental legal system, such as Indonesia, Egypt or 
Senegal and different from others with a common law system, such as India 
or Ghana.  
 A third difference is the limited role of NGOs in China. China’s 
political context has also affected its social context. Where in Western 
countries and some non-Western countries29, the freedom of association is 
largely respected, in China such freedom is not apparent, groups have 
difficulty organizing themselves and such organization is only just starting.30 
For sensitive issues such as pollution control this has meant that only a 
limited amount of NGOs are active nationwide and have done so without 
direct conflict with the national state and with only limited conflict with local 
governments.31 At Lake Dianchi such NGOs were not active and most social 
action against natural resource losses has been of a non-organized nimby (not 
in my backyard) type.32 In this aspect, China is quite extreme; even in regimes 
which were quite repressive such as Indonesia’s New Order, NGOs have 
been quite successful in mounting pressures to increase environmental 
compliance and enforcement.33 
 A fourth difference is the relative inexperience of China with law 
and legal institutions. China’s legal system has only been reestablished since 
1978. As a result of decades of war, civil war and revolution since the 1940s, 
much of the existing legal system, legal institutions and even legal expertise 
were lost. China had to start from scratch.34 It has had to focus on making 
                                                     
27 For comparative data on the level of participation in several developing countries including 
China see Hyden, Court, and Mease, Making Sense of Governance, Empirical Evidence from Sixteen 
Developing Countries.57-75, 65 in particular for data. 
28 See Chapter 2 and 5 
29 For a comparison in civil society between China and other non-Western countries see 
Hyden, Court, and Mease, Making Sense of Governance, Empirical Evidence from Sixteen Developing 
Countries. 64 
30 Saich, Governance and Politics of China. P. Ho, "Greening without conflict? Environmentalism, 
NGOs and Civil Society in China," Development and Change 32 (2001). 
31 For an overview of such NGOs see Ho, "Greening without conflict? Environmentalism, 
NGOs and Civil Society in China." 
32 Ibid. Compare with Broadbent, Environmental Politics in Japan, Networks of Power and Protest. 
33 Cribb, "The Politics of Pollution Control in Indonesia." 
34 Fora n overview of these processes see Peerenboom, China's Long March toward the Rule of 
Law. S.B. Lubman, ed., China's Legal Reforms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
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laws and building legal institutions, while lacking the experience to do so. 
Moreover, the world’s largest unitary legal system had to be reconstructed in 
a rapidly changing society.  This has had two effects. First legal institutions, 
including law enforcement bureaus and lawmakers lack capacity in terms of 
both financial resources as well as human resources. Second, law in China 
has thus been much closer related to politics and policy. As a result, the law 
has changed often adapting itself to new policies, but also to new social and 
economic circumstances or experiences from home or abroad.35 Because of 
this the law, and especially the application and enforcement of law have 
suffered from discontinuity and lack of certainty. In this aspect, China is 
again similar and different from non-Western countries. Some countries, 
such as for example India and Pakistan have fostered a well developed legal 
system with a good legal profession, bench and legal education. Meanwhile, 
especially war torn conflict countries are facing legal vacuums much worse 
than that in China today and more comparable to the chaotic aftermath of 
the Cultural Revolution.  
 A fifth difference, also closely related to China’s revolutionary 
history is the limited amount of professionalization within the country’s 
bureaucracies and legal institutions. Whereas Western and some non-
Western36 countries have had clearly professionalized bureaucrats and legal 
staff including for example police officials, judges or forest inspectors, 
China’s bureaucracy and legal institutions, especially those which were 
(re)instituted in the years after reform, had to recruit many former army 
officers, as the devastation of the years of revolution and especially the 
Cultural Revolution had left little of former professional bureaucrats and 
lawyers. Only since the 1990s, when a new civil service system was instituted 
and when China’s reopened universities had trained significant amounts of 
specialists, bureaucracies have started to recruit specially trained civil 
servants.37  
 A sixth difference between China and the West is the remarkable 
and widely condoned influence of informal networks on the daily operation 
of formal institutions.38 In the literature, this has often been called Guanxi, 
                                                                                                                        
Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China after Mao. Chen, Chinese Law, Towards an 
Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and Development. 
35 This is what Chen has called the piece meal approach to law in China. See Chen, Chinese 
Law, Towards an Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and Development. 
36  See for example Quah, "Transforming the Singapore Civil Service for National 
Development.", E.W. Weidner, ed., Development Administration in Asia (Durham N.C.: Duke 
University Press, 1970). 
37 Burns, "The Civil Service System of the People's Republic of China". Burns, "Changing 
Environmental Impacts on Civil Service Systems: The Cases of China and Hong Kong." 
38 See Potter, "Guanxi and the PRC Legal System: From Contradiction to Complementarity." 
Bian, "Guanxi and the allocation of urban jobs in China.", Yang, "Gifts, Favors, and Banquets: 
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which literally translated means “relationships”. Guanxi practices have at 
times made that personal favor exchange has dominated formal institutional 
rules. In this aspect, China seems similar to many non-Western societies39. 
Because of this, China’s law enforcement institutions run a higher risk of 
capture-like and corruptive practices than similar Western institutions.40   
 These six differences make the case of natural resource protection 
regulation at Lake Dianchi different from cases studied in the West, and 
partly similar to and partly different from non-Western countries. 
Parallels and Differences in Debates about Regulatory Law in 
China and in other Countries 
As outlined above, most scholars and policy-makers discussing China’s 
natural resource protection regulation believe that more stringent and certain 
legislation and enforcement would help to overcome existing problems of 
non-compliance.41 In their analyses many of the problems related to non-
compliance have emerged because of weak legislation, weak enforcement 
institutions and the strong resistance local governments have been able to 
muster against such regulation.  
 The debates in China remind us of how scholarship and 
policymakers discussed regulation in the West in particular in the 1950s, 
1960s and 1970s. In this period, they believed that society required new and 
stronger regulatory institutions to protect citizens from certain types of harm, 
such as environmental degradation and occupational safety. The original 
institutions proved to be too weak especially when trying to regulate 
powerful industry that could capture regulatory agencies.  As a result, public 
interest groups and also politicians started to call for stricter regulation and 
enforcement, which was subsequently instituted by pro-regulation 
governments in the 1970s.  
 However, in the West by the late 1970s and early 1980s in a 
different economic and political climate a reappraisal was made of the 
effectiveness of such stringent and formalistic regulation, calling attention 
for regulatory unreasonableness and overregulation. In the end, such 
warnings led to extensive empirical studies of regulatory effectiveness and to 
                                                                                                                        
the Art of Social Relationships in China.", Yang, "The Resilience of Guanxi and its New 
Development: A Critique of Some New Guanxi Scholarship." 
39 See Chapter 12. There is an abundant literature about networks, patronage and clientalism. 
A good examples about how this affects enforcement is Oposa, A Socio-Cultural Approach to 
Environmental Law Compliance: A Philippine Scenario ([cited). For general studies see S.M. Lipset 
and G.S. Lenz, "Corruption, Culture and Markets.", Riggs, F.W. Administration in Developing 
Countries, The Theory of the Prismatic Society. 
40  For data that show this point see Transparency International, Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 ([cited).  
41 See Chapter 1, 2, 3, 4 and 13 and 14 
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searches for regulatory alternatives and forms of deregulation. In the West 
the flow of debates about regulatory law has led to a rather balanced, to a 
certain extent empirically based, approach about how to institute a command 
and control system of regulation that is able to create compliance and 
enhance enforcement. As we saw above, for lawmaking the balance between 
adequacy, certainty, feasibility and adaptability is central 42 , while for law 
enforcement a balance between pure deterrence and pure cooperative styles 
is the accepted model.43 
 There are also similarities between China and debates about 
regulatory law in non-Western countries. First, similar to China, many of the 
studies on regulatory law in non-Western countries have focused on how to 
make legislation and law enforcement more effective when faced with 
limited political support, corruption and weak institutions.44 In the literature 
on non-Western regulatory law, there has been little concern for 
unreasonableness, and more for capture-like practices undermining the effect 
of regulation, which given the circumstances is no surprise.45  
 Similar to many studies about non-Western regulation and in 
contrast with Western studies, studies about regulatory law in China have not 
clearly focused on unreasonableness, or even feasibility and adaptability. 
Instead, approaches to Chinese regulation remain firmly rooted in the idea of 
coping with a lack of capacity and the danger of capture.  Given current 
differences between China and the West, this is not surprising. China’s 
regulatory institutions, in particular the natural resource protection 
institutions, have a limited capacity compared to Western lawmakers and 
enforcement bureaus. In addition, China has a context with a significant 
amount of corruptive and capture-like practices, especially in the context of 
guanxi and the transition from state-controlled to market oriented industries. 
For lawmaking, this has meant that Chinese lawmakers have focused more 
on adequacy and certainty and less on feasibility and adaptability. For law 
enforcement, this has led to campaigns with a temporary deterrence strategy 
using stringent and formal enforcement methods.  
 While in the context of limited capacity and fear of capture such 
methods seem warranted, and have been used also in the West in the 1970s, 
the present research has questioned their effectiveness. Due to the low level 
of feasibility, adaptability, and cooperation we argued above that the heavy 
emphasis on adequacy, certainty and deterrence in lawmaking and law 
enforcement policies has not led to a sustained compliance with the law and 
thus not to a successful protection of land, air and water at places such as 
                                                     
42 See Chapter 2 
43 See Chapter 12 
44 See Chapter 2 and 12 
45 See Chapter 2 and 12 
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Lake Dianchi. Thus, we hope that the study of regulation in China will pay 
more attention to regulatory unreasonableness.  
 In studies of both Western and non-Western regulatory law, 
alternatives to state regulation have been increasingly recommended. 46 
Especially the World Bank’s series of studies on pollution regulation in non-
Western countries strongly advocates informal forms of regulation to 
overcome existing problems related to rigid and weak institutions in a 
developmental context. 47  These studies advocate alternative approaches 
involving civil society and the market through financial instruments, public 
disclosure and education programs. It has been recognized however, also by 
the World Bank, that such informal regulation cannot be a full alternative to 
state regulation, which often provides the information basis needed for 
informal regulation. In addition, some countries and contexts may be more 
adapted to informal mechanisms than others. In countries such as China 
with a limited civil society and transitional market, social and market-based 
mechanisms may not be as effective.  
 Thus a first comparative conclusion is that there are parallels 
between regulatory debates in contemporary China and debates in the 1960s 
and 1970s in the West and the 1990s about non-Western countries. A second 
conclusion is that while China’s circumstances demand a focus on capacity 
building and control of capture, the feasibility and thus the reasonableness of 
the regulatory system should also be taken into account. As a third 
conclusion, we see that the contemporary Western debates are in certain 
aspects quite ahead of the situation in countries such as China, where a fear 
of capture and a lack in capacity is still very much an issue. Without solving 
these two, and setting up a basic system of command and control regulation, 
the development of alternative forms of regulation will be risky.48 As such, 
the most recent debates about deregulation and alternatives to regulation in 
Western and non-Western countries, should be used with care when 
applying them to China, and only be done so while recognizing the Chinese 
context such as weak capacity, the enhanced danger of capture or corruption, 
the different economic context and the weak role civil society and the market 
play.    
The Importance of the Economic Context to Understand 
Compliance 
The study of Lake Dianchi found that the influences from the economic 
context were the most significant. It dominated all other external and 
                                                     
46 See Chapter 1 
47 World Bank, Greening Industry, New Roles for Communities, Markets and Governments. 
48  Aalders also makes this point. See Aalders, "Self-Regulation and Compliance with 
Environmental Law from a Global Perspective." 
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internal factors in compliance and violation cases. In addition, it found that 
changes in lawmaking and law enforcement had little direct influence on 
compliance. There are some notable differences between our findings 
concerning the influence of the economic context and those in existing 
literature.  
 In existing Western studies, the economic context is also important49, 
albeit not as important as our study here found. An important parallel 
between our study of Lake Dianchi and Western studies is the fact that 
regulating dominant employers is more difficult as many incomes depend on 
them.50  In contrast with our findings, Western studies have found that even 
when compliance causes significant economic costs, regulation can still be 
successful in stopping pollution. Gunningham et al.’s study of beyond-
compliance at pulp mills in several Western countries is important here. This 
study showed that these paper mills invested significantly in abatement, at 
considerable cost, in order to meet the increasingly stringent environmental 
standards. Their study analyzed firm behavior in these countries also by 
looking at the external contexts, focusing on the legal, economic/business 
and social contexts. Their study argues that tightening of the regulation has 
been a driver for changes in the economic and social contexts and as such, 
“regulation is the single most important driver for improved environmental 
performance.”51 Both the general deterrence associated with the threat of 
governmental enforcement52, but also class action by citizens and advocacy 
groups using such stringent standards, as well as informal pressures from 
negative publicity and shaming have influenced firms in the West to comply 
with regulation.53 Because of the pressure, the firms were forced to comply 
with the law despite economic constraints. Furthermore, the economic 
context would adapt to the new constraints, which would apply to all such 
firms.  Gunningham et al’s study thus portrays this process as a 
“convergence” of these three contexts, showing how stricter regulation in 
the legal context affects more pressure in the social context, which will be 
able to overcome restraints to compliance in the economic context.54  
                                                     
49 See for example Gunningham, Kagan, and Thornton, Shades of Green, Business Regulation and 
Environment, Huisman, Tussen Winst en Moraal, Achtergronden van Regelnaleving en Regelovertreding 
door Ondernemingen (Between Profit and Morality, The Backgrounds to Enterprise Compliance and 
Violation). 138 For more sources see Chapter 6 
50 Kagan, Gunningham, and Thornton, "Explaining Corporate Environmental Performance: 
How does regulation matter?" 69 
51 Gunningham, Kagan, and Thornton, Shades of Green, Business Regulation and Environment. 45 
52 General deterrence can work as against violations, but even in case most firms comply it is 
influential as reassurance when in compliance that others would receive punishment for 
violation and as reminder to check such compliance. See Thornton, Gunningham, and Kagan, 
"General Deterrence and Corporate Environmental Behavior." 
53 Gunningham, Kagan, and Thornton, Shades of Green, Business Regulation and Environment. 50 
54 Ibid. 139 
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 The above-mentioned World Bank study of pollution regulation in 
non-Western countries also focuses on a convergence of the economic, the 
social and the regulatory context. This study argues that in some cases a 
combination of social, market and regulatory pressures have made polluting 
firms decrease their pollution. 55  There are different ways in which such 
convergences occur and with different outcomes, some in compliance but 
some in violation. One of the cases discussed in the World Bank study 
concerns the control of pollution of small brick factories in Juárez, Mexico. 
In this case, the continued pollution by scrap burning brick kilns caused so 
much nuisance that community pressure erupted. This led to elections and a 
new mayor who adopted stricter local rules and initiated punitive law 
enforcement. As a result of these pressures and also of a pollution education 
program, companies negotiated with suppliers of clean propane equipment 
for lower equipment prices and were able to adopt cleaner technology 
without closing down. In Juárez, thus a convergence started from the social 
context involving the political, the regulatory and the economic context 
made compliance and pollution abatement possible. 56  However, soon a 
convergence with the opposite effect occurred due to changes in the 
economic context. The annulment of state subsidies for propane gas in 
Mexico prices weakened community and regulatory pressures in Juárez. 
Fearing bankruptcies and unemployment, the community and business 
consensus supporting cleaner production evaporated, while the municipal 
government dropped its deterrent enforcement style.57 We thus see that in 
non-Western contexts, if the situation is right, a convergence similar to the 
US, but starting from the social context can take place. However, such 
convergence depends highly on the economic context. If unemployment 
looms and jobs are on the line, community and regulatory pressures can 
easily dissipate.  
 The analysis of non-compliance cases at Lake Dianchi is also one of 
convergence albeit with a different effect than in Gunningham et al.’s study 
and more similar to how convergence ended in Juárez. Here the economic 
context dominated the convergence of the economic, social, regulatory and 
political contexts and as a result, more stringent regulation did in most cases 
not lead to more compliance.58 The difference between the US and China 
here can be explained by a number of factors. First, as argued above, at Lake 
Dianchi the contradiction between local livelihoods and natural resource 
                                                     
55 World Bank, Greening Industry, New Roles for Communities, Markets and Governments. 
56 Blackman and Bannister, "Pollution Control in the Informal Sector: the Ciudad Juarez 
Brickmakers' Project.", World Bank, Greening Industry, New Roles for Communities, Markets and 
Governments. 
57 Blackman and Bannister, "Pollution Control in the Informal Sector: the Ciudad Juarez 
Brickmakers' Project." 
58 See Chapter 11 
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protection was larger, especially than in the US. Strict enforcement of the 
laws’ norms would in Kunming have led to a decrease of the already much 
more limited income of many, especially in those areas where there were no 
alternative sources of income not directly or indirectly related to natural 
resource loss. In the US study, the firms were able to comply with the 
increasingly stringent norms without having to close down or affect a 
significant amount of livelihoods. 59  Second, because of the contradiction 
between compliance and local livelihoods, and the homogeneous local 
economy in which violating behavior was a dominant source of income, local 
communities never invoked the laws’ more stringent rules as happened in the 
US. Another reason this did not happen is that at Lake Dianchi, non-local 
and therefore independent, public interest groups have not played a 
dominant role due to the political context, which restricts the non-state 
organization of political interests. Here China is different from both the US, 
as well as many other non-Western countries. In addition, for arable land 
protection no such interest groups, even at the national level are identifiable, 
mainly because it is a rather abstract long-term national interest, rather than a 
public concern. Third, China’s law enforcement machinery for natural 
resource protection is much less well equipped than that of Western 
countries, as it lacks resources, well trained personnel, efficient internal 
management and external review systems. The weakness of state 
enforcement is of course exacerbated by the lack of invocation of law by 
inhabitants or NGOs. In addition, agents have been unwilling to enforce the 
law stringently during regular enforcement work due to its local unfeasibility 
and unreasonableness. Fourth, as a hypothesis here not tested we believe 
that due to the years of weak natural resource protection law enforcement 
and the relative inconsistent nature of the legal system as a whole and the 
legal enforcement campaigns, the regulatory context offers much less of a 
general deterrent effect. Regulated actors in China have much less to fear 
from enforcement action, either governmental, from interest groups or 
informal. Specific actions in China against one violating actor therefore may 
have much less general effect in creating compliance than similar actions in 
the West. Fifth, many actors in China are not in compliance, whereas in the 
West, in the case of the pulp mills, most were. This has two results. First for 
those violating, ending violations at economic costs will put them at a 
disadvantaged position from those continuing violation. Second, this 
especially applies to polluting firms, when the majority is not in compliance 
                                                     
59 Except for one pulp mill which experimented with extremely beyond compliance measures 
producing chloride free paper that was not marketable and in the end had to file for 
bankruptcy and lay of 240 workers. See Gunningham, Kagan, and Thornton, Shades of Green, 
Business Regulation and Environment. 61 
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the costs related to compliance have not yet become a normal part of 
business operations accepted within the economic context of the market. 
 From the above we can draw several conclusions. First compliance 
behavior comes forth out of a convergence of different contexts (economic, 
social, political and regulatory) and factors internal to the regulated actor. 
Second, in the West, scholarship demonstrated that for pollution control at 
pulp plants, the regulatory context dominates such convergence towards 
compliance. At Lake Dianchi, however a different convergence occurred, 
where the economic context was dominant and non-compliance resulted, 
largely similar to the final convergence that ended compliance in Juárez, 
Mexico. Third, an economic context where compliance is strongly opposed 
to local livelihoods of most citizens is the most important explanation for 
such a difference.60 Fourth, general deterrence may be less influential on 
compliance behavior in weak regulatory contexts such as the Chinese. Fifth, 
because of all this, in contexts where compliance is strongly opposed to local 
livelihoods, similar to that at Lake Dianchi, the feasibility and adaptability of 
legislation and enforcement is important and the existing economic context 
should be taken into account when seeking solutions for existing problems.  
The Importance of the Social Context for Compliance  
The study of compliance behavior at Lake Dianchi found that the social 
context played an important role in some of the compliance cases. In one 
pollution case and in two land compensation cases local communities were 
able to exert sufficient pressure to make the regulated actors comply or even 
go beyond compliance.  
 The importance of the social context resonates with existing studies 
of compliance from elsewhere. Many Western studies, but also studies about 
non-Western countries now recognize the importance of the social context 
as a source of pressure that enhances compliance.61 A related finding has 
                                                     
60 It is important to note that there are exceptions. China’s one child policy is one such 
exception. Here a policy, which strongly affected local livelihoods and worse private behavior, 
was quite successfully implemented. While we cannot make a full analysis of differences and 
similarities here, a difference between the one child policy, on first glance, and natural 
resource protection regulation, lies in the full and consistent use of China’s CCP political 
machinery towards its implementation. China could do so only at considerable costs and 
would not be able to do so for every policy area at every time. Instead for other areas it has 
resorted to campaigns which in an ad hoc manner try to achieve the same affect, but due to 
inconsistent application fail to sustain results made.  
61  See for example Levine, "Between Choice and Sacrifice: Constructions of Community 
Consent in Reactive Air Pollution Regulation." Kagan, Gunningham, and Thornton, 
"Explaining Corporate Environmental Performance: How does regulation matter?" 68-73 
Sonnenfeld, "Social Movements and Ecological Modernization: The Transformation of Pulp 
and Paper Manufacturing." Sonnenfeld, "Social Movements, environment, and technology in 
Indonesia's pulp and paper industry." World Bank, Greening Industry, New Roles for Communities, 
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been that regulated actors who are more open towards their social context, 
i.e. have a larger amount of social responsiveness, will be more inclined to 
compliance.62  Social contexts can exert pressure directly by addressing the 
regulated actor through legal or informal (collective) action; in addition, it 
may do so indirectly through pressure on lawmakers for stricter regulations 
and law enforcement bureaus for stricter enforcement. Studies from the 
West have emphasized that better organized communities, for example 
through labor unions or trade associations, are more successful in this 
respect.63 Similarly, for developing countries, studies have emphasized the 
role social contexts can play to help achieve better compliance with natural 
resource protection laws, pollution in particular, even when the formal 
regulatory context was weak.64 Hettige et al. study found that such activism 
only existed in communities with a certain level of education and income. 
From Huq and Wheeler’s study of community pressure in Bangladesh, we 
can deduce that community pressure was only successful there when the 
regulated firm was not a dominant employer.65 In addition, Pargal et al. and 
Pargal and Wheeler’s studies demonstrate that in Indonesia and the US social 
pressure from richer and well-educated communities was much more 
effective.66 
 In many of the cases studied at Lake Dianchi, there was little to no 
pressure from the local community. Above we already discussed some of the 
factors that may explain the difference between Lake Dianchi and studies 
from elsewhere: in most cases the violating activity is dominant for local 
income, and as a result local communities have been too dependent of such 
activity (either directly or indirectly), in addition non-local public interest 
groups were not active in the area, partly because under the political system 
topics such as pollution are too sensitive and China’s NGOs have not often 
                                                                                                                        
Markets and Governments. Hettige et al., "Determinants of Pollution Abatement in Developing 
Countries: Evidence from South and Southeast Asia." R.S. Hartman, M. Huq, and D. Wheeler, 
"Why Paper Mills Clean Up, DEterminants of Pollution Abatement in Four Asian Countries," 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, no. 1710 (1997). 
62 Van de Bunt, Organisatiecriminaliteit (Organizational Crime). Braithwaite, John. Crime, Shame and 
Reintegration.  
63 Levine, "Between Choice and Sacrifice: Constructions of Community Consent in Reactive 
Air Pollution Regulation." 1039, Bardach and Kagan, Going by the Book, The Problem of Regulatory 
Unreasonableness. Scholz and Wei, "Regulatory Enforcement in a Federalist System." Hawkins, 
Environment and Enforcement, Regulation and the Social Definition of Pollution. 
64 Hettige et al., "Determinants of Pollution Abatement in Developing Countries: Evidence 
from South and Southeast Asia." Carmen de Mello Lemos, "The Politics of Pollution Control 
in Brazil: State Actors and Social Movements Cleaning up Cubatão." 
65  Huq and Wheeler, "Pollution Reduction Without Formal Regulation: Evidence From 
Bangladesh." 
66  Pargal et al., "Formal and Informal Regulation of Industrial Pollution: Comparative 
Evidence from Indonesia and the United States.", Pargal and Wheeler, "Informal Regulation 
of Industrial Pollution in Developing Countries: Evidence from Indonesia." 
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directly confronted the state on these matters67 or for arable land protection 
such NGOs just do not exist as it is not a public concern. Here we thus see 
that the economic context limits pressure from the local social context, in 
addition we see that the political context further inhibits pressure from the 
non-local social context. In some of the cases at Lake Dianchi, we saw that 
the social context supported violations as it stood to benefit directly from it. 
In these cases, the pressure of the social context thus enhances violation and 
regulated actors with a greater social responsiveness will be less inclined to 
compliance. For arable land regulation, when compensation was not the 
issue, we see that there were no direct victims of violations. As such arable 
land protection is more difficult as victimless violation 68  will not attract 
resistance from society.  
 A first conclusion drawn from this is that the social context can be 
an important driver towards compliance, more stringent legislation and 
enforcement. However, in contexts such as that of Lake Dianchi this will 
only happen if there is either a local community independent of the violating 
activity, educated, and organized enough to initiate action or a non-local 
independent and well-organized social organization, politically and legally 
able to pressure violators towards compliance. A second, related conclusion 
is that the social context influences the effect of social responsiveness on 
compliance. In contrast with existing studies claiming that higher social 
responsiveness leads to better compliance, Lake Dianchi demonstrates that 
in contexts in which the social context supports norm violation, higher social 
responsiveness leads to more non-compliance.  
How Complexity Challenges Lawmaking and Law Enforcement 
This study of Lake Dianchi has confirmed that successful lawmaking and law 
enforcement requires finding a balance between the goals of the law and law 
enforcement on the one hand, and the local interests and circumstances of 
the regulated actors and their economic and social contexts on the other.  
 As we saw, this idea is based in the Western literature. Our analysis 
of studies on the quality of legislation in terms of its effects on voluntary 
compliance, enforcement and goal attainment brought forward four variables 
that should be balanced: adequacy, certainty, feasibility and adaptability.69 In 
addition, the analysis of enforcement strategies found that there is now wide 
                                                     
67 A notable exception is the Beijing located Center for Legal Assistance to  Pollution Victims, 
which has helped farmers initiate cases against companies. However this NGO has not yet 
successfully initiated public litigation cases and has not been active in the area of research. Ho, 
"Greening without conflict? Environmentalism, NGOs and Civil Society in China." 
68 Compare with Oposa, A Socio-Cultural Approach to Environmental Law Compliance: A Philippine 
Scenario ([cited).315 
69 See Chapter 2 
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agreement in the literature that a balance must be found between the 
formalistic and stringent approaches of deterrence, and the informal, less 
stringent approaches of compliance strategies, which accommodate for the 
specific local interests.70 Studies about non-Western law enforcement have 
advocated both deterrence and cooperative styles, while as yet none of them 
has advised to search for the balance as proposed in Western studies.71 
 While in theory, there is thus some agreement about what is good 
regulation, the case of Lake Dianchi at least shows that attaining the 
proposed balance between different elements was difficult. For lawmaking, 
we saw that China’s national legislation was originally quite feasible and 
flexible because of its weak and vague norms, but deficient in terms of 
adequacy and certainty and as such not able to attain its goals. After 
amendments some of the law’s norms became stricter and more specific and 
thus more adequate and certain, however such norms lost their feasibility 
and adaptability which in the end led to a limited amount of voluntary 
compliance, little effective enforcement and a disappointing goal attainment. 
Similarly, we saw that regular enforcement was based on cooperation, wide 
agent discretion and a limited use of sanctions, which sustained many 
violations. Campaign-type enforcement, which was organized in reaction to 
weak regular enforcement, was adversarial, formalistic, with limited 
discretion and involving strict sanctions. In the end, such enforcement was, 
however, also not successful as it also lacked feasibility and adaptability. For 
both lawmaking and law enforcement we thus see that China’s lawmaker has 
moved from one extreme form, where lawmaking and law enforcement 
followed the local interests of the regulated actor while disregarding its own 
long-term environmental goals, to the opposite, where the law’s and law 
enforcement’s goals were central, but there was no adaptation to the interests 
of the regulated actor. Why has it been so difficult to find a proper balance? 
 A first reason is that it is difficult to know what the right balance is, 
as this would require understanding of how far the law and its enforcement 
can go without becoming unfeasible or unreasonable for regulated actors. 
This requires sound empirical knowledge and understanding the regulated 
actor and its responses to lawmaking and law enforcement. For lawmaking, 
Seidman and Seidman have argued that good lawmaking should involve 
knowledge about the behavior of the regulated actor, if it wants to make 
rules that can successfully influence such behavior.72 Similarly, Kagan and 
Scholz have argued that successful enforcement needs to be adapted to the 
                                                     
70 See Chapter 12 
71 See Chapter 12 
72 Seidman and Seidman, "Using Reason and Experience to Draft Country-Specific Laws." 
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reasons why the norm addressees comply or violate the law.73 Tamanaha has 
warned, however, that finding out about such behavior is not easy, especially 
not for lawmakers in developing countries74, and perhaps we should add here 
even law enforcers. 
 Our study of compliance and violation demonstrated that even 
around one lake the same rules led to different outcomes depending on a 
complex set of interacting variables both internal to the regulated actor as 
well as external. The complexity of even one lake pales compared to the 
complexity of a large country as China with a unitary legal system. National 
legislators and law enforcement strategists face the daunting and perhaps 
impossible task of understanding how the multitude of various regulated 
actors in different geographical, economic and cultural settings will respond 
to their rules and enforcement actions. The complexity of compliance and 
violation behavior therefore severely challenges the possibility of designing 
balanced laws and enforcement schemes, especially in a developing legal 
system. 
However, the difficulty of finding a balance between the goals of the 
law and the interests of the regulated actor in various contexts is more 
fundamental than just the complexity of understanding the regulated actor. 
First, even if we would be able to understand the interests of regulated actors, 
the complexity of this information would pose a significant challenge for 
successful lawmaking and enforcement. For lawmaking, the problem is that 
if legislation is truly to be flexible to fit such a complexity of different 
interests in society, even if it was possible to know such interests, it would 
have to become abstract to the point of losing meaning. Only through 
abstraction can legislation leave sufficient room for interpretation in order to 
fit a range of different circumstances and interests. If the law is too abstract 
it loses its control over its outcomes. Abstract law is not able to guarantee 
that the implementation result is in line with the original goals of the law. 
Here lawmaking gets caught in a fundamental dilemma; either it is specific 
and certain, but cannot be adapted to the interests of the regulated actor and 
thus lacks adaptability and as a result feasibility, and thus fails to incur 
compliance; or it is abstract and thus flexible and feasible, but is not certain 
and therefore lacks in adequacy and fails to attain its own goals, even if fully 
complied with. For enforcement, the same applies. If the interests of the 
regulated actors are complex, it is not possible to design a singular 
enforcement strategy that would be successful at influencing compliance for 
all the different types of situations. In other words, faced with complexity, 
enforcement needs a certain amount of discretion, and it needs to be 
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informal. 75  Law enforcement is thus caught in the same dilemma as 
lawmaking. It either leaves sufficient discretion to agents to enforce the law 
in such a manner that it takes the reason for violation into account, but there 
is no guarantee that the enforcement agent will actually strive towards 
compliance. Alternatively, law enforcement is formal with limited discretion 
and a seeming control over outcomes, but without sustained compliance 
because the enforcement action does not fit the interests at hand or the 
reasons for violation. For social problems involving complex conflicts of 
interests balance between the two is thus not easily achieved. 
The second fundamental dilemma concerns the complexity related 
to situations as those at Lake Dianchi where the goals of the law and the 
interests of the regulated actors are conflicting. In this situation, legislation 
and enforcement that accommodate such local interests will have a higher 
chance of not accomplishing the laws’ goals. Vice versa, in a situation where 
the laws’ goals and the local interests are strongly conflicting, lawmaking and 
enforcement that is goal oriented and fixed on achieving the goals of the law 
have a higher chance of being unfeasible locally and not lead to compliance.  
The actual presence of both dilemmas explains why finding a proper 
balance is so hard.  When the goals of the law are strongly opposed to local 
interests, a lack in legal adaptability and enforcement discretion, which will 
more easily occur in a context of a wide variety of local interests and 
contexts, immediately leads to a more unfeasible and unreasonable outcome, 
which adversely affects compliance. Conversely, too much adaptability and 
discretion, which a context of complexity demands, will in this type of 
situation easier lead to compliance and enforcement that does not help attain 
the goals of the law.  
A first conclusion is that complexity challenges successful 
lawmaking and enforcement, which needs to balance the goals of the law 
with the interests of the regulated actor. A second conclusion is that such 
complexity is paramount in large countries such as China. A third conclusion 
is that in such a context of complexity, and often lacking empirical 
knowledge, it is difficult to understand the interests of the regulated actor, 
necessary to find the balance needed for good lawmaking and enforcement. 
A fourth conclusion is that even if the interests of the regulated actors can be 
understood, it is difficult to translate them into successful legislation and 
enforcement strategies because of the dilemma that adaptation to all such 
interests leads to such a high level of abstraction and discretion that goal 
attainment becomes limited. A fifth conclusion is that when the goals of the 
laws are strongly opposed to the interests of the regulated actor and its 
economic and social contexts, even if the interests are well understood 
                                                     
75 This is in line with the cooperative or compliance theory of law enforcement, see Chapter 
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accommodation to such interests will easier lead to failure to attain the laws’ 
goals. A sixth conclusion is that a larger scope of application in the law and a 
larger degree of heterogeneity in society pose an extra challenge for finding 
such balance. A seventh conclusion is that legal systems that are largely top 
down, without for example case law as a source of law are extra challenged 
in offering certainty and adaptability. An eight conclusion is that complexity 
poses limits to legal certainty and the possibility to limit discretion of 
regulated actors or enforcement agents. A ninth conclusion is that the 
professionalization of bureaucracies and courts in Western countries and 
some non-Western countries 76  and their capacity to control enforcement 
without limiting discretion seems not to exist in contexts such as those at 
Lake Dianchi.  
How Politics Influence Ad Hoc Lawmaking and Enforcement  
From the mid-1990s onwards, China’s natural resource protection 
lawmaking and law enforcement suddenly changed several times, from a 
weak, vague, cooperative and non-stringent to strict, specific and stringent. 
These changes made that the law and its enforcement became more oriented 
towards separate goals and less on the full complexity of the regulated issue 
at hand. Changes seemed to result from shifts in what powerful leaders 
deemed important. In addition, changes occurred to some extent as a 
reaction to incidents, and in a manner widely publicized. Political leaders 
seemed to want to show their commitment to deal with incidents in a strong 
manner. The changes witnessed here thus had a political rationale.77 
A comparison taught us that also in many other countries, Western 
and non-Western, legislation and law enforcement suddenly changed because 
of a political reaction to incidents or shifts in power. Examples were 
mentioned in chapters 2, 5, 12 and 15. In these cases, the political rationale 
to show willingness to change prevailed instead of a rationale in which the 
full complexity of the issue at hand could be weighed.  
As an idea for further comparative research, we believe that these 
kinds of changes are a phenomenon, which we here choose to call “ad hoc 
law”. Ad hoc law indicates large changes in lawmaking and law enforcement, 
based on a political rationale as a reaction to incidents and/or shifts in power, 
often temporal in nature, especially for enforcement. Ad hoc law is oriented 
on limited political goals, and may often lead to extreme forms of lawmaking 
and enforcement, highly adequate, certain, or deterrent or oppositely, highly 
feasible, adaptable and cooperative. Following incidents and shifts in power, 
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77 For this term see Snellen, Boeiend geboeid (Captivated Captured) (Inaugural Lecture University of 
Tilburg). 
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one ad hoc change may follow another leading to regulatory conjunctures of 
different styles.  
A general insight is that research about regulatory law should look 
more at how regulatory change occurs and what influence a political 
rationale has for such changes. For this, much can be learned from studies 
about penal populism78 and symbolic politics79. 
Looking Ahead 
Meanwhile natural resource loss continues at Lake Dianchi. Our analysis 
above may seem to indicate that legislation and enforcement remain 
powerless to stop the ongoing construction on arable land and the pollution 
of air and water at places like Lake Dianchi. Is there hope for amelioration in 
the future? 
 We believe there is, especially for pollution. For pollution, if China’s 
economic growth continues and especially if the already expanding service 
sector grows more important and if the local economy diversifies, the local 
economic interests will change. First, there will be more non-polluting 
sources of income. This makes that more stringent action against heavily 
polluting enterprises will be more acceptable. Second, the diversified 
economy will also decrease the influence of dominant employers, especially if 
rather remote regions such as Kouxiang will be connected to Kunming 
through the planned highways. As a result more social pressure to clean-up 
similar to the NCFC case can be expected. Third, the ongoing 
professionalization, especially the recruitment of environmentalist 
enforcement agents will lead to more resistance to local protectionism within 
the enforcement bureaus. Fourth, this will be especially so when the then 
richer peri-urban dwellers around the lake, realize that their raised economic 
standard of living is affected by a polluted environment. Fifth, finally, 
increased enforcement and protest from local communities that thus result 
may in the end lead to a situation in which most comply with the law and the 
costs of compliance are no longer an exception but a rule also recognized by 
the markets that control the regulated firms. For land, unfortunately we 
cannot be as hopeful as it is expected that China’s urbanization and 
industrialization continue and the goals of the law remain opposed to the 
interests of most living in peri-urban areas, who will less and less depend on 
agriculture as a source of income. 
 Meanwhile, a number of steps could be taken to ameliorate current 
problems of land and pollution legislation and enforcement. First, a quality 
                                                     
78  J.V. Roberts et al., Penal Populism and Public Opinion, Lessons from Five Countries (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003). 
79 Stone, Policy Paradox, The Art of Political Decision Making. Edelman, "The Construction and 
Uses of Social Problems."  
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system for lawmaking should be introduced in which the implementability of 
a proposed law is extensively researched, incorporating empirical data about 
the expected behavior of the various regulated actors and about the costs of 
implementation. Second, case law should become a source of law, allowing 
for the bottom-up formation of norms, which can help to bridge certain 
contradictions between certainty and adaptability. Third, some of the most 
unfeasible and ill-adaptable norms should be reconsidered and changed.80 In 
addition, for pollution an integrated permit system should be introduced, as 
such a system seems better able to balance adequacy, feasibility, certainty and 
adaptability. Fourth, law enforcement should become more based on a 
mixed style using both cooperative and deterrent approaches. For this Ayres 
and Braithwaite’s enforcement pyramid is an important instrument.81 Fifth, 
condoning violations should be done explicitly. Sixth, law enforcement 
should continue to expand using public participation and public disclosure. 
Seventh, non-state environmental interest groups should be allowed more 
freedom to organize themselves. In addition, such groups should be given 
legal standing allowing them to initiate public interest litigation. Eighth, 
command and control regulation should be combined more with 
investments in alternative livelihoods. 
 It is hoped that these recommendations, combined with the insights 
drawn from the present study can enhance the law in developmental socio-
legal systems as can be found around Lake Dianchi.  
                                                     
80 These include LMA § 62.1, 62.3, WPPCL § 14.2, 22, 23, 29, 35, 27, APPCL § 13, 48, EIA 
Law § 31.1,  DPR § 17.1, 21.2, KMREP § 8, 11.  
81 Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation. See Chapter 12. 
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Samenvatting   




Het Dianchimeer ligt in het Zuidwesten van China, vlak onder Kunming, de 
hoofdstad van de provincie Yunnan. Sinds de jaren tachtig kon de bevolking 
rondom het meer profiteren van de welvaartsgroei die de lokale 
industrialisatie en urbanisatie met zich meebracht. De economische groei 
heeft echter ook negatieve gevolgen gehad, vooral voor de natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen in het gebied. Door de industrialisatie en urbanisatie is steeds 
meer landbouwgrond verloren gegaan aan bedrijfsterreinen, kantoorpanden 
en woningen. Daarnaast is het meer zelf, maar ook de belangrijkste rivieren 
en de lucht in de omgeving, aangetast door de vervuiling vanuit de vele 
kleine en grotere industrieën die zich daar hebben gevestigd.  
 Dit proefschrift gaat over de regulering van natuurlijke hulpbronnen 
in het Zuidwesten van China. Het bestudeert hoe China in reactie op een 
verlies van landbouwgrond en een sterke lucht- en watervervuiling, vanaf het 
midden van de jaren negentig nieuwe juridische maatregelen heeft genomen 
om de natuurlijke hulpbronnen te beschermen. De maatregelen bestonden 
enerzijds uit het amenderen en invoeren van nieuwe wetgeving, die deels 
striktere en specifiekere normen bevatte. Anderzijds richtten de Chinese 
beleidsmakers zich op het verbeteren van de handhaving door het 
organiseren van jaarlijkse handhavingscampagnes. Dit proefschrift bestudeert 
wat het effect van de aldus verbeterde wetgeving en handhaving is geweest 
op de naleving van recht ter bescherming van landbouwgrond en 
voorkoming en controle van vervuiling in het gebied rondom het Dianchi 
meer.  
Deel I: Wetgeving: Proces en Kwaliteit 
Deel I bestudeert hoe veranderingen in de wetgeving de 
implementeerbaarheid van de Chinese grond- en milieuwetgeving hebben 
beïnvloed. De vier hoofdstukken in dit deel (Hoofdstukken 2-5) bestuderen 
hoe een viertal wetten op het terrein van landbouwgrond en vervuiling in de 
tweede helft van de jaren negentig is veranderd. Ze bekijken hoe de debatten 
ten aanzien van de normen in deze wetten van invloed zijn geweest op de 
implementeerbaarheid van de wetgeving. Het analytisch raamwerk voor dit 
deel handelt over de manier waarop wetgeving tot stand komt en over de 
kwaliteit van wetgeving, met name voor wat betreft de kans dat wettelijke 
regels tot naleving, handhaving en doelverwezenlijking kunnen leiden 
(“implementeerbaarheid”). Wetgeving kenmerkt zich enerzijds door de mate 
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van participatie (van volledig pluralistisch tot elitair) en de mate van 
rationaliteit (van volledig rationeel, tot incrementeel, tot berustend op toeval). 
De mate en soort van participatie en rationaliteit beïnvloeden de inhoud van 
de wet en dus ook haar kwaliteit.  
 In deze studie wordt kwaliteit van wetgeving sterk instrumenteel 
benaderd vanuit het idee dat goede wetgeving tot naleving moet leiden, of in 
geval van overtreding in ieder geval tot goede handhaving die weer tot 
naleving leidt. Daarnaast moet deze naleving dusdanig zijn dat de doelen van 
de wet bewerkstelligd worden. Vanuit deze ideeën behandelt Hoofdstuk 2 
een viertal kenmerken van implementeerbare wetgeving. Ten eerste de 
adequaatheid, hetgeen inhoudt dat de normen in de wet strikt genoeg en 
omvattend genoeg moeten zijn om de formele doelen van deze wet te 
bereiken. Ten tweede de haalbaarheid, hetgeen inhoudt dat naleving en 
handhaving van de wetgeving mogelijk, betaalbaar en acceptabel moeten zijn 
voor de normadressaat en de handhaver. Ten derde de zekerheid, hetgeen 
inhoudt dat regels in de wet zo duidelijk mogelijk moeten zijn en duidelijk 
maken wat van de normadressaat en de handhaver verwacht wordt. Ten 
vierde, de aanpasbaarheid van regels, hetgeen inhoudt dat normen ruimte 
laten aan de normadressaat en de handhaver om ze aan te passen aan de 
specifieke omstandigheden waarin het te beïnvloeden gedrag plaatsvindt. 
Indien wetgeving zo veel mogelijk aan deze vier kenmerken voldoet is er een 
grotere kans op een goede naleving, handhaving en het bereiken van de 
formele doelen. 
 Hoofdstuk 3, maakt op basis van het bovenbeschreven raamwerk 
een analyse van de totstandkoming en de implementeerbaarheid van een 
herziening van China’s Wet op het Grondbeheer. Deze wet die dateerde uit 
1986, werd in 1998 ingrijpend veranderd. Een van de belangrijkste redenen 
voor de wetswijziging was het versterken van de regels ter bescherming van 
landbouwgrond. Halverwege de jaren negentig was het belang van de 
bescherming van deze grond hoog op de agenda van de Chinese regering 
komen te staan. Dit was mede het gevolg van buitenlandse berichtgeving en 
interne rapportage die stelden dat de landbouwgrond verminderde en dat dit 
de voedselvoorziening van China op langere termijn zou schaden. In reactie 
hierop werd een wetsontwerp gemaakt dat de originele wet voorzag van 
strikte bepalingen die de teloorgang van landbouwgrond moesten tegengaan. 
Hierbij was een aantal bepalingen opvallend. Een voorbeeld vormen de 
bepalingen ten aanzien van “basislandbouwgrond”, die op provinciaal niveau 
80% van de grondoppervlakte moest bedragen. Voor conversie hiervan was 
goedkeuring van de centrale regering vereist. Een ander voorbeeld zijn de 
bepalingen ten aanzien van het verbod op bouwen op collectieve 
landbouwgrond. In het wetsontwerp was het verboden om bouwprojecten 
uit te voeren op collectieve grond indien deze een niet-collectief oogmerk 
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had. Daarnaast verbood het wetsontwerp boerengezinnen om een tweede 
huis te bouwen op collectieve grond.  
 Bij de behandeling  van het wetsontwerp konden bepaalde daartoe 
uitgenodigde belanghebbenden, met name lokale overheden en centrale 
ministeries, hun mening geven over de voorgenomen wijzigingen. Op een 
aantal punten, waaronder de zojuist genoemde bepalingen, gaven deze 
belanghebbenden aan dat deze voorgenomen normen niet lokaal uitvoerbaar 
zouden zijn omdat ze niet pasten bij de lokale context. Daar waar hun kritiek 
direct ging over normen voor de bescherming van landbouwgrond, en 
bijvoorbeeld niet over de compensatie voor het verlies van grond, verwierp 
de commissie voor juridische zaken van het Nationaal Volkscongres hun 
bezwaren. De reden daarvoor was dat het Comité een zo strikt en specifiek 
mogelijke wet wilde omdat deze het meest geschikt was om de 
landbouwgrond te beschermen, zo dacht men.  
 De geringe mate van daadwerkelijke participatie (een mening geven 
die niet serieus werd meegewogen) en de geringe mate van rationaliteit (de 
feiten die betrekking konden hebben op de uitvoering van de wetgeving 
werden niet volledig meegewogen) tastten de implementeerbaarheid van de 
wet aan. Hoewel de wet door haar striktere en specifiekere normen goed 
scoort wat betreft adequaatheid en zekerheid, is voor een aantal normen de 
haalbaarheid en aanpasbaarheid gering. Het wetgevingsproces voor de 
nieuwe wet op grondbeheer vertoont een sterk ad hoc karakter. Het is 
gericht op een specifiek belang, de bescherming van landbouwgrond. Het 
gevoel van urgentie, gekoppeld aan het idee dat strike en specifieke 
wetgeving beter is, maakte dat niet de overige aspecten van grondgebruik 
werden meegewogen, zelfs waar lokale onuitvoerbaarheid door 
belanghebbenden werd genoemd, maar er slechts oog was voor het 
beschermen van landbouwgrond. Helaas lijkt door de geringe mate van 
implementeerbaarheid juist die bescherming in het gedrang te komen nu de 
wet niet tot naleving of goede handhaving zal leiden door gebrek aan 
haalbaarheid en aanpasbaarheid. 
 Hoofdstuk 4 behandelt vervuilingswetgeving. Het beschrijft hoe de 
Chinese wetgevers twee wetten, de Wet op Preventie en Controle van 
Watervervuiling en de Wet op Preventie en Controle van Luchtvervuiling, in 
1996, respectievelijk 2000 hebben geamendeerd. En daarnaast hoe de nieuwe 
Wet op Milieueffectrapportage in 2002 werd ingevoerd. De discussies de 
voorbereiding van het wetsontwerp en de consultaties over het formele 
wetsontwerp bleken in een aantal opzichten anders dan de debatten over 
grondbeheer, en in andere opzichten hetzelfde. Voor milieuwetgeving 
hadden het Nationaal Bureau voor Milieubescherming en het de commissie 
voor milieubeheer van het Nationaal Volkscongres aanvankelijk een 
ambitieus eerste wetsvoorstel gemaakt. Hun ambitie kwam voort uit het feit 
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dat het milieu in China snel verslechterde zoals bleek uit een reeks incidenten. 
Bij deze wetten werden mogelijke belanghebbende tegenstanders, zoals 
lokale overheden en industriële ministeries, al vroeg, nog tijdens het 
voorbereiden van het ontwerp, betrokken. Door de sterke kritiek die er op 
een aantal van de voorgenomen bepalingen, met name het vergunningsstelsel 
in de lucht- en waterwetten, werd geleverd werden de uiteindelijke 
wetsvoorstellen aangepast. Voor een deel kenmerkte het wetgevingsproces 
zich dus door participatie van belanghebbenden, ook als deze tegen de 
voorgenomen wet waren.  
 Bepaalde ambitieuze milieunormen werden echter wel in het 
uiteindelijke wetsvoorstel opgenomen zoals de strikte regels ten aanzien van 
kleine vervuilende bedrijven en het strikte verbod op de lozing van bepaalde 
stoffen in de watervervuilingswet, het verbod op uitstoot boven de norm en 
de minimumsanctiebepalingen in de luchtvervuilingswet, en het grote 
werkingsgebied voor milieueffectrapportages en de strikte minimumsancties 
voor overtredingen in de millieueffectrapportagewet. Een aantal 
belanghebbenden uitte sterke kritiek op deze uiteindelijke wetsvoorstellen. 
De commissie voor juridische zaken schonk echter weinig aandacht aan deze 
bezwaren en voerde de wetsvoorstellen grotendeels ongewijzigd door. Bij de 
behandeling van het uiteindelijke wetsvoorstel, was er dus net als bij de 
wetgeving voor grondbeheer geen ruimte voor afwijkende meningen 
hierover en werden normen ingevoerd die mogelijkerwijze niet goed pasten 
bij lokale omstandigheden. Hierbij werd net als bij het debat over grond niet 
de overige aspecten van milieubescherming en lokale economische 
ontwikkeling in ogenschouw genomen.  
 De uiteindelijke milieuwetgeving is deels, doordat veel oude vage en 
niet strikte normen bleven bestaan, niet sterk implementeerbaar door gebrek 
aan zekerheid en adequaatheid. Aan de andere kant is de wetgeving minder 
implementeerbaar door dat sommige van de striktere nieuwe normen juist 
niet tot naleving en handhaving lijken te komen door een gebrek aan 
haalbaarheid en aanpasbaarheid aan de lokale context. 
 Hoofdstuk 5 komt met conclusies van Deel I. De 
totstandkomingsprocessen van de bovenbesproken wetten laten zien dat het 
wetgevingsproces in China langzaam verandert. Eerder kenmerkte Chinese 
wetgeving zich door abstracte en niet te strikte normen, die het resultaat 
waren van uitgebreide onderhandelingen tussen belanghebbende partij-
organen, overheden en ministeries en die aanpasbaar waren aan de lokale en 
sterk verschillende en veranderende omstandigheden. Met name bij de 
wetgeving voor grondbeheer maar deels ook bij de vervuilingswetgeving is 
dit veranderd. De wetgeving is minder het gevolg van onderhandeling en 
aanpassing aan de verschillende belangen en meer gebaseerd op het idee dat 
zekerdere en striktere wetgeving beter werkt. Helaas lijkt dit voor een aantal 
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normen te ver te zijn doorgeschoten en problematisch is. De grootte van 
China, gecombineerd met een geünificeerd rechtssysteem draagt ertoe bij dat 
de wetgever bovendien moeite heeft om tegenstrijdige en complexe belangen 
te verenigen in implementeerbare wetgeving. Hierbij speelt mee dat 
jurisprudentie geen bron van recht is en de vorming van normen van boven 
naar beneden verloopt. Daarnaast lijkt het wetgevingsproces beïnvloed te 
zijn geraakt door een tunnelvisie, waarin alleen het milieubelang voorop 
stond en waarbij geen ruimte was voor afweging van andere belangen, die 
noodzakelijk zou zijn geweest voor de uitvoering van de wetgeving in de 
praktijk.  
Deel II: Naleving en Overtreding 
Deel II van het boek bestudeert in hoeverre en waarom deze wetgeving bij 
het Dianchimeer tot naleving of tot overtreding heeft geleid. Dit deel is 
gebaseerd op een achttiental case studies, verzameld tijdens een jaar van 
veldwerk in Kunming. Hoofdstukken 7 tot en met 10 beschrijven deze cases, 
en doen dat op basis van een in Hoofdstuk 6 besproken analytisch raamwerk. 
Dit raamwerk is opgebouwd uit ideeën over waarom mensen, en met name 
organisaties, waar het in milieuzaken om gaat, zich aan regels houden. Het 
raamwerk omvat variabelen gerelateerd aan de normadressaat (interne 
variabelen) en aan diens context (externe variabelen). Studies van 
regelnalevend gedrag in Westerse en niet-Westerse landen noemen een aantal 
interne variabelen waaronder de manier waarop kosten en baten worden 
gewogen, de ethische normen van het management binnen de organisatie, de 
organisatiecultuur, de hoeveelheid middelen en de grootte van de organisatie. 
Daarnaast laten deze studies zien dat de externe context van de addressaat 
relevant is en met name de regulerende, de economische, de 
maatschappelijke en de politieke contexten. 
 Hoofdstukken 7 tot en met 10 beschrijven de achttien gevalsstudies 
van regelnalevend en regelovertredend gedrag dat plaats vond in een aantal 
dorpen en gebieden rondom het Dianchimeer. De analyse van deze gevallen, 
zoals samengevat in Hoofdstuk 11, laat zien dat de normen uit Beijing en de 
handhaving daarvan slechts in beperkte mate tot de beoogde verandering van 
gedrag hebben geleid rondom het meer.  
 Regelconform gedrag bestond voor een deel uit gevallen waar de 
normadressaat de regels niet kon of nooit had willen overtreden. Het gaat 
hier vooral om dorpen zoals Baocun waar boeren geen tweede huis bouwen 
simpelweg omdat er geen markt is voor huizen die ver van de weg en de stad 
liggen. Daarnaast gaat het om bedrijven die geen veroorzaken, of bedrijven 
die door een faillissement niet meer kunnen vervuilen, en dus niet als gevolg 
van de wetgeving of de handhaving daarvan.  
Samenvatting       443 
 
 
 Voor beide gevallen geldt dat de economische context ter plekke 
bepalend was voor normconformgedrag. De economische context was ook 
een belangrijke verklarende factor voor overtredingen, die voornamelijk daar 
plaatsvonden waar ze de mogelijkheid boden voor economische groei of 
noodzakelijk waren om lokale inkomsten te behouden. Dit is het duidelijkst 
bij de bouw van tweede huizen in Jiacun dorp, waar er een grote vraag naar 
was en voor de vervuiling door kunstmestbedrijven in Kouxiang township, 
die de motor van de economie daar vormen. Een groot deel van de 
bestudeerde overtredingen kon dan ook hieruit verklaard worden dat de 
regels uit Beijing indien volledig nageleefd lokaal tot onacceptabele 
economische gevolgen zouden leiden. Dit bevestigt de conclusies van deel I 
over de implementeerbaarheid.  
 Handhaving was zwak in de bestudeerde gevallen rond het Dianchi 
meer. Slechts in één geval had handhaving directe invloed op regelnaleving, 
het betrof hier een papierfabriek die tijdens een handhavingscampagne 
gedwongen werd te sluiten en te verhuizen naar een armer district ver weg 
van het meer. In geen van de bestudeerde gevallen van overtreding was er 
sprake geweest van handhavingsactie. Een zwakke handhaving lijkt dus een 
bijdrage te hebben geleverd aan de overtredingen die er bestonden, waarover 
meer in Deel III.   
 Een belangrijke reden dat sommige normadressaten zich ondanks 
zwakke handhaving toch conformeerden aan de wet of zelfs verder gingen 
dan de wet, was de druk vanuit de maatschappelijke context. Dit was in het 
bijzonder zichtbaar bij de compensatie, voor protesterende boeren die hun 
grond verloren voor de bouw van een tempel en een school in Jiacun dorp; 
die was hoger dan het wettelijk minimum. De maatschappelijke context was 
ook van grote invloed op normconform gedrag voor de NCFC 
kunstmestfabriek die deels door lokaal protest van boeren gedwongen werd 
tot milieu-investeringen. In beide gevallen kon de maatschappelijke context 
druk uitoefenen omdat deze niet afhankelijk was voor inkomsten uit de 
overtredende activiteit. Dit stond in tegenstelling tot de zwakke 
maatschappelijke druk in de dorpen Licun en Baocun, waar zonder deze 
druk en zonder deugdelijke handhaving normadressaaten ongestraft de wet 
konden overtreden. In een aantal gevallen was er weinig druk vanuit de 
lokale bevolking omdat juist die bevolking direct of indirect baat bij de 
overtreding had. De economische context had dus soms een afzwakkende 
werking op de maatschappelijke context.  
 De politieke context was indirect van belang. Lokale 
democratisering bracht in die dorpen waar de bevolking onafhankelijk was 
van hun leiders een extra pressiemiddel tegen onwenselijke praktijken van 
lokale bestuurders, met name waar het compensatie voor verlies van 
landbouwgrond betrof. In dorpen zoals Licun en Baocun waar de inkomsten 
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voornamelijk lokaal zijn en de dorpsleiders veel macht hebben, brachten 
verkiezingen weinig extra druk op de verkozen dorpsleiders. Daarnaast was 
de gehele politieke context van invloed doordat in China maatschappelijke 
organisaties sterk beperkt worden en er daarom in tegenstelling tot sommige 
andere landen niet een sterke milieubeweging is ontstaan die zich tegen 
lokale milieumisstanden verzet, ook al is er geen verzet van de lokale 
bevolking.  
 Regelnalevend en overtredend gedrag was tenslotte het gevolg van 
een reeks interne variabelen waaronder het feit dat sommige bedrijven veel 
gepensioneerden hadden, bedrijven niet de middelen hadden om zich aan de 
wet te houden, en sommige normadressaten een hoge mate van sociale 
responsiviteit hadden. 
Deel III: Handhaving en Campagnes 
Deel III gaat over de vraag hoe de staat overtredingen opspoort en ze 
bestraft.  Het deel beschrijft waarom de reguliere handhaving zo zwak was 
en wat de invloed van handhavingscampagnes daarop is geweest. De 
uitgebreide literatuur over dit onderwerp, besproken in Hoofdstuk 12, richt 
zich met name op de vraag of juist afschrikkende, strikt formele, sterk 
bestraffende handhaving met een zo groot mogelijke pakkans en strafmaat 
werkt, dan wel de onderhandelende handhaving waarbij de handhaver de 
overtreder door samenwerking probeert tot naleving te bewegen. In recente 
literatuur lijkt er overeenstemming te bestaan dat een combinatie van beide 
benaderingen het meest effectief is. In de praktijk hangt het soort 
handhaving en ook of deze wel of niet effectief is van een aantal variabelen 
af. Ten eerste de organisatie van het handhavingsbureau en daarbij vooral de 
doelstellingen, middelen, interne organisatie en het leiderschap. Ook de 
manier waarop de individuele ambtenaar om gaat met de altijd aanwezige 
discretionaire bevoegdheid bepaalt de handhavingsaanpak en de effectiviteit. 
Naast het bureau en de ambtenaar wordt de handhaving ook bepaald door 
de soort normovertreder en de soort overtreding. Tenslotte, en daar ligt in 
dit boek meer de nadruk op dan in andere studies, wordt handhaving in de 
praktijk sterk beïnvloed door de externe politieke en maatschappelijke 
context waarin het bureau zich bevindt. Politici en belangengroeperingen 
hebben een sterke invloed op de handhavingsorganisatie. Een reeks van 
incidentele factoren, zoals rampen, schandalen, verkiezingen en economische 
mogelijkheden of juist crises, kunnen er voor zorgen dat de politieke of 
maatschappelijke context een verandering in de handhavingsorganisatie 
bewerkstelligt.  
 Hoofdstuk 13 bestudeert de reguliere handhaving door drie bureaus: 
het milieubureau (op stads- en districtsniveau), het bureau voor grondbeheer 
(op stads-, districts- en townshipniveau) en het Dianchi Bestuursbureau. Het 
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hoofdstuk maakt eerst een bestuurskundige analyse van de 
handhavingsorganisatie. De lokaal gefinancierde handhavingsbureaus hebben 
te weinig middelen en overheidssteun om tot effectieve handhaving over te 
gaan. De middelen en steun ontbreken omdat de bureaus lokaal gefinancierd 
worden en de geldende wetgeving deels strijdig is met lokale economische en 
sociale belangen. Het gebrek aan middelen heeft in de milieusector geleid tot 
goal displacement, namelijk dat de milieubureaus meer bezig zijn met inkomsten 
generen dan met vervuiling tegen gaan. Het gebrek aan middelen zorgt er 
ook voor dat de handhavingsbureaus te weinig personeel hebben en ook 
moeite hebben het juiste personeel aan te trekken. Handhavingswerk wordt 
extra moeilijk door slappe interne mechanismen voor controle op 
handhavingsagenten, waardoor deze een grote discretionaire bevoegdheid 
hebben. Hierbij bleken met name de vanuit Beijing georganiseerde salariëring, 
de evaluatiesystemen en de moeilijkheid om het werk van de 
handhavingsagenten tijdens inspecties te overzien problematisch.  
 Vervolgens wordt de handhavingsprocedure in de praktijk bekeken. 
Hierbij blijkt dat het detecteren van overtredingen bijzonder lastig is. Ten 
eerste door het gebrek aan middelen, en ten tweede doordat de industrie, 
vooral dus bij milieurechtshandhaving, slecht meewerkt. De beslissing over 
sancties, zo blijkt, wordt met grote discretionaire bevoegdheid door de 
ambtenaar ter plekke, voor kleine sancties, of door het bureauhoofd, voor 
grote sancties, genomen. Bureaus voor grondbeheer leggen zelden sancties 
op, terwijl milieubureaus ook terughoudend zijn. Alleen het Dianchi 
Bestuursbureau is streng. Zowel bij de opsporing als bij de bestraffing blijken 
de relatie met de overtreder en vooral de sociaal-economische gevolgen van 
de sanctie een belangrijke invloed te hebben. Bij dit alles speelt risicoaversie 
van de handhavingsambtenaar een grote rol. Interne en externe 
mechanismen ter verificatie en controle van de deugdelijkheid en 
rechtmatigheid van opgelegde sancties hebben een geringe invloed op 
handhavingswerk.  
 Uit de analyse in Hoofdstuk 13 blijkt dat de reguliere handhaving, 
dat is alle handhaving naast de in Hoofdstuk 14 te bespreken 
handhavingscampagnes, sterk onderhandelend is. De lokale sociaal-
economische context waarin de overtreding zich afspeelt vormt een obstakel 
voor strengere handhaving. In de bestaande studies van 
milieurechtshandhaving in China wordt dit “lokaal protectionisme” genoemd, 
wat een connotatie van afkeuring van dit soort praktijk inhoudt. Vanuit de 
bestaande analyse is de wetgeving uit Beijing goed maar werkt deze lokaal 
niet door de slappe handhaving omdat lokale overheden hun eigen belangen 
voorop stellen. De analyse in Hoofdstuk 13 probeert begrip te kweken voor 
de opstelling van handhavingsambtenaren. Het doet dit door te kijken naar 
de oorzaak van het protectionisme: de tegenstrijdige belangen tussen de wet 
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en de lokale maatschappelijke en economische context. Daar waar naleving 
van de wet van invloed is op de huidige economische ontwikkeling en waar 
bestaande en mogelijke inkomsten alleen maar mogelijk zijn in overtreding 
van de wet bestaat er weinig lokaal draagvlak voor de wet. De slappe 
reguliere handhaving heeft er dus in bepaalde gevallen, zeker niet in alle, 
voor gezorgd dat de toepassing van moeilijk haalbare en onacceptabele en 
niet flexibele bepalingen uit de nationale wet toch aan de lokale 
omstandigheden is aangepast door overtredingen te gedogen. Dit heeft 
echter wel gevolgen; indien dit zo door gaat zal uiteindelijk het milieu verder 
vervuilen en de landbouwgrond verder afnemen, met alle gevolgen van dien.  
 Hoofdstuk 14 analyseert hoe de Chinese machthebbers in Beijing 
geprobeerd hebben om de reguliere handhaving van recht ter bescherming 
van landbouwgrond en het milieu te versterken. Voor grond zijn er sinds 
1997 campagnes georganiseerd. Aanvankelijk dienden de campagnes om 
strengere normen ten aanzien van grondgebruik af te dwingen zelfs al 
stonden deze nog niet in de wet. De noodzaak die ontstond midden jaren 
negentig om de landbouwgrond te beschermen vormde de basis voor dit 
soort van acties. In de campagnes in 1997 en 1998 werd een bevriezing van 
alle bouwprojecten op landbouwgrond afgekondigd, dit in voorbereiding op 
de inwerkingtreding van de nieuwe Wet op het Grondbeheer op 1 januari 
1999. De aanvankelijke campagnes tot aan 2002 bleken echter niet in staat de 
oprukkende honger naar grond te stillen en in 2003 startte een nieuwe 
krachtigere campagne tegen illegale grondconversies. De campagne had de 
steun van de nationale politieke leiding in Beijing die na een onderzoek uit 
2002 geschokt was door de enorme hoeveelheid landbouwgrond die weer 
verloren was gegaan door illegaal gebruik.  
 De strikte nationale campagne in 2003 had weinig effect bij het 
Dianchimeer, waar ten tijde van het veldwerk in 2004 alle in Deel II 
beschreven illegale grondgebruiken ongestoord plaats konden vinden. Pas 
met de campagne in de zomer van 2004 kwam daar verandering in toen door 
sterke druk vanuit het centrum ook de overheden in Kunming gedwongen 
werden de illegale praktijken, vooral wat betreft het industriële gebruik van 
collectieve grond, te beëindigen en bestaande overtreders te dwingen 
kostbare legalisatie procedures te doorlopen. Door de druk leken lokale 
overheden gedwongen te worden om een illegale, maar lokaal zeer 
noodzakelijke en alom geaccepteerde, praktijk aan te pakken. Dit zou, zo 
stelden dorpelingen, indien daadwerkelijk tot de letter uitgevoerd, kunnen 
leiden tot vele faillissementen van kleine bedrijven die niet het geld hebben 
voor de dure legalisatieprocedures.  
 Voor milieuovertredingen zijn er sinds 1996 campagnes 
georganiseerd. De eerste campagne  richtte zich op kleine sterk vervuilende 
bedrijven, die verantwoordelijk waren voor een belangrijk, maar moeilijk te 
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reguleren deel van de vervuiling. De eerste campagnes ontstonden rond het 
negende vijfjarenplan dat reageerde op sterke vervuilingsincidenten waarvoor 
soms ook veel kleine bedrijven verantwoordelijk waren geweest zoals bij de 
Huai rivier in 1994. De eerste campagne zorgde ervoor dat binnen een aantal 
maanden 60.000 kleine fabrieken werden gesloten. Een tweede campagne die 
liep van 1996 tot en met 1 januari 2000 richtte zich op de grotere vervuilers 
die tot het einde van de campagne kregen zich te confirmeren aan de 
milieunormen en anders moesten sluiten. Beide campagnes leken succesvol, 
althans volgens officiële berichtgeving. De successen konden echter niet 
geconsolideerd worden omdat al snel bleek dat veel industrie die gesloten 
was weer de poorten opende, of industrie die zich aan de nomen hield deze 
later weer begon te overtreden. In reactie op berichten over dit soort 
overtredingen en om deze tegen te gaan, werden er vanaf 2001 jaarlijkse 
herhalingscampagnes met telkens weer nieuwe aandachtsgebieden en 
methodes georganiseerd. Geleidelijk werd daarbij meer gebruik gemaakt van 
publieke participatie, door bijvoorbeeld het instellen van klachtenlijnen en 
het belonen van succesvolle aangiften van overtredingen. In Kunming 
leidden de campagnes van 1996 tot en met 2003 slechts in één van de 
bestudeerde gevallen direct tot regelnaleving, zoals in Deel II behandeld. In 
twee andere gevallen, in het afgelegen Baocun en bij de Tanglang rivier, 
leidde pas de campagne van 2004 tot verandering na een lange tijd van 
overtredingen. Dit kwam omdat de Tanglang rivier na nationale media-
aandacht een lokaal speerpunt in de campagne werd. Door de extra 
inspecties tijdens de campagne konden eindelijk de overtredingen waarover 
de media berichtten worden bewezen en kon er druk worden uitgeoefend op 
de betrokken bedrijven om zich aan de wet te gaan houden. Hoewel dit 
aanvankelijk een succes leek, bleek dat een aantal van de betrokken bedrijven 
een paar maanden na de campagne weer gewoon illegaal konden lozen.  
 Hoofdstuk 14 laat meer in het algemeen zien dat tijdens deze 
campagnes, handhaving verandert van coöperatief naar afschrikkend. Op 
basis van een sterk formalistisch schema worden handhavingsagenten 
gedwongen doelstellingen voor inspecties en sancties te halen. De druk van 
de campagnes is op korte termijn van grote invloed maar kan er niet geheel 
voor zorgen dat de regelnaleving ook op lange termijn behouden blijft, dit 
omdat het onderliggende belangenconflict niet wordt opgelost, maar eerder 
wordt vergroot.  
 Hoofdstuk 15 komt met de conclusies van Deel III over handhaving 
en campagnes. Een eerste analyse is dat vanuit het directe regelnalevend 
gedrag gezien de handhaving en de campagnes niet effectief zijn geweest. 
Deel III heeft laten zien dat handhaving zwak was doordat de lokaal 
georganiseerde handhaving richtte zich te veel naar de lokale belangen die op 
gespannen voet stonden met de wet, terwijl de campagne juist geen rekening 
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hield met deze lokale belangen en daardoor zodra de druk achter deze 
campagne over was invloed verloor en overtredingen terugkwamen. Door de 
afwisseling van extreme benaderingen van handhaving werd het door de 
literatuur gepropageerde gemengde model van samenwerking waar mogelijk 
en straf waar nodig niet bereikt. Tevens vormt de inconsistentie van de 
campagnes een probleem voor het bereiken van een algemeen afschrikkend 
effect en meer in het algemeen de opbouw van een rechtsstaat.  
 Er is ook een tweede, positievere analyse mogelijk die uit een minder 
nauw instrumenteel kader komt dan in dit boek voor het merendeel gebruikt. 
Reguliere handhaving leidde tot een aangepaste toepassing van niet passende 
wetgeving. Campagnehandhaving zorgde ervoor dat eens in de zo veel tijd de 
excessen die door de reguliere handhaving waren ontstaan werden aangepakt. 
Campagnehandhaving zorgde voor een tijdelijke verandering, overigens met 
maar beperkte waarneembare resultaten op langere termijn. Doordat de 
campagnes sterk gericht waren op het verhogen van rechtsbewustzijn en 
participatie door de lokale bevolking is het echter niet uitgesloten dat ze de 
teloorgang van China’s natuurlijke hulpbronnen ook op langere termijn 
gunstig kunnen beïnvloeden.  
Conclusie 
De studie laat zien dat veranderingen in wetgeving en handhaving, in de 
bestudeerde gevallen, maar in geringe mate tot de gewenste 
gedragsverandering, een beter gebruik van de natuurlijke hulpbronnen, bij 
het Dianchimeer hebben geleid. De reden hiervoor is allereerst dat de 
wetgeving te weinig paste bij de lokale economische context van het meer, 
waar huisvesting en industriële bouw op landbouwgrond en vervuilende 
industrie een belangrijke inkomstenbron vormden. Doordat de wetgeving te 
ver afstaat van de lokale economische omstandigheden, is de druk vanuit de 
maatschappelijke context en de handhavingsinstanties op de normadressaat 
ook gering en kan overtreding met geringe kosten plaatsvinden. 
Handhavingscampagnes hebben dit wel tijdelijk kunnen verhelpen en tot 
eerste gedragsveranderingen kunnen leiden, maar omdat ze slechts een 
tijdelijk karakter hadden en ze niet de achterliggende oorzaken, de 
conflicterende belangen konden aanpakken, bleven de resultaten beperkt. 
 Een eerste conclusie is dat de regulering van landbouwgrond en 
vervuiling bij het Dianchimeer problematisch is doordat wetgeving en 
handhaving geen balans hebben weten te bewerkstelligen tussen de formele 
doelen van de wetgever en de lokale belangen ter plekke. Een tweede 
conclusie is dat regelnalevend en overtredend gedrag in hoge mate bleek te 
worden bepaald door convergerende invloeden van de economische, 
maatschappelijke, regulerende en politieke contexten, samen met variabelen 
die te maken hadden met de soort normadressaat in kwestie. 
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 Een vergelijking tussen de bevindingen van deze lokale studie in 
Zuidwest China met studies uit andere landen levert een aantal inzichten op. 
Ten eerste laat het zien dat er parallellen en verschillen zijn in debatten over 
regulatory law zoals die elders plaatsvinden en in China. De parallellen bestaan 
uit de roep om slecht functionerende instituties door striktere regels en 
minder discretionaire bevoegdheden te binden aan de wet. Hier lijkt China 
op Westerse landen in de jaren zeventig en veel niet-Westerse landen tot de 
dag van vandaag. Waar in China echter weinig aandacht voor is en elders 
soms wel is de pasbaarheid en de redelijkheid van de wetgeving en de 
handhaving.  
 Een tweede punt van vergelijking is de invloed van de verschillende 
contexten op regelnalevend gedrag. Zowel over het Dianchimeer alsook over 
andere gevallen buiten China is betoogd dat een samengaan van externe 
factoren (economisch, regulerend, politiek en maatschappelijk) de 
normadressaat, afhankelijk van diens interne variabelen, kan beïnvloeden 
zich aan de wet te gaan houden of juist deze wet te overtreden. Verschil zit 
er in hoe dit werkt. Waar bij het Dianchimeer de economische context de 
andere externe contexten zo beïnvloedde dat overtreding en slechte 
handhaving volgde, was in sommige andere studies juist de regulerende of de 
maatschappelijke context dominant met naleving als gevolg. Wat Dianchi 
anders maakt is dat de tegenstelling tussen de normen uit de wet en de lokale 
economische context groter is en dat de maatschappelijke context 
afhankelijker is van overtredend gedrag.  
 Een derde punt van vergelijking betreft deze tegenstelling. De 
tegenstelling bij het Dianchimeer tussen lokale economische belangen en 
bescherming van natuurlijke hulpbronnen is dusdanig dat hij niet makkelijk 
door wetgeving en handhaving te overbruggen is. Voor een dergelijke situatie 
is het lastig om wetgeving te maken die zowel een bepaald nationaal belang 
beschermt zoals landbouwgrond of milieu, maar die ook lokaal zo passend is 
dat de implementatie gaat lukken. Het dilemma luidt aldus: hetzij de 
wetgeving is goed op papier en zou bij volledige naleving en handhaving tot 
het gewenste doel leiden, maar haalt dat niet in de praktijk doordat de 
wetgeving geen legitimiteit heeft, hetzij de wetgeving is lokaal legitiem maar 
leidt daardoor niet meer tot het gewenste resultaat op macroniveau.  
 Een laatste punt dat opvalt in de vergelijking met andere landen is 
dat zowel in China zoals bij het Dianchi meer, alsook elders de processen 
van wetgeving en handhaving soms last hebben van tunnelvisie en een “ad 
hoc” karakter. Dit houdt in dat wetgeving en handhaving zich sterk op één 
bepaald belang richten, zonder de complexiteit van de belangen als geheel in 
ogenschouw te willen nemen. Een dergelijke nauwe en versimpelde 
benadering treed eerder op wanneer wetgeving en handhaving een reactie 
zijn op tijdelijke gebeurtenissen, zoals rampen, schandalen, 
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machtsverschuivingen of verkiezingen. Ad hoc wetgeving en handhaving kan 
een verandering van een bestaande situatie forceren. Tegelijkertijd is zulk ad 
hoc recht ook risicovol. Allereerst omdat de versimpelde aanpak moeilijker 
tot een daadwerkelijke oplossing van een maatschappelijk probleem zal 
leiden. Daarnaast dreigt het gevaar dat als recht verwordt tot een serie 
reacties op incidenten, de consistentie, de zekerheid en daarmee het 
vertrouwen in recht en de rechtstaat als geheel vermindert.  
 Deze studie biedt aldus een inzicht in de moeilijkheden waarmee 
China geconfronteerd wordt bij het maken van deugdelijke wetten en het 
organiseren van de handhaving daarvan. Vergelijking met andere landen en 
een blik op de toekomst biedt echter ook een perspectief op hoop. 
Specifieke verbeteringen zijn voornamelijk mogelijk op het terrein van de 
bestaande wetgeving waar een aantal niet-implementeerbare normen 
veranderd dient te worden. Daarnaast zijn bepaalde grotere veranderingen 
gewenst die evenwel moeilijker te bewerkstelligen zijn. Het gaat dan 
bijvoorbeeld om het instellen van een wetgevingskwaliteitssysteem, het 
erkennen van jurisprudentie als bron van recht, het verbreden van de 
mogelijkheden om lokale belangen nationaal en regionaal te organiseren, en 
het financieren van alternatieven bronnen van inkomsten in regio’s waar de 
afhankelijkheid van illegale inkomsten groot is. De inzichten van deze studies 
kunnen een basis vormen voor deze en andere veranderingen. Empirische 
data over hoe wetgeving wordt gemaakt, hoe deze wordt nageleefd en 
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